From 089bc8e95ae07b1ada14069935c30fd88204c21c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 15:56:13 +0900
Subject: ima: fix script messages

Fix checkpatch, lindent, etc, warnings/errors

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c            |  2 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  |  6 +++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c        |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 10 +++++-----
 security/integrity/integrity.h         |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 0b759e17a131..198e60903685 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 };
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-					const char *digest, int digestlen)
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
 {
 	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
index b1753e98bf9a..46408b9e62e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
-int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr)
+int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr)
 {
 	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2d4becab8918..e3230d6a8d96 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   int func)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				 int func, enum integrity_status status)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
 		break;
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
 		break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 38477c9c3415..5f0fd113433a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	 * against concurrent list-extension
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next,
-			    struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, struct ima_queue_entry, later);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	(*pos)++;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e9508d5bbfcf..0f359df6344c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -244,9 +244,9 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	return process_measurement(bprm->file,
-				 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
-				 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
-				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+				   (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
+				   bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
+				   MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
 	return process_measurement(file, NULL,
-				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-				 FILE_CHECK);
+				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+				   FILE_CHECK);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index c42fb7a70dee..f86731649f54 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-					const char *digest, int digestlen);
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
 #else
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 08de59eb144d7c41351a467442f898d720f0f15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 07:34:02 -0400
Subject: Revert "ima: policy for RAMFS"

This reverts commit 4c2c392763a682354fac65b6a569adec4e4b5387.

Everything in the initramfs should be measured and appraised,
but until the initramfs has extended attribute support, at
least measured.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 399433ad614e..a9c3d3cd1990 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From c7c8bb237fdbff932b5e431aebee5ce862ea07d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:43:56 +0300
Subject: ima: provide support for arbitrary hash algorithms

In preparation of supporting more hash algorithms with larger hash sizes
needed for signature verification, this patch replaces the 20 byte sized
digest, with a more flexible structure.  The new structure includes the
hash algorithm, digest size, and digest.

Changelog:
- recalculate filedata hash for the measurement list, if the signature
  hash digest size is greater than 20 bytes.
- use generic HASH_ALGO_
- make ima_calc_file_hash static
- scripts lindent and checkpatch fixes

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  7 ++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 32 +++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 20 ++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c   | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  6 +++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 15 ++++++++---
 7 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 39196abaff0d..e6628e783df1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index b3dd616560f7..eb86032f4f1e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
-extern char *ima_hash;
+extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
 /* IMA inode template definition */
@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
 int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1c03e8f1e0e1..e531fe22e582 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 	int result;
+	struct ima_digest_data hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
 	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
@@ -51,14 +52,14 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 
 	if (!violation) {
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-						entry->template_len,
-						entry->digest);
+					      entry->template_len, &hash);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
 					    entry->template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
+		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.digest, hash.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
 	return result;
@@ -147,8 +148,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
-		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
+		/* use default hash algorithm */
+		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
 		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
 			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
@@ -196,7 +198,21 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	if (iint->ima_hash.algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct ima_digest_data hash;
+
+		hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash);
+		if (result)
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+					    result, 0);
+		else
+			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.digest,
+			       hash.length);
+	} else
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash.digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash.length);
 	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -212,14 +228,14 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1];
+	char hash[(iint->ima_hash.length * 2) + 1];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
-		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash.length; i++)
+		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash.digest[i]);
 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index e3230d6a8d96..3833b0fa7108 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			  struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	iint->ima_hash.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
 	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
-				      sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0);
+				     &iint->ima_hash.type,
+				     1 + iint->ima_hash.length, 0);
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -159,8 +159,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
-			    IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc - 1 == iint->ima_hash.length)
+			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash.length);
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (rc) {
 			cause = "invalid-hash";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -172,8 +176,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
 					     xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
-					     iint->ima_xattr.digest,
-					     IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash.length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		} else if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index a02e0791cf15..2fd178651467 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
@@ -28,10 +29,11 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
 
-	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ima_hash, 0, 0);
+	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm);
-		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", ima_hash, rc);
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
+		       hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -40,17 +42,19 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 /*
  * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
  */
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
+static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
+				  struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				  struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
 	char *rbuf;
 	int rc, read = 0;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
@@ -85,17 +89,42 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 	}
 	kfree(rbuf);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (hash->algo != ima_hash_algo && hash->algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash->algo], 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+			       hash_algo_name[hash->algo], rc);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm);
+
+	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
  */
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest)
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -105,7 +134,11 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest)
 	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, data, len, digest);
+	/* this function uses default algo */
+	hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(ima_shash_tfm);
+
+	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
 }
 
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 0f359df6344c..7708c2120d9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -35,11 +36,12 @@ int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 int ima_appraise;
 #endif
 
-char *ima_hash = "sha1";
+int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
-		ima_hash = "md5";
+		ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index f86731649f54..0b02ea868e30 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -59,20 +59,29 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
 	u8 type;
 	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-}  __attribute__((packed));
+} __packed;
+
+#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	64
+
+struct ima_digest_data {
+	u8 algo;
+	u8 length;
+	u8 type;
+	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
 
 /* integrity data associated with an inode */
 struct integrity_iint_cache {
-	struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
+	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned long flags;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
 	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+	struct ima_digest_data ima_hash;
 };
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From d3634d0f426bdeb433cb288bdbb0a5e16cf3dbbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:44:04 +0300
Subject: ima: read and use signature hash algorithm

All files on the filesystem, currently, are hashed using the same hash
algorithm.  In preparation for files from different packages being
signed using different hash algorithms, this patch adds support for
reading the signature hash algorithm from the 'security.ima' extended
attribute and calculates the appropriate file data hash based on it.

Changelog:
- fix scripts Lindent and checkpatch msgs - Mimi
- fix md5 support for older version, which occupied 20 bytes in the
  xattr, not the expected 16 bytes.  Fix the comparison to compare
  only the first 16 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 11 ---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h           | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c       | 12 ++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 11 +++++++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h         | 11 +++++++++
 6 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index b4754667659d..9eae4809006b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -19,17 +19,6 @@
 
 #include "integrity.h"
 
-/*
- * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
- */
-struct signature_v2_hdr {
-	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
-	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
-	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific*/
-	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
-	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
-} __packed;
-
 /*
  * Request an asymmetric key.
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index eb86032f4f1e..efcdef2bf1bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -99,7 +99,9 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file);
+			    struct file *file,
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+			    int *xattr_len);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -132,17 +134,25 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   int func);
+void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		       struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
 					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
-					   const unsigned char *filename)
+					   const unsigned char *filename,
+					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+					   int xattr_len)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -163,6 +173,19 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
+
+static inline void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				     int xattr_len,
+				     struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index e531fe22e582..1dba98e2d7e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -139,17 +139,27 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file)
+			    struct file *file,
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+			    int *xattr_len)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
 
+	if (xattr_value)
+		*xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_dentry, xattr_value);
+
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
 		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+		if (xattr_value)
+			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len,
+					  &iint->ima_hash);
+
 		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
 		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3833b0fa7108..00708a3052cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -107,6 +107,34 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
 	}
 }
 
