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* Fix warningSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | Coverity reports a warning due to unitialized attr structure in one code path. Reported by Coverity (CID 728535) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
* Fix another dereference before null check warningSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | null tcon is not possible in these paths so remove confusing null check Reported by Coverity (CID 728519) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
* CIFS: session servername can't be nullSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | remove impossible check Pointed out by Coverity (CID 115422) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
* Fix warning on impossible comparisonSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | workstation_RFC1001_name is part of the struct and can't be null, remove impossible comparison (array vs. null) Pointed out by Coverity (CID 140095) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
* Fix coverity warningSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Coverity reports a warning for referencing the beginning of the SMB2/SMB3 frame using the ProtocolId field as an array. Although it works the same either way, this patch should quiet the warning and might be a little clearer. Reported by Coverity (CID 741269) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
* Fix dereference before null check warningSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | null tcon is not likely in these paths in current code, but obviously it does clarify the code to check for null (if at all) before derefrencing rather than after. Reported by Coverity (CID 1042666) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
* Don't ignore errors on encrypting password in SMBTconSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Although unlikely to fail (and tree connect does not commonly send a password since SECMODE_USER is the default for most servers) do not ignore errors on SMBNTEncrypt in SMB Tree Connect. Reported by Coverity (CID 1226853) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
* Fix warning on uninitialized buftypeSteve French2015-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pointed out by coverity analyzer. resp_buftype is not initialized in one path which can rarely log a spurious warning (buf is null so there will not be a problem with freeing data, but if buf_type were randomly set to wrong value could log a warning) Reported by Coverity (CID 1269144) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
* cifs: potential memory leaks when parsing mnt optsTaesoo Kim2015-03-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | For example, when mount opt is redundently specified (e.g., "user=A,user=B,user=C"), kernel kept allocating new key/val with kstrdup() and overwrite previous ptr (to be freed). Althouhg mount.cifs in userspace performs a bit of sanitization (e.g., forcing one user option), current implementation is not robust. Other options such as iocharset and domainanme are similarly vulnerable. Signed-off-by: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: fix use-after-free bug in find_writable_fileDavid Disseldorp2015-03-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Under intermittent network outages, find_writable_file() is susceptible to the following race condition, which results in a user-after-free in the cifs_writepages code-path: Thread 1 Thread 2 ======== ======== inv_file = NULL refind = 0 spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // invalidHandle found on openFileList inv_file = open_file // inv_file->count currently 1 cifsFileInfo_get(inv_file) // inv_file->count = 2 spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); cifs_reopen_file() cifs_close() // fails (rc != 0) ->cifsFileInfo_put() spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // inv_file->count = 1 spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock) spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock); list_move_tail(&inv_file->flist, &cifs_inode->openFileList); spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); cifsFileInfo_put(inv_file); ->spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock) // inv_file->count = 0 list_del(&cifs_file->flist); // cleanup!! kfree(cifs_file); spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock); spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock); ++refind; // refind = 1 goto refind_writable; At this point we loop back through with an invalid inv_file pointer and a refind value of 1. On second pass, inv_file is not overwritten on openFileList traversal, and is subsequently dereferenced. Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: smb2_clone_range() - exit on unhandled errorSachin Prabhu2015-03-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While attempting to clone a file on a samba server, we receive a STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST. This is mapped to -EOPNOTSUPP which isn't handled in smb2_clone_range(). We end up looping in the while loop making same call to the samba server over and over again. The proposed fix is to exit and return the error value when encountered with an unhandled error. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* Merge tag 'driver-core-4.0-rc5' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-03-22
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core Pull driver core fixes from Greg KH: "Here are two bugfixes for things reported. One regression in kernfs, and another issue fixed in the LZ4 code that was fixed in the "upstream" codebase that solves a reported kernel crash Both have been in linux-next for a while" * tag 'driver-core-4.0-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: LZ4 : fix the data abort issue kernfs: handle poll correctly on 'direct_read' files.
