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BranchCommit messageAuthorAge
archive/unc-master-3.0P-FP: fix BUG_ON releated to priority inheritanceBjoern Brandenburg13 years
archived-2013.1uncachedev: mmap memory that is not cached by CPUsGlenn Elliott12 years
archived-private-masterMerge branch 'wip-2.6.34' into old-private-masterAndrea Bastoni15 years
archived-semi-partMerge branch 'wip-semi-part' of ssh://cvs/cvs/proj/litmus/repo/litmus2010 int...Andrea Bastoni15 years
demoFurther refinementsJonathan Herman14 years
ecrts-pgm-finalMerge branch 'wip-ecrts14-pgm' of ssh://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/home/litmus/litmus-r...Glenn Elliott12 years
ecrts14-pgm-finalMerge branch 'wip-ecrts14-pgm' of ssh://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/home/litmus/litmus-r...Glenn Elliott12 years
gpusync-rtss12Final GPUSync implementation.Glenn Elliott12 years
gpusync/stagingRename IKGLP R2DGLP.Glenn Elliott12 years
linux-tipMerge branch 'slab/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/p...Linus Torvalds15 years
litmus2008-patch-seriesadd i386 feather-trace implementationBjoern B. Brandenburg16 years
masterPSN-EDF: use inferred_sporadic_job_release_atBjoern Brandenburg9 years
pgmmake it compileGlenn Elliott12 years
prop/litmus-signalsInfrastructure for Litmus signals.Glenn Elliott13 years
prop/robust-tie-breakFixed bug in edf_higher_prio().Glenn Elliott13 years
stagingFix tracepoint compilation errorFelipe Cerqueira13 years
test9/23/2016Namhoon Kim9 years
tracing-develTest kernel tracing events capabilitiesAndrea Bastoni16 years
v2.6.34-with-arm-patchessmsc911x: Add spinlocks around registers accessCatalin Marinas15 years
v2015.1Add ARM syscall def for get_current_budgetBjoern Brandenburg10 years
wip-2011.2-bbbLitmus core: simplify np-section protocolBjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-2011.2-bbb-traceRefactor sched_trace_log_message() -> debug_trace_log_message()Andrea Bastoni14 years
wip-2012.3-gpuSOBLIV draining support for C-EDF.Glenn Elliott12 years
wip-2012.3-gpu-preportpick up last C-RM fileGlenn Elliott12 years
wip-2012.3-gpu-rtss13Fix critical bug in GPU tracker.Glenn Elliott12 years
wip-2012.3-gpu-sobliv-budget-w-ksharkProper sobliv draining and many bug fixes.Glenn Elliott12 years
wip-aedzl-finalMake it easier to compile AEDZL interfaces in liblitmus.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-aedzl-revisedAdd sched_trace data for Apative EDZLGlenn Elliott15 years
wip-arbit-deadlineFix compilation bug.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-aux-tasksDescription of refined aux task inheritance.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-bbbGSN-EDF & Core: improve debug TRACE'ing for NP sectionsBjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-bbb-prio-donuse correct timestampBjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-better-breakImplement hash-based EDF tie-breaking.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-binary-heapMake C-EDF work with simplified binheap_deleteGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-budgetAdded support for choices in budget policy enforcement.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-colorSummarize schedulability with final recordJonathan Herman13 years
wip-color-jlhsched_color: Fixed two bugs causing crashing on experiment restart and a rare...Jonathan Herman13 years
wip-d10-hz1000Enable HZ=1000 on District 10Bjoern B. Brandenburg15 years
wip-default-clusteringFeature: Make default C-EDF clustering compile-time configurable.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-dissipation-jericksoUpdate from 2.6.36 to 2.6.36.4Jeremy Erickson11 years
wip-dissipation2-jericksoUpdate 2.6.36 to 2.6.36.4Jeremy Erickson11 years
wip-ecrts14-pgmMerge branch 'wip-ecrts14-pgm' of ssh://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/home/litmus/litmus-r...Glenn Elliott12 years
wip-edf-hsblast tested versionJonathan Herman14 years
wip-edf-osLookup table EDF-osJeremy Erickson12 years
