apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation

Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

12 files changed, 840 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Generated include files
 #
+net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 81a34426d024..dafdd387d42b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,11 +4,44 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+#    #define AF_LOCAL           1       /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX       */
+#    #define AF_INET            2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
+# to
+#    [1] = "local",
+#    [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define AF_INET            2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
+# to
+#    #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+        sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+         's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+        echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+        printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+        sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+         's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+         $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+#    SOCK_STREAM        = 1,
+# to
+#    [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+        sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+        -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+        echo "};" >> $@
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -61,6 +94,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
             tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
                             $(src)/Makefile
@@ -68,3 +102,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
                       $(src)/Makefile
         $(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+                     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+                     $(src)/Makefile
+        $(call cmd,make-af)
+        $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 7acea14c850b..125dad5c3fde 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2202,6 +2202,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
         AA_SFS_DIR("policy",                    aa_sfs_entry_policy),
         AA_SFS_DIR("domain",                    aa_sfs_entry_domain),
         AA_SFS_DIR("file",                      aa_sfs_entry_file),
+        AA_SFS_DIR("network",                   aa_sfs_entry_network),
         AA_SFS_DIR("mount",                     aa_sfs_entry_mount),
         AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces",                aa_sfs_entry_ns),
         AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability",           VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 3382518b87fa..db80221891c6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
@@ -566,6 +567,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
         return error;
 }
 
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+                            struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+                            u32 request, u32 denied)
+{
+        struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+        int error;
+
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+
+        /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+        if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+                return 0;
+
+        /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
+        error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+        if (denied) {
+                /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
+                /* check every profile in file label to is cached */
+                last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+        }
+        if (!error)
+                update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
  * @op: operation being checked
@@ -610,6 +637,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
                 error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
                                          denied);
 
+        else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+                error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
+                                         denied);
 done:
         rcu_read_unlock();
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 620e81169659..ff4316e1068d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -121,21 +121,29 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
                 /* these entries require a custom callback fn */
                 struct {
                         struct aa_label *peer;
-                        struct {
-                                const char *target;
-                                kuid_t ouid;
-                        } fs;
+                        union {
+                                struct {
+                                        kuid_t ouid;
+                                        const char *target;
+                                } fs;
+                                struct {
+                                        int type, protocol;
+                                        struct sock *peer_sk;
+                                        void *addr;
+                                        int addrlen;
+                                } net;
+                                int signal;
+                                struct {
+                                        int rlim;
+                                        unsigned long max;
+                                } rlim;
+                        };
                 };
                 struct {
                         struct aa_profile *profile;
                         const char *ns;
                         long pos;
                 } iface;
-                int signal;
-                struct {
-                        int rlim;
-                        unsigned long max;
-                } rlim;
                 struct {
                         const char *src_name;
                         const char *type;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..140c8efcf364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND             AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE          AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN         AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT          AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT           0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND             0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN           0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT           0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT           0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+                        AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN |   \
+                        AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+                        AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+                      AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+                      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD |  \
+                      AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK |       \
+                      AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT |  \
+                       AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+        struct aa_label *label;
+        struct aa_label *peer;
+        struct path path;
+};
+
+#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)                           \
+        struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),             \
+                                                  .family = (F)};         \
+        DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,                                           \
+                          ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+                                                     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+                          OP);                                            \
+        NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);                                     \
+        aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);                                       \
+        aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)                                   \
+        DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,  \
+                         (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allow: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+        u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+        u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+        u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+                       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+               int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+                                        struct common_audit_data *sa,
+                                        u32 request,
+                                        struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+                                  sk->sk_type);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+                      struct socket *sock);
+
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+        /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index 2b27bb79aec4..af04d5a7d73d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -135,9 +135,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
 
 
 void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+                         u32 mask);
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-                        u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
+                        u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
 void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
                              struct aa_perms *perms);
 void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 17fe41a9cac3..4364088a0b9e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "lib.h"
 #include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "perms.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
@@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct aa_data {
  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
  *
  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
@@ -148,6 +150,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
         struct aa_policydb policy;
         struct aa_file_rules file;
         struct aa_caps caps;
+        struct aa_net net;
         struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
         struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
@@ -220,6 +223,16 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
         return 0;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
+                                               u16 AF) {
+        unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+        u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
+
+        if (!state)
+                return 0;
+        return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
  * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 08ca26bcca77..8818621b5d95 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
         *str = '\0';
 }
 
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+                         u32 mask)
 {
         const char *fmt = "%s";
         unsigned int i, perm = 1;
@@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
 }
 
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-                        u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
+                        u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
 {
         char str[33];
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4ad0b3a45142..cc5ab23a2d84 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
@@ -736,6 +737,368 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
         return error;
 }
 
