From ddcd0f41471a1e0394c8840a119ec3986a78462c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinicius Costa Gomes Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 22:53:39 -0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix checking the wrong flag when accepting a socket Most probably a typo, the check should have been for BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP instead of BT_DEFER_SETUP (which right now only represents a socket option). Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Acked-by: Andrei Emeltchenko Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c index 46e7f86acfc9..3e18af4dadc4 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) } if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED || !newsock || - test_bit(BT_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags)) { + test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags)) { bt_accept_unlink(sk); if (newsock) sock_graft(sk, newsock); -- cgit v1.2.2 From 476585ecf08067ac4e81d1a4cb19e2caf2093471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 18:54:15 +0800 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix SMP pairing method selection The tk_request function takes the local IO capability as the second last parameter and the remote IO capability as the last parameter. They were previously swapped: when we receive a pairing response req->io_capability contains the local one and rsp->io_capability the remote one. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 6fc7c4708f3e..c4ac2849d9c2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM; - ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability); + ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); if (ret) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; -- cgit v1.2.2 From 4c47d7396420160d27209f578680141874c0110b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishal Agarwal Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 20:27:35 +0530 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix LE pairing completion on connection failure For BR/EDR pairing is assumed to be finished when connection is done. For LE if connection is successful it did not necessarily mean that pairing is also done but if the connection is unsuccessful it should be assumed that pairing procedure is also finished. This patch registers a new function with connect_cfm_cb callback for LE link which sends the pairing complete signal to user space if connection is unsuccessful. Signed-off-by: Vishal Agarwal Acked-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 25d220776079..991d5b667674 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -1873,6 +1873,22 @@ static void pairing_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status) pairing_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status)); } +static void le_connect_complete_cb(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status) +{ + struct pending_cmd *cmd; + + BT_DBG("status %u", status); + + if (!status) + return; + + cmd = find_pairing(conn); + if (!cmd) + BT_DBG("Unable to find a pending command"); + else + pairing_complete(cmd, mgmt_status(status)); +} + static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, u16 len) { @@ -1934,6 +1950,8 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, /* For LE, just connecting isn't a proof that the pairing finished */ if (cp->addr.type == BDADDR_BREDR) conn->connect_cfm_cb = pairing_complete_cb; + else + conn->connect_cfm_cb = le_connect_complete_cb; conn->security_cfm_cb = pairing_complete_cb; conn->disconn_cfm_cb = pairing_complete_cb; -- cgit v1.2.2 From d06cc416f517a25713dedd9e2a9ccf4f3086c09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 18:44:11 +0800 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix deadlock and crash when SMP pairing times out The l2cap_conn_del function tries to cancel_sync the security timer, but when it's called from the timeout function itself a deadlock occurs. Subsequently the "hcon->l2cap_data = NULL" that's supposed to protect multiple calls to l2cap_conn_del never gets cleared and when the connection finally drops we double free's etc which will crash the kernel. This patch fixes the issue by using the HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND for protecting against this. The same flag is also used for the same purpose in other places in the SMP code. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 24f144b72a96..8394e3615ef6 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1295,7 +1295,12 @@ static void security_timeout(struct work_struct *work) struct l2cap_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct l2cap_conn, security_timer.work); - l2cap_conn_del(conn->hcon, ETIMEDOUT); + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) { + smp_chan_destroy(conn); + l2cap_conn_del(conn->hcon, ETIMEDOUT); + } } static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status) -- cgit v1.2.2 From 4dab786482d706a2a41cd16cf174671d640a9870 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 14:58:37 +0800 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix SMP security elevation from medium to high If we have an unauthenticated key it is not sufficient to acheive high security. Therefore, when deciding whether to encrypt the link or request pairing, it is essential to in addition to checking the existence of a key to also check whether it is authenticated or not. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index c4ac2849d9c2..37df4e9b3896 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn) +static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) { struct smp_ltk *key; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; @@ -712,6 +712,9 @@ static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn) if (!key) return 0; + if (sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM && !key->authenticated) + return 0; + if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) return 1; @@ -732,7 +735,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req); - if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn)) + if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) return 0; if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) @@ -771,7 +774,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) return 1; if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) - if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn)) + if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, sec_level)) goto done; if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) -- cgit v1.2.2 From 1c2e004183178e1947882cd2e74f37826f45230e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 23:31:13 +0800 Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for encryption key refresh With LE/SMP the completion of a security level elavation from medium to high is indicated by a HCI Encryption Key Refresh Complete event. The necessary behavior upon receiving this event is a mix of what's done for auth_complete and encryption_change, which is also where most of the event handling code has been copied from. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 4eefb7f65cf6..94ad124a4ea3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -3043,6 +3043,50 @@ static inline void hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } +static void hci_key_refresh_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct hci_ev_key_refresh_complete *ev = (void *) skb->data; + struct hci_conn *conn; + + BT_DBG("%s status %u handle %u", hdev->name, ev->status, + __le16_to_cpu(ev->handle)); + + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + + conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, __le16_to_cpu(ev->handle)); + if (!conn) + goto unlock; + + if (!ev->status) + conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; + + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags); + + if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) { + hci_acl_disconn(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); + hci_conn_put(conn); + goto unlock; + } + + if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) { + if (!ev->status) + conn->state = BT_CONNECTED; + + hci_proto_connect_cfm(conn, ev->status); + hci_conn_put(conn); + } else { + hci_auth_cfm(conn, ev->status); + + hci_conn_hold(conn); + conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT; + hci_conn_put(conn); + } + +unlock: + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); +} + static inline u8 hci_get_auth_req(struct hci_conn *conn) { /* If remote requests dedicated bonding follow that lead */ @@ -3559,6 +3603,10 @@ void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt(hdev, skb); break; + case HCI_EV_KEY_REFRESH_COMPLETE: + hci_key_refresh_complete_evt(hdev, skb); + break; + case HCI_EV_IO_CAPA_REQUEST: hci_io_capa_request_evt(hdev, skb); break; -- cgit v1.2.2