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* selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()Paul Moore2008-10-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior, including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help prevent future problems. Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: use default proc sid on symlinksStephen Smalley2008-09-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks. This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example. This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories. ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference. Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_niceSerge E. Hallyn2008-09-27
| | | | | | | | This reduces the kernel size by 289 bytes. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2008-09-21
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: MAINTAINERS Thanks for breaking my tree :-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: memory leak in security_context_to_sid_coreEric Paris2008-09-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors. security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case. This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started making extensive use of this function. In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created along the way. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * devcgroup: fix race against rmdir()Li Zefan2008-09-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During the use of a dev_cgroup, we should guarantee the corresponding cgroup won't be deleted (i.e. via rmdir). This can be done through css_get(&dev_cgroup->css), but here we can just get and use the dev_cgroup under rcu_read_lock. And also remove checking NULL dev_cgroup, it won't be NULL since a task always belongs to a cgroup. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Update selinux info in MAINTAINERS and Kconfig help textStephen Smalley2008-09-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the SELinux entry in MAINTAINERS and drop the obsolete information from the selinux Kconfig help text. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignmentKaiGai Kohei2008-08-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITYEric Paris2008-08-27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the full LSM needs to be built to build this fs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2008-08-27
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| * security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()David Howells2008-08-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: add/fix security kernel-docRandy Dunlap2008-08-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook. Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation. Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Unify for- and while-loop styleVesa-Matti Kari2008-08-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the same source file). Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: conditional expression type validation was off-by-oneVesa-Matti Kari2008-08-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | expr_isvalid() in conditional.c was off-by-one and allowed invalid expression type COND_LAST. However, it is this header file that needs to be fixed. That way the if-statement's disjunction's second component reads more naturally, "if expr type is greater than the last allowed value" ( rather than using ">=" in conditional.c): if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | smack: limit privilege by labelCasey Schaufler2008-08-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There have been a number of requests to make the Smack LSM enforce MAC even in the face of privilege, either capability based or superuser based. This is not universally desired, however, so it seems desirable to make it optional. Further, at least one legacy OS implemented a scheme whereby only processes running with one particular label could be exempt from MAC. This patch supports these three cases. If /smack/onlycap is empty (unset or null-string) privilege is enforced in the normal way. If /smack/onlycap contains a label only processes running with that label may be MAC exempt. If the label in /smack/onlycap is the star label ("*") the semantics of the star label combine with the privilege restrictions to prevent any violations of MAC, even in the presence of privilege. Again, this will be independent of the privilege scheme. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: Fix a potentially uninitialised variable in SELinux hooksDavid Howells2008-08-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a potentially uninitialised variable in SELinux hooks that's given a pointer to the network address by selinux_parse_skb() passing a pointer back through its argument list. By restructuring selinux_parse_skb(), the compiler can see that the error case need not set it as the caller will return immediately. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: trivial, remove unneeded local variableVesa-Matti J Kari2008-08-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Hello, Remove unneeded local variable: struct avtab_node *newnode Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: Trivial minor fixes that change C null character styleVesa-Matti J Kari2008-08-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Trivial minor fixes that change C null character style. Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | make selinux_write_opts() staticAdrian Bunk2008-08-04
|/ | | | | | | This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_write_opts() static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: /proc/mounts should show what it canEric Paris2008-07-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Given a hosed SELinux config in which a system never loads policy or disables SELinux we currently just return -EINVAL for anyone trying to read /proc/mounts. This is a configuration problem but we can certainly be more graceful. This patch just ignores -EINVAL when displaying LSM options and causes /proc/mounts display everything else it can. If policy isn't loaded the obviously there are no options, so we aren't really loosing any information here. This is safe as the only other return of EINVAL comes from security_sid_to_context_core() in the case of an invalid sid. Even if a FS was mounted with a now invalidated context that sid should have been remapped to unlabeled and so we won't hit the EINVAL and will work like we should. (yes, I tested to make sure it worked like I thought) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-07-26
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits) [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling [PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely [PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap [PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h [PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open [PATCH] f_count may wrap around [PATCH] dup3 fix [PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate() [PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi() [PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent() [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al. [PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup [PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission() [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup [patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup [patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change [patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup [patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok() [PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation ...
