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* cifs: remove code for setting timeouts on requestsJeff Layton2011-01-20
| | | | | | | | | | Since we don't time out individual requests anymore, remove the code that we used to use for setting timeouts on different requests. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: move "ntlmssp" and "local_leases" options out of experimental codeJeff Layton2011-01-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I see no real need to leave these sorts of options under an EXPERIMENTAL ifdef. Since you need a mount option to turn this code on, that only blows out the testing matrix. local_leases has been under the EXPERIMENTAL tag for some time, but it's only the mount option that's under this label. Move it out from under this tag. The NTLMSSP code is also under EXPERIMENTAL, but it needs a mount option to turn it on, and in the future any distro will reasonably want this enabled. Go ahead and move it out from under the EXPERIMENTAL tag. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Support NTLM2 session security during NTLMSSP authentication [try #5]Shirish Pargaonkar2011-01-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Indicate to the server a capability of NTLM2 session security (NTLM2 Key) during ntlmssp protocol exchange in one of the bits of the flags field. If server supports this capability, send NTLM2 key even if signing is not required on the server. If the server requires signing, the session keys exchanged for NTLMv2 and NTLM2 session security in auth packet of the nlmssp exchange are same. Send the same flags in authenticate message (type 3) that client sent in negotiate message (type 1). Remove function setup_ntlmssp_neg_req Make sure ntlmssp negotiate and authenticate messages are zero'ed before they are built. Reported-and-Tested-by: Robbert Kouprie <robbert@exx.nl> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Cleanup and thus reduce smb session structure and fields used during ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Removed following fields from smb session structure cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech in NTLMSSP. response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response). Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed once authenticaiton process is done. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Use appropriate server challengeShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection (struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over that smb connection. For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection does not count. Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - minor error corrections and cleanupShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory, let the tiblob get freed. For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function. For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Allocate session key/client response dynamicallyShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. sequence_number within server is set to 0x2. The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists of session key followed by client response within structure session_key is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key becomes connetion's session key. ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces function cifs_calculate_session_key(). size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size of the key it holds. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: convert cifs_tcp_ses_lock from a rwlock to a spinlockSuresh Jayaraman2010-10-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs_tcp_ses_lock is a rwlock with protects the cifs_tcp_ses_list, server->smb_ses_list and the ses->tcon_list. It also protects a few ref counters in server, ses and tcon. In most cases the critical section doesn't seem to be large, in a few cases where it is slightly large, there seem to be really no benefit from concurrent access. I briefly considered RCU mechanism but it appears to me that there is no real need. Replace it with a spinlock and get rid of the last rwlock in the cifs code. Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Clean up two declarations of blob_lenShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-19
| | | | | | | | | | - Eliminate double declaration of variable blob_len - Modify function build_ntlmssp_auth_blob to return error code as well as length of the blob. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM authentication and signing - Calculate auth response per smb sessionShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* ntlm authentication and signing - Correct response length for ntlmv2 ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-06
| | | | | | | | | | authentication without extended security Fix incorrect calculation of case sensitive response length in the ntlmv2 (without extended security) response. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication codeShirish Pargaonkar2010-09-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP Change variable name mac_key to session key to reflect ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-09-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | the key it holds Change name of variable mac_key to session key. The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not hold message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2, ntlmv1 etc.). mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "[CIFS] Fix ntlmv2 auth with ntlmssp"Steve French2010-09-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 9fbc590860e75785bdaf8b83e48fabfe4d4f7d58. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "missing changes during ntlmv2/ntlmssp auth and sign"Steve French2010-09-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 3ec6bbcdb4e85403f2c5958876ca9492afdf4031. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "[CIFS] Eliminate unused variable warning"Steve French2010-09-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. This reverts commit c89e5198b26a869ce2842bad8519264f3394dee9. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Eliminate unused variable warningSteve French2010-08-25
| | | | | CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* missing changes during ntlmv2/ntlmssp auth and signShirish Pargaonkar2010-08-23
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix ntlmv2 auth with ntlmsspSteve French2010-08-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make ntlmv2 as an authentication mechanism within ntlmssp instead of ntlmv1. Parse type 2 response in ntlmssp negotiation to pluck AV pairs and use them to calculate ntlmv2 response token. Also, assign domain name from the sever response in type 2 packet of ntlmssp and use that (netbios) domain name in calculation of response. Enable cifs/smb signing using rc4 and md5. Changed name of the structure mac_key to session_key to reflect the type of key it holds. Use kernel crypto_shash_* APIs instead of the equivalent cifs functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: remove bogus first_time check in NTLMv2 session setup codeJeff Layton2010-06-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This bug appears to be the result of a cut-and-paste mistake from the NTLMv1 code. The function to generate the MAC key was commented out, but not the conditional above it. The conditional then ended up causing the session setup key not to be copied to the buffer unless this was the first session on the socket, and that made all but the first NTLMv2 session setup fail. Fix this by removing the conditional and all of the commented clutter that made it difficult to see. Cc: Stable <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: Gunther Deschner <gdeschne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
