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path: root/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
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* nfsd: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutexJan Kara2012-07-30
| | | | | | | | | | | When mnt_want_write() starts to handle freezing it will get a full lock semantics requiring proper lock ordering. So push mnt_want_write() call consistently outside of i_mutex. CC: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org CC: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* nfsd: use exp_put() for svc_export_cache putStanislav Kinsbursky2012-04-11
| | | | | | | This patch replaces cache_put() call for svc_export_cache by exp_put() call. Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* fs: propagate umode_t, misc bitsAl Viro2012-01-03
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* nfsd: clean up nfsd_mode_check()J. Bruce Fields2011-08-26
| | | | | | | Add some more comments, simplify logic, do & S_IFMT just once, name "type" more helpfully. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* nfsd: open-code special directory-hardlink checkJ. Bruce Fields2011-08-26
| | | | | | | | We allow the fh_verify caller to specify that any object *except* those of a given type is allowed, by passing a negative type. But only one caller actually uses it. Open-code that check in the one caller. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* nfsd4: allow fh_verify caller to skip pseudoflavor checksJ. Bruce Fields2011-04-11
| | | | Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* nfsd: fix "insecure" export optionJ. Bruce Fields2009-12-20
| | | | | | | | | A typo in 12045a6ee9908b "nfsd: let "insecure" flag vary by pseudoflavor" reversed the sense of the "insecure" flag. Reported-by: Michael Guntsche <mike@it-loops.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* nfsd: remove pointless paths in file headersJ. Bruce Fields2009-12-15
| | | | | | | | The new .h files have paths at the top that are now out of date. While we're here, just remove all of those from fs/nfsd; they never served any purpose. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: restrict filehandles accepted in V4ROOT caseSteve Dickson2009-12-15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | On V4ROOT exports, only accept filehandles that are the *root* of some export. This allows mountd to allow or deny access to individual directories and symlinks on the pseudofilesystem. Note that the checks in readdir and lookup are not enough, since a malicious host with access to the network could guess filehandles that they weren't able to obtain through lookup or readdir. Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: let "insecure" flag vary by pseudoflavorJ. Bruce Fields2009-12-14
| | | | | | | | | This was an oversight; it should be among the export flags that can be allowed to vary by pseudoflavor. This allows an administrator to (for example) allow auth_sys mounts only from low ports, but allow auth_krb5 mounts to use any port. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: Move private headers to source directoryBoaz Harrosh2009-12-14
| | | | | | | | Lots of include/linux/nfsd/* headers are only used by nfsd module. Move them to the source directory Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: Source files #include cleanupsBoaz Harrosh2009-12-14
| | | | | | | | | | | Now that the headers are fixed and carry their own wait, all fs/nfsd/ source files can include a minimal set of headers. and still compile just fine. This patch should improve the compilation speed of the nfsd module. Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: simplify fh_verify access checksJ. Bruce Fields2009-11-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All nfsd security depends on the security checks in fh_verify, and especially on nfsd_setuser(). It therefore bothers me that the nfsd_setuser call may be made from three different places, depending on whether the filehandle has already been mapped to a dentry, and on whether subtreechecking is in force. Instead, make an unconditional call in fh_verify(), so it's trivial to verify that the call always occurs. That leaves us with a redundant nfsd_setuser() call in the subtreecheck case--it needs the correct user set earlier in order to check execute permissions on the path to this filehandle--but I'm willing to accept that minor inefficiency in the subtreecheck case in return for more straightforward permission checking. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: make fs/nfsd/vfs.h for common includesJ. Bruce Fields2009-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | None of this stuff is used outside nfsd, so move it out of the common linux include directory. Actually, probably none of the stuff in include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h really belongs there, so later we may remove that file entirely. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd4: filehandle leak or error exit from fh_compose()J. Bruce Fields2009-09-04
| | | | | | | | | A number of callers (nfsd4_encode_fattr(), at least) don't bother to release the filehandle returned to fh_compose() if fh_compose() returns an error. So, modify fh_compose() to release the filehandle before returning an error. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: move fsid_type choice out of fh_composeJ. Bruce Fields2009-09-02
