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Remove including <linux/version.h> that don't need it.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAPgLHd-Fjx1RybjWFAu1vHRfTvhWwMLL3x46BouC5uNxHPjy1A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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The build_str needs to be char [] not char * for the sizeof() to report
the string length.
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131112165607.GA5921@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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If we don't have RDRAND (in which case nothing else *should* matter),
most sources have a highly biased entropy distribution. Use a
circular multiply to diffuse the entropic bits. A circular multiply
is a good operation for this: it is cheap on standard hardware and
because it is symmetric (unlike an ordinary multiply) it doesn't
introduce its own bias.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131111222839.GA28616@www.outflux.net
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Depending on availability, mix the RDRAND and RDTSC entropy together with
XOR. Only when neither is available should the i8254 be used. Update
the Kconfig documentation to reflect this. Additionally, since bits
used for entropy is masked elsewhere, drop the needless masking in
the get_random_long(). Similarly, use the entire TSC, not just the low
32 bits.
Finally, to improve the starting entropy, do a simple hashing of a
build-time versions string and the boot-time boot_params structure for
some additional level of unpredictability.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131111222839.GA28616@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Counts available alignment positions across all e820 maps, and chooses
one randomly for the new kernel base address, making sure not to collide
with unsafe memory areas.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381450698-28710-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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Adds potential sources of randomness: RDRAND, RDTSC, or the i8254.
This moves the pre-alternatives inline rdrand function into the header so
both pieces of code can use it. Availability of RDRAND is then controlled
by CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, if someone wants to disable it even for kASLR.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381450698-28710-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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This allows decompress_kernel to return a new location for the kernel to
be relocated to. Additionally, enforces CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START as the
minimum relocation position when building with CONFIG_RELOCATABLE.
With CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE set, the choose_kernel_location routine
will select a new location to decompress the kernel, though here it is
presently a no-op. The kernel command line option "nokaslr" is introduced
to bypass these routines.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381450698-28710-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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