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authorAleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>2016-12-21 00:26:24 -0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2017-01-06 04:40:12 -0500
commitc1df5a63716b0f73e95b1b26d878691e6175ea34 (patch)
treeba3e76e47ceed4a97222f3e21c15149b92be8ed3 /fs
parent21245b8635e8636e9e01df06f33cf08f369322b7 (diff)
fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
commit 613cc2b6f272c1a8ad33aefa21cad77af23139f7 upstream. If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE. The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink): [vfs] -> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link -> proc_pid_get_link -> proc_fd_access_allowed -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window. This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to). Cc: dev@opencontainers.org Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c10
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 669c09bfdcad..a9dec2f540dc 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
19 * current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch 19 * current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch
20 * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep 20 * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep
21 * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary 21 * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
22 * formats. 22 * formats.
23 */ 23 */
24 24
25#include <linux/slab.h> 25#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1266 flush_thread(); 1266 flush_thread();
1267 current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; 1267 current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1268 1268
1269 /*
1270 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1271 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1272 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1273 * undergoing exec(2).
1274 */
1275 do_close_on_exec(current->files);
1269 return 0; 1276 return 0;
1270 1277
1271out: 1278out:
@@ -1328,7 +1335,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1328 group */ 1335 group */
1329 current->self_exec_id++; 1336 current->self_exec_id++;
1330 flush_signal_handlers(current, 0); 1337 flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
1331 do_close_on_exec(current->files);
1332} 1338}
1333EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); 1339EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
1334 1340