+void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		       struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+
+	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 0 || xattr_len <= 1 + sizeof(*sig))
+		return;
+
+	sig = (typeof(sig)) xattr_value->digest;
+
+	if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || sig->version != 2)
+		return;
+
+	hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+}
+
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return 0;
+
+	return vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value,
+				  0, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
@@ -116,23 +144,22 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	const char *op = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
-	int rc;
+	int rc = xattr_len;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
-				0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
 		if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
 			goto out;
@@ -159,7 +186,10 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (rc - 1 == iint->ima_hash.length)
+		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash.length)
+			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+			 */
 			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash.length);
@@ -207,7 +237,6 @@ out:
 		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
 	}
 	ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
-	kfree(xattr_value);
 	return status;
 }
 
@@ -223,7 +252,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 7708c2120d9c..95b5df2c6501 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+	int xattr_len = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -187,7 +189,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out_digsig;
 
@@ -198,7 +203,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
@@ -207,6 +213,7 @@ out_digsig:
 		rc = -EACCES;
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	kfree(xattr_value);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0b02ea868e30..ea2318983d97 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ */
+struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
+	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
+	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
+	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
+	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
+} __packed;
+
 /* integrity data associated with an inode */
 struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From b1aaab22e263d0cca1effe319b7d2bf895444219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:12:03 +0900
Subject: ima: pass full xattr with the signature

For possibility to use xattr type for new signature formats,
pass full xattr to the signature verification function.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 1 +
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 198e60903685..b4af4ebc5be2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -44,9 +44,10 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 		}
 	}
 
-	switch (sig[0]) {
+	switch (sig[1]) {
 	case 1:
-		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+		/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
+		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
 				     digest, digestlen);
 	case 2:
 		return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index af9b6852f4e1..336b3ddfe63f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	xattr_len = rc - 1;
+	xattr_len = rc;
 
 	/* check value type */
 	switch (xattr_data->type) {
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
-					xattr_data->digest, xattr_len,
+					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (!rc) {
 			/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 00708a3052cc..e1865a6e80ec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
-					     xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value, rc,
 					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
 					     iint->ima_hash.length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index ea2318983d97..aead6b2b5488 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
  * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
  */
 struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t type;		/* xattr type */
 	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
 	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
 	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From a35c3fb6490cc1d3446e4781693408100113c4fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:44:04 +0300
Subject: ima: use dynamically allocated hash storage

For each inode in the IMA policy, an iint is allocated.  To support
larger hash digests, the iint digest size changed from 20 bytes to
the maximum supported hash digest size.  Instead of allocating the
maximum size, which most likely is not needed, this patch dynamically
allocates the needed hash storage.

Changelog:
- fix krealloc bug

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/iint.c             |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++-----
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  4 +--
 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 74522dbd10a6..c49d3f14cbec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 
 static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1dba98e2d7e9..5a7942e20814 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 	int result;
-	struct ima_digest_data hash;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
 	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
@@ -52,14 +55,14 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 
 	if (!violation) {
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-					      entry->template_len, &hash);
+					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
 					    entry->template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
-		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.digest, hash.length);
+		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
 	return result;
@@ -146,6 +149,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	if (xattr_value)
 		*xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_dentry, xattr_value);
@@ -154,16 +161,23 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
-		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
 
 		if (xattr_value)
-			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len,
-					  &iint->ima_hash);
+			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len, &hash.hdr);
 
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 		if (!result) {
-			iint->version = i_version;
-			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
+						GFP_NOFS);
+			if (tmpbuf) {
+				iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+				memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+				iint->version = i_version;
+				iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+			} else
+				result = -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
 	if (result)
@@ -208,21 +222,24 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	if (iint->ima_hash.algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct ima_digest_data hash;
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct {
+			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		} hash;
 
-		hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash);
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result)
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
 					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
 					    result, 0);
 		else
-			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.digest,
-			       hash.length);
+			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+			       hash.hdr.length);
 	} else
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash.digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash.length);
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash->length);
 	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -238,14 +255,14 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(iint->ima_hash.length * 2) + 1];
+	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash.length; i++)
-		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash.digest[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
+		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index e1865a6e80ec..116630ca5ff3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_hash.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	iint->ima_hash->type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
 	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     &iint->ima_hash.type,
-				     1 + iint->ima_hash.length, 0);
+				     &iint->ima_hash->type,
+				     1 + iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash.length)
+		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
 			 */
 			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash.length);
+				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash->length);
 		else
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (rc) {
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
 					     (const char *)xattr_value, rc,
-					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
-					     iint->ima_hash.length);
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		} else if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index aead6b2b5488..5429ca59125b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 algo;
 	u8 length;
 	u8 type;
-	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 digest[0];
 } __packed;
 
 /*
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
-	struct ima_digest_data ima_hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
 };
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 140d802240a4ba3351494b4ab199964b96f87493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 20:29:47 -0400
Subject: ima: differentiate between template hash and file data hash sizes

The TPM v1.2 limits the template hash size to 20 bytes.  This
patch differentiates between the template hash size, as defined
in the ima_template_entry, and the file data hash size, as
defined in the ima_template_data.  Subsequent patches add support
for different file data hash algorithms.

Change log:
- hash digest definition in ima_store_template() should be TPM_DIGEST_SIZE

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c     | 10 +++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c  |  4 ++--
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index efcdef2bf1bc..52393edfbfd9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct ima_template_data {
 };
 
 struct ima_template_entry {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
+	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
 	const char *template_name;
 	int template_len;
 	struct ima_template_data template;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 5a7942e20814..2cc5dcc6bdeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	int result;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 2fd178651467..872c6698067c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
  */
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 {
-	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc, i;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
 		ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
 		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 	if (!rc)
 		crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 5f0fd113433a..c35cfb5b3c5e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
 
 	/* 2nd: template digest */
-	ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
 	namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
@@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest)
+static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
 }
 
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
 
 	switch (show) {
 	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
-		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest);
+		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
 		break;
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 
 	/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
-	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest);
+	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
 	seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 162ea723db3d..9d0243c10558 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ err_out:
 
 int __init ima_init(void)
 {
-	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc;
 
 	ima_used_chip = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index ff63fe00c195..e63ff3369f10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
 	key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
-		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		if (rc == 0) {
 			ret = qe;
 			break;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
 	char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
 	int audit_info = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 723326b927b675daf4223fe31d7428eca68f194b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2013 17:40:01 +0300
Subject: ima: provide dedicated hash algo allocation function

This patch provides dedicated hash algo allocation and
deallocation function which can be used by different clients.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 872c6698067c..e5d3ebf18436 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -39,6 +39,28 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+			       hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
+		}
+	}
+	return tfm;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
  */
@@ -57,6 +79,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
@@ -98,25 +122,16 @@ out:
 
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (hash->algo != ima_hash_algo && hash->algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash->algo], 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
-			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
-			       hash_algo_name[hash->algo], rc);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
-
-	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
 	rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm);
 
-	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
 
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From ea593993d361748e795f5eb783a5fb5144fb2df9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:24 +0200
Subject: ima: support arbitrary hash algorithms in ima_calc_buffer_hash

ima_calc_buffer_hash will be used with different hash algorithms.
This patch provides support for arbitrary hash algorithms in
ima_calc_buffer_hash.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 2cc5dcc6bdeb..bc1d1282a06f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
@@ -54,6 +55,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
 
 	if (!violation) {
+		/* this function uses default algo */
+		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
 					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index e5d3ebf18436..e2be2524a372 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -139,23 +139,39 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 /*
  * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
  */
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static int ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(const void *buf, int len,
+				    struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				    struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	/* this function uses default algo */
-	hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
-	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(ima_shash_tfm);
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
 	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
 }
 
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	rc = ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 {
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 09ef54359c4ad49c01a12503b2c510b424ecf059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:25 +0200
Subject: ima: ima_calc_boot_agregate must use SHA1

With multiple hash algorithms, ima_hash_tfm is no longer guaranteed to be sha1.
Need to force to use sha1.