* cifs: have decode_negTokenInit set flags in server structJeff Layton2010-05-05
| | | | | | | | ...rather than the secType. This allows us to get rid of the MSKerberos securityEnum. The client just makes a decision at upcall time. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: eliminate "first_time" parm to CIFS_SessSetupJeff Layton2010-04-27
| | | | | | | We can use the is_first_ses_reconnect() function to determine this. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Neaten cERROR and cFYI macros, reduce text spaceJoe Perches2010-04-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Neaten cERROR and cFYI macros, reduce text space ~2.5K Convert '__FILE__ ": " fmt' to '"%s: " fmt', __FILE__' to save text space Surround macros with do {} while Add parentheses to macros Make statement expression macro from macro with assign Remove now unnecessary parentheses from cFYI and cERROR uses defconfig with CIFS support old $ size fs/cifs/built-in.o text data bss dec hex filename 156012 1760 148 157920 268e0 fs/cifs/built-in.o defconfig with CIFS support old $ size fs/cifs/built-in.o text data bss dec hex filename 153508 1760 148 155416 25f18 fs/cifs/built-in.o allyesconfig old: $ size fs/cifs/built-in.o text data bss dec hex filename 309138 3864 74824 387826 5eaf2 fs/cifs/built-in.o allyesconfig new $ size fs/cifs/built-in.o text data bss dec hex filename 305655 3864 74824 384343 5dd57 fs/cifs/built-in.o Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking ↵Tejun Heo2010-03-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* [CIFS] Maximum username length check in session setup does not matchSteve French2010-02-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix length check reported by D. Binderman (see below) d binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> wrote: > > I just ran the sourceforge tool cppcheck over the source code of the > new Linux kernel 2.6.33-rc6 > > It said > > [./cifs/sess.c:250]: (error) Buffer access out-of-bounds May turn out to be harmless, but best to be safe. Note max username length is defined to 32 due to Linux (Windows maximum is 20). Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] cleanup asn handling for ntlmsspSteve French2009-06-24
| | | | | | | | | | | Also removes obsolete distinction between rawntlmssp and ntlmssp (in asn/SPNEGO) since as jra noted we can always send raw ntlmssp in session setup now. remove check for experimental runtime flag (/proc/fs/cifs/Experimental) in ntlmssp path. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix SMB uid in NTLMSSP authenticate requestSteve French2009-05-05
| | | | | | | | We were not setting the SMB uid in NTLMSSP authenticate request which could lead to INVALID_PARAMETER error on 2nd session setup. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] NTLMSSP reenabled after move from connect.c to sess.cSteve French2009-05-04
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The NTLMSSP code was removed from fs/cifs/connect.c and merged (75% smaller, cleaner) into fs/cifs/sess.c As with the old code it requires that cifs be built with CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL, the /proc/fs/cifs/Experimental flag must be set to 2, and mount must turn on extended security (e.g. with sec=krb5). Although NTLMSSP encapsulated in SPNEGO is not enabled yet, "raw" ntlmssp is common and useful in some cases since it offers more complete security negotiation, and is the default way of negotiating security for many Windows systems. SPNEGO encapsulated NTLMSSP will be able to reuse the same code. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix endian conversion of vcnum fieldSteve French2009-05-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When multiply mounting from the same client to the same server, with different userids, we create a vcnum which should be unique if possible (this is not the same as the smb uid, which is the handle to the security context). We were not endian converting additional (beyond the first which is zero) vcnum properly. CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org> Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] rename cifs_strndup to cifs_strndup_from_ucsSteve French2009-04-30
| | | | | | | | | | In most cases, cifs_strndup is converting from Unicode (UCS2 / UTF-32) to the configured local code page for the Linux mount (usually UTF8), so Jeff suggested that to make it more clear that cifs_strndup is doing a conversion not just memory allocation and copy, rename the function to including "from_ucs" (ie Unicode) Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix session setup unicode string saving to use new unicode helpersJeff Layton2009-04-30
| | | | | | | | | ...and change decode_unicode_ssetup to be a void function. It never returns an actual error anyway. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: add cFYI messages with some of the saved strings from ssetup/tconJeff Layton2009-04-16
| | | | | | | ...to make it easier to find problems in this area in the future. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix unicode string area word alignment in session setupJeff Layton2009-04-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The handling of unicode string area alignment is wrong. decode_unicode_ssetup improperly assumes that it will always be preceded by a pad byte. This isn't the case if the string area is already word-aligned. This problem, combined with the bad buffer sizing for the serverDomain string can cause memory corruption. The bad alignment can make it so that the alignment of the characters is off. This can make them translate to characters that are greater than 2 bytes each. If this happens we can overflow the allocation. Fix this by fixing the alignment in CIFS_SessSetup instead so we can verify it against the head of the response. Also, clean up the workaround for improperly terminated strings by checking for a odd-length unicode buffers and then forcibly terminating them. Finally, resize the buffer for serverDomain. Now that we've fixed the alignment, it's probably fine, but a malicious server could overflow it. A better solution for handling these strings is still needed, but this should be a suitable bandaid. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix multiuser mounts so server does not invalidate earlier security ↵Steve French2009-02-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | contexts When two different users mount the same Windows 2003 Server share using CIFS, the first session mounted can be invalidated. Some servers invalidate the first smb session when a second similar user (e.g. two users who get mapped by server to "guest") authenticates an smb session from the same client. By making sure that we set the 2nd and subsequent vc numbers to nonzero values, this ensures that we will not have this problem. Fixes Samba bug 6004, problem description follows: How to reproduce: - configure an "open share" (full permissions to Guest user) on Windows 2003 Server (I couldn't reproduce the problem with Samba server or Windows older than 2003) - mount the share twice with different users who will be authenticated as guest. noacl,noperm,user=john,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw noacl,noperm,user=jeff,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw Result: - just the mount point mounted last is accessible: Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix oops in cifs_strfromUCS_le mounting to servers which do not ↵Steve French2009-02-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | specify their OS Fixes kernel bug #10451 http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10451 Certain NAS appliances do not set the operating system or network operating system fields in the session setup response on the wire. cifs was oopsing on the unexpected zero length response fields (when trying to null terminate a zero length field). This fixes the oops. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: have calc_lanman_hash take more granular argsJeff Layton2008-12-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs: have calc_lanman_hash take more granular args We need to use this routine to encrypt passwords associated with the tcon too. Don't assume that the password will be attached to the smb_session. Also, make some of the values in the lower encryption functions const since they aren't changed. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: explicitly revoke SPNEGO key after session setupJeff Layton2008-09-24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs: explicitly revoke SPNEGO key after session setup The SPNEGO blob returned by an upcall can only be used once. Explicitly revoke it to make sure that we never pick it up again after session setup exits. This doesn't seem to be that big an issue on more recent kernels, but older kernels seem to link keys into the session keyring by default. That said, explicitly revoking the key seems like a reasonable thing to do here. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Turn off Unicode during session establishment for plaintext ↵Steve French2008-08-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication LANMAN session setup did not support Unicode (after session setup, unicode can still be used though). Fixes samba bug# 5319 CC: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Stable Kernel <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] check version in spnego upcall responseSteve French2008-08-25
| | | | | | | | | Currently, we don't check the version in the SPNEGO upcall response even though one is provided. Jeff and Q have made the corresponding change to the Samba client (cifs.upcall). Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] distinguish between Kerberos and MSKerberos in upcallSteve French2008-08-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | Properly handle MSKRB5 by passing sec=mskrb5 to the upcall so that the spengo blob can be generated appropriately. Also, make decode_negTokenInit prefer whichever mechanism is first in the list. Needed for some NetApp servers, and possibly some older versions of Windows which treat the two KRB5 mechanisms differently. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] clean up some hard to read ifdefsSteve French2008-02-12
| | | | | | | | Christoph had noticed too many ifdefs in the CIFS code making it hard to read. This patch removes about a quarter of them from the C files in cifs by improving a few key ifdefs in the .h files. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] fix unicode string alignment in SPNEGO setupJeff Layton2007-12-30
| | | | | | | | | Unicode strings need to be word aligned, but the code that handles that is currently not taking the length of the SPNEGO blob into account. Fix it to do so. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@tupile.poochiereds.net> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] use krb5 session key from first SMB session after a NegProtJeff Layton2007-12-30
| | | | | | | | | Currently, any new kerberos SMB session overwrites the server's session key. The session key should only be set by the first SMB session set up on the socket. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@tupile.poochiereds.net> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Have CIFS_SessSetup build correct SPNEGO SessionSetup requestSteve French2007-11-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Have CIFS_SessSetup call cifs_get_spnego_key when Kerberos is negotiated. Use the info in the key payload to build a session setup request packet. Also clean up how the request buffer in the function is freed on error. With appropriate user space helper (in samba/source/client). Kerberos support (secure session establishment can be done now via Kerberos, previously users would have to use NTLMv2 instead for more secure session setup). Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Fix buffer overflow if server sends corrupt response to smallSteve French2007-11-13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | request In SendReceive() function in transport.c - it memcpy's message payload into a buffer passed via out_buf param. The function assumes that all buffers are of size (CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE) , unfortunately it is also called with smaller (MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE) buffers. There are eight callers (SMB worker functions) which are primarily affected by this change: TreeDisconnect, uLogoff, Close, findClose, SetFileSize, SetFileTimes, Lock and PosixLock CC: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> CC: Przemyslaw Wegrzyn <czajnik@czajsoft.pl> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] log better errors on failed mountsSteve French2007-10-18
| | | | | | | | Also returns more accurate errors to mount for the cases of account expired and password expired Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Break up unicode_sessetup string functionsJeff Layton2007-10-16
| | | | | | | | SPNEGO setup needs only some of these strings. Break up unicode_ssetup_strings so we can call them individually. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] formatting cleanup found by checkpatchSteve French2007-08-30
| | | | Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Check return code on failed allocCyrill Gorcunov2007-08-17
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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