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
+ */
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
+{
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+
+        ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
+        if (!ctx)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+        SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
+        aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+        aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+        path_put(&ctx->path);
+        kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+                                       struct sock *newsk)
+{
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+
+        new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
+        new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+        new->path = ctx->path;
+        path_get(&new->path);
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+                               int protocol)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!label);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
+                          protocol);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+        struct aa_label *label;
+        int error = 0;
+
+        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+        if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
+                error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
+        end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * -   kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
+ *     move to a special kernel label
+ * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ *     sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+        struct aa_label *label;
+
+        if (kern) {
+                struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+
+                label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
+                aa_put_ns(ns);
+        } else
+                label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+        if (sock->sk) {
+                struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+
+                aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+                ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
+        }
+        aa_put_label(label);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+                                struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(!address);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+                                   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(!address);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
+ *
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ *       has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(!newsock);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+                            struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(!msg);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+                                   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+        return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+                                   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+        return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+        return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+        return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
+static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+                            int level, int optname)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+                                      int optname)
+{
+        return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+                                level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+                                      int optname)
+{
+        return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+                                level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+        return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
+ *
+ * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+        if (ctx->peer)
+                return ctx->peer;
+
+        return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+                                             char __user *optval,
+                                             int __user *optlen,
+                                             unsigned int len)
+{
+        char *name;
+        int slen, error = 0;
+        struct aa_label *label;
+        struct aa_label *peer;
+
+        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+        peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
+        if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
+                error = PTR_ERR(peer);
+                goto done;
+        }
+        slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+                                 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+                                 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+        /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+        if (slen < 0) {
+                error = -ENOMEM;
+        } else {
+                if (slen > len) {
+                        error = -ERANGE;
+                } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
+                        error = -EFAULT;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+                if (put_user(slen, optlen))
+                        error = -EFAULT;
+out:
+                kfree(name);
+
+        }
+
+done:
+        end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+                                            struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+        /* TODO: requires secid support */
+        return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ *       socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+        struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+        if (!ctx->label)
+                ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -770,6 +1133,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+                      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+                      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..33d54435f8d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+        AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",   AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+        { }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+        "unknown",
+        "send",
+        "receive",
+        "unknown",
+
+        "create",
+        "shutdown",
+        "connect",
+        "unknown",
+
+        "setattr",
+        "getattr",
+        "setcred",
+        "getcred",
+
+        "chmod",
+        "chown",
+        "chgrp",
+        "lock",
+
+        "mmap",
+        "mprot",
+        "unknown",
+        "unknown",
+
+        "accept",
+        "bind",
+        "listen",
+        "unknown",
+
+        "setopt",
+        "getopt",
+        "unknown",
+        "unknown",
+
+        "unknown",
+        "unknown",
+        "unknown",
+        "unknown",
+};
+
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+        struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+        audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+        if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+                audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+        else
+                audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+        if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
+                audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
+        else
+                audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
+
+        if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+                audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+                aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
+                                   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+                if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+                        audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+                        aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
+                                           net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+                }
+        }
+        if (aad(sa)->peer) {
+                audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+                aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+                                FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+        }
+}
+
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+                       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
+{
+        struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+        AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+        AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+
+        if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+                return 0;
+
+        perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+                ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+        perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+                ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+        perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+                ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+        aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+        return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+               int type, int protocol)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+        return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+                        aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
+                                           type));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+                            struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+        AA_BUG(!label);
+        AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+        if (unconfined(label))
+                return 0;
+
+        return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+                        aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct aa_label *label;
+        int error;
+
+        AA_BUG(!sk);
+        AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+        /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+        label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+        error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+        end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+                      struct socket *sock)
+{
+        AA_BUG(!label);
+        AA_BUG(!sock);
+        AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+
+        return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 4ede87c30f8b..5a2aec358322 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -275,6 +275,19 @@ fail:
         return 0;
 }
 
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+        if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+                if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+                        return 0;
+                if (data)
+                        *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
+                e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 {
         if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -584,7 +597,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
         struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
         const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
         const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
-        size_t ns_len;
+        size_t size = 0, ns_len;
         struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
         char *key = NULL;
         struct aa_data *data;
@@ -717,6 +730,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
                 goto fail;
         }
 
+        size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+        if (size) {
+
+                for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+                        /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+                         * never request
+                         */
+                        if (i >= AF_MAX) {
+                                u16 tmp;
+
+                                if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+                                    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+                                    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+                                        goto fail;
+                                continue;
+                        }
+                        if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+                                goto fail;
+                        if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+                                goto fail;
+                        if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+                                goto fail;
+                }
+                if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+                        goto fail;
+        }
+        if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) {
+                /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */
+                profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+                profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+        }
+
         if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
                 /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
                 info = "failed to unpack policydb";