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* cifs: don't allow mmap'ed pages to be dirtied while under writeback (try #3)Jeff Layton2011-04-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is more or less the same patch as before, but with some merge conflicts fixed up. If a process has a dirty page mapped into its page tables, then it has the ability to change it while the client is trying to write the data out to the server. If that happens after the signature has been calculated then that signature will then be wrong, and the server will likely reset the TCP connection. This patch adds a page_mkwrite handler for CIFS that simply takes the page lock. Because the page lock is held over the life of writepage and writepages, this prevents the page from becoming writeable until the write call has completed. With this, we can also remove the "sign_zero_copy" module option and always inline the pages when writing. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Warn on requesting default security (ntlm) on mountSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Warn once if default security (ntlm) requested. We will update the default to the stronger security mechanism (ntlmv2) in 2.6.41. Kerberos is also stronger than ntlm, but more servers support ntlmv2 and ntlmv2 does not require an upcall, so ntlmv2 is a better default. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGoodSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the TCP_Server_Info is first allocated and connected, tcpStatus == CifsGood means that the NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL request has completed and the socket is ready for other calls. cifs_reconnect however sets tcpStatus to CifsGood as soon as the socket is reconnected and the optional RFC1001 session setup is done. We have no clear way to tell the difference between these two states, and we need to know this in order to know whether we can send an echo or not. Resolve this by adding a new statusEnum value -- CifsNeedNegotiate. When the socket has been connected but has not yet had a NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL request done, set it to this value. Once the NEGOTIATE is done, cifs_negotiate_protocol will set tcpStatus to CifsGood. This also fixes and cleans the logic in cifs_reconnect and cifs_reconnect_tcon. The old code checked for specific states when what it really wants to know is whether the state has actually changed from CifsNeedReconnect. Reported-and-Tested-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: wrap received signature check in srv_mutexJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data structures. While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this function. This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably go to stable too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up various nits in unicode routines (try #2)Jeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Minor revision to the original patch. Don't abuse the __le16 variable on the stack by casting it to wchar_t and handing it off to char2uni. Declare an actual wchar_t on the stack instead. This fixes a valid sparse warning. Fix the spelling of UNI_ASTERISK. Eliminate the unneeded len_remaining variable in cifsConvertToUCS. Also, as David Howells points out. We were better off making cifsConvertToUCS *not* use put_unaligned_le16 since it means that we can't optimize the mapped characters at compile time. Switch them instead to use cpu_to_le16, and simply use put_unaligned to set them in the string. Reported-and-acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up length checks in check2ndT2Jeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Thus spake David Howells: The code that follows this: remaining = total_data_size - data_in_this_rsp; if (remaining == 0) return 0; else if (remaining < 0) { generates better code if you drop the 'remaining' variable and compare the values directly. Clean it up per his recommendation... Reported-and-acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: set ra_pages in backing_dev_infoJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 522440ed made cifs set backing_dev_info on the mapping attached to new inodes. This change caused a fairly significant read performance regression, as cifs started doing page-sized reads exclusively. By virtue of the fact that they're allocated as part of cifs_sb_info by kzalloc, the ra_pages on cifs BDIs get set to 0, which prevents any readahead. This forces the normal read codepaths to use readpage instead of readpages causing a four-fold increase in the number of read calls with the default rsize. Fix it by setting ra_pages in the BDI to the same value as that in the default_backing_dev_info. Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=31662 Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Till <till2.schaefer@uni-dortmund.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix broken BCC check in is_valid_oplock_breakJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | The BCC is still __le16 at this point, and in any case we need to use the get_bcc_le macro to make sure we don't hit alignment problems. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mountJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath, so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for the mount. This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at mount time instead. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* various endian fixes to cifsSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make modules C=2 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ Found for example: CHECK fs/cifs/cifssmb.c fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [usertype] Tid fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: got restricted __le16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: expected long long [signed] [usertype] fl_start fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: got restricted __le64 [usertype] start fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1884:54: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1885:58: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: expected unsigned int [unsigned] fl_pid fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: got restricted __le32 [usertype] pid In checking new smb2 code for missing endian conversions, I noticed some endian errors had crept in over the last few releases into the cifs code (symlink, ntlmssp, posix lock, and also a less problematic warning in fscache). A followon patch will address a few smb2 endian problems. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversionSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings: ~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ CHECK fs/cifs/connect.c fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Max share size is too smallSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | Max share name was set to 64, and (at least for Windows) can be 80. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Allow user names longer than 32 bytesSteve French2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: replace /proc/fs/cifs/Experimental with a module parmJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This flag currently only affects whether we allow "zero-copy" writes with signing enabled. Typically we map pages in the pagecache directly into the write request. If signing is enabled however and the contents of the page change after the signature is calculated but before the write is sent then the signature will be wrong. Servers typically respond to this by closing down the socket. Still, this can provide a performance benefit so the "Experimental" flag was overloaded to allow this. That's really not a good place for this option however since it's not clear what that flag does. Move that flag instead to a new module parameter that better describes its purpose. That's also better since it can be set at module insertion time by configuring modprobe.d. Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: check for private_data before trying to put itJeff Layton2011-04-11
| | | | | | | | | | | cifs_close doesn't check that the filp->private_data is non-NULL before trying to put it. That can cause an oops in certain error conditions that can occur on open or lookup before the private_data is set. Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi2011-03-31
| | | | | | Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
* block: remove per-queue pluggingJens Axboe2011-03-10
| | | | | | | | Code has been converted over to the new explicit on-stack plugging, and delay users have been converted to use the new API for that. So lets kill off the old plugging along with aops->sync_page(). Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
* [CIFS] update cifs versionSteve French2011-02-21
| | | | | | Update version to 1.71 so we can more easily spot modules with the last two fixes Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Fix regression in LANMAN (LM) auth codeShirish Pargaonkar2011-02-21
| | | | | | | | | LANMAN response length was changed to 16 bytes instead of 24 bytes. Revert it back to 24 bytes. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix handling of scopeid in cifs_convert_addressJeff Layton2011-02-17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The code finds, the '%' sign in an ipv6 address and copies that to a buffer allocated on the stack. It then ignores that buffer, and passes 'pct' to simple_strtoul(), which doesn't work right because we're comparing 'endp' against a completely different string. Fix it by passing the correct pointer. While we're at it, this is a good candidate for conversion to strict_strtoul as well. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-by: Björn JACKE <bj@sernet.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: don't always drop malformed replies on the floor (try #3)Jeff Layton2011-02-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Slight revision to this patch...use min_t() instead of conditional assignment. Also, remove the FIXME comment and replace it with the explanation that Steve gave earlier. After receiving a packet, we currently check the header. If it's no good, then we toss it out and continue the loop, leaving the caller waiting on that response. In cases where the packet has length inconsistencies, but the MID is valid, this leads to unneeded delays. That's especially problematic now that the client waits indefinitely for responses. Instead, don't immediately discard the packet if checkSMB fails. Try to find a matching mid_q_entry, mark it as having a malformed response and issue the callback. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up checks in cifs_echo_requestJeff Layton2011-02-09
| | | | | | | | | | | Follow-on patch to 7e90d705 which is already in Steve's tree... The check for tcpStatus == CifsGood is not meaningful since it doesn't indicate whether the NEGOTIATE request has been done. Also, clarify why we're checking for maxBuf == 0. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Do not send SMBEcho requests on new sockets until SMBNegotiateSteve French2011-02-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | In order to determine whether an SMBEcho request can be sent we need to know that the socket is established (server tcpStatus == CifsGood) AND that an SMB NegotiateProtocol has been sent (server maxBuf != 0). Without the second check we can send an Echo request during reconnection before the server can accept it. CC: JG <jg@cms.ac> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: remove checks for ses->status == CifsExitingJeff Layton2011-02-07
| | | | | | | | | ses->status is never set to CifsExiting, so these checks are always false. Tested-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: add check for kmalloc in parse_daclStanislav Fomichev2011-02-05