wip-edf-tie-breakMerge branch 'wip-edf-tie-break' of ssh://rtsrv.cs.unc.edu/home/litmus/litmus...Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-edzl-critiqueUse hr_timer's active checks instead of having own flag.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-edzl-finalImplementation of the EDZL scheduler.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-edzl-revisedClean up comments.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-eventsAdded support for tracing arbitrary actions.Jonathan Herman15 years
wip-extra-debugDBG: add additional tracingBjoern B. Brandenburg15 years
wip-fix-switch-jericksoAttempt to fix race condition with plugin switchingJeremy Erickson15 years
wip-fix3sched: show length of runqueue clock deactivation in /proc/sched_debugBjoern B. Brandenburg15 years
wip-fmlp-dequeueImprove FMLP queue management.Glenn Elliott14 years
wip-ft-irq-flagFeather-Trace: keep track of interrupt-related interference.Bjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-gpu-cleanupEnable sched_trace log injection from userspaceGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-gpu-interruptsRemove option for threading of all softirqs.Glenn Elliott14 years
wip-gpu-rtas12Generalized GPU cost predictors + EWMA. (untested)Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-gpu-rtss12Final GPUSync implementation.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-gpu-rtss12-srpexperimental changes to support GPUs under SRPGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-gpusync-mergeCleanup priority tracking for budget enforcement.Glenn Elliott11 years
wip-ikglpMove RSM and IKGLP imp. to own .c filesGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-k-fmlpMerge branch 'mpi-master' into wip-k-fmlpGlenn Elliott14 years
wip-kernel-coloringAdded recolor syscallNamhoon Kim7 years
wip-kernthreadsKludge work-queue processing into klitirqd.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-klmirqd-to-auxAllow klmirqd threads to be given names.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-ksharkMerge branch 'mpi-staging' into wip-ksharkJonathan Herman13 years
wip-litmus-3.2Merge commit 'v3.2' into litmus-stagingAndrea Bastoni13 years
wip-litmus2011.2Cleanup: Coding conformance for affinity stuff.Glenn Elliott14 years
wip-litmus3.0-2011.2Feather-Trace: keep track of interrupt-related interference.Bjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-master-2.6.33-rtAvoid deadlock when switching task policy to BACKGROUND (ugly)Andrea Bastoni15 years
wip-mcRemoved ARM-specific hacks which disabled less common mixed-criticality featu...Jonathan Herman12 years
wip-mc-bipasaMC-EDF addedbipasa chattopadhyay13 years
wip-mc-jericksoSplit C/D queuesJeremy Erickson15 years
wip-mc2-cache-slackManually patched mc^2 related codeMing Yang10 years
wip-mcrit-maccosmeticMac Mollison15 years
wip-merge-3.0Prevent Linux to send IPI and queue tasks on remote CPUs.Andrea Bastoni14 years
wip-merge-v3.0Prevent Linux to send IPI and queue tasks on remote CPUs.Andrea Bastoni14 years
wip-migration-affinityNULL affinity dereference in C-EDF.Glenn Elliott14 years
wip-mmap-uncacheshare branch with othersGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-modechangeRTSS 2017 submissionNamhoon Kim8 years
wip-nested-lockingAppears to be working.Bryan Ward12 years
wip-omlp-gedfFirst implementation of G-OMLP.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-paiSome cleanup of PAIGlenn Elliott14 years
wip-percore-lib9/21/2016Namhoon Kim9 years
wip-performanceCONFIG_DONT_PREEMPT_ON_TIE: Don't preeempt a scheduled task on priority tie.Glenn Elliott14 years
wip-pgmAdd PGM support to C-FLGlenn Elliott12 years
wip-pgm-splitFirst draft of C-FL-splitNamhoon Kim12 years
wip-pm-ovdAdd preemption-and-migration overhead tracing supportAndrea Bastoni15 years
wip-prio-inhP-EDF updated to use the generic pi framework.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-prioq-dglBUG FIX: Support DGLs with PRIOQ_MUTEXGlenn Elliott13 years
