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* Sanitize f_flags helpersAl Viro2009-12-22
| | | | | | | | * pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place * nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper too (OPEN_FMODE(flags)) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Audit: rearrange audit_context to save 16 bytes per structEric Paris2009-09-24
| | | | | | | | | pahole pointed out that on x86_64 struct audit_context can be rearrainged to save 16 bytes per struct. Since we have an audit_context per task this can acually be a pretty significant gain. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Fix rule eviction order for AUDIT_DIRAl Viro2009-06-24
| | | | | | | | | If syscall removes the root of subtree being watched, we definitely do not want the rules refering that subtree to be destroyed without the syscall in question having a chance to match them. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Audit: clean up all op= output to include string quotingEric Paris2009-06-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string that includes spaces. Somehow this works but it's just wrong. This patch moves all of those that I could find to be quoted. Example: Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule key="number2" list=4 res=0 Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule" key="number2" list=4 res=0 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: seperate audit inode watches into a subfileEric Paris2009-06-23
| | | | | | | | In preparation for converting audit to use fsnotify instead of inotify we seperate the inode watching code into it's own file. This is similar to how the audit tree watching code is already seperated into audit_tree.c Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* Audit: better estimation of execve record lengthEric Paris2009-06-23
| | | | | | | | | | The audit execve record splitting code estimates the length of the message generated. But it forgot to include the "" that wrap each string in its estimation. This means that execve messages with lots of tiny (1-2 byte) arguments could still cause records greater than 8k to be emitted. Simply fix the estimate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* Audit: remove spaces from audit_log_d_pathEric Paris2009-04-05
| | | | | | | | | audit_log_d_path had spaces in the strings which would be emitted on the error paths. This patch simply replaces those spaces with an _ or removes the needless spaces entirely. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* audit: audit_set_auditable defined but not usedEric Paris2009-04-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | after 0590b9335a1c72a3f0defcc6231287f7817e07c8 audit_set_auditable() is now only used by the audit tree code. If CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE is unset it will be defined but unused. This patch simply moves the function inside a CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE block. cc1: warnings being treated as errors /home/acme_unencrypted/git/linux-2.6-tip/kernel/auditsc.c:745: error: ‘audit_set_auditable’ defined but not used make[2]: *** [kernel/auditsc.o] Error 1 make[1]: *** [kernel] Error 2 make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* audit: Fix possible return value truncation in audit_get_context()Paul Moore2009-04-05
| | | | | | | | | | The audit subsystem treats syscall return codes as type long, unfortunately the audit_get_context() function mistakenly converts the return code to an int type in the parameters which could cause problems on systems where the sizeof(int) != sizeof(long). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* auditsc: fix kernel-doc notationRandy Dunlap2009-04-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix auditsc kernel-doc notation: Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): No description found for parameter 'attr' Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): Excess function parameter 'u_attr' description in '__audit_mq_open' Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): No description found for parameter 'notification' Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): Excess function parameter 'u_notification' description in '__audit_mq_notify' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* audit: EXECVE record - removed bogus newlineJiri Pirko2009-04-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (updated) Added hunk that changes the comment, the rest is the same. EXECVE records contain a newline after every argument. auditd converts "\n" to " " so you cannot see newlines even in raw logs, but they're there nevertheless. If you're not using auditd, you need to work round them. These '\n' chars are can be easily replaced by spaces when creating record in kernel. Note there is no need for trailing '\n' in an audit record. record before this patch: "type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\"\na1=\"a\"\na2=\"b\"\na3=\"c\"\n" record after this patch: "type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\" a1=\"a\" a2=\"b\" a3=\"c\"" Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.hAl Viro2009-03-31
| | | | | | | | Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration of struct fs_struct; Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* make sure that filterkey of task,always rules is reportedAl Viro2009-01-04
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fixing audit rule ordering mess, part 1Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | Problem: ordering between the rules on exit chain is currently lost; all watch and inode rules are listed after everything else _and_ exit,never on one kind doesn't stop exit,always on another from being matched. Solution: assign priorities to rules, keep track of the current highest-priority matching rule and its result (always/never). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_log_capset()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | * no allocations * return void * don't duplicate checked for dummy context Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_fd_pair()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | * no allocations * return void Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_mq_open()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | * don't bother with allocations * don't do double copy_from_user() * don't duplicate parts of check for audit_dummy_context() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECVAl Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * logging the original value of *msg_prio in mq_timedreceive(2) is insane - the argument is write-only (i.e. syscall always ignores the original value and only overwrites it). * merge __audit_mq_timed{send,receive} * don't do copy_from_user() twice * don't mess with allocations in auditsc part * ... and don't bother checking !audit_enabled and !context in there - we'd already checked for audit_dummy_context(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_mq_notify()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | | * don't copy_from_user() twice * don't bother with allocations * don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context() * make it return void Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_mq_getsetattr()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | * get rid of allocations * make it return void * don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_ipc_set_perm()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | * get rid of allocations * make it return void * simplify callers Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_ipc_obj()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | | * get rid of allocations * make it return void * simplify callers Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sanitize audit_socketcallAl Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | * don't bother with allocations * now that it can't fail, make it return void Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* don't reallocate buffer in every audit_sockaddr()Al Viro2009-01-04
| | | | | | | No need to do that more than once per process lifetime; allocating/freeing on each sendto/accept/etc. is bloody pointless. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2008-12-24
