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* [IPSEC]: Policy list disorderHerbert Xu2007-01-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | The recent hashing introduced an off-by-one bug in policy list insertion. Instead of adding after the last entry with a lesser or equal priority, we're adding after the successor of that entry. This patch fixes this and also adds a warning if we detect a duplicate entry in the policy list. This should never happen due to this if clause. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6Linus Torvalds2006-12-07
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (48 commits) [NETFILTER]: Fix non-ANSI func. decl. [TG3]: Identify Serdes devices more clearly. [TG3]: Use msleep. [TG3]: Use netif_msg_*. [TG3]: Allow partial speed advertisement. [TG3]: Add TG3_FLG2_IS_NIC flag. [TG3]: Add 5787F device ID. [TG3]: Fix Phy loopback. [WANROUTER]: Kill kmalloc debugging code. [TCP] inet_twdr_hangman: Delete unnecessary memory barrier(). [NET]: Memory barrier cleanups [IPSEC]: Fix inetpeer leak in ipv4 xfrm dst entries. audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n audit: Add auditing to ipsec [IRDA] irlan: Fix compile warning when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n [IrDA]: Incorrect TTP header reservation [IrDA]: PXA FIR code device model conversion [GENETLINK]: Fix misplaced command flags. [NETLIK]: Add a pointer to the Generic Netlink wiki page. [IPV6] RAW: Don't release unlocked sock. ...
| * audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=nJoy Latten2006-12-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Disables auditing in ipsec when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is disabled in the kernel. Also includes a bug fix for xfrm_state.c as a result of original ipsec audit patch. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * audit: Add auditing to ipsecJoy Latten2006-12-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA or ipsec policy is created/deleted. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * [XFRM] Optimize policy dumpingJamal Hadi Salim2006-12-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change optimizes the dumping of Security policies. 1) Before this change .. speedopolis:~# time ./ip xf pol real 0m22.274s user 0m0.000s sys 0m22.269s 2) Turn off sub-policies speedopolis:~# ./ip xf pol real 0m13.496s user 0m0.000s sys 0m13.493s i suppose the above is to be expected 3) With this change .. speedopolis:~# time ./ip x policy real 0m7.901s user 0m0.008s sys 0m7.896s
* | [PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_tChristoph Lameter2006-12-07
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache. The patch was generated using the following script: #!/bin/sh # # Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources. # set -e for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do quilt add $file sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$ mv /tmp/$$ $file quilt refresh done The script was run like this sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache" Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of ↵David Howells2006-12-05
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6 Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c drivers/usb/core/hub.h drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c net/core/netpoll.c Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * [IPSEC]: Add encapsulation family.Miika Komu2006-12-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi> Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * [XFRM]: uninline xfrm_selector_match()Andrew Morton2006-12-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Six callsites, huge. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * SELinux: Fix SA selection semanticsVenkat Yekkirala2006-12-03
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's. With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs: 1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom } 2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t self:association { sendto }; allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom }; Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | WorkStruct: make allyesconfigDavid Howells2006-11-22
|/ | | | | | Fix up for make allyesconfig. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* IPsec: fix handling of errors for socket policiesVenkat Yekkirala2006-10-12
| | | | | | | | | | This treats the security errors encountered in the case of socket policy matching, the same as how these are treated in the case of main/sub policies, which is to return a full lookup failure. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matchingVenkat Yekkirala2006-10-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled" IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable xfrm(s) applied. The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by default" in the above case. This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context). Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied, such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). This patch: Fix the selinux side of things. This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated with the IPSec policy rule. Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case is now handled properly. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookupJames Morris2006-10-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [XFRM]: Clearing xfrm_policy_count[] to zero during flush is incorrect.David S. Miller2006-10-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When we flush policies, we do a type match so we might not actually delete all policies matching a certain direction. So keep track of how many policies we actually kill and subtract that number from xfrm_policy_count[dir] at the end. Based upon a patch by Masahide NAKAMURA. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Fix wildcard as tunnel sourcePatrick McHardy2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | Hashing SAs by source address breaks templates with wildcards as tunnel source since the source address used for hashing/lookup is still 0/0. Move source address lookup to xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() so we can use the real address in the lookup. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: remove xerr_idxp from __xfrm_policy_check()James Morris2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | It seems that during the MIPv6 respin, some code which was originally conditionally compiled around CONFIG_XFRM_ADVANCED was accidently left in after the config option was removed. This patch removes an extraneous pointer (xerr_idxp) which is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Use SLAB_PANICAlexey Dobriyan2006-09-22