wip-refactored-gedfGeneralizd architecture for GEDF-style scheduelrs to reduce code redundancy.Glenn Elliott15 years
wip-release-master-fixbugfix: release master CPU must signal task was pickedBjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
wip-robust-tie-breakEDF priority tie-breaks.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-rt-ksharkMove task time accounting into the complete_job method.Jonathan Herman13 years
wip-rtas12-pgmScheduling of PGM jobs.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-semi-partFix compile error with newer GCCJeremy Erickson12 years
wip-semi-part-edfos-jericksoUse initial CPU set by clientJeremy Erickson12 years
wip-shared-libTODO: Fix condition checks in replicate_page_move_mapping()Namhoon Kim9 years
wip-shared-lib2RTAS 2017 Submission ver.Namhoon Kim9 years
wip-shared-memInitial commit for shared libraryNamhoon Kim9 years
wip-splitting-jericksoFix release behaviorJeremy Erickson13 years
wip-splitting-omlp-jericksoBjoern's Dissertation Code with Priority DonationJeremy Erickson13 years
wip-stage-binheapAn efficient binary heap implementation.Glenn Elliott13 years
wip-sun-portDynamic memory allocation and clean exit for FeatherTraceChristopher Kenna15 years
wip-timer-tracebugfix: C-EDF, clear scheduled field of the correct CPU upon task_exitAndrea Bastoni15 years
wip-tracepointsAdd kernel-style events for sched_trace_XXX() functionsAndrea Bastoni14 years
 
TagDownloadAuthorAge
2015.1commit 8e51b37822...Bjoern Brandenburg10 years
2013.1commit bcaacec1ca...Glenn Elliott12 years
2012.3commit c158b5fbe4...Jonathan Herman13 years
2012.2commit b53c479a0f...Glenn Elliott13 years
2012.1commit 83b11ea1c6...Bjoern B. Brandenburg14 years
rtas12-mc-beta-expcommit 8e236ee20f...Christopher Kenna14 years
2011.1commit d11808b5c6...Christopher Kenna15 years
v2.6.37-rc4commit e8a7e48bb2...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.37-rc3commit 3561d43fd2...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.37-rc2commit e53beacd23...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.37-rc1commit c8ddb2713c...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.36commit f6f94e2ab1...Linus Torvalds15 years
2010.2commit 5c5456402d...Bjoern B. Brandenburg15 years
v2.6.36-rc8commit cd07202cc8...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.36-rc7commit cb655d0f3d...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.36-rc6commit 899611ee7d...Linus Torvalds15 years
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2010.1commit 7c1ff4c544...Andrea Bastoni15 years
v2.6.34commit e40152ee1e...Linus Torvalds15 years
v2.6.33.4commit 4640b4e7d9...Greg Kroah-Hartman15 years
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v2.6.15-rc3commit 624f54be20...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.15-rc2commit 3bedff1d73...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.15-rc1commit cd52d1ee9a...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14commit 741b2252a5...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14-rc5commit 93918e9afc...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14-rc4commit 907a426179...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14-rc3commit 1c9426e8a5...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14-rc2commit 676d55ae30...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.14-rc1commit 2f4ba45a75...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.13commit 02b3e4e2d7...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.13-rc7commit 0572e3da3f...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.13-rc6commit 6fc32179de...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.13-rc5commit 9a351e30d7...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.13-rc4commit 6395352334...Linus Torvalds20 years
v2.6.11tree c39ae07f39...
v2.6.11-treetree c39ae07f39...
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v2.6.12-rc4commit 88d7bd8cb9...
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v2.6.13-rc1commit 4c91aedb75...
v2.6.13-rc2commit a18bcb7450...
v2.6.13-rc3commit c32511e271...
