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* Merge branch 'for-next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-08-04
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial * 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (48 commits) Documentation: update broken web addresses. fix comment typo "choosed" -> "chosen" hostap:hostap_hw.c Fix typo in comment Fix spelling contorller -> controller in comments Kconfig.debug: FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT: typo Faul -> Fault fs/Kconfig: Fix typo Userpace -> Userspace Removing dead MACH_U300_BS26 drivers/infiniband: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data fs/ocfs2: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data libfc: use ARRAY_SIZE scsi: bfa: use ARRAY_SIZE drm: i915: use ARRAY_SIZE drm: drm_edid: use ARRAY_SIZE synclink: use ARRAY_SIZE block: cciss: use ARRAY_SIZE comment typo fixes: charater => character fix comment typos concerning "challenge" arm: plat-spear: fix typo in kerneldoc reiserfs: typo comment fix update email address ...
| * fix typos concerning "initiali[zs]e"Uwe Kleine-König2010-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* | security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissionsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.hMimi Zohar2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | smack: opt_dentry is never null in in smack_d_instantiate()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes some unneeded code for if opt_dentry is null because that can never happen. The function dereferences "opt_dentry" earlier when it checks "if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {". That code was added in 2008. This function called from security_d_instantiate(). I checked all the places which call security_d_instantiate() and dentry is always non-null. I also checked the selinux version of this hook and there is a comment which says that dentry should be non-null if called from d_instantiate(). Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2010-05-05
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| * include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking ↵Tejun Heo2010-03-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* | SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headersDavid Howells2010-04-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't #include Ext2 headers into Smack unnecessarily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SMACK: remove dead cred_commit hookEric Paris2010-04-07
|/ | | | | | | | This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-03-04
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits) init: Open /dev/console from rootfs mqueue: fix typo "failues" -> "failures" mqueue: only set error codes if they are really necessary mqueue: simplify do_open() error handling mqueue: apply mathematics distributivity on mq_bytes calculation mqueue: remove unneeded info->messages initialization mqueue: fix mq_open() file descriptor leak on user-space processes fix race in d_splice_alias() set S_DEAD on unlink() and non-directory rename() victims vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2) get rid of ->mnt_parent in tomoyo/realpath hppfs can use existing proc_mnt, no need for do_kern_mount() in there Mirror MS_KERNMOUNT in ->mnt_flags get rid of useless vfsmount_lock use in put_mnt_ns() Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h get rid of insanity with namespace roots in tomoyo take check for new events in namespace (guts of mounts_poll()) to namespace.c Don't mess with generic_permission() under ->d_lock in hpfs sanitize const/signedness for udf nilfs: sanitize const/signedness in dealing with ->d_name.name ... Fix up fairly trivial (famous last words...) conflicts in drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c and security/tomoyo/realpath.c
| * fix mnt_mountpoint abuse in smackAl Viro2010-03-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (mnt,mnt_mountpoint) pair is conceptually wrong; if you want to use it for generating pathname and for nothing else *and* if you know that vfsmount tree is unchanging, you can get away with that, but the right solution for that is (mnt,mnt_root). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscallsKees Cook2010-02-03
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* net: rename skb->iif to skb->skb_iifEric Dumazet2009-11-20
| | | | | | | To help grep games, rename iif to skb_iif Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* seq_file: constify seq_operationsJames Morris2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against revectoring user-triggerable function pointers. This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Move magic numbers into magic.hNick Black2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h. Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfsDavid P. Quigley2009-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved into one dynamically allocated field. This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled appropriately. [sds: Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.] Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security ↵David P. Quigley2009-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]David Howells2009-09-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security/smack: Use AF_INET for sin_family fieldJulia Lawall2009-08-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Elsewhere the sin_family field holds a value with a name of the form AF_..., so it seems reasonable to do so here as well. Also the values of PF_INET and AF_INET are the same. The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ struct sockaddr_in sip; @@ ( sip.sin_family == - PF_INET + AF_INET | sip.sin_family != - PF_INET + AF_INET | sip.sin_family = - PF_INET + AF_INET ) // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: Make lsm_priv union in lsm_audit.h anonymousThomas Liu2009-07-09
| | | | | | | | | Made the lsm_priv union in include/linux/lsm_audit.h anonymous. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Move variable function in lsm_audit.h into SMACK private spaceThomas Liu2009-07-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Moved variable function in include/linux/lsm_audit.h into the smack_audit_data struct since it is never used outside of it. Also removed setting of function in the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT macro because that variable is now private to SMACK. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> I-dont-see-any-problems-with-it: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_checkIngo Molnar2009-06-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have a retval convention. Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-06-11
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits) nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition. TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures. TOMOYO: Remove unused field. integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter. security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader. TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers. SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex. tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct smack: Remove redundant initialization. integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix rootplug: Remove redundant initialization. smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data integrity: move ima_counts_get integrity: path_check update IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool ...