| | | | | | | Exit from parse_dacl if no memory returned from the call to kmalloc. Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <kernel@fomichev.me> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: don't send an echo request unless NegProt has been doneJeff Layton2011-02-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the socket to the server is disconnected, the client more or less immediately calls cifs_reconnect to reconnect the socket. The NegProt and SessSetup however are not done until an actual call needs to be made. With the addition of the SMB echo code, it's possible that the server will initiate a disconnect on an idle socket. The client will then reconnect the socket but no NegotiateProtocol request is done. The SMBEcho workqueue job will then eventually pop, and an SMBEcho will be sent on the socket. The server will then reject it since no NegProt was done. The ideal fix would be to either have the socket not be reconnected until we plan to use it, or to immediately do a NegProt when the reconnect occurs. The code is not structured for this however. For now we must just settle for not sending any echoes until the NegProt is done. Reported-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: enable signing flag in SMB header when server has it onJeff Layton2011-02-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs_sign_smb only generates a signature if the correct Flags2 bit is set. Make sure that it gets set correctly if we're sending an async call. This patch fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=28142 Reported-and-Tested-by: JG <jg@cms.ac> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Possible slab memory corruption while updating extended stats (repost)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-02-04
| | | | | | | | | Updating extended statistics here can cause slab memory corruption if a callback function frees slab memory (mid_entry). Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Fix variable types in cifs_iovec_read/write (try #2)Pavel Shilovsky2011-02-03
| | | | | | | | | Variable 'i' should be unsigned long as it's used in circle with num_pages, and bytes_read/total_written should be ssize_t according to return value. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix length vs. total_read confusion in cifs_demultiplex_threadJeff Layton2011-02-01
| | | | | | | | | | | length at this point is the length returned by the last kernel_recvmsg call. total_read is the length of all of the data read so far. length is more or less meaningless at this point, so use total_read for everything. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix length checks in checkSMBJeff Layton2011-01-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cERROR message in checkSMB when the calculated length doesn't match the RFC1001 length is incorrect in many cases. It always says that the RFC1001 length is bigger than the SMB, even when it's actually the reverse. Fix the error message to say the reverse of what it does now when the SMB length goes beyond the end of the received data. Also, clarify the error message when the RFC length is too big. Finally, clarify the comments to show that the 512 byte limit on extra data at the end of the packet is arbitrary. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Update cifs minor versionSteve French2011-01-31
| | | | Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: No need to check crypto blockcipher allocationShirish Pargaonkar2011-01-31
| | | | | | | | Missed one change as per earlier suggestion. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up some compiler warningsJeff Layton2011-01-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New compiler warnings that I noticed when building a patchset based on recent Fedora kernel: fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function 'CIFSSMBSetFileSize': fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:4813:8: warning: variable 'data_offset' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] fs/cifs/file.c: In function 'cifs_open': fs/cifs/file.c:349:24: warning: variable 'pCifsInode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] fs/cifs/file.c: In function 'cifs_partialpagewrite': fs/cifs/file.c:1149:23: warning: variable 'cifs_sb' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] fs/cifs/file.c: In function 'cifs_iovec_write': fs/cifs/file.c:1740:9: warning: passing argument 6 of 'CIFSSMBWrite2' from incompatible pointer type [enabled by default] fs/cifs/cifsproto.h:337:12: note: expected 'unsigned int *' but argument is of type 'size_t *' fs/cifs/readdir.c: In function 'cifs_readdir': fs/cifs/readdir.c:767:23: warning: variable 'cifs_sb' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c: In function 'cifs_dfs_d_automount': fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:342:2: warning: 'rc' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:278:6: note: 'rc' was declared here Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: make CIFS depend on CRYPTO_MD4Jeff Layton2011-01-31
| | | | | | | | | | Recently CIFS was changed to use the kernel crypto API for MD4 hashes, but the Kconfig dependencies were not changed to reflect this. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: force a reconnect if there are too many MIDs in flightJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we allow the pending_mid_q to grow without bound with SIGKILL'ed processes. This could eventually be a DoS'able problem. An unprivileged user could a process that does a long-running call and then SIGKILL it. If he can also intercept the NT_CANCEL calls or the replies from the server, then the pending_mid_q could grow very large, possibly even to 2^16 entries which might leave GetNextMid in an infinite loop. Fix this by imposing a hard limit of 32k calls per server. If we cross that limit, set the tcpStatus to CifsNeedReconnect to force cifsd to eventually reconnect the socket and clean out the pending_mid_q. While we're at it, clean up the function a bit and eliminate an unnecessary NULL pointer check. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: don't pop a printk when sending on a socket is interruptedJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | | If we kill the process while it's sending on a socket then the kernel_sendmsg will return -EINTR. This is normal. No need to spam the ring buffer with this info. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: simplify SMB header check routineJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | ...just cleanup. There should be no behavior change. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: send an NT_CANCEL request when a process is signalledJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | Use the new send_nt_cancel function to send an NT_CANCEL when the process is delivered a fatal signal. This is a "best effort" enterprise however, so don't bother to check the return code. There's nothing we can reasonably do if it fails anyway. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: handle cancelled requests betterJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, when a request is cancelled via signal, we delete the mid immediately. If the request was already transmitted however, the client is still likely to receive a response. When it does, it won't recognize it however and will pop a printk. It's also a little dangerous to just delete the mid entry like this. We may end up reusing that mid. If we do then we could potentially get the response from the first request confused with the later one. Prevent the reuse of mids by marking them as cancelled and keeping them on the pending_mid_q list. If the reply comes in, we'll delete it from the list then. If it never comes, then we'll delete it at reconnect or when cifsd comes down. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix two compiler warning about uninitialized varsJeff Layton2011-01-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs/cifs/link.c: In function ‘symlink_hash’: fs/cifs/link.c:58:3: warning: ‘rc’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c: In function ‘mdfour’: fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c:61:3: warning: ‘rc’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized] Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: More crypto cleanup (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-01-27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in file md4.c are not needed anymore. Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations, and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included. Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Add strictcache mount optionPavel Shilovsky2011-01-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | Use for switching on strict cache mode. In this mode the client reads from the cache all the time it has Oplock Level II, otherwise - read from the server. As for write - the client stores a data in the cache in Exclusive Oplock case, otherwise - write directly to the server. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Implement cifs_strict_writev (try #4)Pavel Shilovsky2011-01-25
| | | | | | | | | | | If we don't have Exclusive oplock we write a data to the server. Also set invalidate_mapping flag on the inode if we wrote something to the server. Add cifs_iovec_write to let the client write iovec buffers through CIFSSMBWrite2. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Replace cifs md5 hashing functions with kernel crypto APIsSteve French2011-01-25
| | | | | | | | | | Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. Remove header and source file containing those local functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Make CIFS mount work in a container.Rob Landley2011-01-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS: Remove pointless variable assignment in cifs_dfs_do_automount()Jesper Juhl2011-01-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c::cifs_dfs_do_automount() we have this code: ... mnt = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (IS_ERR(tlink)) { mnt = ERR_CAST(tlink); goto free_full_path; } ses = tlink_tcon(tlink)->ses; rc = get_dfs_path(xid, ses, full_path + 1, cifs_sb->local_nls, &num_referrals, &referrals, cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_MAP_SPECIAL_CHR); cifs_put_tlink(tlink); mnt = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); ... The assignment of 'mnt = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);' is completely pointless. If we take the 'if (IS_ERR(tlink))' branch we'll set 'mnt' again and we'll also do so if we do not take the branch. There is no way we'll ever use 'mnt' with the assigned 'ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)' value, so we may as well just remove the pointless assignment. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix up CIFSSMBEcho for unaligned accessJeff Layton2011-01-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make sure that CIFSSMBEcho can handle unaligned fields. Also fix a minor bug that causes this warning: fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function 'CIFSSMBEcho': fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:740: warning: large integer implicitly truncated to unsigned type ...WordCount is u8, not __le16, so no need to convert it. This patch should apply cleanly on top of the rest of the patchset to clean up unaligned access. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix unaligned accesses in cifsConvertToUCSJeff Layton2011-01-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | Move cifsConvertToUCS to cifs_unicode.c where all of the other unicode related functions live. Have it store mapped characters in 'temp' and then use put_unaligned_le16 to copy it to the target buffer. Also fix the comments to match kernel coding style. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: clean up unaligned accesses in cifs_unicode.cJeff Layton2011-01-20
| | | | | | | | | | Make sure we use get/put_unaligned routines when accessing wide character strings. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2024-10-01 20:31:16 -0400