| * kernfs: handle poll correctly on 'direct_read' files.NeilBrown2015-03-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kernfs supports two styles of read: direct_read and seqfile_read. The latter supports 'poll' correctly thanks to the update of '->event' in kernfs_seq_show. The former does not as '->event' is never updated on a read. So add an appropriate update in kernfs_file_direct_read(). This was noticed because some 'md' sysfs attributes were recently changed to use direct reads. Reported-by: Prakash Punnoor <prakash@punnoor.de> Reported-by: Torsten Kaiser <just.for.lkml@googlemail.com> Fixes: 750f199ee8b578062341e6ddfe36c59ac8ff2dcb Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-03-21
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason: "Most of these are fixing extent reservation accounting, or corners with tree writeback during commit. Josef's set does add a test, which isn't strictly a fix, but it'll keep us from making this same mistake again" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs: Btrfs: fix outstanding_extents accounting in DIO Btrfs: add sanity test for outstanding_extents accounting Btrfs: just free dummy extent buffers Btrfs: account merges/splits properly Btrfs: prepare block group cache before writing Btrfs: fix ASSERT(list_empty(&cur_trans->dirty_bgs_list) Btrfs: account for the correct number of extents for delalloc reservations Btrfs: fix merge delalloc logic Btrfs: fix comp_oper to get right order Btrfs: catch transaction abortion after waiting for it btrfs: fix sizeof format specifier in btrfs_check_super_valid()
| * | Btrfs: fix outstanding_extents accounting in DIOJosef Bacik2015-03-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We are keeping track of how many extents we need to reserve properly based on the amount we want to write, but we were still incrementing outstanding_extents if we wrote less than what we requested. This isn't quite right since we will be limited to our max extent size. So instead lets do something horrible! Keep track of how many outstanding_extents we reserved, and decrement each time we allocate an extent. If we use our entire reserve make sure to jack up outstanding_extents on the inode so the accounting works out properly. Thanks, Reported-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: add sanity test for outstanding_extents accountingJosef Bacik2015-03-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I introduced a regression wrt outstanding_extents accounting. These are tricky areas that aren't easily covered by xfstests as we could change MAX_EXTENT_SIZE at any time. So add sanity tests to cover the various conditions that are tricky in order to make sure we don't introduce regressions in the future. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: just free dummy extent buffersJosef Bacik2015-03-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If we fail during our sanity tests we could get NULL deref's because we unload the module before the dummy extent buffers are free'd via RCU. So check for this case and just free the things directly. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: account merges/splits properlyJosef Bacik2015-03-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | My fix Btrfs: fix merge delalloc logic only fixed half of the problems, it didn't fix the case where we have two large extents on either side and then join them together with a new small extent. We need to instead keep track of how many extents we have accounted for with each side of the new extent, and then see how many extents we need for the new large extent. If they match then we know we need to keep our reservation, otherwise we need to drop our reservation. This shows up with a case like this [BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE+4K][4K HOLE][BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE+4K] Previously the logic would have said that the number extents required for the new size (3) is larger than the number of extents required for the largest side (2) therefore we need to keep our reservation. But this isn't the case, since both sides require a reservation of 2 which leads to 4 for the whole range currently reserved, but we only need 3, so we need to drop one of the reservations. The same problem existed for splits, we'd think we only need 3 extents when creating the hole but in reality we need 4. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: prepare block group cache before writingJosef Bacik2015-03-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Writing the block group cache will modify the extent tree quite a bit because it truncates the old space cache and pre-allocates new stuff. To try and cut down on the churn lets do the setup dance first, then later on hopefully we can avoid looping with newly dirtied roots. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: fix ASSERT(list_empty(&cur_trans->dirty_bgs_list)Josef Bacik2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dave could hit this assert consistently running btrfs/078. This is because when we update the block groups we could truncate the free space, which would try to delete the csums for that range and dirty the csum root. For this to happen we have to have already written out the csum root so it's kind of hard to hit this case. This patch fixes this by changing the logic to only write the dirty block groups if the dirty_cowonly_roots list is empty. This will get us the same effect as before since we add the extent root last, and will cover the case that we dirty some other root again but not the extent root. Thanks, Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: account for the correct number of extents for delalloc reservationsJosef Bacik2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Direct IO can easily pass in an buffer that is greater than BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE, so take this into account when reserving extents in the delalloc reservation code. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: fix merge delalloc logicJosef Bacik2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | My patch to properly count outstanding extents wrt MAX_EXTENT_SIZE introduced a regression when re-dirtying already dirty areas. We have logic in split to make sure we are taking the largest space into account but didn't have it for merge, so it was sometimes making us think we were turning a tiny extent into a huge extent, when in reality we already had a huge extent and needed to use the other side in our logic. This fixes the regression that was reported by a user on list. Thanks, Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: fix comp_oper to get right orderLiu Bo2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Case (oper1->seq > oper2->seq) should differ with case (oper1->seq < oper2->seq). Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: catch transaction abortion after waiting for itLiu Bo2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This problem is uncovered by a test case: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/244297. Fsync() can report success when it actually doesn't. When we have several threads running fsync() at the same tiem and in one fsync() we get a transaction abortion due to some problems(in the test case it's disk failures), and other fsync()s may return successfully which makes userspace programs think that data is now safely flushed into disk. It's because that after fsyncs() fail btrfs_sync_log() due to disk failures, they get to try btrfs_commit_transaction() where it finds that there is already a transaction being committed, and they'll just call wait_for_commit() and return. Note that we actually check "trans->aborted" in btrfs_end_transaction, but it's likely that the error message is still not yet throwed out and only after wait_for_commit() we're sure whether the transaction is committed successfully. This add the necessary check and it now passes the test. Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | btrfs: fix sizeof format specifier in btrfs_check_super_valid()Fabian Frederick2015-03-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes mips compilation warning: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c: In function 'btrfs_check_super_valid': fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3927:21: warning: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat] Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
* | | Merge branch 'for-4.0' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linuxLinus Torvalds2015-03-21
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull nfsd bufix from Bruce Fields: "This is a fix for a crash easily triggered by 4.1 activity to a server built with CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS. There are some more bugfixes queued up that I intend to pass along next week, but this is the most critical" * 'for-4.0' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: Subject: nfsd: don't recursively call nfsd4_cb_layout_fail
| * | | Subject: nfsd: don't recursively call nfsd4_cb_layout_failChristoph Hellwig2015-03-19
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Due to a merge error when creating c5c707f9 ("nfsd: implement pNFS layout recalls"), we recursively call nfsd4_cb_layout_fail from itself, leading to stack overflows. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Fixes: c5c707f9 ("nfsd: implement pNFS layout recalls") Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c index 3c1bfa1..1028a06 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c @@ -587,8 +587,6 @@ nfsd4_cb_layout_fail(struct nfs4_layout_stateid *ls) rpc_ntop((struct sockaddr *)&clp->cl_addr, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)); - nfsd4_cb_layout_fail(ls); - printk(KERN_WARNING "nfsd: client %s failed to respond to layout recall. " " Fencing..\n", addr_str); -- 1.9.1
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-03-19
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse Pull fuse fixes from Miklos Szeredi: "This fixes bugs in zero-copy splice to the fuse device" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse: fuse: explicitly set /dev/fuse file's private_data fuse: set stolen page uptodate fuse: notify: don't move pages
| * | | fuse: explicitly set /dev/fuse file's private_dataTom Van Braeckel2015-03-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The misc subsystem (which is used for /dev/fuse) initializes private_data to point to the misc device when a driver has registered a custom open file operation, and initializes it to NULL when a custom open file operation has *not* been provided. This subtle quirk is confusing, to the point where kernel code registers *empty* file open operations to have private_data point to the misc device structure. And it leads to bugs, where the addition or removal of a custom open file operation surprisingly changes the initial contents of a file's private_data structure. So to simplify things in the misc subsystem, a patch [1] has been proposed to *always* set the private_data to point to the misc device, instead of only doing this when a custom open file operation has been registered. But before this patch can be applied we need to modify drivers that make the assumption that a misc device file's private_data is initialized to NULL because they didn't register a custom open file operation, so they don't rely on this assumption anymore. FUSE uses private_data to store the fuse_conn and errors out if this is not initialized to NULL at mount time. Hence, we now set a file's private_data to NULL explicitly, to be independent of whatever value the misc subsystem initializes it to by default. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/4/939 Reported-by: Giedrius Statkevicius <giedriuswork@gmail.com> Reported-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Van Braeckel <tomvanbraeckel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
