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* SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux performance when AVC missesKaiGai Kohei2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance when ACV misses" patch. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses.KaiGai Kohei2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h. In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse in performance aspect. This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry, so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen. * struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated from general purpose slab. * Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous version. * The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars. The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we access many files which have different security context one after another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so any access always causes AVC misses. selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s] STD: 0.265 0.019 ------------------------------------------ 1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s] 2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s] 3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s] 4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s] 5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s] 6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s] 7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s] 8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s] Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and permsEric Paris2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the policy flags are 0 - Deny unknown security access. (default) 2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions 4 - allow unknown security access The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Improve read/write performanceYuichi Nakamura2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open time to allow this optimization. (see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2) Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usageYuichi Nakamura2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch reduces memory usage of SELinux by tuning avtab. Number of hash slots in avtab was 32768. Unused slots used memory when number of rules is fewer. This patch decides number of hash slots dynamically based on number of rules. (chain length)^2 is also printed out in avtab_hash_eval to see standard deviation of avtab hash table. Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [SELINUX]: Update for netfilter ->hook() arg changes.David S. Miller2007-10-15
| | | | | | They take a "struct sk_buff *" instead of a "struct sk_buff **" now. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [INET]: local port range robustnessStephen Hemminger2007-10-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Expansion of original idea from Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> Add robustness and locking to the local_port_range sysctl. 1. Enforce that low < high when setting. 2. Use seqlock to ensure atomic update. The locking might seem like overkill, but there are cases where sysadmin might want to change value in the middle of a DoS attack. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Support multiple network namespaces with netlinkEric W. Biederman2007-10-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace, this includes the controlling kernel sockets. This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols to only support the initial network namespace. Request by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED. As they would if the kernel did not have the support for that netlink protocol compiled in. As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces. The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation at hash table insertion and hash table look up time. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Make device event notification network namespace safeEric W. Biederman2007-10-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Every user of the network device notifiers is either a protocol stack or a pseudo device. If a protocol stack that does not have support for multiple network namespaces receives an event for a device that is not in the initial network namespace it quite possibly can get confused and do the wrong thing. To avoid problems until all of the protocol stacks are converted this patch modifies all netdev event handlers to ignore events on devices that are not in the initial network namespace. As the rest of the code is made network namespace aware these checks can be removed. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* SELinux: fix array out of bounds when mounting with selinux optionsEric Paris2007-09-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | Given an illegal selinux option it was possible for match_token to work in random memory at the end of the match_table_t array. Note that privilege is required to perform a context mount, so this issue is effectively limited to root only. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: clear parent death signal on SID transitionsStephen Smalley2007-08-30
| | | | | | | | | Clear parent death signal on SID transitions to prevent unauthorized signaling between SIDs. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
* fix NULL pointer dereference in __vm_enough_memory()Alan Cox2007-08-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not current->mm. The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption that this does not happen as does the security code. As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the helper function. A new security test is added for the case where we need to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to avoid the need to change large amounts of code. (Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* SELinux: correct error code in selinux_audit_rule_initSteve G2007-08-16
| | | | | | | Corrects an error code so that it is valid to pass to userspace. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <linux_4ever@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@halo.namei>
* SELinux: remove redundant pointer checks before calling kfree()Paul Moore2007-08-02
| | | | | | | | We don't need to check for NULL pointers before calling kfree(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: restore proper NetLabel caching behaviorPaul Moore2007-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | A small fix to the SELinux/NetLabel glue code to ensure that the NetLabel cache is utilized when possible. This was broken when the SELinux/NetLabel glue code was reorganized in the last kernel release. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Typo fixes errror -> errorGabriel Craciunescu2007-07-31
| | | | | | | | | | | Typo fixes errror -> error Signed-off-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@googlemail.com> Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* SELinux: null-terminate context string in selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_allocVenkat Yekkirala2007-07-25
