KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instruction in guest

Virtualization of Intel SGX depends on Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
management that is not yet available in the kernel, i.e. KVM support
for exposing SGX to a guest cannot be added until basic support
for SGX is upstreamed, which is a WIP[1].

Until SGX is properly supported in KVM, ensure a guest sees expected
behavior for ENCLS, i.e. all ENCLS #UD.  Because SGX does not have a
true software enable bit, e.g. there is no CR4.SGXE bit, the ENCLS
instruction can be executed[1] by the guest if SGX is supported by the
system.  Intercept all ENCLS leafs (via the ENCLS- exiting control and
field) and unconditionally inject #UD.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg171333.html or
    https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/3/879

[2] A guest can execute ENCLS in the sense that ENCLS will not take
    an immediate #UD, but no ENCLS will ever succeed in a guest
    without explicit support from KVM (map EPC memory into the guest),
    unless KVM has a *very* egregious bug, e.g. accidentally mapped
    EPC memory into the guest SPTEs.  In other words this patch is
    needed only to prevent the guest from seeing inconsistent behavior,
    e.g. #GP (SGX not enabled in Feature Control MSR) or #PF (leaf
    operand(s) does not point at EPC memory) instead of #UD on ENCLS.
    Intercepting ENCLS is not required to prevent the guest from truly
    utilizing SGX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20180814163334.25724-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 31e90e83fdd6..c76ca8c4befa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -1684,6 +1684,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery(void)
                 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit(void)
+{
+        return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+                SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+}
+
 /*
  * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
  * Refer from
@@ -4551,7 +4557,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
                         SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
                         SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
                         SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
-                        SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
+                        SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
+                        SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
                 if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
                                         MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
                                         &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
@@ -6648,6 +6655,9 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
                 vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
                 vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
         }
+
+        if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+                vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
 }
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -9314,6 +9324,17 @@ fail:
         return 1;
 }
 
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+        /*
+         * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
+         * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
+         * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+         */
+        kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+        return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
  * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
@@ -9371,6 +9392,7 @@ static int (*const kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
         [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
         [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]                  = handle_vmfunc,
         [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]        = handle_preemption_timer,
+        [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]                   = handle_encls,
 };
 
 static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
@@ -9741,6 +9763,9 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
         case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC:
                 /* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
                 return false;
+        case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
+                /* SGX is never exposed to L1 */
+                return false;
         default:
                 return true;
         }
@@ -12101,6 +12126,9 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
                 if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
                         vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, -1ull);
 
+                if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+                        vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+
                 vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
         }