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* capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris2010-11-15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* convert get_sb_single() usersAl Viro2010-10-29
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: do not assign default i_ino in new_inodeChristoph Hellwig2010-10-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of always assigning an increasing inode number in new_inode move the call to assign it into those callers that actually need it. For now callers that need it is estimated conservatively, that is the call is added to all filesystems that do not assign an i_ino by themselves. For a few more filesystems we can avoid assigning any inode number given that they aren't user visible, and for others it could be done lazily when an inode number is actually needed, but that's left for later patches. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* selinux: include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_userStephen Rothwell2010-10-20
| | | | | | | Include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user (fixes ppc build warning). Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: implement mmap on /selinux/policyEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | /selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel. This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernelEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file /selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: drop useless (and incorrect) AVTAB_MAX_SIZEEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | AVTAB_MAX_SIZE was a define which was supposed to be used in userspace to define a maximally sized avtab when userspace wasn't sure how big of a table it needed. It doesn't make sense in the kernel since we always know our table sizes. The only place it is used we have a more appropiately named define called AVTAB_MAX_HASH_BUCKETS, use that instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: deterministic ordering of range transition rulesEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | Range transition rules are placed in the hash table in an (almost) arbitrary order. This patch inserts them in a fixed order to make policy retrival more predictable. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: secid_to_secctx returns len when data is NULLEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set the slen pointer. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* secmark: make secmark object handling genericEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()KOSAKI Motohiro2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: fix up style problem on /selinux/statusKaiGai Kohei2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes up coding-style problem at this commit: 4f27a7d49789b04404eca26ccde5f527231d01d5 selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: change to new flag variablematt mooney2010-10-20
| | | | | | | Replace EXTRA_CFLAGS with ccflags-y. Signed-off-by: matt mooney <mfm@muteddisk.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: really fix dependency causing parallel compile failure.Paul Gortmaker2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While the previous change to the selinux Makefile reduced the window significantly for this failure, it is still possible to see a compile failure where cpp starts processing selinux files before the auto generated flask.h file is completed. This is easily reproduced by adding the following temporary change to expose the issue everytime: - cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ... + cmd_flask = sleep 30 ; scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ... This failure happens because the creation of the object files in the ss subdir also depends on flask.h. So simply incorporate them into the parent Makefile, as the ss/Makefile really doesn't do anything unique. With this change, compiling of all selinux files is dependent on completion of the header file generation, and this test case with the "sleep 30" now confirms it is functioning as expected. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: fix parallel compile errorPaul Gortmaker2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Selinux has an autogenerated file, "flask.h" which is included by two other selinux files. The current makefile has a single dependency on the first object file in the selinux-y list, assuming that will get flask.h generated before anyone looks for it, but that assumption breaks down in a "make -jN" situation and you get: selinux/selinuxfs.c:35: fatal error: flask.h: No such file or directory compilation terminated. remake[9]: *** [security/selinux/selinuxfs.o] Error 1 Since flask.h is included by security.h which in turn is included nearly everywhere, make the dependency apply to all of the selinux-y list of objs. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)KaiGai Kohei2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: type_bounds_sanity_check has a meaningless variable declarationEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | type is not used at all, stop declaring and assigning it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* tty: fix fu_list abuseNick Piggin2010-08-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | tty: fix fu_list abuse tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling. If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose). This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean". Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug. The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors. This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers. [ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether that will ever be worth implementing. ] Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: cleanup files_lock lockingNick Piggin2010-08-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs: cleanup files_lock locking Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds2010-08-10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
| * rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lockOleg Nesterov2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When doing an exec, selinux updates rlimits in its code of current process depending on current max. Make sure max or cur doesn't change in the meantime by grabbing task_lock which do_prlimit needs for changing limits too. While at it, use rlimit helper for accessing CPU rlimit a line below. To have a volatile access too. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
| * rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpuJiri Slaby2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct as a parameter to update_rlimit_cpu to be able to set rlimit_cpu of different task than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELINUX: Fix build error.Ralf Baechle2010-08-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix build error caused by a stale security/selinux/av_permissions.h in the $(src) directory which will override a more recent version in $(obj) that is it appears to strike only when building with a separate object directory. Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_arrayEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap) (12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length 3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly. In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE pieces. -v2 rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj) drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly -v3 make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: Move execmod to the common permsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types. To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops those needless perms as well. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: place open in the common file permsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open in the common file perms. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: special dontaudit for access checksEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so: dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial. If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions (rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial. This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissionsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: break ocontext reading into a separate functionEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate function ocontext_read() Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: move genfs read to a separate functionEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new function called genfs_read() Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: fix error codes in symtab_init()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is appropriate here. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: fix error codes in cond_read_bool()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error. The new code returns either -ENOMEM, or -EINVAL or it propagates the error codes from lower level functions next_entry() or hashtab_insert(). next_entry() returns -EINVAL. hashtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -EEXIST, or -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: fix error codes in cond_policydb_init()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's better to propagate the error code from avtab_init() instead of returning -1 (-EPERM). It turns out that avtab_init() never fails so this patch doesn't change how the code runs but it's still a clean up. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: fix error codes in cond_read_node()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Originally cond_read_node() returned -1 (-EPERM) on errors which was incorrect. Now it either propagates the error codes from lower level functions next_entry() or cond_read_av_list() or it returns -ENOMEM or -EINVAL. next_entry() returns -EINVAL. cond_read_av_list() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: fix error codes in cond_read_av_list()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After this patch cond_read_av_list() no longer returns -1 for any errors. It just propagates error code back from lower levels. Those can either be -EINVAL or -ENOMEM. I also modified cond_insertf() since cond_read_av_list() passes that as a function pointer to avtab_read_item(). It isn't used anywhere else. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: propagate error codes in cond_read_list()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are passed back when the security module gets loaded. The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error but after this patch it can return -EINVAL, or -ENOMEM or propagate the error code from cond_read_node(). cond_read_node() still returns -1 all the time, but I fix that in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: cleanup return codes in avtab_read_item()Dan Carpenter2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The avtab_read_item() function tends to return -1 as a default error code which is wrong (-1 means -EPERM). I modified it to return appropriate error codes which is -EINVAL or the error code from next_entry() or insertf(). next_entry() returns -EINVAL. insertf() is a function pointer to either avtab_insert() or cond_insertf(). avtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -ENOMEM, and -EEXIST. cond_insertf() currently returns -1, but I will fix it in a later patch. There is code in avtab_read() which translates the -1 returns from avtab_read_item() to -EINVAL. The translation is no longer needed, so I removed it. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: use generic_file_llseekArnd Bergmann2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The default for llseek will change to no_llseek, so selinuxfs needs to add explicit .llseek assignments. Since we're dealing with regular files from a VFS perspective, use generic_file_llseek. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.hMimi Zohar2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Use current_security() when possiblePaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There were a number of places using the following code pattern: struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; ... which were simplified to the following: struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Convert socket related access controls to use socket labelsPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At present, the socket related access controls use a mix of inode and socket labels; while there should be no practical difference (they _should_ always be the same), it makes the code more confusing. This patch attempts to convert all of the socket related access control points (with the exception of some of the inode/fd based controls) to use the socket's own label. In the process, I also converted the socket_has_perm() function to take a 'sock' argument instead of a 'socket' since that was adding a bit more overhead in some cases. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Shuffle the sk_security_struct alloc and free routinesPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The sk_alloc_security() and sk_free_security() functions were only being called by the selinux_sk_alloc_security() and selinux_sk_free_security() functions so we just move the guts of the alloc/free routines to the callers and eliminate a layer of indirection. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Consolidate sockcreate_sid logicPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Consolidate the basic sockcreate_sid logic into a single helper function which allows us to do some cleanups in the related code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Set the peer label correctly on connected UNIX domain socketsPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on the client end of a pair of connected UNIX sockets. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: seperate range transition rules to a seperate functionEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the range transition rule to a separate function, range_read(), rather than doing it all in policydb_read() Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: remove all rcu head initializationsPaul E. McKenney2010-08-02
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove all rcu head inits. We don't care about the RCU head state before passing it to call_rcu() anyway. Only leave the "on_stack" variants so debugobjects can keep track of objects on stack. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* switch selinux delayed superblock handling to iterate_supers()Al Viro2010-05-21
| | | | | | ... kill their private list, while we are at it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdupJulia Lawall2010-05-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use kstrdup when the goal of an allocation is copy a string into the allocated region. The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ expression from,to; expression flag,E1,E2; statement S; @@ - to = kmalloc(strlen(from) + 1,flag); + to = kstrdup(from, flag); ... when != \(from = E1 \| to = E1 \) if (to==NULL || ...) S ... when != \(from = E2 \| to = E2 \) - strcpy(to, from); // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2010-05-05
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