Changelog:
- pass ima_digest_data to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() instead of char *
  (Roberto Sassu);
- create an ima_digest_data structure in ima_add_boot_aggregate()
  (Roberto Sassu);
- pass hash->algo to ima_alloc_tfm() (Roberto Sassu, reported by Dmitry).
- "move hash definition in ima_add_boot_aggregate()" commit hunk to here.
- sparse warning fix - Fengguang Wu

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   | 10 +++++++++-
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 52393edfbfd9..e0e1cde6e674 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index e2be2524a372..22be23f13b3d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -184,16 +184,17 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 /*
  * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
  */
-int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
+					      struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc, i;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
@@ -210,3 +211,20 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 		crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
 	return rc;
 }
+
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 9d0243c10558..77cd5005f2db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
@@ -46,6 +47,10 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 1;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry)
@@ -56,12 +61,15 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	if (ima_used_chip) {
 		violation = 0;
-		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest);
+		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
 	if (result < 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 7d802a227b7f26c89f13dab09767e6b0aebd9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:26 +0200
Subject: ima: pass the file descriptor to ima_add_violation()

Pass the file descriptor instead of the inode to ima_add_violation(),
to make the latter consistent with ima_store_measurement() in
preparation for the new template architecture.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++---
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e0e1cde6e674..d7bec6f37b61 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bc1d1282a06f..98160a3259fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
  * value is invalidated.
  */
-void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 95b5df2c6501..5e8b1f7becd2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -94,10 +94,9 @@ out:
 		pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
-				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(file, pathname,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 9803d413f41db86fdf0097f1af781fe2e68f474c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:27 +0200
Subject: ima: pass the filename argument up to ima_add_template_entry()

Pass the filename argument to ima_add_template_entry() in order to
eliminate a dependency on template specific data (third argument of
integrity_audit_msg).

This change is required because, with the new template management
mechanism, the generation of a new measurement entry will be performed
by new specific functions (introduced in next patches) and the current IMA
code will not be aware anymore of how data is stored in the entry payload.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h       | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c   | 9 +++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c  | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 6 +++---
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d7bec6f37b61..27d2ffbd0763 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ int ima_fs_init(void);
 void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
 int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-		       struct inode *inode);
+		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 98160a3259fe..a0fe5041310a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
-		       int violation, struct inode *inode)
+		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
+		       const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		}
 		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
 	}
-	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
+	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
 	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
 err_out:
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 	if (result < 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 77cd5005f2db..d42fac308aaa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
 		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
 	return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index e63ff3369f10..d85e99761f4f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
  * and extend the pcr.
  */
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-			   const char *op, struct inode *inode)
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
@@ -141,8 +142,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	}
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-			    entry->template.file_name,
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 			    op, audit_cause, result, audit_info);
 	return result;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 7bc5f447ce9d01e19394b5399bf1a4fcebf0f8dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:28 +0200
Subject: ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API

Instead of allocating and initializing the template entry from multiple
places (eg. boot aggregate, violation, and regular measurements), this
patch defines a new function called ima_alloc_init_template().  The new
function allocates and initializes the measurement entry with the inode
digest and the filename.

In respect to the current behavior, it truncates the file name passed
in the 'filename' argument if the latter's size is greater than 255 bytes
and the passed file descriptor is NULL.

Changelog:
- initialize 'hash' variable for non TPM case - Mimi
- conform to expectation for 'iint' to be defined as a pointer. - Mimi
- add missing 'file' dependency for recalculating file hash. - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  3 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 24 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 27d2ffbd0763..da03d3389619 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a0fe5041310a..29dd43de823a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -23,6 +23,62 @@
 
 static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
 
+/*
+ * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
+ */
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+{
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	e = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!e)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(&(e)->template, 0, sizeof(e->template));
+	if (!iint)		/* IMA measurement violation entry */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct {
+			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		} hash;
+
+		if (!file) {
+			result = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+
+		inode = file_inode(file);
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		hash.hdr.length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+		if (result) {
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+					    filename, "collect_data",
+					    "failed", result, 0);
+			goto out_free;
+		} else
+			memcpy(e->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+			       hash.hdr.length);
+	} else
+		memcpy(e->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash->length);
+out:
+	strcpy(e->template.file_name,
+	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX && file != NULL) ?
+	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
+	*entry = e;
+	return 0;
+out_free:
+	kfree(e);
+	return result;
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
  *
@@ -90,13 +146,11 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry) {
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, &entry);
+	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
 	}
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
@@ -220,34 +274,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry) {
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, &entry);
+	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
 		return;
 	}
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct {
-			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-		} hash;
-
-		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
-		if (result)
-			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
-					    result, 0);
-		else
-			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-			       hash.hdr.length);
-	} else
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash->length);
-	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
-	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
-	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index d42fac308aaa..50e15e6336c4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -43,34 +43,36 @@ int ima_used_chip;
 static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
 	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
-	int violation = 1;
+	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry)
-		goto err_out;
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+	iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+	iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
 
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name,
-		IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	if (ima_used_chip) {
-		violation = 0;
-		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
+
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+					 &entry);
+	if (result < 0)
+		return;
+
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From adf53a778a0a5a5dc9103509da4a9719046e5310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:29 +0200
Subject: ima: new templates management mechanism
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
and pathname.  The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1).  The
pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters.  To
overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
templates.

The main reason to introduce this feature is that, each time a new
template is defined, the functions that generate and display the
measurement list would include the code for handling a new format and,
thus, would significantly grow over time.

This patch set solves this problem by separating the template management
from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the definition
of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine which
information should be included in the measurement list, and a template
field, to generate and display data of a given type.

To define a new template field, developers define the field identifier
and implement two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate
and display measurement entries.  Initially, this patch set defines the
following template fields (support for additional data types will be
added later):
 - 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
        calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
 - 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to
        255 bytes;
 - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
           algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
           prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
 - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.

Defining a new template descriptor requires specifying the template format,
a string of field identifiers separated by the '|' character.  This patch
set defines the following template descriptors:
 - "ima": its format is 'd|n';
 - "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'

Further details about the new template architecture can be found in
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt.