| * [patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_changeMiklos Szeredi2008-07-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and fsnotify_change(). This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change(). That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file. [Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for noticing.] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * [PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitlyAl Viro2008-07-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags" bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6Linus Torvalds2008-07-26
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: netns: fix ip_rt_frag_needed rt_is_expired netfilter: nf_conntrack_extend: avoid unnecessary "ct->ext" dereferences netfilter: fix double-free and use-after free netfilter: arptables in netns for real netfilter: ip{,6}tables_security: fix future section mismatch selinux: use nf_register_hooks() netfilter: ebtables: use nf_register_hooks() Revert "pkt_sched: sch_sfq: dump a real number of flows" qeth: use dev->ml_priv instead of dev->priv syncookies: Make sure ECN is disabled net: drop unused BUG_TRAP() net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON drivers/net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON
| * selinux: use nf_register_hooks()Alexey Dobriyan2008-07-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | tracehook: tracehook_tracer_taskRoland McGrath2008-07-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds the tracehook_tracer_task() hook to consolidate all forms of "Who is using ptrace on me?" logic. This is used for "TracerPid:" in /proc and for permission checks. We also clean up the selinux code the called an identical accessor. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | devcgroup: code cleanupLi Zefan2008-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - clean up set_majmin() - use simple_strtoul() to parse major/minor [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix simple_strtoul() usage] [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix warnings] Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCUPavel Emelyanov2008-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading from one. This is OK, but can be better. Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for /dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to 20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock doesn't seem very good. Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions checking under the rcu_read_lock. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | cgroup files: convert devcgroup_access_write() into a cgroup write_string() ↵Paul Menage2008-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | handler This patch converts devcgroup_access_write() from a raw file handler into a handler for the cgroup write_string() method. This allows some boilerplate copying/locking/checking to be removed and simplifies the cleanup path, since these functions are performed by the cgroups framework before calling the handler. Signed-off-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | security: filesystem capabilities no longer experimentalAndrew G. Morgan2008-07-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for configuring filesystem capabilities. Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | security: protect legacy applications from executing with insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan2008-07-24
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file, it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a fail-safe permission check. For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for them, see: http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still (ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present"James Morris2008-07-15
| | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9. From Eric Paris: "Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
* security: remove register_security hookJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as a secondary module should do so explicitly. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* security: remove dummy module fixMiklos Szeredi2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module": CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITY Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dummy moduleMiklos Szeredi2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hookMiklos Szeredi2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the sb_show_options() hook. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mountsEric Paris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if presentEric Paris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all. This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy. An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs if available and will follow the genfs rule. This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with this path we just don't need to define it! Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: fix return of void-valued expressionsJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form "returning void-valued expression". Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
* SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while blockJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variableJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printkEric Paris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on everything. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux ↵Stephen Smalley2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | whine) On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > Getting a few of these with FC5: > > SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69 > SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69 > > one came out when I logged in. > > No other symptoms, yet. Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling class values unknown to policy as normal denials. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policyEric Paris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex, sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_avEric Paris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array which should be correctly referenced. At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling) and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined if that class exists in policy. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: open code sidtab lockJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | Open code sidtab lock to make Andrew Morton happy. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* SELinux: open code load_mutexJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | Open code load_mutex as suggested by Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: open code policy_rwlockJames Morris2008-07-14
| | | | | | | Open code policy_rwlock, as suggested by Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* selinux: fix endianness bug in network node address handlingStephen Smalley2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the policy. Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: simplify ioctl checkingStephen Smalley2008-07-14
| | | | | | | | | | | Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the permission check rather than dealing with individual command values. This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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