From 334c29a64507dda187565dd0db0403de3d70ec8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2006 19:31:51 -0800 Subject: [GENETLINK]: Move command capabilities to flags. This patch moves command capabilities to command flags. Other than being cleaner, saves several bytes. We increment the nlctrl version so as to signal to user space that to not expect the attributes. We will try to be careful not to do this too often ;-> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/genetlink.c | 18 ++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c index b9b03747c1f3..b5df749cba8f 100644 --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c @@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ int genl_register_ops(struct genl_family *family, struct genl_ops *ops) goto errout; } + if (ops->dumpit) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DO; + if (ops->doit) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP; + if (ops->policy) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL; + genl_lock(); list_add_tail(&ops->ops_list, &family->ops_list); genl_unlock(); @@ -387,7 +394,7 @@ static void genl_rcv(struct sock *sk, int len) static struct genl_family genl_ctrl = { .id = GENL_ID_CTRL, .name = "nlctrl", - .version = 0x1, + .version = 0x2, .maxattr = CTRL_ATTR_MAX, }; @@ -425,15 +432,6 @@ static int ctrl_fill_info(struct genl_family *family, u32 pid, u32 seq, NLA_PUT_U32(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_ID, ops->cmd); NLA_PUT_U32(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_FLAGS, ops->flags); - if (ops->policy) - NLA_PUT_FLAG(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_POLICY); - - if (ops->doit) - NLA_PUT_FLAG(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_DOIT); - - if (ops->dumpit) - NLA_PUT_FLAG(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_DUMPIT); - nla_nest_end(skb, nest); } -- cgit v1.2.2 From 1b6651f1bf2453d593478aa88af267f057fd73e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2006 19:59:00 -0800 Subject: [XFRM]: Use output device disable_xfrm for forwarded packets Currently the behaviour of disable_xfrm is inconsistent between locally generated and forwarded packets. For locally generated packets disable_xfrm disables the policy lookup if it is set on the output device, for forwarded traffic however it looks at the input device. This makes it impossible to disable xfrm on all devices but a dummy device and use normal routing to direct traffic to that device. Always use the output device when checking disable_xfrm. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 9f3924c4905e..11c167118e87 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@ static inline int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb, #endif if (in_dev->cnf.no_policy) rth->u.dst.flags |= DST_NOPOLICY; - if (in_dev->cnf.no_xfrm) + if (out_dev->cnf.no_xfrm) rth->u.dst.flags |= DST_NOXFRM; rth->fl.fl4_dst = daddr; rth->rt_dst = daddr; -- cgit v1.2.2 From baf5d743d1b8783fdbd5c1260ada2926e5bbaaee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2006 20:02:37 -0800 Subject: [XFRM] Optimize policy dumping This change optimizes the dumping of Security policies. 1) Before this change .. speedopolis:~# time ./ip xf pol real 0m22.274s user 0m0.000s sys 0m22.269s 2) Turn off sub-policies speedopolis:~# ./ip xf pol real 0m13.496s user 0m0.000s sys 0m13.493s i suppose the above is to be expected 3) With this change .. speedopolis:~# time ./ip x policy real 0m7.901s user 0m0.008s sys 0m7.896s --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index f6c77bd36fdd..4f04222698d9 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -860,33 +860,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_flush); int xfrm_policy_walk(u8 type, int (*func)(struct xfrm_policy *, int, int, void*), void *data) { - struct xfrm_policy *pol; + struct xfrm_policy *pol, *last = NULL; struct hlist_node *entry; - int dir, count, error; + int dir, last_dir = 0, count, error; read_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock); count = 0; - for (dir = 0; dir < 2*XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) { - struct hlist_head *table = xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].table; - int i; - - hlist_for_each_entry(pol, entry, - &xfrm_policy_inexact[dir], bydst) { - if (pol->type == type) - count++; - } - for (i = xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].hmask; i >= 0; i--) { - hlist_for_each_entry(pol, entry, table + i, bydst) { - if (pol->type == type) - count++; - } - } - } - - if (count == 0) { - error = -ENOENT; - goto out; - } for (dir = 0; dir < 2*XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) { struct hlist_head *table = xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].table; @@ -896,21 +875,37 @@ int xfrm_policy_walk(u8 type, int (*func)(struct xfrm_policy *, int, int, void*) &xfrm_policy_inexact[dir], bydst) { if (pol->type != type) continue; - error = func(pol, dir % XFRM_POLICY_MAX, --count, data); - if (error) - goto out; + if (last) { + error = func(last, last_dir % XFRM_POLICY_MAX, + count, data); + if (error) + goto out; + } + last = pol; + last_dir = dir; + count++; } for (i = xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].hmask; i >= 0; i--) { hlist_for_each_entry(pol, entry, table + i, bydst) { if (pol->type != type) continue; - error = func(pol, dir % XFRM_POLICY_MAX, --count, data); - if (error) - goto out; + if (last) { + error = func(last, last_dir % XFRM_POLICY_MAX, + count, data); + if (error) + goto out; + } + last = pol; + last_dir = dir; + count++; } } } - error = 0; + if (count == 0) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + error = func(last, last_dir % XFRM_POLICY_MAX, 0, data); out: read_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock); return error; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 94b9bb5480e73cec4552b19fc3f809742b4ebf67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2006 20:03:35 -0800 Subject: [XFRM] Optimize SA dumping Same comments as in "[XFRM] Optimize policy dumping" The numbers are (20K SAs): --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index da54a64ccfa3..a14c88bf17f0 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ int xfrm_state_walk(u8 proto, int (*func)(struct xfrm_state *, int, void*), void *data) { int i; - struct xfrm_state *x; + struct xfrm_state *x, *last = NULL; struct hlist_node *entry; int count = 0; int err = 0; @@ -1107,24 +1107,22 @@ int xfrm_state_walk(u8 