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Respect priority in policy lookups.David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | Even if we find an exact match in the hash table, we must inspect the inexact list to look for a match with a better priority. Noticed by Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Extract common hashing code into xfrm_hash.[ch]David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Hash policies when non-prefixed.David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This idea is from Alexey Kuznetsov. It is common for policies to be non-prefixed. And for that case we can optimize lookups, insert, etc. quite a bit. For each direction, we have a dynamically sized policy hash table for non-prefixed policies. We also have a hash table on policy->index. For prefixed policies, we have a list per-direction which we will consult on lookups when a non-prefix hashtable lookup fails. This still isn't as efficient as I would like it. There are four immediate problems: 1) Lots of excessive refcounting, which can be fixed just like xfrm_state was 2) We do 2 hash probes on insert, one to look for dups and one to allocate a unique policy->index. Althought I wonder how much this matters since xfrm_state inserts do up to 3 hash probes and that seems to perform fine. 3) xfrm_policy_insert() is very complex because of the priority ordering and entry replacement logic. 4) Lots of counter bumping, in addition to policy refcounts, in the form of xfrm_policy_count[]. This is merely used to let code path(s) know that some IPSEC rules exist. So this count is indexed per-direction, maybe that is overkill. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Purge dst references to deleted SAs passively.David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | Just let GC and other normal mechanisms take care of getting rid of DST cache references to deleted xfrm_state objects instead of walking all the policy bundles. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Do not flush all bundles on SA insert.David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | Instead, simply set all potentially aliasing existing xfrm_state objects to have the current generation counter value. This will make routes get relooked up the next time an existing route mentioning these aliased xfrm_state objects gets used, via xfrm_dst_check(). Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Add generation count to xfrm_state and xfrm_dst.David S. Miller2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Each xfrm_state inserted gets a new generation counter value. When a bundle is created, the xfrm_dst objects get the current generation counter of the xfrm_state they will attach to at dst->xfrm. xfrm_bundle_ok() will return false if it sees an xfrm_dst with a generation count different from the generation count of the xfrm_state that dst points to. This provides a facility by which to passively and cheaply invalidate cached IPSEC routes during SA database changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Add sorting interface for state and template.Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | Under two transformation policies it is required to merge them. This is a platform to sort state for outbound and templates for inbound respectively. It will be used when Mobile IPv6 and IPsec are used at the same time. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM] POLICY: sub policy support.Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sub policy is introduced. Main and sub policy are applied the same flow. (Policy that current kernel uses is named as main.) It is required another transformation policy management to keep IPsec and Mobile IPv6 lives separate. Policy which lives shorter time in kernel should be a sub i.e. normally main is for IPsec and sub is for Mobile IPv6. (Such usage as two IPsec policies on different database can be used, too.) Limitation or TODOs: - Sub policy is not supported for per socket one (it is always inserted as main). - Current kernel makes cached outbound with flowi to skip searching database. However this patch makes it disabled only when "two policies are used and the first matched one is bypass case" because neither flowi nor bundle information knows about transformation template size. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
