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* VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting bufferDavid P. Quigley2008-02-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized buffer. Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be used elsewhere for Labeled NFS. The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [AUDIT] add session id to audit messagesEric Paris2008-02-01
| | | | | | | | | In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is labeled ses= or oses= Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* [PATCH] switch audit_get_loginuid() to task_struct *Al Viro2008-02-01
| | | | | | all callers pass something->audit_context Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [SELinux]: Fix double free in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid()Paul Moore2008-01-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit 45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 ("fix memory leak in netlabel code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() fails. This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy() call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* security: compile capabilities by defaultsergeh@us.ibm.com2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | Capabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY=n, and its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY=y. But it is set to default n. Default it to y instead. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: make selinux_set_mnt_opts() staticAdrian Bunk2008-01-29
| | | | | | | selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add warning messages on network denial due to errorPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem. This patch adds warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible notification. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checksPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper control over forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem. Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier work on this topic eventually led to this patch. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDsPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes. This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checksPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the entry is removed it is decreased. In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the target is removed. These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine if either of these subsystems are enabled. NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled() function. This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which is not the case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystemsPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels. As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as possible. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add a new peer class and permissions to the Flask definitionsPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes. Also, bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22Paul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features it supports. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() ↵Paul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | functions This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is redundant since we already have the address family. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindexPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to bother with this at all. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Convert the netif code to use ifindex valuesPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is not being used and therefore is "dead code". Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NetLabel: Add IP address family information to the netlbl_skbuff_getattr() ↵Paul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | function In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the address family separate from the packet itself. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NetLabel: Add secid token support to the NetLabel secattr structPaul Moore2008-01-29
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and "static" or "fallback" labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the NetLabel kernel API. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NETFILTER]: Introduce NF_INET_ hook valuesPatrick McHardy2008-01-28
| | | | | | | | | | | The IPv4 and IPv6 hook values are identical, yet some code tries to figure out the "correct" value by looking at the address family. Introduce NF_INET_* values for both IPv4 and IPv6. The old values are kept in a #ifndef __KERNEL__ section for userspace compatibility. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux: fix labeling of /proc/net inodesStephen Smalley2008-01-25
| | | | | | | | | | The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials. Fix security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...". Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-01-25
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiate security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fields security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook security: call security_file_permission from rw_verify_area security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook Security: remove security.h include from mm.h Security: remove security_file_mmap hook sparse-warnings (NULL as 0). Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information security/selinux: Add missing "space"
| * selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiateEamon Walsh2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the requirement that the new and related object types differ in order to polyinstantiate by MLS level. This allows MLS polyinstantiation to occur in the absence of explicit type_member rules or when the type has not changed. Potential users of this support include pam_namespace.so (directory polyinstantiation) and the SELinux X support (property polyinstantiation). Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fieldsJan Engelhardt2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Constify function pointer tables and fields. Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * security: add a secctx_to_secid() hookDavid Howells2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux implementation for this hook. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hookH. Peter Anvin2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs. This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has been used as motivation for not using initramfs. Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally used by SELinux but can now be safely removed: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2 Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security informationEric Paris2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * security/selinux: Add missing "space"Joe Perches2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add missing space. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Kobject: convert remaining kobject_unregister() to kobject_put()Greg Kroah-Hartman2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with kobject_put(). Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | kobject: convert kernel_kset to be a kobjectGreg Kroah-Hartman2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel_kset does not need to be a kset, but a much simpler kobject now that we have kobj_attributes. We also rename kernel_kset to kernel_kobj to catch all users of this symbol with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning. Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | kset: convert kernel_subsys to use kset_createGreg Kroah-Hartman2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dynamically create the kset instead of declaring it statically. We also rename kernel_subsys to kernel_kset to catch all users of this symbol with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning. Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | kobject: convert securityfs to use kobject_createGreg Kroah-Hartman2008-01-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need a kset here, a simple kobject will do just fine, so dynamically create the kobject and use it. Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | kobject: remove struct kobj_type from struct ksetGreg Kroah-Hartman2008-01-24
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need a "default" ktype for a kset. We should set this explicitly every time for each kset. This change is needed so that we can make ksets dynamic, and cleans up one of the odd, undocumented assumption that the kset/kobject/ktype model has. This patch is based on a lot of help from Kay Sievers. Nasty bug in the block code was found by Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-01-21