proto, int (*func)(struct xfrm_state *, int, void*), spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); for (i = 0; i <= xfrm_state_hmask; i++) { hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, xfrm_state_bydst+i, bydst) { - if (xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, proto)) - count++; + if (!xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, proto)) + continue; + if (last) { + err = func(last, count, data); + if (err) + goto out; + } + last = x; + count++; } } if (count == 0) { err = -ENOENT; goto out; } - - for (i = 0; i <= xfrm_state_hmask; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, xfrm_state_bydst+i, bydst) { - if (!xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, proto)) - continue; - err = func(x, --count, data); - if (err) - goto out; - } - } + err = func(last, 0, data); out: spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); return err; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 7cf4c1a5fd13820d7591179c0b925d739b2be9a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kazunori MIYAZAWA Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2006 13:21:22 +1000 Subject: [IPSEC]: Add support for AES-XCBC-MAC The glue of xfrm. Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c index 5a0dbeb6bbe8..6b381fc0383d 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c @@ -119,6 +119,23 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc aalg_list[] = { .sadb_alg_maxbits = 160 } }, +{ + .name = "xcbc(aes)", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 96, + .icv_fullbits = 128, + } + }, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 128, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 128 + } +}, }; static struct xfrm_algo_desc ealg_list[] = { -- cgit v1.2.2 From 74c9c0c17dea729d6089c0c82762babd02e65f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Mishin Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:43:50 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: Fix {ip,ip6,arp}_tables hook validation Commit 590bdf7fd2292b47c428111cb1360e312eff207e introduced a regression in match/target hook validation. mark_source_chains builds a bitmask for each rule representing the hooks it can be reached from, which is then used by the matches and targets to make sure they are only called from valid hooks. The patch moved the match/target specific validation before the mark_source_chains call, at which point the mask is always zero. This patch returns back to the old order and moves the standard checks to mark_source_chains. This allows to get rid of a special case for standard targets as a nice side-effect. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 48 ++++++++++++++--------------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 68 +++++++++++++++-------------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 59 ++++++++++++++--------------------- 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 413c2d0a1f3d..71b76ade00e1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -375,6 +375,13 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->arp)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last * big jump. */ @@ -404,6 +411,14 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } + /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -426,8 +441,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, static inline int standard_check(const struct arpt_entry_target *t, unsigned int max_offset) { - struct arpt_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - /* Check standard info. */ if (t->u.target_size != ARPT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct arpt_standard_target))) { @@ -437,18 +450,6 @@ static inline int standard_check(const struct arpt_entry_target *t, return 0; } - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) { - duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } return 1; } @@ -627,18 +628,20 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) { + duprintf("Looping hook\n"); + return -ELOOP; + } + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) { - duprintf("Looping hook\n"); - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ @@ -647,9 +650,6 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name, memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size); } - return 0; -cleanup: - ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); return ret; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 8a455439b128..2bddf8491982 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -401,6 +401,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->ip)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last big jump. */ do { @@ -438,6 +445,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -469,27 +483,6 @@ cleanup_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, unsigned int *i) return 0; } -static inline int -standard_check(const struct ipt_entry_target *t, - unsigned int max_offset) -{ - struct ipt_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - - /* Check standard info. */ - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) { - duprintf("ipt_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("ipt_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - static inline int check_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, const char *name, @@ -576,12 +569,7 @@ check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size, if (ret) goto err; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ipt_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, size)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", @@ -718,17 +706,19 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) + return -ELOOP; + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; + } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { @@ -736,9 +726,6 @@ translate_table(const char *name, memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size); } - return 0; -cleanup: - IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); return ret; } @@ -1591,18 +1578,13 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, if (ret) goto err; - ret = -EINVAL; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ipt_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, *size)) - goto err; - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, de, target, t->data, de->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n", t->u.kernel.target->name); - goto err; + ret = -EINVAL; } - ret = 0; err: return