capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic

Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.

Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 13661d34f842..9b8a6e79d858 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -695,6 +695,8 @@ out:
         return rc;
 }
 
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
 /*
  * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
  * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -713,7 +715,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
         const struct cred *old = current_cred();
         struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
 
-        if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+        if (!root_privileged())
                 return;
         /*
          * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
@@ -838,7 +840,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
                 if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
                     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
-                    issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+                    !root_privileged()) {
                         ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
                         if (ret < 0)
                                 return ret;