Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
  callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
  CRNG is initialized.

  Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
  initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
  per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
  warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
  bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
  architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
  random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
  random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
  net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
  net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
  rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
  ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
  iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
  cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
  random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
  random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API

12 files changed, 168 insertions, 38 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 23cab7a8c1c1..afa3ce7d3e72 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@
 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE           512
 #define EXTRACT_SIZE            10
 
-#define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0
 
 #define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
 
@@ -437,6 +436,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
                                     __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
 /**********************************************************************
  *
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
                 _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
                                  sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
         else
-                get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+                _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
         for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
                 if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
                     !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
@@ -851,11 +851,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
         }
 }
 
-static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)
-{
-        wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
-}
-
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
                           __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
@@ -1477,22 +1472,44 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
         return ret;
 }
 
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+        _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
+                                      void **previous)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+        const bool print_once = false;
+#else
+        static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+#endif
+
+        if (print_once ||
+            crng_ready() ||
+            (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+                return;
+        WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+        print_once = true;
+#endif
+        pr_notice("random: %s called from %pF with crng_init=%d\n",
+                  func_name, caller, crng_init);
+}
+
 /*
  * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
  * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
  * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
  * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch().
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
         __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-#if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0
-        if (!crng_ready())
-                printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called "
-                       "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
-#endif
         trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
         while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
@@ -1509,9 +1526,35 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
                 crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
         memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 }
+
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+        static void *previous;
+
+        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+        _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 /*
+ * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+        if (likely(crng_ready()))
+                return 0;
+        return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+/*
  * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
  * pool is initialised.
  *
@@ -1865,6 +1908,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
                 unsigned int, flags)
 {
+        int ret;
+
         if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1877,9 +1922,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
         if (!crng_ready()) {
                 if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
                         return -EAGAIN;
-                crng_wait_ready();
-                if (signal_pending(current))
-                        return -ERESTARTSYS;
+                ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+                if (unlikely(ret))
+                        return ret;
         }
         return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
 }
@@ -2040,15 +2085,19 @@ static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
  * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the
- * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
+ * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
 {
         u64 ret;
-        bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
+        bool use_lock;
         unsigned long flags = 0;
         struct batched_entropy *batch;
+        static void *previous;
 
 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
         if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))
@@ -2059,6 +2108,9 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
             return ret;
 #endif
 
+        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+        use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
         batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
         if (use_lock)
                 read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
@@ -2078,13 +2130,17 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32);
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
 {
         u32 ret;
-        bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
+        bool use_lock;
         unsigned long flags = 0;
         struct batched_entropy *batch;
+        static void *previous;
 
         if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
                 return ret;
 
+        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+        use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
         batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
         if (use_lock)
                 read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index 903b667f8e01..f9bc8ec6fb6b 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -47,18 +47,21 @@ static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len)
         }
 }
 
-static void chap_gen_challenge(
+static int chap_gen_challenge(
         struct iscsi_conn *conn,
         int caller,
         char *c_str,
         unsigned int *c_len)
 {
+        int ret;
         unsigned char challenge_asciihex[CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1];
         struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
 
         memset(challenge_asciihex, 0, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1);
 
-        get_random_bytes(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+        ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+        if (unlikely(ret))
+                return ret;
         chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge,
                                 CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
         /*
@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ static void chap_gen_challenge(
 
         pr_debug("[%s] Sending CHAP_C=0x%s\n\n", (caller) ? "server" : "client",
                         challenge_asciihex);
+        return 0;
 }
 
 static int chap_check_algorithm(const char *a_str)
@@ -143,6 +147,7 @@ static struct iscsi_chap *chap_server_open(
         case CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN:
         default:
                 pr_err("Unsupported CHAP_A value\n");
+                kfree(conn->auth_protocol);
                 return NULL;
         }
 
@@ -156,7 +161,10 @@ static struct iscsi_chap *chap_server_open(
         /*
          * Generate Challenge.
          */
-        chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len);
+        if (chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len) < 0) {
+                kfree(conn->auth_protocol);
+                return NULL;
+        }
 
         return chap;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
index 92b96b51d506..e9bdc8b86e7d 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
@@ -245,22 +245,26 @@ int iscsi_check_for_session_reinstatement(struct iscsi_conn *conn)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static void iscsi_login_set_conn_values(
+static int iscsi_login_set_conn_values(
         struct iscsi_session *sess,
         struct iscsi_conn *conn,
         __be16 cid)
 {
+        int ret;
         conn->sess              = sess;
         conn->cid               = be16_to_cpu(cid);
         /*
          * Generate a random Status sequence number (statsn) for the new
          * iSCSI connection.
          */
-        get_random_bytes(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32));
+        ret = get_random_bytes_wait(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32));
+        if (unlikely(ret))
+                return ret;
 
         mutex_lock(&auth_id_lock);
         conn->auth_id           = iscsit_global->auth_id++;
         mutex_unlock(&auth_id_lock);
+        return 0;
 }
 
 __printf(2, 3) int iscsi_change_param_sprintf(
@@ -306,7 +310,11 @@ static int iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s1(
                 return -ENOMEM;
         }
 