ret; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index f63fb86d7c7b..4eec4b3988b8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -440,6 +440,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->ipv6)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last big jump. */ do { @@ -477,6 +484,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -508,27 +522,6 @@ cleanup_match(struct ip6t_entry_match *m, unsigned int *i) return 0; } -static inline int -standard_check(const struct ip6t_entry_target *t, - unsigned int max_offset) -{ - struct ip6t_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - - /* Check standard info. */ - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) { - duprintf("ip6t_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("ip6t_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - static inline int check_match(struct ip6t_entry_match *m, const char *name, @@ -616,12 +609,7 @@ check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size, if (ret) goto err; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ip6t_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, size)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", @@ -758,17 +746,19 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) + return -ELOOP; + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; + } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { @@ -777,9 +767,6 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } return 0; -cleanup: - IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); - return ret; } /* Gets counters. */ -- cgit v1.2.2 From f6677f4312ee74f8ca68c4cc4060465607b72b41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Mishin Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:44:07 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: Fix iptables compat hook validation In compat mode, matches and targets valid hooks checks always successful due to not initialized e->comefrom field yet. This patch separates this checks from translation code and moves them after mark_source_chains() call, where these marks are initialized. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin Signed-off-by; Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 2bddf8491982..0ff2956d35e5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1516,25 +1516,8 @@ static inline int compat_copy_match_from_user(struct ipt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr, compat_uint_t *size, const char *name, const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask) { - struct ipt_entry_match *dm; - struct ipt_match *match; - int ret; - - dm = (struct ipt_entry_match *)*dstptr; - match = m->u.kernel.match; xt_compat_match_from_user(m, dstptr, size); - - ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, dm->u.match_size - sizeof(*dm), - name, hookmask, ip->proto, - ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); - if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry - && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, dm->data, - hookmask)) { - duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", - m->u.kernel.match->name); - ret = -EINVAL; - } - return ret; + return 0; } static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, @@ -1556,7 +1539,7 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_copy_match_from_user, dstptr, size, name, &de->ip, de->comefrom); if (ret) - goto err; + return ret; de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size); t = ipt_get_target(e); target = t->u.kernel.target; @@ -1569,26 +1552,62 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h]) newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size; } + return ret; +} + +static inline int compat_check_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, const char *name, + const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask) +{ + struct ipt_match *match; + int ret; + + match = m->u.kernel.match; + ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, m->u.match_size - sizeof(*m), + name, hookmask, ip->proto, + ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); + if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry + && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, m->data, + hookmask)) { + duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n", + m->u.kernel.match->name); + ret = -EINVAL; + } + return ret; +} + +static inline int compat_check_target(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name) +{ + struct ipt_entry_target *t; + struct ipt_target *target; + int ret; - t = ipt_get_target(de); + t = ipt_get_target(e); target = t->u.kernel.target; ret = xt_check_target(target, AF_INET, t->u.target_size - sizeof(*t), name, e->comefrom, e->ip.proto, e->ip.invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); - if (ret) - goto err; - - if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry - && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, de, target, - t->data, de->comefrom)) { + if (!ret && t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, + t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n", t->u.kernel.target->name); ret = -EINVAL; } -err: return ret; } +static inline int compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name) +{ + int ret; + + ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_check_match, name, &e->ip, + e->comefrom); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return compat_check_target(e, name); +} + static int translate_compat_table(const char *name, unsigned int valid_hooks, @@ -1677,6 +1696,11 @@ translate_compat_table(const char *name, if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1)) goto free_newinfo; + ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry1, newinfo->size, compat_check_entry, + name); + if (ret) + goto free_newinfo; + /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1) -- cgit v1.2.2 From ece006416d4fb472f4d2114feede5665cff971b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yasuyuki Kozakai Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:44:57 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: Don't try to find clashed expectation The original code continues loop to find expectation in list if the master conntrack of the found expectation is unconfirmed. But it never success in that case, because nf_conntrack_expect_related() never insert clashed expectation to the list. This stops loop in that case. Signed-off-by: Yasuyuki Kozakai Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 