aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/security.c
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAge
* security: trim security.hAl Viro2012-02-13
| | | | | | | Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* mm: collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single functionAl Viro2012-02-13
| | | | | | | Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: create task_free security callbackKees Cook2012-02-09
| | | | | | | | | The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds2012-01-14
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
| * security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris2012-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * capabilities: remove all _real_ interfacesEric Paris2012-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The name security_real_capable and security_real_capable_noaudit just don't make much sense to me. Convert them to use security_capable and security_capable_noaudit. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
| * capabilities: introduce security_capable_noauditEric Paris2012-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Exactly like security_capable except don't audit any denials. This is for places where the kernel may make decisions about what to do if a task has a given capability, but which failing that capability is not a sign of a security policy violation. An example is checking if a task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to lower it's likelyhood of being killed by the oom killer. This check is not a security violation if it is denied. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
| * capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capableEric Paris2012-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap. Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone. Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right place! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirelyEric Paris2012-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *Al Viro2012-01-06
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->path_mknod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->path_mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch security_path_chmod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->mknod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->create() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | security: Fix security_old_inode_init_security() when CONFIG_SECURITY is not setJan Kara2012-01-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 1e39f384bb01 ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set. But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them uninitialized which then results in interesting failures. Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this just fine. [ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar. It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit fb88c2b6cbb1: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return code". - Linus ] Reported-by: Jorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds2011-10-25
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits) TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek. Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option. Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access Smack: compilation fix Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte Smack: domain transition protections (v3) Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) Smack: Clean up comments Smack: Repair processing of fcntl Smack: Rule list lookup performance Smack: check permissions from user space (v2) TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector. TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock. TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning. TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock. TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector. TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings. target: check hex2bin result encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result ...
| * evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return codeMimi Zohar2011-09-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| * security: sparse fix: Move security_fixup_op to security.hJames Morris2011-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix sparse warning by moving declaraion to global header. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Merge branch 'next-evm' of ↵James Morris2011-08-08
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6 into next Conflicts: fs/attr.c Resolve conflict manually. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evmMimi Zohar2011-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode. Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| | * evm: call evm_inode_init_security from security_inode_init_securityMimi Zohar2011-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changelog v7: - moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security, renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| | * security: imbed evm calls in security hooksMimi Zohar2011-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
| | * integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
| | * security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callbackMimi Zohar2011-07-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* | | bluetooth: Properly clone LSM attributes to newly created child connectionsPaul Moore2011-10-18
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Bluetooth stack has internal connection handlers for all of the various Bluetooth protocols, and unfortunately, they are currently lacking the LSM hooks found in the core network stack's connection handlers. I say unfortunately, because this can cause problems for users who have have an LSM enabled and are using certain Bluetooth devices. See one problem report below: * http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=741703 In order to keep things simple at this point in time, this patch fixes the problem by cloning the parent socket's LSM attributes to the newly created child socket. If we decide we need a more elaborate LSM marking mechanism for Bluetooth (I somewhat doubt this) we can always revisit this decision in the future. Reported-by: James M. Cape <jcape@ignore-your.tv> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | ->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to exec_permission()Al Viro2011-07-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use security_inode_permission() instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | ->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()Al Viro2011-07-20
|/ | | | | | pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds2011-03-16
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
| * net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller2011-03-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const.David S. Miller2011-02-22
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-16
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
| * \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-03-07
| |\ \
| | * | LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSMEric Paris2011-03-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * | security: remove unused security_sysctl hookLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more. Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris2011-02-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris2011-03-07
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | |/| / | | |/
| * | CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooksDavid Howells2011-01-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-15
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits) posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer() hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update() posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks posix-timers: Cleanup namespace posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86 posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning. time: Splitout compat timex accessors ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset posix-timer: Update comment ... Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S (name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in: kernel/time.c
| * | time: Correct the *settime* parametersRichard Cochran2011-02-02
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const' attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions implementing these calls. Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at> Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* / security: add cred argument to security_capable()Chris Wright2011-02-11
|/ | | | | | | | | Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a wider range of call sites. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'vfs-scale-working' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-01-07
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin * 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits) fs: scale mntget/mntput fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers fs: implement faster dentry memcmp fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking bit_spinlock: add required includes kernel: add bl_list xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path fs: dcache remove d_mounted fs: fs_struct use seqlock fs: rcu-walk for path lookup ...
| * fs: rcu-walk for path lookupNick Piggin2011-01-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk. This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element, significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability. The overall design is like this: * LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk. * Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are not required for dentry persistence. * synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk. * Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and down the path. * Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode, so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its members have changed. * Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent during the path walk. * inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for limited things. * i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk. * i_op can be loaded. When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence, and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk. Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root). The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are: * NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element) * parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs * dentries with d_revalidate * Following links In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware. Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* | af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.David S. Miller2011-01-05
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other" during stream connects. However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned to NULL under the unix_state_lock(). Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead of the forward mapping. Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris2010-11-15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'ima-memory-use-fixes'Linus Torvalds2010-10-26
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * ima-memory-use-fixes: IMA: fix the ToMToU logic IMA: explicit IMA i_flag to remove global lock on inode_delete IMA: drop refcnt from ima_iint_cache since it isn't needed IMA: only allocate iint when needed IMA: move read counter into struct inode IMA: use i_writecount rather than a private counter IMA: use inode->i_lock to protect read and write counters IMA: convert internal flags from long to char IMA: use unsigned int instead of long for counters IMA: drop the inode opencount since it isn't needed for operation IMA: use rbtree instead of radix tree for inode information cache
| * IMA: only allocate iint when neededEric Paris2010-10-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed. Thus greatly reducing memory usage. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2024-11-05 06:04:25 -0500