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code
| * selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel codePaul Moore2008-01-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here: * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Fix filesystem capability supportAndrew G. Morgan2008-01-21
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process' inheritable capability set. To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities enabled and in use. That is: - CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code to be compiled in. - You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised. Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm spaceEric Paris2007-12-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: detect dead booleansStephen Smalley2007-12-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of using f_op to detect dead booleans, check the inode index against the number of booleans and check the dentry name against the boolean name for that index on reads and writes. This prevents incorrect use of a boolean file opened prior to a policy reload while allowing valid use of it as long as it still corresponds to the same boolean in the policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: do not clear f_op when removing entriesStephen Smalley2007-12-05
| | | | | | | Do not clear f_op when removing entries since it isn't safe to do. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programsSerge E. Hallyn2007-11-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started by the same user. This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to kill X when the window manager exits. When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. Then cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task. This is a change in behavior compared to when !CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES. This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the same user. If so, then signal is allowed. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* file capabilities: allow sigcont within sessionSerge E. Hallyn2007-11-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9247 Allow sigcont to be sent to a process with greater capabilities if it is in the same session. Otherwise, a shell from which I've started a root shell and done 'suspend' can't be restarted by the parent shell. Also don't do file-capabilities signaling checks when uids for the processes don't match, since the standard check_kill_permission will have done those checks. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Tested-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* SELinux: add more validity checks on policy loadStephen Smalley2007-11-07
| | | | | | | | | | Add more validity checks at policy load time to reject malformed policies and prevent subsequent out-of-range indexing when in permissive mode. Resolves the NULL pointer dereference reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=357541. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: fix bug in new ebitmap code.KaiGai Kohei2007-11-07
| | | | | | | | | The "e_iter = e_iter->next;" statement in the inner for loop is primally bug. It should be moved to outside of the for loop. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: suppress a warning for 64k pages.Stephen Rothwell2007-11-07
| | | | | | | | | On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this: security/selinux/xfrm.c:214: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2007-10-23
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: always check SIGCHLD in selinux_task_wait
| * SELinux: always check SIGCHLD in selinux_task_waitEric Paris2007-10-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When checking if we can wait on a child we were looking at p->exit_signal and trying to make the decision based on if the signal would eventually be allowed. One big flaw is that p->exit_signal is -1 for NPTL threads and so aignal_to_av was not actually checking SIGCHLD which is what would have been sent. Even is exit_signal was set to something strange it wouldn't change the fact that the child was there and needed to be waited on. This patch just assumes wait is based on SIGCHLD. Specific permission checks are made when the child actually attempts to send a signal. This resolves the problem of things like using GDB on confined domains such as in RH BZ 232371. The confined domain did not have permission to send a generic signal (exit_signal == -1) back to the unconfined GDB. With this patch the GDB wait works and since the actual signal sent is allowed everything functions as it should. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | capabilities: clean up file capability readingSerge E. Hallyn2007-10-22
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simplify the vfs_cap_data structure. Also fix get_file_caps which was declaring __le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ] on the stack, but XATTR_CAPS_SZ is already * sizeof(__le32). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* pid namespaces: define is_global_init() and is_container_init()Serge E. Hallyn2007-10-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | is_init() is an ambiguous name for the pid==1 check. Split it into is_global_init() and is_container_init(). A cgroup init has it's tsk->pid == 1. A global init also has it's tsk->pid == 1 and it's active pid namespace is the init_pid_ns. But rather than check the active pid namespace, compare the task structure with 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper', which is initialized during boot to the /sbin/init process and never changes. Changelog: 2.6.22-rc4-mm2-pidns1: - Use 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper' to determine if a given task is the global init (/sbin/init) process. This would improve performance and remove dependence on the task_pid(). 2.6.21-mm2-pidns2: - [Sukadev Bhattiprolu] Changed is_container_init() calls in {powerpc, ppc,avr32}/traps.c for the _exception() call to is_global_init(). This way, we kill only the cgroup if the cgroup's init has a bug rather than force a kernel panic. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment] [sukadev@us.ibm.com: Use is_global_init() in arch/m32r/mm/fault.c] [bunk@stusta.de: kernel/pid.c: remove unused exports] [sukadev@us.ibm.com: Fix capability.c to work with threaded init] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Poetzel <herbert@13thfloor.at> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sparse pointer use of zero as nullStephen Hemminger2007-10-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL pointer. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcapAndrew Morgan2007-10-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1, can change the capabilities of another process, p2. This is not the meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities, there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on another. Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the implementation of CAP_SETPCAP. The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no process can set the capabilities of another process. The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution rules: pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec) pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI) pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0 at exec() time. As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI capability set. The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch) is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process - to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules are applied. Here is how it works: Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI. Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0. That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to be present in pP. The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond the above: if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) { pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0 */ } This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities are not useful to or needed by the login program itself. One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap) would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this capability and pass it on through the inheritable set. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security/ cleanupsAdrian Bunk2007-10-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible: - remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix - remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security - remove some no longer required exit code - remove a bunch of no longer used exports Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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