Changelog:
- don't defer calling ima_init_template() - Mimi
- don't define ima_lookup_template_desc() until used - Mimi
- squashed with documentation patch - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile       |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  29 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c     |   4 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 56dfee7cbf61..7fe4ae37dbea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index da03d3389619..c85718f1f623 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -36,12 +36,39 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
 #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
 
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN	16
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX	15
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
+/* IMA template field data definition */
+struct ima_field_data {
+	u8 *data;
+	u32 len;
+};
+
+/* IMA template field definition */
+struct ima_template_field {
+	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
+	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+};
+
+/* IMA template descriptor definition */
+struct ima_template_desc {
+	char *name;
+	char *fmt;
+	int num_fields;
+	struct ima_template_field **fields;
+};
+
 /* IMA inode template definition */
 struct ima_template_data {
 	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
@@ -79,6 +106,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 
+int ima_init_template(void);
+
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 50e15e6336c4..f84aec5412f3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	rc = ima_init_crypto();
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
+	rc = ima_init_template();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
 	ima_init_policy();
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7e86783ccf51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template.c
+ *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
+ */
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
+};
+
+static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+};
+
+static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
+							const char *field_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported_fields); i++)
+		if (strncmp(supported_fields[i].field_id, field_id,
+			    IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) == 0)
+			return &supported_fields[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ima_template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
+{
+	char c;
+	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
+	int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+	while (i < template_fmt_len) {
+		c = template_fmt[i];
+		if (c == '|')
+			j++;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return j + 1;
+}
+
+static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
+				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+				     int *num_fields)
+{
+	char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt;
+	int template_num_fields = ima_template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
+	int i, result = 0;
+
+	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (*fields == NULL) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
+	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
+		struct ima_template_field *f = ima_lookup_template_field(c);
+
+		if (!f) {
+			result = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		(*fields)[i] = f;
+	}
+	*num_fields = i;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(*fields);
+	*fields = NULL;
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int init_defined_templates(void)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	/* Init defined templates. */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
+		struct ima_template_desc *template = &defined_templates[i];
+
+		result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+						   &(template->fields),
+						   &(template->num_fields));
+		if (result < 0)
+			return result;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+int ima_init_template(void)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	result = init_defined_templates();
+	if (result < 0)
+		return result;
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 3ce1217d6cd5dfa82a9db5c2a999cc1bb01490d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:30 +0200
Subject: ima: define template fields library and new helpers

This patch defines a library containing two initial template fields,
inode digest (d) and file name (n), the 'ima' template descriptor,
whose format is 'd|n', and two helper functions,
ima_write_template_field_data() and ima_show_template_field_data().

Changelog:
- replace ima_eventname_init() parameter NULL checking with BUG_ON.
  (suggested by Mimi)
- include "new template fields for inode digest (d) and file name (n)"
  definitions to fix a compiler warning.  - Mimi
- unnecessary to prefix static function names with 'ima_'. remove
  prefix to resolve Lindent formatting changes. - Mimi
- abbreviated/removed inline comments - Mimi
- always send the template field length - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile           |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |   5 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c           |   4 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  15 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |  31 +++++
 6 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 7fe4ae37dbea..d79263d2fdbf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c85718f1f623..e1f081d65dbf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN	16
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX	15
 
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima"
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
@@ -105,6 +108,8 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
 
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index c35cfb5b3c5e..414862e1904b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 }
 
-static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
 {
 	while (datalen--)
 		seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 {
 	int i;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 7e86783ccf51..810042264396 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -13,15 +13,20 @@
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
 #include "ima.h"
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
+	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME,.fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+	{.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
+	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
-static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
-							const char *field_id)
+static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -32,7 +37,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int ima_template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
+static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
 {
 	char c;
 	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
 	char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt;
-	int template_num_fields = ima_template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
+	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
 	int i, result = 0;
 
 	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
@@ -66,7 +71,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
 	}
 	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
 	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
-		struct ima_template_field *f = ima_lookup_template_field(c);
+		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
 
 		if (!f) {
 			result = -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e13fc7c04ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.c
+ *      Library of supported template fields.
+ */
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
+
+enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING };
+static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
+	u32 buflen;
+
+	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
+		buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+		buflen = datalen + 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		buflen = datalen;
+	}
+
+	buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace all space characters with underscore for event names and
+	 * strings. This avoid that, during the parsing of a measurements list,
+	 * filenames with spaces or that end with the suffix ' (deleted)' are
+	 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
+	 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
+	 */
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+		for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
+			if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
+				*buf_ptr = '_';
+	}
+
+	field_data->data = buf;
+	field_data->len = buflen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
+		ima_print_digest(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+		seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
+					  enum ima_show_type show,
+					  enum data_formats datafmt,
+					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+	if (!field_data->len)
+		return;
+	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	switch (show) {
+	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
+		ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
+	u8 *cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int result;
+
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo == ima_hash_algo) {
+		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!file)		/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	inode = file_inode(file);
+	hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+	if (result) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+				    filename, "collect_data",
+				    "failed", result, 0);
+		return result;
+	}
+out:
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					     DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event.
+ */
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
+	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
+
+	if (filename) {
+		cur_filename = filename;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
+
+		if (cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (file) {
+		cur_filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
+	} else
+		/*
+		 * Truncate filename if the latter is too long and
+		 * the file descriptor is not available.
+		 */
+		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
+out:
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
+					     DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, field_data);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2cecc83a928d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.h
+ *      Header for the library of supported template fields.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 4d7aeee73f5304bf195aa2904f8eb1d7b2e8fe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:32 +0200
Subject: ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

This patch adds support for the new template 'ima-ng', whose format
is defined as 'd-ng|n-ng'.  These new field definitions remove the
size limitations of the original 'ima' template.  Further, the 'd-ng'
field prefixes the inode digest with the hash algorithim, when
displaying the new larger digest sizes.

Change log:
- scripts/Lindent fixes  - Mimi
- "always true comparison" - reported by Fengguang Wu, resolved Dmitry
- initialize hash_algo variable to HASH_ALGO__LAST
- always prefix digest with hash algorithm - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |   7 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |   8 ++
 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 810042264396..bf38d1af3cfd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
-	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME,.fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
+	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
+	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -24,6 +25,10 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
 	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index e13fc7c04ebc..7d841448f246 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -12,9 +12,25 @@
  * File: ima_template_lib.c
  *      Library of supported template fields.
  */
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
-enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING };
+static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
+{
+	if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1 || algo == HASH_ALGO_MD5)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+enum data_formats {
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
+	DATA_FMT_STRING
+};
+
 static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
@@ -62,12 +78,22 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
+	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+
 	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
+		buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
+		if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
+			seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+
+		/* skip ':' and '\0' */
+		buf_ptr += 2;
+		buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
-		ima_print_digest(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+		ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen);
 		break;
 	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
-		seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+		seq_printf(m, "%s", buf_ptr);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -108,14 +134,59 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
 }
 
