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* [PATCH] mutex subsystem, semaphore to mutex: VFS, ->i_semJes Sorensen2006-01-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the inode semaphore to a mutex. I have tested it on XFS and compiled as much as one can consider on an ia64. Anyway your luck with it might be different. Modified-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (finished the conversion) Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* [PATCH] shrink dentry structEric Dumazet2006-01-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some long time ago, dentry struct was carefully tuned so that on 32 bits UP, sizeof(struct dentry) was exactly 128, ie a power of 2, and a multiple of memory cache lines. Then RCU was added and dentry struct enlarged by two pointers, with nice results for SMP, but not so good on UP, because breaking the above tuning (128 + 8 = 136 bytes) This patch reverts this unwanted side effect, by using an union (d_u), where d_rcu and d_child are placed so that these two fields can share their memory needs. At the time d_free() is called (and d_rcu is really used), d_child is known to be empty and not touched by the dentry freeing. Lockless lookups only access d_name, d_parent, d_lock, d_op, d_flags (so the previous content of d_child is not needed if said dentry was unhashed but still accessed by a CPU because of RCU constraints) As dentry cache easily contains millions of entries, a size reduction is worth the extra complexity of the ugly C union. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com> Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keysDavid Howells2006-01-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Discard duplicate keys from a keyring on linkDavid Howells2006-01-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added. The match is contingent on the type and description strings being the same. This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired, revoked and dead keys easily. After some discussion it was concluded that duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise hide the new key. Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Permit key expiry time to be setDavid Howells2006-01-08
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a new keyctl function that allows the expiry time to be set on a key or removed from a key, provided the caller has attribute modification access. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] rcu file: use atomic primitivesNick Piggin2006-01-08
| | | | | | | | | Use atomic_inc_not_zero for rcu files instead of special case rcuref. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [XFRM]: Fix sparse warning.Luiz Capitulino2006-01-07
| | | | | | | | security/selinux/xfrm.c:155:10: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6Linus Torvalds2006-01-06
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| * [LSM-IPSec]: Corrections to LSM-IPSec NethooksTrent Jaeger2006-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches previously applied. (1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak. (2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto to setcontext. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sam/kbuildLinus Torvalds2006-01-06
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| * kbuild: un-stringnify KBUILD_MODNAMESam Ravnborg2006-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now when kbuild passes KBUILD_MODNAME with "" do not __stringify it when used. Remove __stringnify for all users. This also fixes the output of: $ ls -l /sys/module/ drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia_core drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "processor" drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "psmouse" The quoting of the module names will be gone again. Thanks to GregKH + Kay Sievers for reproting this. Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
* | [PATCH] security/: possible cleanupsAdrian Bunk2006-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make needlessly global code static Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Keys: Remove key duplicationDavid Howells2006-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the key duplication stuff since there's nothing that uses it, no way to get at it and it's awkward to deal with for LSM purposes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: more ARRAY_SIZE cleanupsTobias Klauser2006-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Further ARRAY_SIZE cleanups under security/selinux. Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@nuerscht.ch> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: ARRAY_SIZE cleanupsNicolas Kaiser2006-01-06
|/ | | | | | | | | | Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]). Signed-off-by: Nicolas Kaiser <nikai@nikai.net> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Per-packet access control.Trent Jaeger2006-01-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies (xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the security association's negotiated and used have the same security context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such security contexts for policies and security associations. It also enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned. Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be sent in that manner. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used, then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet, respectively. The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via selinux_xfrm_state_alloc. When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone. When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or selinux_xfrm_state_free. Testing: The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We created policies and security associations with particular security contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no security context was supplied (which either did or did not use security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.Trent Jaeger2006-01-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] Keys: Fix permissions check for update vs addDavid Howells2005-12-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | Permit add_key() to once again update a matching key rather than adding a new one if a matching key already exists in the target keyring. This bug causes add_key() to always add a new key, displacing the old from the target keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: extend selinuxfs context interfaceStephen Smalley2005-11-09
| | | | | | | | | | This patch extends the selinuxfs context interface to allow return the canonical form of the context to userspace. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: disable setxattr on mountpoint labeled filesystemsStephen Smalley2005-11-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch disables the setting of SELinux xattrs on files created in filesystems labeled via mountpoint labeling (mounted with the context= option). selinux_inode_setxattr already prevents explicit setxattr from userspace on such filesystems, so this provides consistent behavior for file creation. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: MLS compatibilityStephen Smalley2005-11-09
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch enables files created on a MLS-enabled SELinux system to be accessible on a non-MLS SELinux system, by skipping the MLS component of the security context in the non-MLS case. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] kfree cleanup: securityJesper Juhl2005-11-07
| | | | | | | | | | | This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Remove incorrect and obsolete '!' operatorsDavid Howells2005-11-07