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| * CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own credsDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds. This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b) seeing deallocated memory. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernelDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record theEric Paris2008-11-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | actual capbilities being added/removed. This patch adds a new record type which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets. example output if you audit capset syscalls would be: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in aEric Paris2008-11-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion and includes the process's pE, pI, pP. Before and after the bprm capability are applied. This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls. an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid: setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000 type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1" type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): cwd="/home/test" type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2 type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATHEric Paris2008-11-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | records of any file that has file capabilities set. Files which do not have fcaps set will not have different PATH records. An example audit record if you run: setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash /bin/bash type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com" type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2 type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | [PATCH] fix broken timestamps in AVC generated by kernel threadsAl Viro2008-12-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | Timestamp in audit_context is valid only if ->in_syscall is set. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [patch 1/1] audit: remove excess kernel-docRandy Dunlap2008-12-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Delete excess kernel-doc notation in kernel/auditsc.c: Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1481): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_entry' Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1564): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_exit' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [PATCH] return records for fork() both to child and parentAl Viro2008-12-09
|/ | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* tty: Fix abusers of current->sighand->ttyAlan Cox2008-10-13
| | | | | | | | Various people outside the tty layer still stick their noses in behind the scenes. We need to make sure they also obey the locking and referencing rules. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] audit: Moved variable declaration to beginning of functionCordelia2008-09-01
| | | | | | | | got rid of compilation warning: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code Signed-off-by: Cordelia Sam <cordesam@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Re: [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is setzhangxiliang2008-08-04
| | | | | | | | | Sorry, I miss a blank between if and "(". And I add "unlikely" to check "ctx" in audit_match_perm() and audit_match_filetype(). This is a new patch for it. Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is setzhangxiliang2008-08-01
| | | | | | | | | | When calling audit_filter_task(), it calls audit_filter_rules() with audit_context is NULL. If the key field is set, the result in audit_filter_rules() will be set to 1 and ctx->filterkey will be set to key. But the ctx is NULL in this condition, so kernel will panic. Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] Audit: Collect signal info when SIGUSR2 is sent to auditdEric Paris2008-08-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | Makes the kernel audit subsystem collect information about the sending process when that process sends SIGUSR2 to the userspace audit daemon. SIGUSR2 is a new interesting signal to auditd telling auditd that it should try to start logging to disk again and the error condition which caused it to stop logging to disk (usually out of space) has been rectified. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* x86_64 syscall audit fast-pathRoland McGrath2008-07-23
| | | | | | | | | | This adds a fast path for 64-bit syscall entry and exit when TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is set, but no other kind of syscall tracing. This path does not need to save and restore all registers as the general case of tracing does. Avoiding the iret return path when syscall audit is enabled helps performance a lot. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
* [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPEAl Viro2008-04-28
| | | | | | | | | | Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1. Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument. I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory", etc. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warningsHarvey Harrison2008-04-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use msglen as the identifier. kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions. kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before use. Eliminate the inner i variables. kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.hHarvey Harrison2008-04-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Leave audit_sig_{uid|pid|sid} protected by #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL. Noticed by sparse: kernel/audit.c:73:6: warning: symbol 'audit_ever_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/audit.c:100:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_uid' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/audit.c:101:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_pid' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/audit.c:102:6: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_sid' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/audit.c:117:23: warning: symbol 'audit_ih' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/auditfilter.c:78:18: warning: symbol 'audit_filter_list' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Audit: standardize string audit interfacesEric Paris2008-04-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use: void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n); void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf); void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n); void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string); This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Audit: end printk with newlineEric Paris2008-04-28
| | | | | | | A couple of audit printk statements did not have a newline. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Audit: Final renamings and cleanupAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-18
| | | | | | | | | Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooksAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of the exported SELinux interface. Basically, use: security_audit_rule_init secuirty_audit_rule_free security_audit_rule_known security_audit_rule_match instad of (respectively) : selinux_audit_rule_init selinux_audit_rule_free audit_rule_has_selinux selinux_audit_rule_match Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exportsAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces: selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid) selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid) selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid) selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len) kfree(ctx) and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively: security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid) security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid) security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid) security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len) security_release_secctx(ctx, len) Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx succeeded. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* [PATCH] Audit: Fix the format type for size_t variablesPaul Moore2008-03-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following compiler warning by using "%zu" as defined in C99. CC kernel/auditsc.o kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_log_single_execve_arg': kernel/auditsc.c:1074: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 4 has type 'size_t' Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2024-11-26 08:59:13 -0500