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* secmark: make secmark object handling genericEric Paris2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()KOSAKI Motohiro2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Fix security_module_enable() error.Tetsuo Handa2010-10-20
| | | | | | | | | | We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module"). If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0 unless overridden via boot time parameter. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds2010-08-10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
| * rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby2010-07-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notifyLinus Torvalds2010-08-10
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits) fanotify: use both marks when possible fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists fsnotify: remove group->mask fsnotify: remove the global masks fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event fanotify: use the mark in handler functions audit: use the mark in handler functions dnotify: use the mark in handler functions inotify: use the mark in handler functions fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput fsnotify: store struct file not struct path ... Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
| * | fsnotify: new fsnotify hooks and events types for access decisionsEric Paris2010-07-28
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* / LSM: Remove unused arguments from security_path_truncate().Tetsuo Handa2010-08-02
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | When commit be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(), only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed. But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor. Thus, let's remove these arguments. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Add __init to fixup function.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-16
| | | | | | | | register_security() became __init function. So do verify() and security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook acctEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook key_session_to_parentEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setgroupsEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setgidEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setuidEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook cred_commitEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook inode_deleteEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_pivotrootEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_addmountEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_remountEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_umount_busyEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_umount_closeEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove sb_check_sb hooksEric Paris2010-04-11
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'next-queue' into nextJames Morris2010-03-08
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| * Security: Add __init to register_security to disable load a security module ↵wzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | on runtime LSM framework doesn't allow to load a security module on runtime, it must be loaded on boot time. but in security/security.c: int register_security(struct security_operations *ops) { ... if (security_ops != &default_security_ops) return -EAGAIN; ... } if security_ops == &default_security_ops, it can access to register a security module. If selinux is enabled, other security modules can't register, but if selinux is disabled on boot time, the security_ops was set to default_security_ops, LSM allows other kernel modules to use register_security() to register a not trust security module. For example: disable selinux on boot time(selinux=0). #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/security.h> MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("wzt"); extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops); int (*new_register_security)(struct security_operations *ops); int rootkit_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return 0; } struct security_operations rootkit_ops = { .bprm_check_security = rootkit_bprm_check_security, }; static int rootkit_init(void) { printk("Load LSM rootkit module.\n"); /* cat /proc/kallsyms | grep register_security */ new_register_security = 0xc0756689; if (new_register_security(&rootkit_ops)) { printk("Can't register rootkit module.\n"); return 0; } printk("Register rootkit module ok.\n"); return 0; } static void rootkit_exit(void) { printk("Unload LSM rootkit module.\n"); } module_init(rootkit_init); module_exit(rootkit_exit); Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2010-02-28
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| * Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variablewzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-02-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy), but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config. Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available. Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscallsKees Cook2010-02-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * security: correct error returns for get/set security with private inodesJames Morris2010-01-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the getsecurity and setsecurity operations return zero for kernel private inodes, where xattrs are not available directly to userspace. This confuses some applications, and does not conform to the man page for getxattr(2) etc., which state that these syscalls should return ENOTSUP if xattrs are not supported or disabled. Note that in the listsecurity case, we still need to return zero as we don't know which other xattr handlers may be active. For discussion of userland confusion, see: http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg17988.html This patch corrects the error returns so that ENOTSUP is reported to userspace as required. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
| * LSM: Rename security_path_ functions argument names.Tetsuo Handa2009-12-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | include/linux/security.h and security/capability.c are using "struct path *dir" but security/security.c was using "struct path *path" by error. This patch renames "struct path *path" to "struct path *dir". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Take ima_file_free() to proper place.Al Viro2010-02-07
|/ | | | | | Hooks: Just Say No. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security: report the module name to security_module_requestEric Paris2009-11-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Config option to set a default LSMJohn Johansen2009-11-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select a specific LSM. This adds a config option that allows specifying a default LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter. If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM to register is used. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooksMimi Zohar2009-10-25
| | | | | | | | | Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to the existing security_ hooks. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Add security_path_chroot().Tetsuo Handa2009-10-11
| | | | | | | | | This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().Tetsuo Handa2009-10-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security ↵David P. Quigley2009-09-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]David Howells2009-09-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driverPaul Moore2009-08-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: introducing security_request_moduleEric Paris2009-08-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_checkIngo Molnar2009-06-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have a retval convention. Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security modelsChristoph Lameter2009-06-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY. It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096. mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes with CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFilesDavid Howells2009-04-03
| | | | | | | | | | | Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
* lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hookPaul Moore2009-03-28
| | | | | | | | | | The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about what can be safely accomplished using this hook. If a legitimate need for this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2009-01-06
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| * CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3]David Howells2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process being checked. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() ↵James Morris2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ver #2]" This reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8. David has a better version to come.
| * CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]David Howells2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op - task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds. strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.Kentaro Takeda2008-12-31
|/ | | | | | | | | | Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()James Morris2008-12-19
| | | | | | | | Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* CRED: fix sparse warningsHannes Eder2008-11-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: fix sparse warnings Fix the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:228:2: warning: returning void-valued expression security/security.c:233:2: warning: returning void-valued expression security/security.c:616:2: warning: returning void-valued expression Signed-off-by: Hannes Eder <hannes@hanneseder.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>