| | | | | | | | | | The attached patch removes a couple of incorrect and obsolete '!' operators left over from the conversion of the key permission functions from true/false returns to zero/error returns. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] cleanup the usage of SEND_SIG_xxx constantsOleg Nesterov2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | This patch simplifies some checks for magic siginfo values. It should not change the behaviour in any way. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] remove hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constantsOleg Nesterov2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constants with their symbolic names. No changes in affected .o files. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]David Howells2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable changes are: (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which programs may access a key. (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key. (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules; the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out. (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather than a boolean value. (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of attributes (UID, GID, permissions). Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation, but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based on the permission request bits. Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled. This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected: [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operationsDavid Howells2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Export user-defined key operations so that those who wish to define their own key type based on the user-defined key operations may do so (as has been requested). The header file created has been placed into include/keys/user-type.h, thus creating a directory where other key types may also be placed. Any objections to doing this? Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] reduce sizeof(struct file)Eric Dumazet2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that RCU applied on 'struct file' seems stable, we can place f_rcuhead in a memory location that is not anymore used at call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead, file_free_rcu) time, to reduce the size of this critical kernel object. The trick I used is to move f_rcuhead and f_list in an union called f_u The callers are changed so that f_rcuhead becomes f_u.fu_rcuhead and f_list becomes f_u.f_list Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: remove unecessary size_t checks in selinuxfsDavi Arnaut2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | This patch removes a bunch of unecessary checks for (size_t < 0) in selinuxfs. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux-canonicalize-getxattr-fixAndrew Morton2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/hooks.c: In function `selinux_inode_getxattr': security/selinux/hooks.c:2193: warning: unused variable `sbsec' Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: canonicalize getxattr()James Morris2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after the fs level getxattr() function. The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem. In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk. The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call, so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with the kernel value. We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems (i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the kernel value to the user. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: convert to kzallocJames Morris2005-10-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K. Before: text data bss dec hex filename 86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o After: text data bss dec hex filename 85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] gfp_t: net/*Al Viro2005-10-28
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: handle sel_make_bools() failure in selinuxfsDavi Arnaut2005-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes error handling in sel_make_bools(), where currently we'd get a memory leak via security_get_bools() and try to kfree() the wrong pointer if called again. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: Fix NULL deref in policydb_destroyStephen Smalley2005-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a possible NULL dereference in policydb_destroy, where p->type_attr_map can be NULL if policydb_destroy is called to clean up a partially loaded policy upon an error during policy load. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additiveDavid Howells2005-10-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch makes the possessor permissions on a key additive with user/group/other permissions on the same key. This permits extra rights to be granted to the possessor of a key without taking away any rights conferred by them owning the key or having common group membership. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Split key permissions checking into a .c fileDavid Howells2005-10-08
| | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys... key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add request-key process documentationDavid Howells2005-10-08
| | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds documentation for the process by which request-key works, including how it permits helper processes to gain access to the requestor's keyrings. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] key: plug request_key_auth memleakDavid Howells2005-10-08
| | | | | | | | | Plug request_key_auth memleak. This can be triggered by unprivileged users, so is local DoS. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux - fix SCTP socket bug and general IP protocol handlingJames Morris2005-09-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP based protocols. Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP. The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket. So, any socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and SOCK_DGRAM as UDP. Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking. This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket as TCP or UDP. The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets). Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer. This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level check, which then fails for generic sockets. It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP. This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of trying to recalculate it. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add possessor permissions to keys [try #3]David Howells2005-09-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key targets using the LSM facilities. This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *) that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer. The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as it's not an intrinsic property of a key. Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever possession information needs to be passed through. This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on return from kmem_cache_alloc(). The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all reference variables should now end in "_ref". Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] seclvl: use securityfs (fix)Serge Hallyn2005-09-17
| | | | | | | | | That should be -EINVAL for both. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] seclvl-use-securityfs tidyAndrew Morton2005-09-17
| | | | | | | | | | | We don't put braces around single statements, thanks. Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chrisw/lsm-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-13
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| * [PATCH] SECURITY must depend on SYSFSAdrian Bunk2005-08-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_SECURITY=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n results in the following compile error: <-- snip --> ... LD vmlinux security/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init': inode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys' make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1 <-- snip --> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] seclvl securityfsserue@us.ibm.com2005-07-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Once again, the simple_attr in libfs was actually sufficient - I'd thought the __attribute__(format(printk(1,2))) was more mysterious than it really is. At last, here is the full patch to make seclvl use securityfs. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> -- seclvl.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------------- 1 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-) Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c ===================================================================
| * [PATCH] add securityfs for all LSMs to useGreg KH2005-07-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point. This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new /my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM. It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from Mike Waychison. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
* | Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dwmw2/audit-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-13
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| * \ Merge with /shiny/git/linux-2.6/.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-08-09
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| * \ \ Merge with /shiny/git/linux-2.6/.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-07-13
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