| | | | | | More trivial cleanup. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: move some of fh_compose into helper functionsJ. Bruce Fields2009-09-02
| | | | Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* knfsd: remove unreported filehandle stats countersGreg Banks2009-05-27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The file nfsfh.c contains two static variables nfsd_nr_verified and nfsd_nr_put. These are counters which are incremented as a side effect of the fh_verify() fh_compose() and fh_put() operations, i.e. at least twice per NFS call for any non-trivial workload. Needless to say this makes the cacheline that contains them (and any other innocent victims) a very hot contention point indeed under high call-rate workloads on multiprocessor NFS server. It also turns out that these counters are not used anywhere. They're not reported to userspace, they're not used in logic, they're not even exported from the object file (let alone the module). All they do is waste CPU time. So this patch removes them. Tests on a 16 CPU Altix A4700 with 2 10gige Myricom cards, configured separately (no bonding). Workload is 640 client threads doing directory traverals with random small reads, from server RAM. Before ====== Kernel profile: % cumulative self self total time samples samples calls 1/call 1/call name 6.05 2716.00 2716.00 30406 0.09 1.02 svc_process 4.44 4706.00 1990.00 1975 1.01 1.01 spin_unlock_irqrestore 3.72 6376.00 1670.00 1666 1.00 1.00 svc_export_put 3.41 7907.00 1531.00 1786 0.86 1.02 nfsd_ofcache_lookup 3.25 9363.00 1456.00 10965 0.13 1.01 nfsd_dispatch 3.10 10752.00 1389.00 1376 1.01 1.01 nfsd_cache_lookup 2.57 11907.00 1155.00 4517 0.26 1.03 svc_tcp_recvfrom ... 2.21 15352.00 1003.00 1081 0.93 1.00 nfsd_choose_ofc <---- ^^^^ Here the function nfsd_choose_ofc() reads a global variable which by accident happened to be located in the same cacheline as nfsd_nr_verified. Call rate: nullarbor:~ # pmdumptext nfs3.server.calls ... Thu Dec 13 00:15:27 184780.663 Thu Dec 13 00:15:28 184885.881 Thu Dec 13 00:15:29 184449.215 Thu Dec 13 00:15:30 184971.058 Thu Dec 13 00:15:31 185036.052 Thu Dec 13 00:15:32 185250.475 Thu Dec 13 00:15:33 184481.319 Thu Dec 13 00:15:34 185225.737 Thu Dec 13 00:15:35 185408.018 Thu Dec 13 00:15:36 185335.764 After ===== kernel profile: % cumulative self self total time samples samples calls 1/call 1/call name 6.33 2813.00 2813.00 29979 0.09 1.01 svc_process 4.66 4883.00 2070.00 2065 1.00 1.00 spin_unlock_irqrestore 4.06 6687.00 1804.00 2182 0.83 1.00 nfsd_ofcache_lookup 3.20 8110.00 1423.00 10932 0.13 1.00 nfsd_dispatch 3.03 9456.00 1346.00 1343 1.00 1.00 nfsd_cache_lookup 2.62 10622.00 1166.00 4645 0.25 1.01 svc_tcp_recvfrom [...] 0.10 42586.00 44.00 74 0.59 1.00 nfsd_choose_ofc <--- HA!! ^^^^ Call rate: nullarbor:~ # pmdumptext nfs3.server.calls ... Thu Dec 13 01:45:28 194677.118 Thu Dec 13 01:45:29 193932.692 Thu Dec 13 01:45:30 194294.364 Thu Dec 13 01:45:31 194971.276 Thu Dec 13 01:45:32 194111.207 Thu Dec 13 01:45:33 194999.635 Thu Dec 13 01:45:34 195312.594 Thu Dec 13 01:45:35 195707.293 Thu Dec 13 01:45:36 194610.353 Thu Dec 13 01:45:37 195913.662 Thu Dec 13 01:45:38 194808.675 i.e. about a 5.3% improvement in call rate. Signed-off-by: Greg Banks <gnb@melbourne.sgi.com> Reviewed-by: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* NFSD: FIDs need to take precedence over UUIDsSteve Dickson2009-01-07
| | | | | | | | | When determining the fsid_type in fh_compose(), the setting of the FID via fsid= export option needs to take precedence over using the UUID device id. Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: update fh_verify descriptionJ. Bruce Fields2009-01-06
| | | | Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells2008-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* nfsd: permit unauthenticated stat of export rootJ. Bruce Fields2008-09-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | RFC 2623 section 2.3.2 permits the server to bypass gss authentication checks for certain operations that a client may perform when mounting. In the case of a client that doesn't have some form of credentials available to it on boot, this allows it to perform the mount unattended. (Presumably real file access won't be needed until a user with credentials logs in.) Being slightly more lenient allows lots of old clients to access krb5-only exports, with the only loss being a small amount of information leaked about the root directory of the export. This affects only v2 and v3; v4 still requires authentication for all access. Thanks to Peter Staubach testing against a Solaris client, which suggesting addition of v3 getattr, to the list, and to Trond for noting that doing so exposes no additional information. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
* [PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()Al Viro2008-07-26