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2025-09-09 02:40:38 -0400
">= __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work, push_to_pool), }; static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; /* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. * * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. */ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int nbytes) { unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; int input_rotate; int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; const char *bytes = in; __u32 w; tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; input_rotate = r->input_rotate; i = r->add_ptr; /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ while (nbytes--) { w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate); i = (i - 1) & wordmask; /* XOR in the various taps */ w ^= r->pool[i]; w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; /* * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits * rotation, so that successive passes spread the * input bits across the pool evenly. */ input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31; } r->input_rotate = input_rotate; r->add_ptr = i; } static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int nbytes) { trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); } static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int nbytes) { unsigned long flags; trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); } struct fast_pool { __u32 pool[4]; unsigned long last; unsigned short reg_idx; unsigned char count; }; /* * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. */ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) { __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); d ^= a; b ^= c; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); d ^= a; b ^= c; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); d ^= a; b ^= c; a += b; c += d; b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); d ^= a; b ^= c; f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b; f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d; f->count++; } static void process_random_ready_list(void) { unsigned long flags; struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { struct module *owner = rdy->owner; list_del_init(&rdy->list); rdy->func(rdy); module_put(owner); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); } /* * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy. * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. */ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { int entropy_count, orig; const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (!nbits) return; retry: entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count); if (nfrac < 0) { /* Debit */ entropy_count += nfrac; } else { /* * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions * approach the full value asymptotically: * * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) * * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) * * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869... * so we can approximate the exponential with * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time. * * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2 * turns no matter how large nbits is. */ int pnfrac = nfrac; const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); unsigned int add = ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; entropy_count += add; pnfrac -= anfrac; } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); } if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); WARN_ON(1); entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) entropy_count = pool_size; if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; r->entropy_total += nbits; if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) { r->initialized = 1; r->entropy_total = 0; } trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_); if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) { crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; } /* should we wake readers? */ if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } /* If the input pool is getting full, send some * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. */ if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && r->initialized && r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) { struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; if (other->entropy_count <= 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { schedule_work(&other->push_work); r->entropy_total = 0; } } } } static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1)); if (nbits < 0) return -EINVAL; /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max); credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); return 0; } /********************************************************************* * * CRNG using CHACHA20 * *********************************************************************/ #define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around * their brain damage. */ static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; #endif static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; unsigned long rv; memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); if (crng == &primary_crng) _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); else _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); crng->state[i] ^= rv; } crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; char *p; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; if (crng_ready()) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); } return 1; } static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) { unsigned long flags; int i, num; union { __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; __u32 key[8]; } buf; if (r) { num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0); if (num == 0) return; } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); } spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { unsigned long rv; if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; } memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); crng->init_time = jiffies; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); pr_notice("random: crng init done\n"); } } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long v, flags; if (crng_init > 1 && time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) crng->state[14] ^= v; chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); if (crng->state[12] == 0) crng->state[13]++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA if (crng_node_pool) crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; if (crng == NULL) #endif crng = &primary_crng; _extract_crng(crng, out); } /* * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; __u32 *s, *d; int i; used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { extract_crng(tmp); used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; for (i=0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA if (crng_node_pool) crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; if (crng == NULL) #endif crng = &primary_crng; _crng_backtrack_protect(crng, tmp, used); } static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; int large_request = (nbytes > 256); while (nbytes) { if (large_request && need_resched()) { if (signal_pending(current)) { if (ret == 0) ret = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } schedule(); } extract_crng(tmp); i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } nbytes -= i; buf += i; ret += i; } crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i); /* Wipe data just written to memory */ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return ret; } /********************************************************************* * * Entropy input management * *********************************************************************/ /* There is one of these per entropy source */ struct timer_rand_state { cycles_t last_time; long last_delta, last_delta2; unsigned dont_count_entropy:1; }; #define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; /* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it. * * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) { unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; unsigned long flags; if (!crng_ready()) { crng_fast_load(buf, size); return; } trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_); spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size); _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; /* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. * * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. * */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) { struct entropy_store *r; struct { long jiffies; unsigned cycles; unsigned num; } sample; long delta, delta2, delta3; preempt_disable(); sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); sample.num = num; r = &input_pool; mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample)); /* * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas * in order to make our estimate. */ if (!state->dont_count_entropy) { delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time; state->last_time = sample.jiffies; delta2 = delta - state->last_delta; state->last_delta = delta; delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2; state->last_delta2 = delta2; if (delta < 0) delta = -delta; if (delta2 < 0) delta2 = -delta2; if (delta3 < 0) delta3 = -delta3; if (delta > delta2) delta = delta2; if (delta > delta3) delta = delta3; /* * delta is now minimum absolute delta. * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. */ credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); } preempt_enable(); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; /* ignore autorepeat and the