diff options
author | Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> | 2017-01-05 12:15:01 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-01-19 14:18:03 -0500 |
commit | 3fbaff3adc763d999fa803bc1aeb5e49c48ce5c0 (patch) | |
tree | 11359187efd8dcd81499f4550a05381e17b47e92 | |
parent | 1a62a0f76556f39d6d67789bb981b28230aaa338 (diff) |
drivers: char: mem: Fix thinkos in kmem address checks
commit 488debb9971bc7d0edd6d8080ba78ca02a04f6c4 upstream.
When borrowing the pfn_valid() check from mmap_kmem(), somebody managed
to get physical and virtual addresses spectacularly muddled up, such
that we've ended up with checks for one being the other. Whilst this
does indeed prevent out-of-bounds accesses crashing, on most systems
it also prevents the more desirable use-case of working at all ever.
Check the *virtual* offset correctly for what it is. Furthermore, do
so in the right place - a read or write may span multiple pages, so a
single up-front check is insufficient. High memory accesses already
have a similar validity check just before the copy_to_user() call, so
just make the low memory path fully consistent with that.
Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Fixes: 148a1bc84398 ("drivers: char: mem: Check {read,write}_kmem() addresses")
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/mem.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index 5bb1985ec484..6d9cc2d39d22 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c | |||
@@ -381,9 +381,6 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf, | |||
381 | char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vread() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ | 381 | char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vread() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ |
382 | int err = 0; | 382 | int err = 0; |
383 | 383 | ||
384 | if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p))) | ||
385 | return -EIO; | ||
386 | |||
387 | read = 0; | 384 | read = 0; |
388 | if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { | 385 | if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { |
389 | low_count = count; | 386 | low_count = count; |
@@ -412,6 +409,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf, | |||
412 | * by the kernel or data corruption may occur | 409 | * by the kernel or data corruption may occur |
413 | */ | 410 | */ |
414 | kbuf = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p); | 411 | kbuf = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p); |
412 | if (!virt_addr_valid(kbuf)) | ||
413 | return -ENXIO; | ||
415 | 414 | ||
416 | if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, sz)) | 415 | if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, sz)) |
417 | return -EFAULT; | 416 | return -EFAULT; |
@@ -482,6 +481,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf, | |||
482 | * corruption may occur. | 481 | * corruption may occur. |
483 | */ | 482 | */ |
484 | ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p); | 483 | ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p); |
484 | if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr)) | ||
485 | return -ENXIO; | ||
485 | 486 | ||
486 | copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz); | 487 | copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz); |
487 | if (copied) { | 488 | if (copied) { |
@@ -512,9 +513,6 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, | |||
512 | char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ | 513 | char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ |
513 | int err = 0; | 514 | int err = 0; |
514 | 515 | ||
515 | if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p))) | ||
516 | return -EIO; | ||
517 | |||
518 | if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { | 516 | if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { |
519 | unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, | 517 | unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, |
520 | (unsigned long)high_memory - p); | 518 | (unsigned long)high_memory - p); |