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* capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris2010-11-15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* secmark: make secmark object handling genericEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()KOSAKI Motohiro2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* tty: fix fu_list abuseNick Piggin2010-08-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | tty: fix fu_list abuse tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling. If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose). This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean". Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug. The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors. This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers. [ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether that will ever be worth implementing. ] Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: cleanup files_lock lockingNick Piggin2010-08-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs: cleanup files_lock locking Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds2010-08-10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
| * rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lockOleg Nesterov2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When doing an exec, selinux updates rlimits in its code of current process depending on current max. Make sure max or cur doesn't change in the meantime by grabbing task_lock which do_prlimit needs for changing limits too. While at it, use rlimit helper for accessing CPU rlimit a line below. To have a volatile access too. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
| * rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpuJiri Slaby2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct as a parameter to update_rlimit_cpu to be able to set rlimit_cpu of different task than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: place open in the common file permsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open in the common file perms. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: special dontaudit for access checksEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so: dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial. If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions (rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial. This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissionsEric Paris2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.hMimi Zohar2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Use current_security() when possiblePaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There were a number of places using the following code pattern: struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; ... which were simplified to the following: struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Convert socket related access controls to use socket labelsPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At present, the socket related access controls use a mix of inode and socket labels; while there should be no practical difference (they _should_ always be the same), it makes the code more confusing. This patch attempts to convert all of the socket related access control points (with the exception of some of the inode/fd based controls) to use the socket's own label. In the process, I also converted the socket_has_perm() function to take a 'sock' argument instead of a 'socket' since that was adding a bit more overhead in some cases. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Shuffle the sk_security_struct alloc and free routinesPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The sk_alloc_security() and sk_free_security() functions were only being called by the selinux_sk_alloc_security() and selinux_sk_free_security() functions so we just move the guts of the alloc/free routines to the callers and eliminate a layer of indirection. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Consolidate sockcreate_sid logicPaul Moore2010-08-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Consolidate the basic sockcreate_sid logic into a single helper function which allows us to do some cleanups in the related code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: Set the peer label correctly on connected UNIX domain socketsPaul Moore2010-08-02
|/ | | | | | | | | Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on the client end of a pair of connected UNIX sockets. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* switch selinux delayed superblock handling to iterate_supers()Al Viro2010-05-21
| | | | | | ... kill their private list, while we are at it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archsStephen Smalley2010-04-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote: > From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com> > Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400 > > > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps > > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 > > [heap] > > SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP > just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set > both executable and writable. > > You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since > because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch, > the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does. > You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not. > > Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32 > || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with > this. > > In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the > VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the > SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to > go through this process too. To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding whether to enable or disable these checks. VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't constant on some architectures but instead depends on current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly. So we'll just use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these checks. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: always call sk_security_struct sksecEric Paris2010-04-07
| | | | | | | | trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy since we don't always call it sksec. Just rename everything sksec. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'next-queue' into nextJames Morris2010-03-08
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| * selinux: const strings in tablesStephen Hemminger2010-03-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Several places strings tables are used that should be declared const. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: Make selinux_kernel_create_files_as() shouldn't just always return 0David Howells2010-02-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make selinux_kernel_create_files_as() return an error when it gets one, rather than unconditionally returning 0. Without this, cachefiles doesn't return an error if the SELinux policy doesn't let it create files with the label of the directory at the base of the cache. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variablewzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-02-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy), but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config. Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available. Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | syslog: use defined constants instead of raw numbersKees Cook2010-02-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now the syslog "type" action are just raw numbers which makes the source difficult to follow. This patch replaces the raw numbers with defined constants for some level of sanity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscallsKees Cook2010-02-03
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SECURITY: selinux, fix update_rlimit_cpu parameterJiri Slaby2010-01-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't pass current RLIMIT_RTTIME to update_rlimit_cpu() in selinux_bprm_committing_creds, since update_rlimit_cpu expects RLIMIT_CPU limit. Use proper rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur instead to fix that. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'master' of /home/davem/src/GIT/linux-2.6/David S. Miller2009-12-05
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: drivers/net/pcmcia/fmvj18x_cs.c drivers/net/pcmcia/nmclan_cs.c drivers/net/pcmcia/xirc2ps_cs.c drivers/net/wireless/ray_cs.c
| * security: report the module name to security_module_requestEric Paris2009-11-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * selinux: drop remapping of netlink classesStephen Smalley2009-10-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking based on netlink message type for policy version < 18. This removes compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink security class used for all netlink sockets was split into finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux 2.6.8. The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11. Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: reset the security_ops before flushing the avc cacheEric Paris2009-09-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch resets the security_ops to the secondary_ops before it flushes the avc. It's still possible that a task on another processor could have already passed the security_ops dereference and be executing an selinux hook function which would add a new avc entry. That entry would still not be freed. This should however help to reduce the number of needless avcs the kernel has when selinux is disabled at run time. There is no wasted memory if selinux is disabled on the command line or not compiled. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | net: rename skb->iif to skb->skb_iifEric Dumazet2009-11-20
|/ | | | | | | To help grep games, rename iif to skb_iif Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* do_wait() wakeup optimization: change __wake_up_parent() to use filtered wakeupOleg Nesterov2009-09-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ratan Nalumasu reported that in a process with many threads doing unnecessary wakeups. Every waiting thread in the process wakes up to loop through the children and see that the only ones it cares about are still not ready. Now that we have struct wait_opts we can change do_wait/__wake_up_parent to use filtered wakeups. We can make child_wait_callback() more clever later, right now it only checks eligible_child(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ratan Nalumasu <rnalumasu@gmail.com> Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfsDavid P. Quigley2009-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved into one dynamically allocated field. This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled appropriately. [sds: Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.] Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security ↵David P. Quigley2009-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]David Howells2009-09-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]David Howells2009-09-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes all references, not just those from task_structs). Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid. This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the credential struct has been previously released): http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: Support for the new TUN LSM hooksPaul Moore2009-08-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(), security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach(). This includes the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks associated with TUN devices. The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create() hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach() is a bit special. The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most closely resembles a relabel operation. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: adjust rules for ATTR_FORCEAmerigo Wang2009-08-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As suggested by OGAWA Hirofumi in thread: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/8/7/132, we should let selinux_inode_setattr() to match our ATTR_* rules. ATTR_FORCE should not force things like ATTR_SIZE. [hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: tweaks] Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-08-19
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/Kconfig Manual fix. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris2009-08-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmapEric Paris2009-08-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.cJames Morris2009-08-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c The buffer always needs to be freed here; we either error out or allocate more memory. Reported-by: iceberg <strakh@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* | SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.hThomas Liu2009-08-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version behaves the same way as the unpatched version. Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space, once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the unpatched. I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: add selinux_kernel_module_requestEric Paris2009-08-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to load a module. This is a different operation than a process trying to load a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris2009-08-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmapEric Paris2009-08-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | kernel: rename is_single_threaded(task) to current_is_single_threaded(void)Oleg Nesterov2009-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current, we can't use task->signal or task->mm. - it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can fork right after the check. Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"James Morris2009-07-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 8113a8d80f4c6a3dc3724b39b470f3fee9c426b6. The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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