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+				     field_data);
+}
+
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
+static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
+				       struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+				       bool size_limit)
+{
+	/*
+	 * digest formats:
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+	 *    where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algoritm is not
+	 *    SHA1 or MD5
+	 */
+	u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
+	u32 offset = 0;
+
+	if (!size_limit) {
+		fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
+		if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1,
+					   "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+		buffer[offset] = ':';
+		offset += 2;
+	}
+
+	if (digest)
+		memcpy(buffer + offset, digest, digestsize);
+	else
+		/*
+		 * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation.
+		 * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset of
+		 * IMA_DIGEST_SIZE.
+		 */
+		offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize,
+					     fmt, field_data);
+}
+
 /*
- * This function writes the digest of an event.
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -125,8 +196,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
-	u8 *cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
-	u32 cur_digestsize = IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	int result;
 
@@ -135,7 +206,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo == ima_hash_algo) {
+	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
 		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
 		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
 		goto out;
@@ -145,7 +216,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	inode = file_inode(file);
-	hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
+	    ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 	if (result) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
@@ -153,20 +225,46 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 				    "failed", result, 0);
 		return result;
 	}
+	cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+	cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
 out:
-	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
-					     DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, -1,
+					   field_data, true);
 }
 
 /*
- * This function writes the name of an event.
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+
+	/* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
+	if (!iint)
+		goto out;
+
+	cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+out:
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   hash_algo, field_data, false);
+}
+
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     const unsigned char *filename,
+				     struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+				     bool size_limit)
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+	enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
+	    DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
 
 	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
 
@@ -174,7 +272,7 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		cur_filename = filename;
 		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
 
-		if (cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+		if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -189,5 +287,27 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
 out:
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
-					     DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, field_data);
+					     fmt, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
+					 field_data, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
+					 field_data, false);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 2cecc83a928d..16c5e7810234 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 
 void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
@@ -28,4 +30,10 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From a71dc65d30a472409f05d247f4eab91b14acf2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:33 +0200
Subject: ima: switch to new template management mechanism

This patch performs the switch to the new template mechanism by modifying
the functions ima_alloc_init_template(), ima_measurements_show() and
ima_ascii_measurements_show(). The old function ima_template_show() was
removed as it is no longer needed. Also, if the template descriptor used
to generate a measurement entry is not 'ima', the whole length of field
data stored for an entry is provided before the data itself through the
binary_runtime_measurement interface.

Changelog:
- unnecessary to use strncmp() (Mimi Zohar)
- create new variable 'field' in ima_alloc_init_template() (Roberto Sassu)
- use GFP_NOFS flag in ima_alloc_init_template() (Roberto Sassu)
- new variable 'num_fields' in ima_store_template() (Roberto Sassu,
  proposed by Mimi Zohar)
- rename ima_calc_buffer_hash/template_hash() to ima_calc_field_array_hash(),
  something more generic (Mimi, requested by Dmitry)
- sparse error fix - Fengguang Wu
- fix lindent warnings
- always include the field length in the template data length
- include the template field length variable size in the template data length
- include both the template field data and field length in the template digest
  calculation. Simplifies verifying the template digest. (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 19 ++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 75 ++++++++++++-----------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c   | 34 ++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c       | 54 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 22 ++++++++++
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e1f081d65dbf..72d013e190b1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -72,17 +72,11 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
 	struct ima_template_field **fields;
 };
 
-/* IMA inode template definition */
-struct ima_template_data {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
-	char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1];	/* name + \0 */
-};
-
 struct ima_template_entry {
 	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
-	const char *template_name;
-	int template_len;
-	struct ima_template_data template;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
+	u32 template_data_len;
+	struct ima_field_data template_data[0];	/* template related data */
 };
 
 struct ima_queue_entry {
@@ -102,14 +96,16 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
-			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
 void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
+int ima_init_template(void);
 
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
@@ -146,7 +142,6 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
-void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 29dd43de823a..baa348179527 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
-static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
-
 /*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
@@ -30,52 +28,32 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
-	struct ima_template_entry *e;
-	int result = 0;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i, result = 0;
 
-	e = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!e)
+	*entry = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry) + template_desc->num_fields *
+			 sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!*entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(&(e)->template, 0, sizeof(e->template));
-	if (!iint)		/* IMA measurement violation entry */
-		goto out;
-
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct inode *inode;
-		struct {
-			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-		} hash;
+	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
+		u32 len;
 
-		if (!file) {
-			result = -EINVAL;
-			goto out_free;
-		}
+		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
+					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
+		if (result != 0)
+			goto out;
 
-		inode = file_inode(file);
-		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		hash.hdr.length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
-		if (result) {
-			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-					    filename, "collect_data",
-					    "failed", result, 0);
-			goto out_free;
-		} else
-			memcpy(e->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-			       hash.hdr.length);
-	} else
-		memcpy(e->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash->length);
-out:
-	strcpy(e->template.file_name,
-	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX && file != NULL) ?
-	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
-	*entry = e;
+		len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len;
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
+	}
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	return 0;
-out_free:
-	kfree(e);
+out:
+	kfree(*entry);
+	*entry = NULL;
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -101,24 +79,23 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
 	int result;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
-	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
-	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
-
 	if (!violation) {
+		int num_fields = entry->template_desc->num_fields;
+
 		/* this function uses default algo */
 		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
+		result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
+						   num_fields, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-					    entry->template_name, op,
+					    template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 22be23f13b3d..676e0292dfec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -137,26 +137,46 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 }
 
 /*
- * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
+ * Calculate the hash of template data
  */
-static int ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(const void *buf, int len,
-				    struct ima_digest_data *hash,
-				    struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					 int num_fields,
+					 struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+					 struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
 		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
+	int rc, i;
 
 	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
-	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
+					 (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
+					 sizeof(field_data[i].len));
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
+					 field_data[i].len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+			      struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	int rc;
@@ -165,7 +185,7 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	rc = ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+	rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, num_fields, hash, tfm);
 
 	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 414862e1904b..d47a7c86a21d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
  *       char[20]=template digest
  *       32bit-le=template name size
  *       char[n]=template name
+ *       [eventdata length]
  *       eventdata[n]=template specific data
  */
 static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
 	int namelen;
 	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
 	e = qe->entry;
@@ -136,15 +138,22 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
-	namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
+	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
 	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
-	ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
+
+	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
+	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+		ima_putc(m, &e->template_data_len,
+			 sizeof(e->template_data_len));
 
-	/* 5th:  template specific data */
-	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
-			  IMA_SHOW_BINARY);
+	/* 6th:  template specific data */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_BINARY,
+							&e->template_data[i]);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -175,33 +184,13 @@ void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
 }
 
-void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
-{
-	struct ima_template_data *entry = e;
-	int namelen;
-
-	switch (show) {
-	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
-		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
-		break;
-	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
-		ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-		namelen = strlen(entry->file_name);
-		ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
-		ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen);
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
-}
-
 /* print in ascii */
 static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
 	e = qe->entry;
@@ -215,11 +204,18 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
-	seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
+	seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
 
 	/* 4th:  template specific data */
-	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
-			  IMA_SHOW_ASCII);
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+		if (e->template_data[i].len == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_ASCII,
+							&e->template_data[i]);
+	}
+	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index bf38d1af3cfd..1c4cf194592c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -31,6 +31,20 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
+static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+
+static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
+		if (strcmp(defined_templates[i].name, name) == 0)
+			return defined_templates + i;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -110,6 +124,14 @@ static int init_defined_templates(void)
 	return result;
 }
 
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
+{
+	if (!ima_template)
+		ima_template = lookup_template_desc(IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
+
+	return ima_template;
+}
+
 int ima_init_template(void)
 {
 	int result;
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 5278aa52f35003ddafda80b0243b3693f935b134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:38 +0200
Subject: ima: add audit log support for larger hashes

Different files might be signed based on different hash algorithms.
This patch prefixes the audit log measurement hash with the hash
algorithm.