588d37937046..7df8f9a2f863 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -91,25 +91,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_conntrack_expect_find_get); struct nf_conntrack_expect * find_expectation(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { - struct nf_conntrack_expect *i; + struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp; + + exp = __nf_conntrack_expect_find(tuple); + if (!exp) + return NULL; - list_for_each_entry(i, &nf_conntrack_expect_list, list) { /* If master is not in hash table yet (ie. packet hasn't left this machine yet), how can other end know about expected? Hence these are not the droids you are looking for (if master ct never got confirmed, we'd hold a reference to it and weird things would happen to future packets). */ - if (nf_ct_tuple_mask_cmp(tuple, &i->tuple, &i->mask) - && nf_ct_is_confirmed(i->master)) { - if (i->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { - atomic_inc(&i->use); - return i; - } else if (del_timer(&i->timeout)) { - nf_ct_unlink_expect(i); - return i; - } - } + if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(exp->master)) + return NULL; + + if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { + atomic_inc(&exp->use); + return exp; + } else if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { + nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp); + return exp; } + return NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.2 From f216f082b2b37c4943f1e7c393e2786648d48f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart De Schuymer Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:45:21 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: bridge netfilter: deal with martians correctly The attached patch resolves an issue where a IP DNATed packet with a martian source is forwarded while it's better to drop it. It also resolves messages complaining about ip forwarding being disabled while it's actually enabled. Thanks to lepton for reporting this problem. This is probably a candidate for the -stable release. Signed-off-by: Bart De Schuymer Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_netfilter.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c index ac47ba2ba028..bd221ad52eaf 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -221,10 +222,14 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void) * * Otherwise, the packet is considered to be routed and we just * change the destination MAC address so that the packet will - * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed. + * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed. For a redirected + * packet, ip_route_input() will give back the localhost as output device, + * which differs from the bridge device. * * Let us now consider the case that ip_route_input() fails: * + * This can be because the destination address is martian, in which case + * the packet will be dropped. * After a "echo '0' > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" ip_route_input() * will fail, while __ip_route_output_key() will return success. The source * address for __ip_route_output_key() is set to zero, so __ip_route_output_key @@ -237,7 +242,8 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void) * * --Lennert, 20020411 * --Bart, 20020416 (updated) - * --Bart, 20021007 (updated) */ + * --Bart, 20021007 (updated) + * --Bart, 20062711 (updated) */ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OTHERHOST) { @@ -264,15 +270,15 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) struct net_device *dev = skb->dev; struct iphdr *iph = skb->nh.iph; struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = skb->nf_bridge; + int err; if (nf_bridge->mask & BRNF_PKT_TYPE) { skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OTHERHOST; nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_PKT_TYPE; } nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_NF_BRIDGE_PREROUTING; - if (dnat_took_place(skb)) { - if (ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev)) { + if ((err = ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev))) { struct rtable *rt; struct flowi fl = { .nl_u = { @@ -283,19 +289,33 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) }, .proto = 0, }; + struct in_device *in_dev = in_dev_get(dev); + + /* If err equals -EHOSTUNREACH the error is due to a + * martian destination or due to the fact that + * forwarding is disabled. For most martian packets, + * ip_route_output_key() will fail. It won't fail for 2 types of + * martian destinations: loopback destinations and destination + * 0.0.0.0. In both cases the packet will be dropped because the + * destination is the loopback device and not the bridge. */ + if (err != -EHOSTUNREACH || !in_dev || IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev)) + goto free_skb; if (!ip_route_output_key(&rt, &fl)) { /* - Bridged-and-DNAT'ed traffic doesn't - * require ip_forwarding. - * - Deal with redirected traffic. */ - if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev || - rt->rt_type == RTN_LOCAL) { + * require ip_forwarding. */ + if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev) { skb->dst = (struct dst_entry *)rt; goto bridged_dnat; } + /* we are sure that forwarding is disabled, so printing + * this message is no problem. Note that the packet could + * still have a martian destination address, in which case + * the packet could be dropped even if forwarding were enabled */ __br_dnat_complain(); dst_release((struct dst_entry *)rt); } +free_skb: kfree_skb(skb); return 0; } else { -- cgit v1.2.2 From 5c804bfdcca2593422dd6edc2d7db4dba645543c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:46:13 -0800 Subject: [NET_SCHED]: cls_fw: fix NULL pointer dereference When the first fw classifier is initialized, there is a small window between the ->init() and ->change() calls, during which the classifier is active but not entirely set up and tp->root is still NULL (->init() does nothing). When a packet is queued during this window a NULL pointer dereference occurs in fw_classify() when trying to dereference head->mask; Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/cls_fw.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_fw.c b/net/sched/cls_fw.c index f59a2c4aa039..c797d6ada7de 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_fw.