| | | | | | | | | xfrm_audit_log() expects the context string to be null-terminated which currently doesn't happen with user-supplied contexts. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()Jesper Juhl2007-07-23
| | | | | | | | | Fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add() Note: The Coverity checker gets credit for spotting this one. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* [PATCH] get rid of AVC_PATH postponed treatmentAl Viro2007-07-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH records when audit is disabled. I must admit my stupidity - I assumed that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held). Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way. It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those. Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations, kmalloc() in there is not a problem. IOW, the simple fix is sufficient: let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main record. It's trivial to do. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().Paul Mundt2007-07-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's c59def9f222d44bb7e2f0a559f2906191a0862d7 change. They've been BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them either. This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create() completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves, or the documentation references). Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2007-07-19
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel SELinux: enable dynamic activation/deactivation of NetLabel/SELinux enforcement
| * SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabelPaul Moore2007-07-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel is in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the following necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG defined as "netlabel_peer_t"): allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; The policy for unlabeled traffic would be: allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included in the latest SELinux Reference Policy release 20070629 or later. Users who make use of NetLabel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their policy to avoid network problems. Users who do not make use of NetLabel will not notice any difference. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: enable dynamic activation/deactivation of NetLabel/SELinux enforcementPaul Moore2007-07-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a new NetLabel KAPI interface, netlbl_enabled(), which reports on the current runtime status of NetLabel based on the existing configuration. LSMs that make use of NetLabel, i.e. SELinux, can use this new function to determine if they should perform NetLabel access checks. This patch changes the NetLabel/SELinux glue code such that SELinux only enforces NetLabel related access checks when netlbl_enabled() returns true. At present NetLabel is considered to be enabled when there is at least one labeled protocol configuration present. The result is that by default NetLabel is considered to be disabled, however, as soon as an administrator configured a CIPSO DOI definition NetLabel is enabled and SELinux starts enforcing NetLabel related access controls - including unlabeled packet controls. This patch also tries to consolidate the multiple "#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL" blocks into a single block to ease future review as recommended by Linus. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | coredump masking: reimplementation of dumpable using two flagsKawai, Hidehiro2007-07-19
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes mm_struct.dumpable to a pair of bit flags. set_dumpable() converts three-value dumpable to two flags and stores it into lower two bits of mm_struct.flags instead of mm_struct.dumpable. get_dumpable() behaves in the opposite way. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export set_dumpable] Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* usermodehelper: Tidy up waitingJeremy Fitzhardinge2007-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rather than using a tri-state integer for the wait flag in call_usermodehelper_exec, define a proper enum, and use that. I've preserved the integer values so that any callers I've missed should still work OK. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com> Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@in.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Introduce is_owner_or_cap() to wrap CAP_FOWNER use with fsuid checkSatyam Sharma2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as well, thus violating its semantics. [ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ... untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ] The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone. Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Audit: add TTY input auditingMiloslav Trmac2007-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for ↵Linus Torvalds2007-07-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NetLabel" This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0. It bit people like Michal Piotrowski: "My system is too secure, I can not login :)" because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux policies. As a result, quoth James Morris: "Can you please revert this patch? We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others. Sorry for the hassle." Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: unexport mmap_min_addrAdrian Bunk2007-07-11
| | | | | | | Remove unneeded export. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabelPaul Moore2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel is in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the following necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG defined as "netlabel_peer_t"): allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; The policy for unlabeled traffic would be: allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included in the SELinux Reference Policy SVN tree, r2352 or later. Users who enable NetLabel support in the kernel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their policy to avoid network problems. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmapEric Paris2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to 0, preserving existing behavior. This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea) Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Use %lu for inode->i_no when printing avcTobias Oed2007-07-11