* [XFRM]: Trace which secpath state is reject factor.Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | For Mobile IPv6 usage, it is required to trace which secpath state is reject factor in order to notify it to user space (to know the address which cannot be used route optimized communication). Based on MIPL2 kernel patch. This patch was also written by: Henrik Petander <petander@tcs.hut.fi> Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM] IPV6: Restrict bundle reusingMasahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For outbound transformation, bundle is checked whether it is suitable for current flow to be reused or not. In such IPv6 case as below, transformation may apply incorrect bundle for the flow instead of creating another bundle: - The policy selector has destination prefix length < 128 (Two or more addresses can be matched it) - Its bundle holds dst entry of default route whose prefix length < 128 (Previous traffic was used such route as next hop) - The policy and the bundle were used a transport mode state and this time flow address is not matched the bundled state. This issue is found by Mobile IPv6 usage to protect mobility signaling by IPsec, but it is not a Mobile IPv6 specific. This patch adds strict check to xfrm_bundle_ok() for each state mode and address when prefix length is less than 128. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Rename secpath_has_tunnel to secpath_has_nontransport.Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | On current kernel inbound transformation state is allowed transport and disallowed tunnel mode when mismatch is occurred between tempates and states. As the result of adding two more modes by Mobile IPv6, this function name is misleading. Inbound transformation can allow only transport mode when mismatch is occurred between template and secpath. Based on MIPL2 kernel patch. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Restrict authentication algorithm only when inbound transformation ↵Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | protocol is IPsec. For Mobile IPv6 usage, routing header or destination options header is used and it doesn't require this comparison. It is checked only for IPsec template. Based on MIPL2 kernel patch. Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Add XFRM_MODE_xxx for future use.Masahide NAKAMURA2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel. It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger for Mobile IPv6. Based on MIPL2 kernel patch. This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi> Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labelingVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can be used. The following protos are currently not handled, but they should continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently do. ipmr ip_gre ipip igmp sit sctp ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device) decnet Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and stateVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-22
| | | | | | | | | This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Validate properly in xfrm_dst_check()David S. Miller2006-08-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If dst->obsolete is -1, this is a signal from the bundle creator that we want the XFRM dst and the dsts that it references to be validated on every use. I misunderstood this intention when I changed xfrm_dst_check() to always return NULL. Now, when we purge a dst entry, by running dst_free() on it. This will set the dst->obsolete to a positive integer, and we want to return NULL in that case so that the socket does a relookup for the route. Thus, if dst->obsolete<0, let stale_bundle() validate the state, else always return NULL. In general, we need to do things more intelligently here because we flush too much state during rule changes. Herbert Xu has some ideas wherein the key manager gives us some help in this area. We can also use smarter state management algorithms inside of the kernel as well. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Conversions from kmalloc+memset to k(z|c)alloc.Panagiotis Issaris2006-07-21
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Panagiotis Issaris <takis@issaris.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel2006-06-30
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* [IPSEC] xfrm: Abstract out encapsulation modesHerbert Xu2006-06-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode. It is meant to represent the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes. By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths. Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and BEET modes. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] xfrm: Undo afinfo lock proliferationHerbert Xu2006-06-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced down to one each for policy and state respectively. This is based on the observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6. The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look suspicious at first. However, after you realise that nobody ever takes the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :) As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of the corresponding modules. Since neither module can be unloaded at all we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :) Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock useIngo Molnar2006-04-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at: [<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d [<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22 [<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d [<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32 [<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b [<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad [<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a [<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e [<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7 [<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141 [<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0 [<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46 [<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138 [<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9 [<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413 [<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356 [<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110 [<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d [<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6 [<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1 this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo(). Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix softirq-unsafe xfrm typemap->lock useIngo Molnar2006-04-29
| | | | | | | | xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock() uses must be softirq-safe. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Kill unused decap state structureHerbert Xu2006-04-01
| | | | | | | | | This patch removes the *_decap_state structures which were previously used to share state between input/post_input. This is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET] sem2mutex: net/Arjan van de Ven2006-03-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Add some missing exports.David S. Miller2006-03-20
| | | | | | To fix the case of modular xfrm_user. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - policy expiresJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-20
| | | | | | | | This is similar to the SA expire insertion patch - only it inserts expires for SP. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directlyHerbert Xu2006-02-27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which we ought to do. However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the checksums without using this post_input stuff at all. The crucial point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered when adjusting checksums. What's more, the checksum adjustment comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums. We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :) When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum is currently unused. All we have to do is to make that the checksum adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures! I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately woven into the sec_path stuff. We can kill them later too. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETFILTER]: Fix bridge netfilter related in xfrm_lookupPatrick McHardy2006-02-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The bridge-netfilter code attaches a fake dst_entry with dst->ops == NULL to purely bridged packets. When these packets are SNATed and a policy lookup is done, xfrm_lookup crashes because it tries to dereference dst->ops. Change xfrm_lookup not to dereference dst->ops before checking for the DST_NOXFRM flag and set this flag in the fake dst_entry. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Fix policy double putPatrick McHardy2006-02-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The policy is put once immediately and once at the error label, which results in the following Oops: kernel BUG at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:250! invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT [...] CPU: 0 EIP: 0060:[<c028caf7>] Not tainted VLI EFLAGS: 00210246 (2.6.16-rc3 #39) EIP is at __xfrm_policy_destroy+0xf/0x46 eax: d49f2000 ebx: d49f2000 ecx: f74bd880 edx: f74bd280 esi: d49f2000 edi: 00000001 ebp: cd506dcc esp: cd506dc8 ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 Process ssh (pid: 31970, threadinfo=cd506000 task=cfb04a70) Stack: <0>cd506000 cd506e34 c028e92b ebde7280 cd506e58 cd506ec0 f74bd280 00000000 00000214 0000000a 0000000a 00000000 00000002 f7ae6000 00000000 cd506e58 cd506e14 c0299e36 f74bd280 e873fe00 c02943fd cd506ec0 ebde7280 f271f440 Call Trace: [<c0103a44>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xaa/0xb5 [<c0103b75>] show_registers+0x126/0x18c [<c0103e68>] die+0x14e/0x1db [<c02b6809>] do_trap+0x7c/0x96 [<c0104237>] do_invalid_op+0x89/0x93 [<c01035af>] error_code+0x4f/0x54 [<c028e92b>] xfrm_lookup+0x349/0x3c2 [<c02b0b0d>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x317/0x452 [<c0281749>] inet_dgram_connect+0x49/0x54 [<c02404d2>] sys_connect+0x51/0x68 [<c0240928>] sys_socketcall+0x6f/0x166 [<c0102aa1>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Fix strange IPsec freeze.Herbert Xu2006-02-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Problem discovered and initial patch by Olaf Kirch: there's a problem with IPsec that has been bugging some of our users for the last couple of kernel revs. Every now and then, IPsec will freeze the machine completely. This is with openswan user land, and with kernels up to and including 2.6.16-rc2. I managed to debug this a little, and what happens is that we end up looping in xfrm_lookup, and never get out. With a bit of debug printks added, I can this happening: ip_route_output_flow calls xfrm_lookup xfrm_find_bundle returns NULL (apparently we're in the middle of negotiating a new SA or something) We therefore call xfrm_tmpl_resolve. This returns EAGAIN We go to sleep, waiting for a policy update. Then we loop back to the top Apparently, the dst_orig that was passed into xfrm_lookup has been dropped from the routing table (obsolete=2) This leads to the endless loop, because we now create a new bundle, check the new bundle and find it's stale (stale_bundle -> xfrm_bundle_ok -> dst_check() return 0) People have been testing with the patch below, which seems to fix the problem partially. They still see connection hangs however (things only clear up when they start a new ping or new ssh). So the patch is obvsiouly not sufficient, and something else seems to go wrong. I'm grateful for any hints you may have... I suggest that we simply bail out always. If the dst decides to die on us later on, the packet will be dropped anyway. So there is no great urgency to retry here. Once we have the proper resolution queueing, we can then do the retry again. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Olaf Kirch <okir@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] remove bogus asm/bug.h includes.Al Viro2006-02-07
| | | | | | | A bunch of asm/bug.h includes are both not needed (since it will get pulled anyway) and bogus (since they are done too early). Removed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"Kris Katterjohn2006-01-09
| | | | | | | This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);" Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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