| | | | | | | Incidentally, the name that gives hundreds of false positives on grep is not a good idea... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* nfsd: fix spurious EACCESS in reconnect_path()Neil Brown2008-06-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Thanks to Frank Van Maarseveen for the original problem report: "A privileged process on an NFS client which drops privileges after using them to change the current working directory, will experience incorrect EACCES after an NFS server reboot. This problem can also occur after memory pressure on the server, particularly when the client side is quiet for some time." This occurs because the filehandle points to a directory whose parents are no longer in the dentry cache, and we're attempting to reconnect the directory to its parents without adequate permissions to perform lookups in the parent directories. We can therefore fix the problem by acquiring the necessary capabilities before attempting the reconnection. We do this only in the no_subtree_check case, since the documented behavior of the subtree_check export option requires the server to check that the user has lookup permissions on all parents. The subtree_check case still has a problem, since reconnect_path() unnecessarily requires both read and lookup permissions on all parent directories. However, a fix in that case would be more delicate, and use of subtree_check is already discouraged for other reasons. Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Frank van Maarseveen <frankvm@frankvm.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: rename MAY_ flagsMiklos Szeredi2008-06-23
| | | | | | | | | | | Rename nfsd_permission() specific MAY_* flags to NFSD_MAY_* to make it clear, that these are not used outside nfsd, and to avoid name and number space conflicts with the VFS. [comment from hch: rename MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE and MAY_EXEC as well] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd: move most of fh_verify to separate functionJ. Bruce Fields2008-04-23
| | | | | | | | | | | Move the code that actually parses the filehandle and looks up the dentry and export to a separate function. This simplifies the reference counting a little and moves fh_verify() a little closer to the kernel ideal of small, minimally-indentended functions. Clean up a few other minor style sins along the way. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
* nfsd: fix oops on access from high-numbered portsJ. Bruce Fields2008-03-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This bug was always here, but before my commit 6fa02839bf9412e18e77 ("recheck for secure ports in fh_verify"), it could only be triggered by failure of a kmalloc(). After that commit it could be triggered by a client making a request from a non-reserved port for access to an export marked "secure". (Exports are "secure" by default.) The result is a struct svc_export with a reference count one too low, resulting in likely oopses next time the export is accessed. The reference counting here is not straightforward; a later patch will clean up fh_verify(). Thanks to Lukas Hejtmanek for the bug report and followup. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Lukas Hejtmanek <xhejtman@ics.muni.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Wrap buffers used for rpc debug printks into RPC_IFDEBUGPavel Emelyanov2008-02-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sorry for the noise, but here's the v3 of this compilation fix :) There are some places, which declare the char buf[...] on the stack to push it later into dprintk(). Since the dprintk sometimes (if the CONFIG_SYSCTL=n) becomes an empty do { } while (0) stub, these buffers cause gcc to produce appropriate warnings. Wrap these buffers with RPC_IFDEBUG macro, as Trond proposed, to compile them out when not needed. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* Use struct path in struct svc_exportJan Blunck2008-02-15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I'm embedding struct path into struct svc_export. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: NFSD: fix wrong mnt_writer count in rename] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* nfsd: move nfsd/auth.h into fs/nfsdJ. Bruce Fields2008-02-01
| | | | | | | | | | This header is used only in a few places in fs/nfsd, so there seems to be little point to having it in include/. (Thanks to Robert Day for pointing this out.) Cc: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
* nfsd4: recheck for secure ports in fh_verifyJ. Bruce Fields2007-11-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As with commit 7fc90ec93a5eb71f4b08403baf5ba7176b3ec6b1 ("knfsd: nfsd: call nfsd_setuser() on fh_compose(), fix nfsd4 permissions problem") this is a case where we need to redo a security check in fh_verify() even though the filehandle already has an associated dentry--if the filehandle was created by fh_compose() in an earlier operation of the nfsv4 compound, then we may not have done these checks yet. Without this fix it is possible, for example, to traverse from an export without the secure ports requirement to one with it in a single compound, and bypass the secure port check on the new export. While we're here, fix up some minor style problems and change a printk() to a dprintk(), to make it harder for random unprivileged users to spam the logs. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Reviewed-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exportfs: add fid typeChristoph Hellwig2007-10-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patchset is a medium scale rewrite of the export operations interface. The goal is to make the interface less complex, and easier to understand from the filesystem side, aswell as preparing generic support for exporting of 64bit inode numbers. This touches all nfs exporting filesystems, and I've done testing on all of the filesystems I have here locally (xfs, ext2, ext3, reiserfs, jfs) This patch: Add a structured fid type so that we don't have to pass an array of u32 values around everywhere. It's a union of possible layouts. As a start there's only the u32 array and the traditional 32bit inode format, but there will be more in one of my next patchset when I start to document the various filehandle formats we have in lowlevel filesystems better. Also add an enum that gives the various filehandle types human- readable names. Note: Some people might think the struct containing an anonymous union is ugly, but I didn't want to pass around a raw union type. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net> Cc: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com> Cc: Timothy Shimmin <tes@sgi.com> Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Chris Mason <mason@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: "Vladimir V. Saveliev" <vs@namesys.com> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: Validate filehandle type in fsid_sourceNeil Brown2007-09-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fsid_source decided where to get the 'fsid' number to return for a GETATTR based on the type of filehandle. It can be from the device, from the fsid, or from the UUID. It is possible for the filehandle to be inconsistent with the export information, so make sure the export information actually has the info implied by the value returned by fsid_source. Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: "Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino" <lcapitulino@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd: allow auth_sys nlm on rpcsec_gss exportsJ. Bruce Fields2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Our clients (like other clients, as far as I know) use only auth_sys for nlm, even when using rpcsec_gss for the main nfs operations. Administrators that want to deny non-kerberos-authenticated locking requests will need to turn off NFS protocol versions less than 4.... Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd4: make readonly access depend on pseudoflavorJ. Bruce Fields2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | Allow readonly access to vary depending on the pseudoflavor, using the flag passed with each pseudoflavor in the export downcall. The rest of the flags are ignored for now, though some day we might also allow id squashing to vary based on the flavor. Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd4: return nfserr_wrongsecAndy Adamson2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | Make the first actual use of the secinfo information by using it to return nfserr_wrongsec when an export is found that doesn't allow the flavor used on this request. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd: set rq_client to ip-address-determined-domainJ. Bruce Fields2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We want it to be possible for users to restrict exports both by IP address and by pseudoflavor. The pseudoflavor information has previously been passed using special auth_domains stored in the rq_client field. After the preceding patch that stored the pseudoflavor in rq_pflavor, that's now superfluous; so now we use rq_client for the ip information, as auth_null and auth_unix do. However, we keep around the special auth_domain in the rq_gssclient field for backwards compatibility purposes, so we can still do upcalls using the old "gss/pseudoflavor" auth_domain if upcalls using the unix domain to give us an appropriate export. This allows us to continue supporting old mountd. In fact, for this first patch, we always use the "gss/pseudoflavor" auth_domain (and only it) if it is available; thus rq_client is ignored in the auth_gss case, and this patch on its own makes no change in behavior; that will be left to later patches. Note on idmap: I'm almost tempted to just replace the auth_domain in the idmap upcall by a dummy value--no version of idmapd has ever used it, and it's unlikely anyone really wants to perform idmapping differently depending on the where the client is (they may want to perform *credential* mapping differently, but that's a different matter--the idmapper just handles id's used in getattr and setattr). But I'm updating the idmapd code anyway, just out of general backwards-compatibility paranoia. Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd: provide export lookup wrappers which take a svc_rqstJ. Bruce Fields2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Split the callers of exp_get_by_name(), exp_find(), and exp_parent() into those that are processing requests and those that are doing other stuff (like looking up filehandles for mountd). No change in behavior, just a (fairly pointless, on its own) cleanup. (Note this has the effect of making nfsd_cross_mnt() pass rqstp->rq_client instead of exp->ex_client into exp_find_by_name(). However, the two should have the same value at this point.) Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: nfsd: make all exp_finding functions return -errno's on errJ. Bruce Fields2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently exp_find(), exp_get_by_name(), and friends, return an export on success, and on failure return: errors -EAGAIN (drop this request pending an upcall) or -ETIMEDOUT (an upcall has timed out), or return NULL, which can mean either that there was a memory allocation failure, or that an export was not found, or that a passed-in export lacks an auth_domain. Many callers seem to assume that NULL means that an export was not found, which may lead to bugs in the case of a memory allocation failure. Modify these functions to distinguish between the two NULL cases by returning either -ENOENT or -ENOMEM. They now never return NULL. We get to simplify some code in the process. We return -ENOENT in the case of a missing auth_domain. This case should probably be removed (or converted to a bug) after confirming that it can never happen. Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: exportfs: add procedural interface for NFSDChristoph Hellwig2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently NFSD calls directly into filesystems through the export_operations structure. I plan to change this interface in various ways in later patches, and want to avoid the export of the default operations to NFSD, so this patch adds two simple exportfs_encode_fh/exportfs_decode_fh helpers for NFSD to call instead of poking into exportfs guts. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: exportfs: add exportfs.h headerChristoph Hellwig2007-07-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | currently the export_operation structure and helpers related to it are in fs.h. fs.h is already far too large and there are very few places needing the export bits, so split them off into a separate header. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs build] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* knfsd: avoid Oops if buggy userspace performs confusing filehandle->dentry ↵NeilBrown2007-05-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mapping When a lookup request arrives, nfsd uses information provided by userspace (mountd) to find the right filesystem. It then assumes that the same filehandle type as the incoming filehandle can be used to create an outgoing filehandle. However if mountd is buggy, or maybe just being creative, the filesystem may not support that filesystem type, and the kernel could oops, particularly if 'ex_uuid' is NULL but a FSID_UUID* filehandle type is used. So add some proper checking that the fsid version/type from the incoming filehandle is actually supportable, and ignore that information if it isn't supportable. Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not usedRandy Dunlap2007-05-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed. Suggested by Al Viro. Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc, sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs). Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] include of asm/pgtable.h in nfsfh is bogusAl Viro2007-03-14
| | | | | | | not needed and actually breaks build on frv, while we are at it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.hTim Schmielau2007-02-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes. There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the course of cleaning it up. To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble. Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha, arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig, allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted by unnecessarily included header files). Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] knfsd: add some new fsid typesNeilBrown2007-02-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for using a filesystem UUID to identify and export point in the filehandle. For NFSv2, this UUID is xor-ed down to 4 or 8 bytes so that it doesn't take up too much room. For NFSv3+, we use the full 16 bytes, and possibly also a 64bit inode number for exports beneath the root of a filesystem. When generating an fsid to return in 'stat' information, use the UUID (hashed down to size) if it is available and a small 'fsid' was not specifically provided. Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] knfsd: tidy up choice of filesystem-identifier when creating a ↵NeilBrown2007-02-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | filehandle If we are using the same version/fsid as a current filehandle, then there is no need to verify the the numbers are valid for this export, and they must be (we used them to find this export). This allows us to simplify the fsid selection code. Also change "ref_fh_version" and "ref_fh_fsid_type" to "version" and "fsid_type", as the important thing isn't that they are the version/type of the reference filehandle, but they are the chosen type for the new filehandle. And tidy up some indenting. Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] knfsd: SUNRPC: Add a function to format the address in an svc_rqst ↵Chuck Lever2007-02-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for printing There are loads of places where the RPC server assumes that the rq_addr fields contains an IPv4 address. Top among these are error and debugging messages that display the server's IP address. Let's refactor the address printing into a separate function that's smart enough to figure out the difference between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Aurelien Charbon <aurelien.charbon@ext.bull.net> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] endianness bug: ntohl() misspelled as >> 24 in fh_verify().Al Viro2007-02-01
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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