Changelog:
- use generic HASH_ALGO defintions
- use ':' as delimiter between the hash algorithm and the digest
  (Roberto Sassu)
- always include the hash algorithm used when audit-logging a measurement

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index baa348179527..5fcc80695d87 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
+	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
+	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
@@ -287,7 +289,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash);
+	snprintf(algo_hash, sizeof(algo_hash), "%s:%s", algo_name, hash);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash);
 
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From add1c05dceb495a45036d66cdcbb3b2306de26c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:39 +0200
Subject: ima: defer determining the appraisal hash algorithm for 'ima'
 template

The same hash algorithm should be used for calculating the file
data hash for the IMA measurement list, as for appraising the file
data integrity.  (The appraise hash algorithm is stored in the
'security.ima' extended attribute.)  The exception is when the
reference file data hash digest, stored in the extended attribute,
is larger than the one supported by the template.  In this case,
the file data hash needs to be calculated twice, once for the
measurement list and, again, for appraisal.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5e8b1f7becd2..0b11bb49ac4f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
@@ -188,7 +189,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+			xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+	} else
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 4286587dccd43d4f81fa227e413ed7e909895342 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:34 +0200
Subject: ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template

This patch adds a Kconfig option to select the default IMA
measurement list template.  The 'ima' template limited the
filedata hash to 20 bytes and the pathname to 255 charaters.
The 'ima-ng' measurement list template permits larger hash
digests and longer pathnames.

Changelog:
- keep 'select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO' in 'config IMA' section (Kconfig)
  (Roberto Sassu);
- removed trailing whitespaces (Roberto Sassu).
- Lindent fixes

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e6628e783df1..de26cc873ae6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -46,6 +46,31 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default template"
+	default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	depends on IMA
+	help
+	  Select the default IMA measurement template.
+
+	  The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a
+	  hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
+	  limited to 255 characters.  The 'ima-ng' measurement list
+	  template permits both larger hash digests and longer
+	  pathnames.
+
+	config IMA_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima"
+	config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-ng (default)"
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
+	string
+	depends on IMA
+	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
+	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
 	depends on IMA
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 1c4cf194592c..c28ff9bf8f32 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int init_defined_templates(void)
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 {
 	if (!ima_template)
-		ima_template = lookup_template_desc(IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
-
+		ima_template =
+		    lookup_template_desc(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
 	return ima_template;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 9b9d4ce592d283fc4c01da746c02a840c499bb7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:35 +0200
Subject: ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured
 default

This patch allows users to specify from the kernel command line the
template descriptor, among those defined, that will be used to generate
and display measurement entries. If an user specifies a wrong template,
IMA reverts to the template descriptor set in the kernel configuration.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index c28ff9bf8f32..000221419f6c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
  * File: ima_template.c
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima.h"
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
@@ -32,6 +34,35 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+
+static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	int template_len = strlen(str);
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
+	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
+	 */
+	template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
+	if (!template_desc)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
+	 * by the 'ima' template.
+	 */
+	if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
+	    ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
+		pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ima_template = template_desc;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From e7a2ad7eb6f48ad80c70a22dd8167fb34b409466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:37 +0200
Subject: ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms

The IMA measurement list contains two hashes - a template data hash
and a filedata hash.  The template data hash is committed to the TPM,
which is limited, by the TPM v1.2 specification, to 20 bytes.  The
filedata hash is defined as 20 bytes as well.

Now that support for variable length measurement list templates was
added, the filedata hash is not limited to 20 bytes.  This patch adds
Kconfig support for defining larger default filedata hash algorithms
and replacing the builtin default with one specified on the kernel
command line.

<uapi/linux/hash_info.h> contains a list of hash algorithms.  The
Kconfig default hash algorithm is a subset of this list, but any hash
algorithm included in the list can be specified at boot, using the
'ima_hash=' kernel command line option.

Changelog v2:
- update Kconfig

Changelog:
- support hashes that are configured
- use generic HASH_ALGO_ definitions
- add Kconfig support
- hash_setup must be called only once (Dmitry)
- removed trailing whitespaces (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig    | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index de26cc873ae6..351a58ed56ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -71,6 +71,41 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
+	default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	depends on IMA
+	help
+	   Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
+	   list, integrity appraisal and audit log.  The compiled default
+	   hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command
+	   line 'ima_hash=' option.
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+		bool "SHA1 (default)"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA1
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+		bool "SHA256"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+		bool "SHA512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+		bool "WP512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_WP512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
+	string
+	depends on IMA
+	default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+	default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+	default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
 	depends on IMA
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 0b11bb49ac4f..14d4cb557894 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -37,11 +37,32 @@ int ima_appraise;
 #endif
 
 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+static int hash_setup_done;
 
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
-	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
-		ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i;
+
+	if (hash_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
+			ima_hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	hash_setup_done = 1;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
@@ -306,6 +327,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
 	error = ima_init();
 	if (!error)
 		ima_initialized = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 3ea7a56067e663278470c04fd655adf809e72d4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 11:22:51 +0300
Subject: ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr

All files labeled with 'security.ima' hashes, are hashed using the
same hash algorithm.  Changing from one hash algorithm to another,
requires relabeling the filesystem.  This patch defines a new xattr
type, which includes the hash algorithm, permitting different files
to be hashed with different algorithms.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 13 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 116630ca5ff3..734e9468aca0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -45,10 +46,22 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_hash->type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     &iint->ima_hash->type,
-				     1 + iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	int rc, offset;
+	u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+
+	if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+		offset = 1;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	} else {
+		offset = 0;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
+	}
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				   &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
+				   (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
+				   iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -112,15 +125,31 @@ void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 {
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
 
-	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 0 || xattr_len <= 1 + sizeof(*sig))
+	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
 		return;
 
-	sig = (typeof(sig)) xattr_value->digest;
-
-	if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || sig->version != 2)
-		return;
-
-	hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
+			return;
+		hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+		break;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		hash->algo = xattr_value->digest[0];
+		break;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		/* this is for backward compatibility */
+		if (xattr_len == 21) {
+			unsigned int zero = 0;
+			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
+				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+			else
+				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		} else if (xattr_len == 17)
+			hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -153,7 +182,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	const char *op = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
-	int rc = xattr_len;
+	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
@@ -180,17 +209,21 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		hash_start = 1;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
 		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
 			cause = "IMA signature required";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash->length)
+		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
+				iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
 			 */
-			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start],
 				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash->length);
 		else
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 5429ca59125b..2fb5e53e927f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
 	EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
 	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
 };
 
 struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
@@ -66,7 +67,17 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
 struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 algo;
 	u8 length;
-	u8 type;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8 unused;
+			u8 type;
+		} sha1;
+		struct {
+			u8 type;
+			u8 algo;
+		} ng;
+		u8 data[2];
+	} xattr;
 	u8 digest[0];
 } __packed;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From bcbc9b0cf6d8f340a1d166e414f4612b353f7a9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 11:15:00 -0400
Subject: ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature

This patch defines a new template called 'ima-sig', which includes
the file signature in the template data, in addition to the file's
digest and pathname.