| * | | fuse: set stolen page uptodateMiklos Szeredi2015-02-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Regular pipe buffers' ->steal method (generic_pipe_buf_steal()) doesn't set PG_uptodate. Don't warn on this condition, just set the uptodate flag. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| * | | fuse: notify: don't move pagesMiklos Szeredi2015-02-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fuse_try_move_page() is not prepared for replacing pages that have already been read. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* | | | Merge branch 'overlayfs-next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-03-19
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs Pull overlayfs fixes from Miklos Szeredi: "This fixes minor issues with the multi-layer update in v4.0" * 'overlayfs-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: ovl: upper fs should not be R/O ovl: check lowerdir amount for non-upper mount ovl: print error message for invalid mount options
| * | | | ovl: upper fs should not be R/Ohujianyang2015-03-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After importing multi-lower layer support, users could mount a r/o partition as the left most lowerdir instead of using it as upperdir. And a r/o upperdir may cause an error like overlayfs: failed to create directory ./workdir/work during mount. This patch check the *s_flags* of upper fs and return an error if it is a r/o partition. The checking of *upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags* can be removed now. This patch also remove /* FIXME: workdir is not needed for a R/O mount */ from ovl_fill_super() because: 1) for upper fs r/o case Setting a r/o partition as upper is prevented, no need to care about workdir in this case. 2) for "mount overlay -o ro" with a r/w upper fs case Users could remount overlayfs to r/w in this case, so workdir should not be omitted. Signed-off-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
| * | | | ovl: check lowerdir amount for non-upper mounthujianyang2015-03-18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Recently multi-lower layer mount support allow upperdir and workdir to be omitted, then cause overlayfs can be mount with only one lowerdir directory. This action make no sense and have potential risk. This patch check the total number of lower directories to prevent mounting overlayfs with only one directory. Also, an error message is added to indicate lower directories exceed OVL_MAX_STACK limit. Signed-off-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
| * | | | ovl: print error message for invalid mount optionshujianyang2015-03-18
| | |/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Overlayfs should print an error message if an incorrect mount option is caught like other filesystems. After this patch, improper option input could be clearly known. Reported-by: Fabian Sturm <fabian.sturm@aduu.de> Signed-off-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
* / | | pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspaceKirill A. Shutemov2015-03-17
|/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | locks: fix generic_delete_lease tracepoint to use victim pointerJeff Layton2015-03-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that "fl" won't point at a valid lock at this point, so use "victim" instead which is either a valid lock or NULL. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
* | | fanotify: fix event filtering with FAN_ONDIR setSuzuki K. Poulose2015-03-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With FAN_ONDIR set, the user can end up getting events, which it hasn't marked. This was revealed with fanotify04 testcase failure on Linux-4.0-rc1, and is a regression from 3.19, revealed with 66ba93c0d7fe6 ("fanotify: don't set FAN_ONDIR implicitly on a marks ignored mask"). # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/fanotify04 [ ... ] fanotify04 7 TPASS : event generated properly for type 100000 fanotify04 8 TFAIL : fanotify04.c:147: got unexpected event 30 fanotify04 9 TPASS : No event as expected The testcase sets the adds the following marks : FAN_OPEN | FAN_ONDIR for a fanotify on a dir. Then does an open(), followed by close() of the directory and expects to see an event FAN_OPEN(0x20). However, the fanotify returns (FAN_OPEN|FAN_CLOSE_NOWRITE(0x10)). This happens due to the flaw in the check for event_mask in fanotify_should_send_event() which does: if (event_mask & marks_mask & ~marks_ignored_mask) return true; where, event_mask == (FAN_ONDIR | FAN_CLOSE_NOWRITE), marks_mask == (FAN_ONDIR | FAN_OPEN), marks_ignored_mask == 0 Fix this by masking the outgoing events to the user, as we already take care of FAN_ONDIR and FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD. Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | nilfs2: fix deadlock of segment constructor during recoveryRyusuke Konishi2015-03-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to a report from Yuxuan Shui, nilfs2 in kernel 3.19 got stuck during recovery at mount time. The code path that caused the deadlock was as follows: nilfs_fill_super() load_nilfs() nilfs_salvage_orphan_logs() * Do roll-forwarding, attach segment constructor for recovery, and kick it. nilfs_segctor_thread() nilfs_segctor_thread_construct() * A lock is held with nilfs_transaction_lock() nilfs_segctor_do_construct() nilfs_segctor_drop_written_files() iput() iput_final() write_inode_now() writeback_single_inode() __writeback_single_inode() do_writepages() nilfs_writepage() nilfs_construct_dsync_segment() nilfs_transaction_lock() --> deadlock This can happen if commit 7ef3ff2fea8b ("nilfs2: fix deadlock of segment constructor over I_SYNC flag") is applied and roll-forward recovery was performed at mount time. The roll-forward recovery can happen if datasync write is done and the file system crashes immediately after that. For instance, we can reproduce the issue with the following steps: < nilfs2 is mounted on /nilfs (device: /dev/sdb1) > # dd if=/dev/zero of=/nilfs/test bs=4k count=1 && sync # dd if=/dev/zero of=/nilfs/test conv=notrunc oflag=dsync bs=4k count=1 && reboot -nfh < the system will immediately reboot > # mount -t nilfs2 /dev/sdb1 /nilfs The deadlock occurs because iput() can run segment constructor through writeback_single_inode() if MS_ACTIVE flag is not set on sb->s_flags. The above commit changed segment constructor so that it calls iput() asynchronously for inodes with i_nlink == 0, but that change was imperfect. This fixes the another deadlock by deferring iput() in segment constructor even for the case that mount is not finished, that is, for the case that MS_ACTIVE flag is not set. Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Reported-by: Yuxuan Shui <yshuiv7@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | ocfs2: make append_dio an incompat featureMark Fasheh2015-03-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It turns out that making this feature ro_compat isn't quite enough to prevent accidental corruption on mount from older kernels. Ocfs2 (like other file systems) will process orphaned inodes even when the user mounts in 'ro' mode. So for the case of a filesystem not knowing the append_dio feature, mounting the filesystem could result in orphaned-for-dio files being deleted, which we clearly don't want. So instead, turn this into an incompat flag. Btw, this is kind of my fault - initially I asked that we add a flag to cover the feature and even suggested that we use an ro flag. It wasn't until I was looking through our commits for v4.0-rc1 that I realized we actually want this to be incompat. Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-03-06
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason: "Outside of misc fixes, Filipe has a few fsync corners and we're pulling in one more of Josef's fixes from production use here" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs: Btrfs:__add_inode_ref: out of bounds memory read when looking for extended ref. Btrfs: fix data loss in the fast fsync path Btrfs: remove extra run_delayed_refs in update_cowonly_root Btrfs: incremental send, don't rename a directory too soon btrfs: fix lost return value due to variable shadowing Btrfs: do not ignore errors from btrfs_lookup_xattr in do_setxattr Btrfs: fix off-by-one logic error in btrfs_realloc_node Btrfs: add missing inode update when punching hole Btrfs: abort the transaction if we fail to update the free space cache inode Btrfs: fix fsync race leading to ordered extent memory leaks
| * | Btrfs:__add_inode_ref: out of bounds memory read when looking for extended ref.Quentin Casasnovas2015-03-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Improper arithmetics when calculting the address of the extended ref could lead to an out of bounds memory read and kernel panic. Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7+ Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: fix data loss in the fast fsync pathFilipe Manana2015-03-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When using the fast file fsync code path we can miss the fact that new writes happened since the last file fsync and therefore return without waiting for the IO to finish and write the new extents to the fsync log. Here's an example scenario where the fsync will miss the fact that new file data exists that wasn't yet durably persisted: 1. fs_info->last_trans_committed == N - 1 and current transaction is transaction N (fs_info->generation == N); 2. do a buffered write; 3. fsync our inode, this clears our inode's full sync flag, starts an ordered extent and waits for it to complete - when it completes at btrfs_finish_ordered_io(), the inode's last_trans is set to the value N (via btrfs_update_inode_fallback -> btrfs_update_inode -> btrfs_set_inode_last_trans); 4. transaction N is committed, so fs_info->last_trans_committed is now set to the value N and fs_info->generation remains with the value N; 5. do another buffered write, when this happens btrfs_file_write_iter sets our inode's last_trans to the value N + 1 (that is fs_info->generation + 1 == N + 1); 6. transaction N + 1 is started and fs_info->generation now has the value N + 1; 7. transaction N + 1 is committed, so fs_info->last_trans_committed is set to the value N + 1; 8. fsync our inode - because it doesn't have the full sync flag set, we only start the ordered extent, we don't wait for it to complete (only in a later phase) therefore its last_trans field has the value N + 1 set previously by btrfs_file_write_iter(), and so we have: inode->last_trans <= fs_info->last_trans_committed (N + 1) (N + 1) Which made us not log the last buffered write and exit the fsync handler immediately, returning success (0) to user space and resulting in data loss after a crash. This can actually be triggered deterministically and the following excerpt from a testcase I made for xfstests triggers the issue. It moves a dummy file across directories and then fsyncs the old parent directory - this is just to trigger