like */ if (value == last_value) return; last_value = value; add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; #define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ #define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1)) static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) { long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; /* Use a weighted moving average */ delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); avg_cycles += delta; /* And average deviation */ delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); avg_deviation += delta; } #else #define add_interrupt_bench(x) #endif static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) return 0; idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) idx = 0; ptr += idx++; WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); return *ptr; } void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) { struct entropy_store *r; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned long now = jiffies; cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); __u32 c_high, j_high; __u64 ip; unsigned long seed; int credit = 0; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0; j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0; fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq; fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs); fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); if (!crng_ready()) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; } return; } if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; r = &input_pool; if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) return; fast_pool->last = now; __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); /* * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the * interrupt noise. */ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) { __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed)); credit = 1; } spin_unlock(&r->lock); fast_pool->count = 0; /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) { if (!disk || !disk->random) return; /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); #endif /********************************************************************* * * Entropy extraction routines * *********************************************************************/ /* * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'. */ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes); static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) { if (!r->pull || r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) || r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) return; _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); } static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) { __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; int bytes = nbytes; /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); /* but never more than the buffer size */ bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); } /* * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead * of letting it go to waste. */ static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) { struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store, push_work); BUG_ON(!r); _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8); trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT); } /* * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. */ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; size_t ibytes, nfrac; BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); /* Can we pull enough? */ retry: entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes; /* never pull more than available */ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) have_bytes = 0; ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); if (ibytes < min) ibytes = 0; if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", r->name, entropy_count); WARN_ON(1); entropy_count = 0; } nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac; else entropy_count = 0; if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); if (ibytes && (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } return ibytes; } /* * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and * extract_entropy_user. * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) { int i; union { __u32 w[5]; unsigned long l[LONGS(20)]; } hash; __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; unsigned long flags; /* * If we have an architectural hardware random number * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector */ sha_init(hash.w); for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) { unsigned long v; if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; hash.l[i] = v; } /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16) sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); /* * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); /* * In case the hash function has some recognizable output * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back * twice as much data as we output. */ hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3]; hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4]; hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); } static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int fips) { ssize_t ret = 0, i; __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; unsigned long flags; while (nbytes) { extract_buf(r, tmp); if (fips) { spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); } i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); memcpy(buf, tmp, i); nbytes -= i; buf += i; ret += i; } /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return ret; } /* * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and * returns it in a buffer. * * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers. */ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; unsigned long flags; /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ if (fips_enabled) { spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); if (!r->last_data_init) { r->last_data_init = 1; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE); extract_buf(r, tmp); spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); } trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); } /* * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and * returns it in a userspace buffer. */ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i; __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; int large_request = (nbytes > 256); trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0); while (nbytes) { if (large_request && need_resched()) { if (signal_pending(current)) { if (ret == 0) ret = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } schedule(); } extract_buf(r, tmp); i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } nbytes -= i; buf += i; ret += i; } /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return ret; } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous)) static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) { #ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM const bool print_once = false; #else static bool print_once __read_mostly; #endif if (print_once || crng_ready() || (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) return; WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); #ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM print_once = true; #endif pr_notice("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller, crng_init); } /* * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { extract_crng(buf); buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (nbytes > 0) { extract_crng(tmp); memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); } else crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { static void *previous; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); /* * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long} * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling * this function forfeits the guarantee of security. * * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded. * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal. */ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) { if (likely(crng_ready())) return 0; return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready()); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); /* * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking * pool is initialised. * * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive */ int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) { struct module *owner; unsigned long flags; int err = -EALREADY; if (crng_ready()) return err; owner = rdy->owner; if (!try_module_get(owner)) return -ENOENT; spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); if (crng_ready()) goto out; owner = NULL; list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); err = 0; out: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); module_put(owner); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); /* * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. */ void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) { unsigned long flags; struct module *owner = NULL; spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { list_del_init(&rdy->list); owner = rdy->owner; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); module_put(owner); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); /* * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. */ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) { char *p = buf; trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_); while (nbytes) { unsigned long v; int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; memcpy(p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk; } if (nbytes) get_random_bytes(p, nbytes); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); /* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data * * @r: pool to initialize * * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { int i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); unsigned long rv; r->last_pulled = jiffies; mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv)); } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } /* * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot * process. But it limits our options here. We must use * statically allocated structures that already have all * initializations complete at compile time. We should also * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data * we were given. */ static int rand_initialize(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA int i; struct crng_state *crng; struct crng_state **pool; #endif init_std_data(&input_pool); init_std_data(&blocking_pool); crng_initialize(&primary_crng); #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL); for_each_online_node(i) { crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); crng_initialize(crng); pool[i] = crng; } mb(); crng_node_pool = pool; #endif return 0; } early_initcall(rand_initialize); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) { struct timer_rand_state *state; /* * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy * source. */ state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); if (state) { state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; disk->random = state; } } #endif static ssize_t _random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t n; if (nbytes == 0) return 0; nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE); while (1) { n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes); if (n < 0) return n; trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8, ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); if (n > 0) return n; /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */ if (nonblock) return -EAGAIN; wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits); if (signal_pending(current)) return -ERESTARTSYS; } } static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); } static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { unsigned long flags; static int maxwarn = 10; int ret; if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { maxwarn--; printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read " "(%zd bytes read)\n", current->comm, nbytes); spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); crng_init_cnt = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); return ret; } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) { __poll_t mask; poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait); poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); mask = 0; if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; return mask; } static int write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; __u32 buf[16]; const char __user *p = buffer; while (count > 0) { bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) return -EFAULT; count -= bytes; p += bytes; mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes); cond_resched(); } return 0; } static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { size_t ret; ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count); if (ret) return ret; return (ssize_t)count; } static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { int size, ent_count; int __user *p = (int __user *)arg; int retval; switch (cmd) { case RNDGETENTCNT: /* inherently racy, no point locking */ ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool); if (put_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return 0; case RNDADDTOENTCNT: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); case RNDADDENTROPY: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p++)) return -EFAULT; if (ent_count < 0) return -EINVAL; if (get_user(size, p++)) return -EFAULT; retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p, size); if (retval < 0) return retval; return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: /* * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear * the entropy pool, as that's silly. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; input_pool.entropy_count = 0; blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; return 0; default: return -EINVAL; } } static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) { return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync); } const struct file_operations random_fops = { .read = random_read, .write = random_write, .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { .read = urandom_read, .write = random_write, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, flags) { int ret; if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; if (count > INT_MAX) count = INT_MAX; if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); if (!crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (unlikely(ret)) return ret; } return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); } /******************************************************************** * * Sysctl interface * ********************************************************************/ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL #include <linux/sysctl.h> static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; /* * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. * * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data. */ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { struct ctl_table fake_table; unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid; uuid = table->data; if (!uuid) { uuid = tmp_uuid; generate_random_uuid(uuid); } else { static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock); spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock); if (!uuid[8]) generate_random_uuid(uuid); spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock); } sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid); fake_table.data = buf; fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf); return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } /* * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits */ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { struct ctl_table fake_table; int entropy_count; entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; fake_table.data = &entropy_count; fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { .procname = "poolsize", .data = &sysctl_poolsize, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "entropy_avail", .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, }, { .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold", .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, .extra1 = &min_read_thresh, .extra2 = &max_read_thresh, }, { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", .data = &random_min_urandom_seed, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "boot_id", .data = &sysctl_bootid, .maxlen = 16, .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, { .procname = "uuid", .maxlen = 16, .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH { .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles", .data = &avg_cycles, .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles), .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, }, { .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation", .data = &avg_deviation, .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation), .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, }, #endif { } }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ struct batched_entropy { union { u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; }; unsigned int position; }; static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_reset_lock); /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); u64 get_random_u64(void) { u64 ret; bool use_lock; unsigned long flags = 0; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret)) return ret; #else if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) && arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1)) return ret; #endif warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; if (use_lock) read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); u32 get_random_u32(void) { u32 ret; bool use_lock; unsigned long flags = 0; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) return ret; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; if (use_lock) read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); /* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the * next usage. */ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) { int cpu; unsigned long flags; write_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = 0; per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = 0; } write_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); } /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the * random address must fall. * * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. * * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. * * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, * @start is returned. */ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) { if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); } if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) range = ULONG_MAX - start; range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; if (range == 0) return start; return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); } /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. */ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; if (!crng_ready()) { crng_fast_load(buffer, count); return; } /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2025-09-09 02:40:38 -0400