A template is composed of a set of fields.  Associated with each
field is an initialization and display function.  This patch defines
a new template field called 'sig', the initialization function
ima_eventsig_init(), and the display function ima_show_template_sig().

This patch modifies the .field_init() function definition to include
the 'security.ima' extended attribute and length.

Changelog:
- remove unused code (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- avoid calling ima_write_template_field_data() unnecesarily (Roberto Sassu)
- rename DATA_FMT_SIG to DATA_FMT_HEX
- cleanup ima_eventsig_init() based on Roberto's comments

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig            |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 10 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          | 14 ++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 12 +++++++++-
 8 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 351a58ed56ab..81a27971d884 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ choice
 		bool "ima"
 	config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
 		bool "ima-ng (default)"
+	config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-sig"
 endchoice
 
 config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
 	depends on IMA
 	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
 
 choice
 	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 72d013e190b1..bf03c6a16cc8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ struct ima_template_field {
 	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
 	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
-			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 };
@@ -134,12 +135,15 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
 			    int *xattr_len);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 5fcc80695d87..0e7540863fc2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
  */
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	int i, result = 0;
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		u32 len;
 
 		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
+					   xattr_value, xattr_len,
 					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
 		if (result != 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -123,7 +125,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename,
+					 NULL, 0, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
@@ -239,7 +242,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
  */
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len)
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -251,7 +256,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename,
+					 xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index f84aec5412f3..15f34bd40abe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	}
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
-					 &entry);
+					 NULL, 0, &entry);
 	if (result < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 14d4cb557894..149ee1119f87 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
-		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 000221419f6c..4e5da990630b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
 	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 7d841448f246..6d66ad6ed265 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ enum data_formats {
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
 	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
-	DATA_FMT_STRING
+	DATA_FMT_STRING,
+	DATA_FMT_HEX
 };
 
 static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
@@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 		buf_ptr += 2;
 		buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
+	case DATA_FMT_HEX:
+		if (!buflen)
+			break;
 		ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen);
 		break;
 	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
@@ -147,6 +151,12 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
+}
+
 static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
 				       struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 				       bool size_limit)
@@ -190,6 +200,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -237,7 +248,8 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
 	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
@@ -295,6 +307,7 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
@@ -306,8 +319,29 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
  */
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
 					 field_data, false);
 }
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
+ */
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		      const unsigned char *filename,
+		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, fmt,
+					   field_data);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 16c5e7810234..63f6b52cb1c2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -24,16 +24,26 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 				 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		      const unsigned char *filename,
+		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 217091dd7a7a1bdac027ddb7c5a25f6ac0b8e241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 08:47:43 -0400
Subject: ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  8 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index b4af4ebc5be2..77ca965ab684 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
 
@@ -21,11 +23,19 @@
 
 static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+	".evm",
+	".module",
+	".ima",
+};
+#else
 static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 	"_evm",
 	"_module",
 	"_ima",
 };
+#endif
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
@@ -35,7 +45,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {
 		keyring[id] =
-			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+		    request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
 		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
 			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
 			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
@@ -56,3 +66,21 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	const struct user_struct *user = cred->user;
+
+	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
+				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, user->uid_keyring);
+	if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
+		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
+	else
+		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n",
+			keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id]));
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 81a27971d884..dad8d4ca2437 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -123,3 +123,11 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
 	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default y
+	help
+	   This option requires that all keys added to the _ima
+	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 734e9468aca0..46353ee517f6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -381,3 +381,14 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	}
 	return result;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static int __init init_ima_keyring(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(init_ima_keyring);
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..b9e7c133734a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -137,12 +137,19 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
 static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 				    int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+
+static int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 34ef7bd3823bf4401bf8f1f855e1bc77b82b1a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2013 16:36:35 -0800
Subject: Revert "ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This reverts commit 217091dd7a7a1bdac027ddb7c5a25f6ac0b8e241, which
caused the following build error:

  security/integrity/digsig.c:70:5: error: redefinition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’
  security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: note: previous definition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’ w
  security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: warning: ‘integrity_init_keyring’ defined but not used

reported by Krzysztof Kolasa. Mimi says:

 "I made the classic mistake of requesting this patch to be upstreamed
  at the last second, rather than waiting until the next open window.

  At this point, the best course would probably be to revert the two
  commits and fix them for the next open window"

Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 30 +-----------------------------
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  8 --------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 -----------
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  7 -------
 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 55 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 77ca965ab684..b4af4ebc5be2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
-#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
 
@@ -23,19 +21,11 @@
 
 static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
-	".evm",
-	".module",
-	".ima",
-};
-#else
 static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 	"_evm",
 	"_module",
 	"_ima",
 };
-#endif
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
@@ -45,7 +35,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {
 		keyring[id] =
-		    request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
 		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
 			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
 			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
@@ -66,21 +56,3 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
-
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
-{
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct user_struct *user = cred->user;
-
-	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
-				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
-				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-				     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, user->uid_keyring);
-	if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
-		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
-	else
-		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n",
-			keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id]));
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index dad8d4ca2437..81a27971d884 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -123,11 +123,3 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
 	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
 	  If unsure, say N.
-
-config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-	bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed"
-	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-	default y
-	help
-	   This option requires that all keys added to the _ima
-	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 46353ee517f6..734e9468aca0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -381,14 +381,3 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	}
 	return result;
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-static int __init init_ima_keyring(void)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
-	return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(init_ima_keyring);
-#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index b9e7c133734a..2fb5e53e927f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -137,19 +137,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
-
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
 static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 				    int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
-
-static int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From b6f8f16f41d92861621b043389ef49de1c52d613 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2013 19:21:39 +0100
Subject: ima: do not include field length in template digest calc for ima
 template

To maintain compatibility with userspace tools, the field length must not
be included in the template digest calculation for the 'ima' template.