a transaction commit, so moving files around isn't directly related to the issue but it was chosen because running 'sync' for example does more than just committing the current transaction, as it flushes/waits for all file data to be persisted. The issue can also happen at random periods, since the transaction kthread periodicaly commits the current transaction (about every 30 seconds by default). The body of the test is: _scratch_mkfs >> $seqres.full 2>&1 _init_flakey _mount_flakey # Create our main test file 'foo', the one we check for data loss. # By doing an fsync against our file, it makes btrfs clear the 'needs_full_sync' # bit from its flags (btrfs inode specific flags). $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 8K" \ -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io # Now create one other file and 2 directories. We will move this second file # from one directory to the other later because it forces btrfs to commit its # currently open transaction if we fsync the old parent directory. This is # necessary to trigger the data loss bug that affected btrfs. mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1 touch $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1/bar mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_2 # Make sure everything is durably persisted. sync # Write more 8Kb of data to our file. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 8K 8K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io # Move our 'bar' file into a new directory. mv $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_2/bar # Fsync our first directory. Because it had a file moved into some other # directory, this made btrfs commit the currently open transaction. This is # a condition necessary to trigger the data loss bug. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/testdir_1 # Now fsync our main test file. If the fsync succeeds, we expect the 8Kb of # data we wrote previously to be persisted and available if a crash happens. # This did not happen with btrfs, because of the transaction commit that # happened when we fsynced the parent directory. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Simulate a crash/power loss. _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_DROP_WRITES _unmount_flakey _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_ALLOW_WRITES _mount_flakey # Now check that all data we wrote before are available. echo "File content after log replay:" od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo status=0 exit The expected golden output for the test, which is what we get with this fix applied (or when running against ext3/4 and xfs), is: wrote 8192/8192 bytes at offset 0 XXX Bytes, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) wrote 8192/8192 bytes at offset 8192 XXX Bytes, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) File content after log replay: 0000000 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa * 0020000 bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb * 0040000 Without this fix applied, the output shows the test file does not have the second 8Kb extent that we successfully fsynced: wrote 8192/8192 bytes at offset 0 XXX Bytes, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) wrote 8192/8192 bytes at offset 8192 XXX Bytes, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) File content after log replay: 0000000 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa * 0020000 So fix this by skipping the fsync only if we're doing a full sync and if the inode's last_trans is <= fs_info->last_trans_committed, or if the inode is already in the log. Also remove setting the inode's last_trans in btrfs_file_write_iter since it's useless/unreliable. Also because btrfs_file_write_iter no longer sets inode->last_trans to fs_info->generation + 1, don't set last_trans to 0 if we bail out and don't bail out if last_trans is 0, otherwise something as simple as the following example wouldn't log the second write on the last fsync: 1. write to file 2. fsync file 3. fsync file |--> btrfs_inode_in_log() returns true and it set last_trans to 0 4. write to file |--> btrfs_file_write_iter() no longers sets last_trans, so it remained with a value of 0 5. fsync |--> inode->last_trans == 0, so it bails out without logging the second write A test case for xfstests will be sent soon. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: remove extra run_delayed_refs in update_cowonly_rootJosef Bacik2015-03-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This got added with my dirty_bgs patch, it's not needed. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: incremental send, don't rename a directory too soonFilipe Manana2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's one more case where we can't issue a rename operation for a directory as soon as we process it. We used to delay directory renames only if they have some ancestor directory with a higher inode number that got renamed too, but there's another case where we need to delay the rename too - when a directory A is renamed to the old name of a directory B but that directory B has its rename delayed because it has now (in the send root) an ancestor with a higher inode number that was renamed. If we don't delay the directory rename in this case, the receiving end of the send stream will attempt to rename A to the old name of B before B got renamed to its new name, which results in a "directory not empty" error. So fix this by delaying directory renames for this case too. Steps to reproduce: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt $ mkdir /mnt/a $ mkdir /mnt/b $ mkdir /mnt/c $ touch /mnt/a/file $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap1 $ mv /mnt/c /mnt/x $ mv /mnt/a /mnt/x/y $ mv /mnt/b /mnt/a $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap2 $ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/1.send $ btrfs send -p /mnt/snap1 /mnt/snap2 -f /tmp/2.send $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt2 $ btrfs receive /mnt2 -f /tmp/1.send $ btrfs receive /mnt2 -f /tmp/2.send ERROR: rename b -> a failed. Directory not empty A test case for xfstests follows soon. Reported-by: Ames Cornish <ames@cornishes.net> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | btrfs: fix lost return value due to variable shadowingDavid Sterba2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A block-local variable stores error code but btrfs_get_blocks_direct may not return it in the end as there's a ret defined in the function scope. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.6+ Fixes: d187663ef24c ("Btrfs: lock extents as we map them in DIO") Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: do not ignore errors from btrfs_lookup_xattr in do_setxattrFilipe Manana2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The return value from btrfs_lookup_xattr() can be a pointer encoding an error, therefore deal with it. This fixes commit 5f5bc6b1e2d5 ("Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic"). Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: fix off-by-one logic error in btrfs_realloc_nodeFilipe Manana2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The end_slot variable actually matches the number of pointers in the node and not the last slot (which is 'nritems - 1'). Therefore in order to check that the current slot in the for loop doesn't match the last one, the correct logic is to check if 'i' is less than 'end_slot - 1' and not 'end_slot - 2'. Fix this and set end_slot to be 'nritems - 1', as it's less confusing since the variable name implies it's inclusive rather then exclusive. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: add missing inode update when punching holeFilipe Manana2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When punching a file hole if we endup only zeroing parts of a page, because the start offset isn't a multiple of the sector size or the start offset and length fall within the same page, we were not updating the inode item. This prevented an fsync from doing anything, if no other file changes happened in the current transaction, because the fields in btrfs_inode used to check if the inode needs to be fsync'ed weren't updated. This issue is easy to reproduce and the following excerpt from the xfstest case I made shows how to trigger it: _scratch_mkfs >> $seqres.full 2>&1 _init_flakey _mount_flakey # Create our test file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x22 -b 16K 0 16K" \ $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io # Fsync the file, this makes btrfs update some btrfs inode specific fields # that are used to track if the inode needs to be written/updated to the fsync # log or not. After this fsync, the new values for those fields indicate that # a subsequent fsync does not need to touch the fsync log. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Force a commit of the current transaction. After this point, any operation # that modifies the data or metadata of our file, should update those fields in # the btrfs inode with values that make the next fsync operation write to the # fsync log. sync # Punch a hole in our file. This small range affects only 1 page. # This made the btrfs hole punching implementation write only some zeroes in # one page, but it did not update the btrfs inode fields used to determine if # the next fsync needs to write to the fsync log. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fpunch 8000 4K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Another variation of the previously mentioned case. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fpunch 15000 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Now fsync the file. This was a no-operation because the previous hole punch # operation didn't update the inode's fields mentioned before, so they remained # with the values they had after the first fsync - that is, they indicate that # it is not needed to write to fsync log. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo echo "File content before:" od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Simulate a crash/power loss. _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_DROP_WRITES _unmount_flakey # Enable writes and mount the fs. This makes the fsync log replay code run. _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_ALLOW_WRITES _mount_flakey # Because the last fsync didn't do anything, here the file content matched what # it was after the first fsync, before the holes were punched, and not what it # was after the holes were punched. echo "File content after:" od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo This issue has been around since 2012, when the punch hole implementation was added, commit 2aaa66558172 ("Btrfs: add hole punching"). A test case for xfstests follows soon. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
| * | Btrfs: abort the transaction if we fail to update the free space cache inodeJosef Bacik2015-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Our gluster boxes were hitting a problem where they'd run out of space when updating the block group cache and therefore wouldn't be able to update the free space inode. This is a problem because this is how we invalidate the cache and protect ourselves from errors further down the stack, so if this fails we have to abort the transaction so we make sure we don't end up with stale free space cache. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2025-09-01 12:14:12 -0400