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_fw.c @@ -101,9 +101,10 @@ static int fw_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct fw_head *head = (struct fw_head*)tp->root; struct fw_filter *f; int r; - u32 id = skb->mark & head->mask; + u32 id = skb->mark; if (head != NULL) { + id &= head->mask; for (f=head->ht[fw_hash(id)]; f; f=f->next) { if (f->id == id) { *res = f->res; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 9a217a1c7e7f36ec4996314d64267dd711dbd9bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:47:21 -0800 Subject: [IPV6]: Repair IPv6 Fragments The commit "[IPV6]: Use kmemdup" (commit-id: af879cc704372ef762584e916129d19ffb39e844) broke IPv6 fragments. Bug was spotted by Yasuyuki Kozakai . Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index e05ecbb1412d..e9212c7ff5cf 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -624,13 +624,13 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = NULL; /* BUILD HEADER */ + *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb->nh.raw, hlen, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!tmp_hdr) { IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS); return -ENOMEM; } - *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; __skb_pull(skb, hlen); fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr)); skb->nh.raw = __skb_push(skb, hlen); -- cgit v1.2.2 From 4e33fa14faecc150e97c0e4f2320745bdc7b7112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahide NAKAMURA Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 13:48:27 -0800 Subject: [IPV6] RAW: Don't release unlocked sock. When user builds IPv6 header and send it through raw socket, kernel tries to release unlocked sock. (Kernel log shows "BUG: bad unlock balance detected" with enabled debug option.) The lock is held only for non-hdrincl sock in this function then this patch fix to do nothing about lock for hdrincl one. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/raw.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c index c2e629d6aea4..4ae1b19ada5d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/raw.c +++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c @@ -854,7 +854,8 @@ back_from_confirm: } done: dst_release(dst); - release_sock(sk); + if (!inet->hdrincl) + release_sock(sk); out: fl6_sock_release(flowlabel); return err<0?err:len; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 48d4ed7a86d70a7e381cc8e48a97312182093ce2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2006 20:06:25 -0800 Subject: [GENETLINK]: Fix misplaced command flags. The command flags for dump and do were swapped.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/genetlink.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c index b5df749cba8f..548e4e6e698f 100644 --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c @@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ int genl_register_ops(struct genl_family *family, struct genl_ops *ops) } if (ops->dumpit) - ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DO; - if (ops->doit) ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP; + if (ops->doit) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DO; if (ops->policy) ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL; -- cgit v1.2.2 From e694ba4428d53882489c07fd7d60c39b3e164dd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeet Chaudhuri Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2006 20:08:45 -0800 Subject: [IrDA]: Incorrect TTP header reservation We must reserve SAR + MAX_HEADER bytes for IrLMP to fit in. Patch from Jeet Chaudhuri Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/irda/irttp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/irda/irttp.c b/net/irda/irttp.c index 252f11012566..03504f3e4990 100644 --- a/net/irda/irttp.c +++ b/net/irda/irttp.c @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ int irttp_connect_request(struct tsap_cb *self, __u8 dtsap_sel, return -ENOMEM; /* Reserve space for MUX_CONTROL and LAP header */ - skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER); + skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER + TTP_SAR_HEADER); } else { tx_skb = userdata; /* @@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ int irttp_connect_response(struct tsap_cb *self, __u32 max_sdu_size, return -ENOMEM; /* Reserve space for MUX_CONTROL and LAP header */ - skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER); + skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER + TTP_SAR_HEADER); } else { tx_skb = userdata; /* -- cgit v1.2.2 From 161a09e737f0761ca064ee6a907313402f7a54b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joy Latten Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2006 13:11:54 -0600 Subject: audit: Add auditing to ipsec An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA or ipsec policy is created/deleted. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/key/af_key.c | 27 +++++++++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 17 ++++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 33 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 0e1dbfbb9b10..5dd5094659a1 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -1420,6 +1421,9 @@ static int pfkey_add(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hdr, else err = xfrm_state_update(x); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) { x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD; __xfrm_state_put(x); @@ -1460,8 +1464,12 @@ static int pfkey_delete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *h err = -EPERM; goto out; } - + err = xfrm_state_delete(x); + + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) goto out; @@ -1637,12 +1645,15 @@ static int pfkey_flush(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hd { unsigned proto; struct km_event c; + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; proto = pfkey_satype2proto(hdr->sadb_msg_satype); if (proto == 0) return -EINVAL; - xfrm_state_flush(proto); + audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context); + audit_info.secid = 0; + xfrm_state_flush(proto, &audit_info); c.data.proto = proto; c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq; c.pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; @@ -2205,6 +2216,9 @@ static int pfkey_spdadd(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *h err = xfrm_policy_insert(pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, xp, hdr->sadb_msg_type != SADB_X_SPDUPDATE); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSPD, err ? 