From 17762060c25590bfddd68cc1131f28ec720f405f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 5 Jul 2010 21:29:28 +0000 Subject: bridge: Clear IPCB before possible entry into IP stack The bridge protocol lives dangerously by having incestuous relations with the IP stack. In this instance an abomination has been created where a bogus IPCB area from a bridged packet leads to a crash in the IP stack because it's interpreted as IP options. This patch papers over the problem by clearing the IPCB area in that particular spot. To fix this properly we'd also need to parse any IP options if present but I'm way too lazy for that. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Cheers, Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_netfilter.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c index 44420992f72f..8fb75f89c4aa 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c @@ -591,6 +591,9 @@ static unsigned int br_nf_pre_routing(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb, pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len); + /* BUG: Should really parse the IP options here. */ + memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm)); + nf_bridge_put(skb->nf_bridge); if (!nf_bridge_alloc(skb)) return NF_DROP; -- cgit v1.2.2