Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this release:

   - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
   - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
   - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
  X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
  netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
  netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
  netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
  PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
  tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
  tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
  tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
  tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
  PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
  X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
  PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
  KEYS: revert encrypted key change
  ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
  firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
  security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
  PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
  ...

3 files changed, 12 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a3d33fe592d6..ab1f1200ce5d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
 /*
  * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
  * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
- *   PTRACE_ATTACH
+ *   PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
  */
 static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
          * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to
          * mess up.
          */
-        if (current->no_new_privs)
+        if (task_no_new_privs(current))
                 bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
 
         t = p;
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
 
         if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
-            !current->no_new_privs &&
+            !task_no_new_privs(current) &&
             kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
             kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
                 /* Set-uid? */
diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
index 567983d2c0eb..7dd55b745c4d 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
@@ -174,7 +174,9 @@ static int nfs_map_numeric_to_string(__u32 id, char *buf, size_t buflen)
 
 static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver = {
         .name           = "id_resolver",
-        .instantiate    = user_instantiate,
+        .preparse       = user_preparse,
+        .free_preparse  = user_free_preparse,
+        .instantiate    = generic_key_instantiate,
         .match          = user_match,
         .revoke         = user_revoke,
         .destroy        = user_destroy,
@@ -282,6 +284,8 @@ static struct key *nfs_idmap_request_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
                                                 desc, "", 0, idmap);
                 mutex_unlock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
         }
+        if (!IS_ERR(rkey))
+                set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
 
         kfree(desc);
         return rkey;
@@ -394,7 +398,9 @@ static const struct rpc_pipe_ops idmap_upcall_ops = {
 
 static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy = {
         .name           = "id_legacy",
-        .instantiate    = user_instantiate,
+        .preparse       = user_preparse,
+        .free_preparse  = user_free_preparse,
+        .instantiate    = generic_key_instantiate,
         .match          = user_match,
         .revoke         = user_revoke,
         .destroy        = user_destroy,
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index d7f9199217bb..cd3653e4f35c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -297,15 +297,11 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,
         seq_puts(m, header);
         CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
                 seq_printf(m, "%08x",
-                           a->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - __capi]);
+                           a->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - __capi]);
         }
         seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 
-/* Remove non-existent capabilities */
-#define NORM_CAPS(v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \
-                                CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1)
-
 static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 {
         const struct cred *cred;
@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
         cap_bset        = cred->cap_bset;
         rcu_read_unlock();
 
-        NORM_CAPS(cap_inheritable);
-        NORM_CAPS(cap_permitted);
-        NORM_CAPS(cap_effective);
-        NORM_CAPS(cap_bset);
-
         render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
         render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted);
         render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);