| * smack: Remove redundant initialization.Tetsuo Handa2009-05-27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need to explicitly initialize to cap_* because it will be filled by security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of dataRoel Kluin2009-05-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not go beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data Signed-off-by: Roel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-05-08
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| * | smack: implement logging V3Etienne Basset2009-04-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \ It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : 0: no logging 1: log denied (default) 2: log accepted 3: log denied&accepted Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | Merge branch 'rcu-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-06-10
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: rcu: rcu_sched_grace_period(): kill the bogus flush_signals() rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriate rculist.h: introduce list_entry_rcu() and list_first_entry_rcu() rcu: Update RCU tracing documentation for __rcu_pending rcu: Add __rcu_pending tracing to hierarchical RCU RCU: make treercu be default
| * | rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriateJiri Pirko2009-04-15
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use previously introduced list_entry_rcu instead of an open-coded list_entry + rcu_dereference combination. Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com LKML-Reference: <20090414181715.GA3634@psychotron.englab.brq.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* / Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity in smack_inode_setxattrEtienne Basset2009-04-17
|/ | | | | | | | | | the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error). Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* smack: Add a new '-CIPSO' option to the network address label configurationEtienne Basset2009-03-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new special option '-CIPSO' to the Smack subsystem. When used in the netlabel list, it means "use CIPSO networking". A use case is when your local network speaks CIPSO and you want also to connect to the unlabeled Internet. This patch also add some documentation describing that. The patch also corrects an oops when setting a '' SMACK64 xattr to a file. Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* netlabel: Cleanup the Smack/NetLabel code to fix incoming TCP connectionsPaul Moore2009-03-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch cleans up a lot of the Smack network access control code. The largest changes are to fix the labeling of incoming TCP connections in a manner similar to the recent SELinux changes which use the security_inet_conn_request() hook to label the request_sock and let the label move to the child socket via the normal network stack mechanisms. In addition to the incoming TCP connection fixes this patch also removes the smk_labled field from the socket_smack struct as the minor optimization advantage was outweighed by the difficulty in maintaining it's proper state. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinuxPaul Moore2009-03-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* smack: convert smack to standard linux listsEtienne Basset2009-03-25
| | | | | | | | | | | the following patch (on top of 2.6.29) converts Smack lists to standard linux lists Please review and consider for inclusion in 2.6.30-rc regards, Etienne Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-03-23
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| * smack: fixes for unlabeled host supportetienne2009-03-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in 2.6.29rc. It should go in before -final. 1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label), preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with IP options) 2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24, /32 masks but not other masks) 3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ... 4) they were not sorted 1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue. The patch : -creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr, -sorted by netmask length -use the new sorted nature of smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific -corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr & netlbladdr_seq_show Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | smack: fixes for unlabeled host supportetienne2009-03-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in 2.6.29rc. It should go in before -final. 1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label), preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with IP options) 2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24, /32 masks but not other masks) 3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ... 4) they were not sorted 1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue. The patch : -creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr, -sorted by netmask length -use the new sorted nature of smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific -corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr & netlbladdr_seq_show Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | smack: fix lots of kernel-doc notationRandy Dunlap2009-02-18
|/ | | | | | | | Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* smackfs load append mode fixCasey Schaufler2009-01-27
| | | | | | | | | | | Given just how hard it is to find the code that uses MAY_APPEND it's probably not a big surprise that this went unnoticed for so long. The Smack rules loading code is incorrectly setting the MAY_READ bit when MAY_APPEND is requested. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* remove lots of double-semicolonsFernando Carrijo2009-01-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2009-01-06
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| * Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() ↵James Morris2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ver #2]" This reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8. David has a better version to come.
| * CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]David Howells2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op - task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds. strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * smack: Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networksCasey Schaufler2008-12-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks. Relies heavily on Paul Moore's netlabel support. Creates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel take the form: A.B.C.D LABEL or A.B.C.D/N LABEL where A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32, and LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is assumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are matched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will match everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one host. A new system label "@", pronounced "web", is defined. Processes can not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web label can be written to by any process, and packets coming from a web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label is a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has been requested many times. The nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right and the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts be treated as unlabeled. CIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated single label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by processes with labels that can write to the label of the host. Packets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled. Once added a single label designation cannot be removed, however the label may be changed. The behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
| * netlabel: Update kernel configuration APIPaul Moore2008-12-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the NetLabel kernel API to expose the new features added in kernel releases 2.6.25 and 2.6.28: the static/fallback label functionality and network address based selectors. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* | audit: validate comparison operations, store them in sane formAl Viro2009-01-04
|/ | | | | | | | | | | Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g. audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it. ->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree instances updated. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* smackfs: check for allocation failures in smk_set_access()Sergio Luis2008-12-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smackfs: check for allocation failures in smk_set_access() While adding a new subject/object pair to smack_list, smk_set_access() didn't check the return of kzalloc(). This patch changes smk_set_access() to return 0 or -ENOMEM, based on kzalloc()'s return. It also updates its caller, smk_write_load(), to check for smk_set_access()'s return, given it is no longer a void return function. Signed-off-by: Sergio Luis <sergio@larces.uece.br> To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Cc: LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()James Morris2008-12-19
| | | | | | | | Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actionsDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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