0 : 1, xp, NULL); + if (err) goto out; @@ -2282,6 +2296,10 @@ static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, &sel, tmp.security, 1); security_xfrm_policy_free(&tmp); + + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, (xp) ? 1 : 0, xp, NULL); + if (xp == NULL) return -ENOENT; @@ -2416,8 +2434,11 @@ static int key_notify_policy_flush(struct km_event *c) static int pfkey_spdflush(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hdr, void **ext_hdrs) { struct km_event c; + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; - xfrm_policy_flush(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN); + audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context); + audit_info.secid = 0; + xfrm_policy_flush(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, &audit_info); c.data.type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN; c.event = XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY; c.pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 4f04222698d9..47c13649bac1 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "xfrm_hash.h" @@ -804,7 +805,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_byid); -void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type) +void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info) { int dir; @@ -824,6 +825,9 @@ void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type) hlist_del(&pol->byidx); write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid, audit_info->secid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, 1, pol, NULL); + xfrm_policy_kill(pol); killed++; @@ -842,6 +846,11 @@ void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type) hlist_del(&pol->byidx); write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid, + audit_info->secid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, 1, + pol, NULL); + xfrm_policy_kill(pol); killed++; @@ -1977,6 +1986,115 @@ int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct xfrm_dst *first, EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_bundle_ok); +/* Audit addition and deletion of SAs and ipsec policy */ + +void xfrm_audit_log(uid_t auid, u32 sid, int type, int result, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + + char *secctx; + u32 secctx_len; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *sctx = NULL; + struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; + int family; + extern int audit_enabled; + + if (audit_enabled == 0) + return; + + audit_buf = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, type); + if (audit_buf == NULL) + return; + + switch(type) { + case AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSA: + audit_log_format(audit_buf, "SAD add: auid=%u", auid); + break; + case AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA: + audit_log_format(audit_buf, "SAD delete: auid=%u", auid); + break; + case AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSPD: + audit_log_format(audit_buf, "SPD add: auid=%u", auid); + break; + case AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD: + audit_log_format(audit_buf, "SPD delete: auid=%u", auid); + break; + default: + return; + } + + if (sid != 0 && + security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx); + else + audit_log_task_context(audit_buf); + + if (xp) { + family = xp->selector.family; + if (xp->security) + sctx = xp->security; + } else { + family = x->props.family; + if (x->security) + sctx = x->security; + } + + if (sctx) + audit_log_format(audit_buf, + " sec_alg=%u sec_doi=%u sec_obj=%s", + sctx->ctx_alg, sctx->ctx_doi, sctx->ctx_str); + + switch(family) { + case AF_INET: + { + struct in_addr saddr, daddr; + if (xp) { + saddr.s_addr = xp->selector.saddr.a4; + daddr.s_addr = xp->selector.daddr.a4; + } else { + saddr.s_addr = x->props.saddr.a4; + daddr.s_addr = x->id.daddr.a4; + } + audit_log_format(audit_buf, + " src=%u.%u.%u.%u dst=%u.%u.%u.%u", + NIPQUAD(saddr), NIPQUAD(daddr)); + } + break; + case AF_INET6: + { + struct in6_addr saddr6, daddr6; + if (xp) { + memcpy(&saddr6, xp->selector.saddr.a6, + sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + memcpy(&daddr6, xp->selector.daddr.a6, + sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + } else { + memcpy(&saddr6, x->props.saddr.a6, + sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + memcpy(&daddr6, x->id.daddr.a6, + sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + } + audit_log_format(audit_buf, + " src=" NIP6_FMT "dst=" NIP6_FMT, + NIP6(saddr6), NIP6(daddr6)); + } + break; + } + + if (x) + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%lu(0x%lx) protocol=%s", + (unsigned long)ntohl(x->id.spi), + (unsigned long)ntohl(x->id.spi), + x->id.proto == IPPROTO_AH ? "AH" : + (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_ESP ? + "ESP" : "IPCOMP")); + + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result); + audit_log_end(audit_buf); +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_audit_log); + int xfrm_policy_register_afinfo(struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo) { int err = 0; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index a14c88bf17f0..d5d3a6f1f609 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "xfrm_hash.h" @@ -238,6 +239,7 @@ static void xfrm_timer_handler(unsigned long data) unsigned long now = (unsigned long)xtime.tv_sec; long next = LONG_MAX; int warn = 0; + int err = 0; spin_lock(&x->lock); if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_DEAD) @@ -295,9 +297,14 @@ expired: next = 2; goto resched; } - if (!__xfrm_state_delete(x) && x->id.spi) + + err = __xfrm_state_delete(x); + if (!err && x->id.spi) km_state_expired(x, 1, 0); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + out: spin_unlock(&x->lock); } @@ -384,9 +391,10 @@ int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_delete); -void xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto) +void xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info) { int i; + int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); for (i = 0; i <= xfrm_state_hmask; i++) { @@ -400,6 +408,11 @@ restart: spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); xfrm_state_delete(x); + err = xfrm_state_delete(x); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid, + audit_info->secid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, + err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); xfrm_state_put(x); spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 311205ffa775..e5372b11fc8f 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) #include #endif +#include static int verify_one_alg(struct rtattr **xfrma, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type) { @@ -454,6 +455,9 @@ static int xfrm_add_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma) else err = xfrm_state_update(x); + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) { x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD; __xfrm_state_put(x); @@ -523,6 +527,10 @@ static int xfrm_del_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma) } err = xfrm_state_delete(x); + + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) goto out; @@ -1030,6 +1038,9 @@ static int xfrm_add_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfr * a type XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY - JHS */ excl = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY; err = xfrm_policy_insert(p->dir, xp, excl); + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, err ? 