-        iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
+        ret = iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
+        if (unlikely(ret)) {
+                kfree(sess);
+                return ret;
+        }
         sess->init_task_tag     = pdu->itt;
         memcpy(&sess->isid, pdu->isid, 6);
         sess->exp_cmd_sn        = be32_to_cpu(pdu->cmdsn);
@@ -497,8 +505,7 @@ static int iscsi_login_non_zero_tsih_s1(
 {
         struct iscsi_login_req *pdu = (struct iscsi_login_req *)buf;
 
-        iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid);
-        return 0;
+        return iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -554,9 +561,8 @@ static int iscsi_login_non_zero_tsih_s2(
                 atomic_set(&sess->session_continuation, 1);
         spin_unlock_bh(&sess->conn_lock);
 
-        iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid);
-
-        if (iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list,
+        if (iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid) < 0 ||
+            iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list,
                         conn->tpg->param_list, 0) < 0) {
                 iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_TARGET_ERR,
                                 ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_NO_RESOURCES);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
index 556f480c6936..180b3356ff86 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ init_cifs(void)
         spin_lock_init(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
         spin_lock_init(&GlobalMid_Lock);
 
-        get_random_bytes(&cifs_lock_secret, sizeof(cifs_lock_secret));
+        cifs_lock_secret = get_random_u32();
 
         if (cifs_max_pending < 2) {
                 cifs_max_pending = 2;
diff --git a/include/linux/net.h b/include/linux/net.h
index abcfa46a2bd9..dda2cc939a53 100644
--- a/include/linux/net.h
+++ b/include/linux/net.h
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ do {									\
 
 #define net_get_random_once(buf, nbytes)                        \
         get_random_once((buf), (nbytes))
+#define net_get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes)                   \
+        get_random_once_wait((buf), (nbytes))
 
 int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec,
                    size_t num, size_t len);
diff --git a/include/linux/once.h b/include/linux/once.h
index 285f12cb40e6..9c98aaa87cbc 100644
--- a/include/linux/once.h
+++ b/include/linux/once.h
@@ -53,5 +53,7 @@ void __do_once_done(bool *done, struct static_key *once_key,
 
 #define get_random_once(buf, nbytes)                                         \
         DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes, (buf), (nbytes))
+#define get_random_once_wait(buf, nbytes)                                    \
+        DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes_wait, (buf), (nbytes))                      \
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_ONCE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 1fa0dc880bd7..eafea6a09361 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
@@ -78,6 +79,31 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
         return val & CANARY_MASK;
 }
 
+/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
+ * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+        int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+        if (unlikely(ret))
+                return ret;
+        get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
+        static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+                int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
+                if (unlikely(ret)) \
+                        return ret; \
+                *out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+                return 0; \
+        }
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+#undef declare_get_random_var
+
 unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 
 u32 prandom_u32(void);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 789c6e9e5e01..98fe715522e8 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1223,6 +1223,34 @@ config STACKTRACE
           It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require
           stack trace generation.
 
+config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+        bool "Warn for all uses of unseeded randomness"
+        default n
+        help
+          Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of
+          cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible
+          to generate those numbers securely. This setting ensures that these
+          flaws don't go unnoticed, by enabling a message, should this ever
+          occur. This will allow people with obscure setups to know when things
+          are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing
+          it.
+
+          Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting
+          a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can
+          result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long
+          time.  This is really bad from a security perspective, and
+          so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
+          to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
+          However, since users can not do anything actionble to
+          address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
+          warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+
+          Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
+          unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for
+          those developers interersted in improving the security of
+          Linux kernels running on their architecture (or
+          subarchitecture).
+
 config DEBUG_KOBJECT
         bool "kobject debugging"
         depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
diff --git a/lib/rhashtable.c b/lib/rhashtable.c
index 42466c167257..707ca5d677c6 100644
--- a/lib/rhashtable.c
+++ b/lib/rhashtable.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static struct bucket_table *bucket_table_alloc(struct rhashtable *ht,
 
         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tbl->walkers);
 
-        get_random_bytes(&tbl->hash_rnd, sizeof(tbl->hash_rnd));
+        tbl->hash_rnd = get_random_u32();
 
         for (i = 0; i < nbuckets; i++)
                 INIT_RHT_NULLS_HEAD(tbl->buckets[i], ht, i);
diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
index 3d265c5cb6d0..5c036d2f401e 100644
--- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
+++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
@@ -599,7 +599,11 @@ struct ceph_client *ceph_create_client(struct ceph_options *opt, void *private)
 {
         struct ceph_client *client;
         struct ceph_entity_addr *myaddr = NULL;
-        int err = -ENOMEM;
+        int err;
+
+        err = wait_for_random_bytes();
+        if (err < 0)
+                return ERR_PTR(err);
 
         client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL);
         if (client == NULL)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index e31fc11a8000..d0713627deb6 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -347,8 +347,7 @@ out_entries:
 
 static void neigh_get_hash_rnd(u32 *x)
 {
-        get_random_bytes(x, sizeof(*x));
-        *x |= 1;
+        *x = get_random_u32() | 1;
 }
 
 static struct neigh_hash_table *neigh_hash_alloc(unsigned int shift)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index c816cd53f7fc..0383e66f59bc 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -2979,8 +2979,7 @@ static __net_init int rt_genid_init(struct net *net)
 {
         atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0);
         atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0);
-        get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid,
-                         sizeof(net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid));
+        atomic_set(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, get_random_int());
         return 0;
 }