From 3d43321b7015387cfebbe26436d0e9d299162ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2009 15:49:29 -0700 Subject: modules: sysctl to block module loading Implement a sysctl file that disables module-loading system-wide since there is no longer a viable way to remove CAP_SYS_MODULE after the system bounding capability set was removed in 2.6.25. Value can only be set to "1", and is tested only if standard capability checks allow CAP_SYS_MODULE. Given existing /dev/mem protections, this should allow administrators a one-way method to block module loading after initial boot-time module loading has finished. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index a4ccdd1981cf..02b134956273 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - kstack_depth_to_print [ X86 only ] - l2cr [ PPC only ] - modprobe ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt +- modules_disabled - msgmax - msgmnb - msgmni @@ -179,6 +180,16 @@ kernel stack. ============================================================== +modules_disabled: + +A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded +in an otherwise modular kernel. This toggle defaults to off +(0), but can be set true (1). Once true, modules can be +neither loaded nor unloaded, and the toggle cannot be set back +to false. + +============================================================== + osrelease, ostype & version: # cat osrelease -- cgit v1.2.2 From ecfcc53fef3c357574bb6143dce6631e6d56295c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Etienne Basset Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2009 20:40:06 +0200 Subject: smack: implement logging V3 the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \ It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : 0: no logging 1: log denied (default) 2: log accepted 3: log denied&accepted Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/Smack.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/Smack.txt b/Documentation/Smack.txt index 629c92e99783..34614b4c708e 100644 --- a/Documentation/Smack.txt +++ b/Documentation/Smack.txt @@ -184,8 +184,9 @@ length. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot -contain unprintable characters or the "/" (slash) character. Smack labels -cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options. +contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'" +(quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters. +Smack labels cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options. There are some predefined labels: @@ -523,3 +524,18 @@ Smack supports some mount options: These mount options apply to all file system types. +Smack auditing + +If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT +in your kernel configuration. +By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by +writing a single character to the /smack/logging file : +0 : no logging +1 : log denied (default) +2 : log accepted +3 : log denied & accepted + +Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get +the subjet, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function +that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event +audited. -- cgit v1.2.2 From 5789ba3bd0a3cd20df5980ebf03358f2eb44fd67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Thu, 21 May 2009 15:47:06 -0400 Subject: IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy The IMA TCB policy is dangerous. A normal use can use all of a system's memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of executables. The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the measurements meaningless. There is no good fix for this in the kernel. A full TCB policy would need to be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and useful system. But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements. One option would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the LSM. For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting to such broad rules.... IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements and supports i_version. Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default. This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index e87bdbfbcc75..d9a24a04cfb1 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -914,6 +914,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" } default: "sha1" + ima_tcb [IMA] + Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted + Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all + programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files + opened for read by uid=0. + in2000= [HW,SCSI] See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c. -- cgit v1.2.2