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* ima: ecryptfs fix imbalance messageMimi Zohar2009-10-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The unencrypted files are being measured. Update the counters to get rid of the ecryptfs imbalance message. (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/519737) Reported-by: Sachin Garg Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Remove Kconfig NET dependency and select MD5Tyler Hicks2009-10-08
| | | | | | | | | eCryptfs no longer uses a netlink interface to communicate with ecryptfsd, so NET is not a valid dependency anymore. MD5 is required and must be built for eCryptfs to be of any use. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: depends on CRYPTORandy Dunlap2009-10-08
| | | | | | | | | | ecryptfs uses crypto APIs so it should depend on CRYPTO. Otherwise many build errors occur. [63 lines not pasted] Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Prevent lower dentry from going negative during unlinkTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When calling vfs_unlink() on the lower dentry, d_delete() turns the dentry into a negative dentry when the d_count is 1. This eventually caused a NULL pointer deref when a read() or write() was done and the negative dentry's d_inode was dereferenced in ecryptfs_read_update_atime() or ecryptfs_getxattr(). Placing mutt's tmpdir in an eCryptfs mount is what initially triggered the oops and I was able to reproduce it with the following sequence: open("/tmp/upper/foo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 3 link("/tmp/upper/foo", "/tmp/upper/bar") = 0 unlink("/tmp/upper/foo") = 0 open("/tmp/upper/bar", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 4 unlink("/tmp/upper/bar") = 0 write(4, "eCryptfs test\n"..., 14 <unfinished ...> +++ killed by SIGKILL +++ https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/387073 Reported-by: Loïc Minier <loic.minier@canonical.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Propagate vfs_read and vfs_write return codesTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Errors returned from vfs_read() and vfs_write() calls to the lower filesystem were being masked as -EINVAL. This caused some confusion to users who saw EINVAL instead of ENOSPC when the disk was full, for instance. Also, the actual bytes read or written were not accessible by callers to ecryptfs_read_lower() and ecryptfs_write_lower(), which may be useful in some cases. This patch updates the error handling logic where those functions are called in order to accept positive return codes indicating success. Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Validate global auth tok keysTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | When searching through the global authentication tokens for a given key signature, verify that a matching key has not been revoked and has not expired. This allows the `keyctl revoke` command to be properly used on keys in use by eCryptfs. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Filename encryption only supports password auth tokensTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with something other than a password authentication token, such as a private token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON(). Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Check for O_RDONLY lower inodes when opening lower filesTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write. Instead, only try an unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails. This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only mount. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Handle unrecognized tag 3 cipher codesTyler Hicks2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3 packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat(). Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: improved dependency checking and reportingDave Hansen2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | So, I compiled a 2.6.31-rc5 kernel with ecryptfs and loaded its module. When it came time to mount my filesystem, I got this in dmesg, and it refused to mount: [93577.776637] Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name [aes]; rc = [-2] [93577.783280] Error attempting to initialize key TFM cipher with name = [aes]; rc = [-2] [93577.791183] Error attempting to initialize cipher with name = [aes] and key size = [32]; rc = [-2] [93577.800113] Error parsing options; rc = [-22] I figured from the error message that I'd either forgotten to load "aes" or that my key size was bogus. Neither one of those was the case. In fact, I was missing the CRYPTO_ECB config option and the 'ecb' module. Unfortunately, there's no trace of 'ecb' in that error message. I've done two things to fix this. First, I've modified ecryptfs's Kconfig entry to select CRYPTO_ECB and CRYPTO_CBC. I also took CRYPTO out of the dependencies since the 'select' will take care of it for us. I've also modified the error messages to print a string that should contain both 'ecb' and 'aes' in my error case. That will give any future users a chance of finding the right modules and Kconfig options. I also wonder if we should: select CRYPTO_AES if !EMBEDDED since I think most ecryptfs users are using AES like me. Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Removed extra newline, 80-char violation] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Fix lockdep-reported AB-BA mutex issueRoland Dreier2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Lockdep reports the following valid-looking possible AB-BA deadlock with global_auth_tok_list_mutex and keysig_list_mutex: ecryptfs_new_file_context() -> ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() -> mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); -> ecryptfs_add_keysig() -> mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); vs ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() -> mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); -> ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig() -> mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); ie the two mutexes are taken in opposite orders in the two different code paths. I'm not sure if this is a real bug where two threads could actually hit the two paths in parallel and deadlock, but it at least makes lockdep impossible to use with ecryptfs since this report triggers every time and disables future lockdep reporting. Since ecryptfs_add_keysig() is called only from the single callsite in ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(), the simplest fix seems to be to move the lock of keysig_list_mutex back up outside of the where global_auth_tok_list_mutex is taken. This patch does that, and fixes the lockdep report on my system (and ecryptfs still works OK). The full output of lockdep fixed by this patch is: ======================================================= [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2 ------------------------------------------------------- gdm/2640 is trying to acquire lock: (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 but task is already holding lock: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff8108c897>] check_prev_add+0x2a7/0x370 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121526a>] ecryptfs_add_keysig+0x5a/0xb0 [<ffffffff81213299>] ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs+0x59/0xb0 [<ffffffff81214b06>] ecryptfs_new_file_context+0xa6/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8120e42a>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x4a/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff -> #0 (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0 [<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120 [<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200 [<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by gdm/2640: #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8113cb8b>] do_filp_open+0x3cb/0xae0 #1: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0 stack backtrace: Pid: 2640, comm: gdm Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108b988>] print_circular_bug_tail+0xa8/0xf0 [<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370 [<ffffffff81094912>] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff81017275>] ? print_context_stack+0x85/0x140 [<ffffffff81089c68>] ? find_usage_backwards+0x38/0x160 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8108b0b0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x0/0xb0 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8108c02c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81125b0d>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfd/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8108c34d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x14d/0x190 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0 [<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120 [<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200 [<ffffffff81210240>] ? ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0x60/0xe0 [<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8129a93e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0 [<ffffffff8155410b>] ? _spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff81139e9b>] ? getname+0x3b/0x240 [<ffffffff81148a5a>] ? alloc_fd+0xfa/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff81553b8f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: Remove unneeded locking that triggers lockdep false positivesRoland Dreier2009-09-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), inode_info->lower_file_mutex is locked, and just after the mutex is unlocked, the code does: kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_inode_info_cache, inode_info); This means that if another context could possibly try to take the same mutex as ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), then it could end up getting the mutex just before the data structure containing the mutex is freed. So any such use would be an obvious use-after-free bug (catchable with slab poisoning or mutex debugging), and therefore the locking in ecryptfs_destroy_inode() is not needed and can be dropped. Similarly, in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat(), crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex is locked, and then the mutex is unlocked just before the code does: memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); Therefore taking this mutex is similarly not necessary. Removing this locking fixes false-positive lockdep reports such as the following (and they are false-positives for exactly the same reason that the locking is not needed): ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3 --------------------------------- inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage. kswapd0/323 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&inode_info->lower_file_mutex){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff81210d34>] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100 {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at: [<ffffffff8108c02c>] mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0 [<ffffffff8108c10f>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xaf/0xe0 [<ffffffff81125a51>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x41/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8113117a>] get_empty_filp+0x7a/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8112dd46>] dentry_open+0x36/0xc0 [<ffffffff8121a36c>] ecryptfs_privileged_open+0x5c/0x2e0 [<ffffffff81210283>] ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0xa3/0xe0 [<ffffffff8120e838>] ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower+0x278/0x380 [<ffffffff8120f97a>] ecryptfs_lookup+0x12a/0x250 [<ffffffff8113930a>] real_lookup+0xea/0x160 [<ffffffff8113afc8>] do_lookup+0xb8/0xf0 [<ffffffff8113b518>] __link_path_walk+0x518/0x870 [<ffffffff8113bd9c>] path_walk+0x5c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8113be5b>] do_path_lookup+0x5b/0xa0 [<ffffffff8113bfe7>] user_path_at+0x57/0xa0 [<ffffffff811340dc>] vfs_fstatat+0x3c/0x80 [<ffffffff8113424b>] vfs_stat+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff81134274>] sys_newstat+0x24/0x50 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff irq event stamp: 7811 hardirqs last enabled at (7811): [<ffffffff810c037f>] call_rcu+0x5f/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (7810): [<ffffffff810c0353>] call_rcu+0x33/0x90 softirqs last enabled at (3764): [<ffffffff810631da>] __do_softirq+0x14a/0x220 softirqs last disabled at (3751): [<ffffffff8101440c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by kswapd0/323: #0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810f67ed>] shrink_slab+0x3d/0x190 #1: (&type->s_umount_key#35){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811429a1>] prune_dcache+0xd1/0x1b0 stack backtrace: Pid: 323, comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ad6c>] print_usage_bug+0x18c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8108aff0>] ? check_usage_forwards+0x0/0xc0 [<ffffffff8108bac2>] mark_lock_irq+0xf2/0x280 [<ffffffff8108bd87>] mark_lock+0x137/0x1d0 [<ffffffff81164710>] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0 [<ffffffff8108bee6>] mark_irqflags+0xc6/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8108d337>] __lock_acquire+0x287/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff815526ad>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100 [<ffffffff81164710>] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0 [<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100 [<ffffffff8129a91e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0 [<ffffffff81552b36>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff81210d34>] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100 [<ffffffff81145d27>] destroy_inode+0x87/0xd0 [<ffffffff81146b4c>] generic_delete_inode+0x12c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81145832>] iput+0x62/0x70 [<ffffffff811423c8>] dentry_iput+0x98/0x110 [<ffffffff81142550>] d_kill+0x50/0x80 [<ffffffff81142623>] prune_one_dentry+0xa3/0xc0 [<ffffffff811428b1>] __shrink_dcache_sb+0x271/0x290 [<ffffffff811429d9>] prune_dcache+0x109/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81142abf>] shrink_dcache_memory+0x3f/0x50 [<ffffffff810f68dd>] shrink_slab+0x12d/0x190 [<ffffffff810f9377>] balance_pgdat+0x4d7/0x640 [<ffffffff8104c4c0>] ? finish_task_switch+0x40/0x150 [<ffffffff810f63c0>] ? isolate_pages_global+0x0/0x60 [<ffffffff810f95f7>] kswapd+0x117/0x170 [<ffffffff810777a0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40 [<ffffffff810f94e0>] ? kswapd+0x0/0x170 [<ffffffff810773be>] kthread+0x9e/0xb0 [<ffffffff8101430a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff81013c90>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff81077320>] ? kthread+0x0/0xb0 [<ffffffff81014300>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@digitalvampire.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* const: mark remaining address_space_operations constAlexey Dobriyan2009-09-22
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: parse_tag_3_packet check tag 3 packet encrypted key sizeRamon de Carvalho Valle2009-07-28
| | | | | | | | | | | The parse_tag_3_packet function does not check if the tag 3 packet contains a encrypted key size larger than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES. Signed-off-by: Ramon de Carvalho Valle <ramon@risesecurity.org> [tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Added printk newline and changed goto to out_free] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Check Tag 11 literal data buffer sizeTyler Hicks2009-07-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tag 11 packets are stored in the metadata section of an eCryptfs file to store the key signature(s) used to encrypt the file encryption key. After extracting the packet length field to determine the key signature length, a check is not performed to see if the length would exceed the key signature buffer size that was passed into parse_tag_11_packet(). Thanks to Ramon de Carvalho Valle for finding this bug using fsfuzzer. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* push BKL down into ->put_superChristoph Hellwig2009-06-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move BKL into ->put_super from the only caller. A couple of filesystems had trivial enough ->put_super (only kfree and NULLing of s_fs_info + stuff in there) to not get any locking: coda, cramfs, efs, hugetlbfs, omfs, qnx4, shmem, all others got the full treatment. Most of them probably don't need it, but I'd rather sort that out individually. Preferably after all the other BKL pushdowns in that area. [AV: original used to move lock_super() down as well; these changes are removed since we don't do lock_super() at all in generic_shutdown_super() now] [AV: fuse, btrfs and xfs are known to need no damn BKL, exempt] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Convert obvious places to deactivate_locked_super()Al Viro2009-05-09
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: Fix min function comparison warningTyler Hicks2009-04-27
| | | | | | | | | This warning shows up on 64 bit builds: fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:693: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: fix printk format warningRandy Dunlap2009-04-27
| | | | | | | | | fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:670: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Larger buffer for encrypted symlink targetsTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When using filename encryption with eCryptfs, the value of the symlink in the lower filesystem is encrypted and stored as a Tag 70 packet. This results in a longer symlink target than if the target value wasn't encrypted. Users were reporting these messages in their syslog: [ 45.653441] ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet: max_packet_size is [56]; real packet size is [51] [ 45.653444] ecryptfs_decode_and_decrypt_filename: Could not parse tag 70 packet from filename; copying through filename as-is This was due to bufsiz, one the arguments in readlink(), being used to when allocating the buffer passed to the lower inode's readlink(). That symlink target may be very large, but when decoded and decrypted, could end up being smaller than bufsize. To fix this, the buffer passed to the lower inode's readlink() will always be PATH_MAX in size when filename encryption is enabled. Any necessary truncation occurs after the decoding and decrypting. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Lock lower directory inode mutex during lookupTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | This patch locks the lower directory inode's i_mutex before calling lookup_one_len() to find the appropriate dentry in the lower filesystem. This bug was found thanks to the warning set in commit 2f9092e1. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_unlink_sigs warningsTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Fix data corruption when using ecryptfs_passthroughTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ecryptfs_passthrough is a mount option that allows eCryptfs to allow data to be written to non-eCryptfs files in the lower filesystem. The passthrough option was causing data corruption due to it not always being treated as a non-eCryptfs file. The first 8 bytes of an eCryptfs file contains the decrypted file size. This value was being written to the non-eCryptfs files, too. Also, extra 0x00 characters were being written to make the file size a multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Print FNEK sig properly in /proc/mountsTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | The filename encryption key signature is not properly displayed in /proc/mounts. The "ecryptfs_sig=" mount option name is displayed for all global authentication tokens, included those for filename keys. This patch checks the global authentication token flags to determine if the key is a FEKEK or FNEK and prints the appropriate mount option name before the signature. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: NULL pointer dereference in ecryptfs_send_miscdev()Tyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | If data is NULL, msg_ctx->msg is set to NULL and then dereferenced afterwards. ecryptfs_send_raw_message() is the only place that ecryptfs_send_miscdev() is called with data being NULL, but the only caller of that function (ecryptfs_process_helo()) is never called. In short, there is currently no way to trigger the NULL pointer dereference. This patch removes the two unused functions and modifies ecryptfs_send_miscdev() to remove the NULL dereferences. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Copy lower inode attrs before dentry instantiationTyler Hicks2009-04-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the upper inode to d_instantiate(). This is important for security_d_instantiate(). The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so: type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc: denied { 0x100000 } for pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872 scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0 tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory, confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: use memdup_user()Li Zefan2009-04-20
| | | | | | | Remove open-coded memdup_user(). Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ecryptfs: use kzfree()Johannes Weiner2009-04-01
| | | | | | | | | | Use kzfree() instead of memset() + kfree(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* constify dentry_operations: ecryptfsAl Viro2009-03-27
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: NULL crypt_stat dereference during lookupTyler Hicks2009-03-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat was possible during lookup. This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it. Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for finding this bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Allocate a variable number of pages for file headersTyler Hicks2009-03-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page(). However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front field. ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to the lower filesystem for the file header. Unfortunately, at least 8K was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single, zeroed page being smaller than 8K. This resulted in random areas of kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K. This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents(). Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with me to find the problem. 2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this vulnerability. Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Florian Streibelt <florian@f-streibelt.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename keyTyler Hicks2009-03-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Regression in unencrypted filename symlinksTyler Hicks2009-02-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of filename encryption caused a regression in unencrypted filename symlink support. ecryptfs_copy_filename() is used when dealing with unencrypted filenames and it reported that the new, copied filename was a character longer than it should have been. This caused the return value of readlink() to count the NULL byte of the symlink target. Most applications don't care about the extra NULL byte, but a version control system (bzr) helped in discovering the bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/Kconfig: move ecryptfs outAlexey Dobriyan2009-01-22
| | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
* fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: cleanup kerneldocQinghuang Feng2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | Arguments lower_dentry and ecryptfs_dentry in ecryptfs_create_underlying_file() have been merged into dentry, now fix it. Signed-off-by: Qinghuang Feng <qhfeng.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Clean up ecryptfs_decode_from_filename()Michael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Flesh out the comments for ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(). Remove the return condition, since it is always 0. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: kerneldoc for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet()Michael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | Kerneldoc updates for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet(). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Fix data types (int/size_t)Michael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will never be larger than int). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Replace %Z with %zMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | %Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount optionMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlinkMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(), and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions. Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to inode crypt_stat. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functionsMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These functions support encrypting and encoding the filename contents. The encrypted filename contents may consist of any ASCII characters. This patch includes a custom encoding mechanism to map the ASCII characters to a reduced character set that is appropriate for filenames. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updatesMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packetsMichael Halcrow2009-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-01-05
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: inotify: fix type errors in interfaces fix breakage in reiserfs_new_inode() fix the treatment of jfs special inodes vfs: remove duplicate code in get_fs_type() add a vfs_fsync helper sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify zero i_uid/i_gid on inode allocation inode->i_op is never NULL ntfs: don't NULL i_op isofs check for NULL ->i_op in root directory is dead code affs: do not zero ->i_op kill suid bit only for regular files vfs: lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) race condition
| * add a vfs_fsync helperChristoph Hellwig2009-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fsync currently has a fdatawrite/fdatawait pair around the method call, and a mutex_lock/unlock of the inode mutex. All callers of fsync have to duplicate this, but we have a few and most of them don't quite get it right. This patch adds a new vfs_fsync that takes care of this. It's a little more complicated as usual as ->fsync might get a NULL file pointer and just a dentry from nfsd, but otherwise gets afile and we want to take the mapping and file operations from it when it is there. Notes on the fsync callers: - ecryptfs wasn't calling filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait on the lower file - coda wasn't calling filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait on the host file, and returning 0 when ->fsync was missing - shm wasn't calling either filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait nor taking i_mutex. Now given that shared memory doesn't have disk backing not doing anything in fsync seems fine and I left it out of the vfs_fsync conversion for now, but in that case we might just not pass it through to the lower file at all but just call the no-op simple_sync_file directly. [and now actually export vfs_fsync] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * inode->i_op is never NULLAl Viro2009-01-05
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even though it had been eliminated years ago. You'd need to go out of your way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on such inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still did that bogosity, all that crap can go away. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | fs: symlink write_begin allocation context fixNick Piggin2009-01-04
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the write_begin/write_end aops, page_symlink was broken because it could no longer pass a GFP_NOFS type mask into the point where the allocations happened. They are done in write_begin, which would always assume that the filesystem can be entered from reclaim. This bug could cause filesystem deadlocks. The funny thing with having a gfp_t mask there is that it doesn't really allow the caller to arbitrarily tinker with the context in which it can be called. It couldn't ever be GFP_ATOMIC, for example, because it needs to take the page lock. The only thing any callers care about is __GFP_FS anyway, so turn that into a single flag. Add a new flag for write_begin, AOP_FLAG_NOFS. Filesystems can now act on this flag in their write_begin function. Change __grab_cache_page to accept a nofs argument as well, to honour that flag (while we're there, change the name to grab_cache_page_write_begin which is more instructive and does away with random leading underscores). This is really a more flexible way to go in the end anyway -- if a filesystem happens to want any extra allocations aside from the pagecache ones in ints write_begin function, it may now use GFP_KERNEL (rather than GFP_NOFS) for common case allocations (eg. ocfs2_alloc_write_ctxt, for a random example). [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix ubifs] [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix fuse] Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x] Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> [ Cleaned up the calling convention: just pass in the AOP flags untouched to the grab_cache_page_write_begin() function. That just simplifies everybody, and may even allow future expansion of the logic. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: check readlink result was not an error before using itDuane Griffin2008-12-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The result from readlink is being used to index into the link name buffer without checking whether it is a valid length. If readlink returns an error this will fault or cause memory corruption. Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2008-12-04
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c Manually fixed above to use new creds API functions, e.g. nfs4_save_creds(). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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