From 83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2012 13:45:40 -0400 Subject: SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- security/security.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index bf619ffc9a4d..5497a57fba01 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -701,11 +701,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return security_ops->file_receive(file); } -int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred); + ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred); if (ret) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.2 From e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 13:30:51 -0400 Subject: split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file() ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5497a57fba01..d91c66d3956b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -657,18 +657,22 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags); if (ret) return ret; return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); } +int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr); +} + int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { -- cgit v1.2.2 From 8b3ec6814c83d76b85bd13badc48552836c24839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:11:23 -0400 Subject: take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/security.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d91c66d3956b..3b11b3b72fe2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 @@ -657,11 +660,35 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) { + unsigned long reqprot = prot; int ret; - + /* + * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC? + * + * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec + * mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.) + */ + if (!(reqprot & PROT_READ)) + goto out; + if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) + goto out; + if (!file) { + prot |= PROT_EXEC; + } else if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_MMU + unsigned long caps = 0; + struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; + if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) + caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; + if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) + goto out; +#endif + prot |= PROT_EXEC; + } +out: ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags); if (ret) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 19:58:30 -0400 Subject: take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 3b11b3b72fe2..3efc9b12aef4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -660,36 +660,46 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - unsigned long flags) +static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - unsigned long reqprot = prot; - int ret; /* - * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC? - * - * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec - * mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.) + * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect + * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... */ - if (!(reqprot & PROT_READ)) - goto out; + if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) + return prot; if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) - goto out; - if (!file) { - prot |= PROT_EXEC; - } else if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { + return prot; + /* + * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. + */ + if (!file) + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + /* + * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need + * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + */ + if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU unsigned long caps = 0; struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) - goto out; + return prot; #endif - prot |= PROT_EXEC; + return prot | PROT_EXEC; } -out: - ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags); + /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ + return prot; +} + +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int ret; + ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot, + mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); if (ret) return ret; return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); -- cgit v1.2.2