0 : 1, xp, NULL); + if (err) { security_xfrm_policy_free(xp); kfree(xp); @@ -1257,6 +1268,10 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfr xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(type, p->dir, &p->sel, tmp.security, delete); security_xfrm_policy_free(&tmp); } + if (delete) + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, (xp) ? 1 : 0, xp, NULL); + if (xp == NULL) return -ENOENT; @@ -1291,8 +1306,11 @@ static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma { struct km_event c; struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; - xfrm_state_flush(p->proto); + audit_info.loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid; + audit_info.secid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid; + xfrm_state_flush(p->proto, &audit_info); c.data.proto = p->proto; c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type; c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; @@ -1442,12 +1460,15 @@ static int xfrm_flush_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **x struct km_event c; u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN; int err; + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, (struct rtattr **)xfrma); if (err) return err; - xfrm_policy_flush(type); + audit_info.loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid; + audit_info.secid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid; + xfrm_policy_flush(type, &audit_info); c.data.type = type; c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type; c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; @@ -1502,6 +1523,9 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void * err = 0; if (up->hard) { xfrm_policy_delete(xp, p->dir); + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, 1, xp, NULL); + } else { // reset the timers here? printk("Dont know what to do with soft policy expire\n"); @@ -1533,8 +1557,11 @@ static int xfrm_add_sa_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void ** goto out; km_state_expired(x, ue->hard, current->pid); - if (ue->hard) + if (ue->hard) { __xfrm_state_delete(x); + xfrm_audit_log(NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, 1, NULL, x); + } out: spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); xfrm_state_put(x); -- cgit v1.2.2 From c9204d9ca79baac564b49d36d0228a69d7ded084 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joy Latten Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2006 15:50:43 -0600 Subject: audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n Disables auditing in ipsec when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is disabled in the kernel. Also includes a bug fix for xfrm_state.c as a result of original ipsec audit patch. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++ net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 47c13649bac1..140bb9b384ac 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -1986,6 +1986,7 @@ int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct xfrm_dst *first, EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_bundle_ok); +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL /* Audit addition and deletion of SAs and ipsec policy */ void xfrm_audit_log(uid_t auid, u32 sid, int type, int result, @@ -2094,6 +2095,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_log(uid_t auid, u32 sid, int type, int result, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_audit_log); +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ int xfrm_policy_register_afinfo(struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo) { diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index d5d3a6f1f609..fdb08d9f34aa 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ restart: xfrm_state_hold(x); spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); - xfrm_state_delete(x); err = xfrm_state_delete(x); xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid, audit_info->secid, -- cgit v1.2.2 From 26db167702756d0022f8ea5f1f30cad3018cfe31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2006 23:45:15 -0800 Subject: [IPSEC]: Fix inetpeer leak in ipv4 xfrm dst entries. We grab a reference to the route's inetpeer entry but forget to release it in xfrm4_dst_destroy(). Bug discovered by Kazunori MIYAZAWA Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c index d4107bb701b5..fb9f69c616f5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c @@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static void xfrm4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst) if (likely(xdst->u.rt.idev)) in_dev_put(xdst->u.rt.idev); + if (likely(xdst->u.rt.peer)) + inet_putpeer(xdst->u.rt.peer); xfrm_dst_destroy(xdst); } -- cgit v1.2.2 From e16aa207ccb61c5111525c462eeeba1f3f5fd370 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ralf Baechle Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2006 00:11:33 -0800 Subject: [NET]: Memory barrier cleanups I believe all the below memory barriers only matter on SMP so therefore the smp_* variant of the barrier should be used. I'm wondering if the barrier in net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c should be dropped entirely. schedule_work's implementation currently implies a memory barrier and I think sane semantics of schedule_work() should imply a memory barrier, as needed so the caller shouldn't have to worry. It's not quite obvious why the barrier in net/packet/af_packet.c is needed; maybe it should be implied through flush_dcache_page? Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/wireless.