From 459e216429a04779216b61f0fb61938a459fd1ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Sandeen Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 16:19:52 -0800 Subject: ecryptfs: initialize new auth_tokens before teardown ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat() checks whether each auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key is nonzero and if so puts that key. However, in some early mount error paths nothing has initialized the pointer, and we try to key_put() garbage. Running the bad cipher tests in the testsuite exposes this, and it's happy with the following change. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen Cc: Michael Halcrow Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs') diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index 263fed88c0ca..f458c1f35565 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; int rc = 0; - new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, + new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_auth_tok) { rc = -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.2.2