Fixes commit: a71dc65 ima: switch to new template management mechanism

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index bf03c6a16cc8..a21cf706d213 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+			      struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
 			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 0e7540863fc2..80374842fe0b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		/* this function uses default algo */
 		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
+						   entry->template_desc,
 						   num_fields, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 676e0292dfec..fdf60def52e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
  * Calculate the hash of template data
  */
 static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					 struct ima_template_desc *td,
 					 int num_fields,
 					 struct ima_digest_data *hash,
 					 struct crypto_shash *tfm)
@@ -160,9 +161,13 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 		return rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
-					 (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
-					 sizeof(field_data[i].len));
+		if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
+			rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
+						(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
+						sizeof(field_data[i].len));
+			if (rc)
+				break;
+		}
 		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
 					 field_data[i].len);
 		if (rc)
@@ -175,7 +180,8 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+			      struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
 			      struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
@@ -185,7 +191,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, num_fields, hash, tfm);
+	rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, desc, num_fields,
+					   hash, tfm);
 
 	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 3e8e5503a33577d89bdb7469b851b11f507bbed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2013 19:21:40 +0100
Subject: ima: do not send field length to userspace for digest of ima template

This patch defines a new value for the 'ima_show_type' enumerator
(IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) to prevent that the field length
is transmitted through the 'binary_runtime_measurements' interface
for the digest field of the 'ima' template.

Fixes commit: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library and new helpers

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c           | 14 +++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c |  6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a21cf706d213..9636e17c9f5d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
-enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
+		     IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
 enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 
 /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index d47a7c86a21d..db01125926bd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
 	int namelen;
 	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	bool is_ima_template = false;
 	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
@@ -145,14 +146,21 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
 
 	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
-	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
+		is_ima_template = true;
+
+	if (!is_ima_template)
 		ima_putc(m, &e->template_data_len,
 			 sizeof(e->template_data_len));
 
 	/* 6th:  template specific data */
 	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
-		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_BINARY,
-							&e->template_data[i]);
+		enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY;
+		struct ima_template_field *field = e->template_desc->fields[i];
+
+		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
+			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+		field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 6d66ad6ed265..c38adcc910fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
 					  enum data_formats datafmt,
 					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+	if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
+		ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+
 	if (!field_data->len)
 		return;
+
 	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
 }
 
@@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
 		ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
 		break;
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
 		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
 		break;
 	default:
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From dbc335d2dc3c437649eb6b39f4e9aee2a13eb0af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 20:18:52 +0100
Subject: ima: make a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This patch makes a copy of the 'template_fmt' function argument so that
the latter will not be modified by strsep(), which does the splitting by
replacing the given separator with '\0'.

 IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
 Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address 0000000000842000
 Oops: 0004 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc2-00098-g3ce1217d6cd5 #17
 task: 000000003ffa0000 ti: 000000003ff84000 task.ti: 000000003ff84000
 Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000000044bf88 (strsep+0x7c/0xa0)
            R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 EA:3
 Krnl GPRS: 000000000000007c 000000000000007c 000000003ff87d90 0000000000821fd8
            0000000000000000 000000000000007c 0000000000aa37e0 0000000000aa9008
            0000000000000051 0000000000a114d8 0000000100000002 0000000000842bde
            0000000000842bdf 00000000006f97f0 000000000040062c 000000003ff87cf0
 Krnl Code: 000000000044bf7c: a7f4000a           brc     15,44bf90
            000000000044bf80: b90200cc           ltgr    %r12,%r12
           #000000000044bf84: a7840006           brc     8,44bf90
           >000000000044bf88: 9200c000           mvi     0(%r12),0
            000000000044bf8c: 41c0c001           la      %r12,1(%r12)
            000000000044bf90: e3c020000024       stg     %r12,0(%r2)
            000000000044bf96: b904002b           lgr     %r2,%r11
            000000000044bf9a: ebbcf0700004       lmg     %r11,%r12,112(%r15)
 Call Trace:
 ([<00000000004005fe>] ima_init_template+0xa2/0x1bc)
  [<0000000000a7c896>] ima_init+0x7a/0xa8
  [<0000000000a7c938>] init_ima+0x24/0x40
  [<00000000001000e8>] do_one_initcall+0x68/0x128
  [<0000000000a4eb56>] kernel_init_freeable+0x20a/0x2b4
  [<00000000006a1ff4>] kernel_init+0x30/0x178
  [<00000000006b69fe>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
  [<00000000006b69f8>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc
 Last Breaking-Event-Address:
  [<000000000044bf42>] strsep+0x36/0xa0

Fixes commit: adf53a7 ima: new templates management mechanism

Changelog v1:
- make template_fmt 'const char *' (reported-by James Morris)
- fix kstrdup memory leak (reported-by James Morris)

Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 4e5da990630b..913e1927f916 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
+static int template_fmt_size(const char *template_fmt)
 {
 	char c;
 	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
@@ -106,23 +106,28 @@ static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
 	return j + 1;
 }
 
-static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
+static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
-	char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt;
+	char *c, *template_fmt_copy;
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
 	int i, result = 0;
 
 	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
+	template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (template_fmt_copy == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (*fields == NULL) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
+	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_copy, "|")) != NULL &&
 	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
 		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
 
@@ -133,10 +138,12 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
 		(*fields)[i] = f;
 	}
 	*num_fields = i;
-	return 0;
 out:
-	kfree(*fields);
-	*fields = NULL;
+	if (result < 0) {
+		kfree(*fields);
+		*fields = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree(template_fmt_copy);
 	return result;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From af91706d5ddecb4a9858cca9e90d463037cfd498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2013 14:40:41 +0100
Subject: ima: store address of template_fmt_copy in a pointer before calling
 strsep

This patch stores the address of the 'template_fmt_copy' variable in a new
variable, called 'template_fmt_ptr', so that the latter is passed as an
argument of strsep() instead of the former. This modification is needed
in order to correctly free the memory area referenced by
'template_fmt_copy' (strsep() modifies the pointer of the passed string).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 913e1927f916..635695f6a185 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
-	char *c, *template_fmt_copy;
+	char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
 	int i, result = 0;
 
@@ -127,7 +127,9 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_copy, "|")) != NULL &&
+
+	template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
+	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
 	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
 		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From 09ae6345721afbb7cf3e0920209b140cbe7bff0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2013 00:05:20 +0100
Subject: ima: Do not free 'entry' before it is initialized

7bc5f447ce9d0 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to
API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a
bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip).

So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we
should not attempt to free it.

Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971)

Fixes: 7bc5f447ce9d0 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 15f34bd40abe..76b8e2c4fd38 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
-			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.2


From a7ed7c60e14df5b986f93549717235b882643e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2013 19:40:34 +0100
Subject: ima: properly free ima_template_entry structures

The new templates management mechanism records information associated
to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it
available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry'
structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA).

Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length
varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field),
it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a
'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong.

This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which
walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory
referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for
the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree()
that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument
with calls to the new function.

Fixes: a71dc65: ima: switch to new template management mechanism
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/integrity')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 9636e17c9f5d..0356e1d437ca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 80374842fe0b..c38bbce8c6a6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -21,6 +21,19 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
+/*
+ * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
+ */
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
+		kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
+
+	kfree(entry);
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
@@ -37,6 +50,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!*entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
 		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
 		u32 len;
@@ -51,10 +65,9 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
 		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
 	}
-	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	return 0;
 out:
-	kfree(*entry);
+	ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
 	*entry = NULL;
 	return result;
 }
@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	}
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 err_out:
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 			    op, cause, result, 0);
@@ -269,7 +282,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }
 
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 76b8e2c4fd38..37122768554a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 	return;
 err_out:
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
-- 
cgit v1.2.2