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++-- net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/wireless.c b/net/core/wireless.c index cb1b8728d7ee..f69ab7b4408e 100644 --- a/net/core/wireless.c +++ b/net/core/wireless.c @@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ int iw_handler_set_spy(struct net_device * dev, * The rtnl_lock() make sure we don't race with the other iw_handlers. * This make sure wireless_spy_update() "see" that the spy list * is temporarily disabled. */ - wmb(); + smp_wmb(); /* Are there are addresses to copy? */ if(wrqu->data.length > 0) { @@ -2159,7 +2159,7 @@ int iw_handler_set_spy(struct net_device * dev, } /* Make sure above is updated before re-enabling */ - wmb(); + smp_wmb(); /* Enable addresses */ spydata->spy_number = wrqu->data.length; diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c index 8c74f9168b7d..75373f35383f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ void inet_twdr_hangman(unsigned long data) need_timer = 0; if (inet_twdr_do_twkill_work(twdr, twdr->slot)) { twdr->thread_slots |= (1 << twdr->slot); - mb(); + smp_mb(); schedule_work(&twdr->twkill_work); need_timer = 1; } else { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 9304034c0c47..c701f6abbfc1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4235,7 +4235,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * Change state from SYN-SENT only after copied_seq * is initialized. */ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; - mb(); + smp_mb(); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); security_inet_conn_established(sk, skb); @@ -4483,7 +4483,7 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, case TCP_SYN_RECV: if (acceptable) { tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; - mb(); + smp_mb(); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); sk->sk_state_change(sk); diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 08e68b67bbf6..da73e8a8c18d 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct packe sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex; h->tp_status = status; - mb(); + smp_mb(); { struct page *p_start, *p_end; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 905eee008b5440e30186ab72c238ec8cb2886f74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2006 00:12:30 -0800 Subject: [TCP] inet_twdr_hangman: Delete unnecessary memory barrier(). As per Ralf Baechle's observations, the schedule_work() call should give enough of a memory barrier, so the explicit one here is totally unnecessary. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c index 75373f35383f..061fd7a961b8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c @@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ void inet_twdr_hangman(unsigned long data) need_timer = 0; if (inet_twdr_do_twkill_work(twdr, twdr->slot)) { twdr->thread_slots |= (1 << twdr->slot); - smp_mb(); schedule_work(&twdr->twkill_work); need_timer = 1; } else { -- cgit v1.2.2 From 456c38f9682645cbb0537cb4e16848a28c1d3a76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2006 00:18:22 -0800 Subject: [WANROUTER]: Kill kmalloc debugging code. It duplicates what SLAB debug can do already. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/wanrouter/wanmain.c | 57 ------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 57 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wanrouter/wanmain.c b/net/wanrouter/wanmain.c index 316211d9f17d..769cdd62c1bb 100644 --- a/net/wanrouter/wanmain.c +++ b/net/wanrouter/wanmain.c @@ -62,63 +62,6 @@ #define KMEM_SAFETYZONE 8 -/***********FOR DEBUGGING PURPOSES********************************************* -static void * dbg_kmalloc(unsigned int size, int prio, int line) { - int i = 0; - void * v = kmalloc(size+sizeof(unsigned int)+2*KMEM_SAFETYZONE*8,prio); - char * c1 = v; - c1 += sizeof(unsigned int); - *((unsigned int *)v) = size; - - for (i = 0; i < KMEM_SAFETYZONE; i++) { - c1[0] = 'D'; c1[1] = 'E'; c1[2] = 'A'; c1[3] = 'D'; - c1[4] = 'B'; c1[5] = 'E'; c1[6] = 'E'; c1[7] = 'F'; - c1 += 8; - } - c1 += size; - for (i = 0; i < KMEM_SAFETYZONE; i++) { - c1[0] = 'M'; c1[1] = 'U'; c1[2] = 'N'; c1[3] = 'G'; - c1[4] = 'W'; c1[5] = 'A'; c1[6] = 'L'; c1[7] = 'L'; - c1 += 8; - } - v = ((char *)v) + sizeof(unsigned int) + KMEM_SAFETYZONE*8; - printk(KERN_INFO "line %d kmalloc(%d,%d) = %p\n",line,size,prio,v); - return v; -} -static void dbg_kfree(void * v, int line) { - unsigned int * sp = (unsigned int *)(((char *)v) - (sizeof(unsigned int) + KMEM_SAFETYZONE*8)); - unsigned int size = *sp; - char * c1 = ((char *)v) - KMEM_SAFETYZONE*8; - int i = 0; - for (i = 0; i < KMEM_SAFETYZONE; i++) { - if ( c1[0] != 'D' || c1[1] != 'E' || c1[2] != 'A' || c1[3] != 'D' - || c1[4] != 'B' || c1[5] != 'E' || c1[6] != 'E' || c1[7] != 'F') { - printk(KERN_INFO "kmalloced block at %p has been corrupted (underrun)!\n",v); - printk(KERN_INFO " %4x: %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x\n", i*8, - c1[0],c1[1],c1[2],c1[3],c1[4],c1[5],c1[6],c1[7] ); - } - c1 += 8; - } - c1 += size; - for (i = 0; i < KMEM_SAFETYZONE; i++) { - if ( c1[0] != 'M' || c1[1] != 'U' || c1[2] != 'N' || c1[3] != 'G' - || c1[4] != 'W' || c1[5] != 'A' || c1[6] != 'L' || c1[7] != 'L' - ) { - printk(KERN_INFO "kmalloced block at %p has been corrupted (overrun):\n",v); - printk(KERN_INFO " %4x: %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x %2x\n", i*8, - c1[0],c1[1],c1[2],c1[3],c1[4],c1[5],c1[6],c1[7] ); - } - c1 += 8; - } - printk(KERN_INFO "line %d kfree(%p)\n",line,v); - v = ((char *)v) - (sizeof(unsigned int) + KMEM_SAFETYZONE*8); - kfree(v); -} - -#define kmalloc(x,y) dbg_kmalloc(x,y,__LINE__) -#define kfree(x) dbg_kfree(x,__LINE__) -*****************************************************************************/ - /* * Function Prototypes */ -- cgit v1.2.2 From 272491ef423b6976a230a998b10f46976aa91342 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2006 01:17:24 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: Fix non-ANSI func. decl. Fix non-ANSI function declaration: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1096:25: warning: non-ANSI function declaration of function 'nf_conntrack_flush' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index eaa0f8a1adb6..9b3158ce46e1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ static void free_conntrack_hash(struct list_head *hash, int vmalloced, int size) get_order(sizeof(struct list_head) * size)); } -void nf_conntrack_flush() +void nf_conntrack_flush(void) { nf_ct_iterate_cleanup(kill_all, NULL); } -- cgit v1.2.2