From 6e5a2d1d32596850a0ebf7fb3e54c0d69901dabd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darrel Goeddel Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2006 16:57:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] audit: support for object context filters This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements of the SELinux context. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel Acked-by: Stephen Smalley kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/ss/services.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 92e80b99d183..d2e80e62ff0c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1848,12 +1848,17 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */ if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */ if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) return -EINVAL; @@ -1875,6 +1880,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr); if (!userdatum) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -1882,6 +1888,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr); if (!roledatum) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -1889,6 +1896,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr); if (!typedatum) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -1897,6 +1905,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); break; } @@ -1949,6 +1959,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, without a match */ switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user); @@ -1959,6 +1970,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, } break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role); @@ -1969,6 +1981,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, } break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type); @@ -1980,7 +1993,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: - level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ? + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN || + field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ? &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]); switch (op) { case AUDIT_EQUAL: -- cgit v1.2.2