| | | | | | | Inode numbers are unsigned long and so need to %lu as format string of printf. Signed-off-by: Tobias Oed <tobias.oed@octant-fr.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: allow preemption between transition permission checksStephen Smalley2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache miss case. The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating and eliminating this interface from the kernel. Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: introduce schedule points in policydb_destroy()Eric Paris2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During the LSPP testing we found that it was possible for policydb_destroy() to take 10+ seconds of kernel time to complete. Basically all policydb_destroy() does is walk some (possibly long) lists and free the memory it finds. Turning off slab debugging config options made the problem go away since the actual functions which took most of the time were (as seen by oprofile) > 121202 23.9879 .check_poison_obj > 78247 15.4864 .check_slabp were caused by that. So I decided to also add some voluntary schedule points in that code so config voluntary preempt would be enough to solve the problem. Something similar was done in places like shmem_free_pages() when we have to walk a list of memory and free it. This was tested by the LSPP group on the hardware which could reproduce the problem just loading a new policy and was found to not trigger the softlock detector. It takes just as much processing time, but the kernel doesn't spend all that time stuck doing one thing and never scheduling. Someday a better way to handle memory might make the time needed in this function a lot less, but this fixes the current issue as it stands today. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: add selinuxfs structure for object class discoveryChristopher J. PeBenito2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The structure is as follows (relative to selinuxfs root): /class/file/index /class/file/perms/read /class/file/perms/write ... Each class is allocated 33 inodes, 1 for the class index and 32 for permissions. Relative to SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET, the inode of the index file DIV 33 is the class number. The inode of the permission file % 33 is the index of the permission for that class. Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: change sel_make_dir() to specify inode counter.Christopher J. PeBenito2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | Specify the inode counter explicitly in sel_make_dir(), rather than always using sel_last_ino. Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: rename sel_remove_bools() for more general usage.Christopher J. PeBenito2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | sel_remove_bools() will also be used by the object class discovery, rename it for more general use. Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the ↵Christopher J. PeBenito2007-07-11
| | | | | | | | | | running policy Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes, and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class. Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NetLabel]: consolidate the struct socket/sock handling to just struct sockPaul Moore2007-06-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current NetLabel code has some redundant APIs which allow both "struct socket" and "struct sock" types to be used; this may have made sense at some point but it is wasteful now. Remove the functions that operate on sockets and convert the callers. Not only does this make the code smaller and more consistent but it pushes the locking burden up to the caller which can be more intelligent about the locks. Also, perform the same conversion (socket to sock) on the SELinux/NetLabel glue code where it make sense. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* filesDavid Sterba2007-05-09
| | | | | | | Fix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not usedRandy Dunlap2007-05-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed. Suggested by Al Viro. Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc, sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs). Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* tty: introduce no_tty and use it in selinuxEric W. Biederman2007-05-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While researching the tty layer pid leaks I found a weird case in selinux when we drop a controlling tty because of inadequate permissions we don't do the normal hangup processing. Which is a problem if it happens the session leader has exec'd something that can no longer access the tty. We already have code in the kernel to handle this case in the form of the TIOCNOTTY ioctl. So this patch factors out a helper function that is the essence of that ioctl and calls it from the selinux code. This removes the inconsistency in handling dropping of a controlling tty and who knows it might even make some part of user space happy because it received a SIGHUP it was expecting. In addition since this removes the last user of proc_set_tty outside of tty_io.c proc_set_tty is made static and removed from tty.h Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* remove "struct subsystem" as it is no longer neededGreg Kroah-Hartman2007-05-02
| | | | | | | | | | | We need to work on cleaning up the relationship between kobjects, ksets and ktypes. The removal of 'struct subsystem' is the first step of this, especially as it is not really needed at all. Thanks to Kay for fixing the bugs in this patch. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2007-04-27
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfs selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfs selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server MAINTAINERS: update selinux entry SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server NetLabel: convert a BUG_ON in the CIPSO code to a runtime check NetLabel: cleanup and document CIPSO constants
| * selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloadsStephen Smalley2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At present, the userland policy loading code has to go through contortions to preserve boolean values across policy reloads, and cannot do so atomically. As this is what we always want to do for reloads, let the kernel preserve them instead. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfsJames Carter2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the numbering of the booleans directory inodes in selinuxfs to provide more room for new inodes without a conflict in inode numbers and to be consistent with how inode numbering is done in the initial_contexts directory. Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfsJames Carter2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the unused enumeration constant, SEL_AVC, from the sel_inos enumeration in selinuxfs. Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodesJames Carter2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes to prevent a conflict between inodes numbered using last_ino when created with new_inode() and those labeled explicitly. Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfsJames Carter2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs. An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs. Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitionsStephen Smalley2007-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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