25 files changed, 171 insertions, 136 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 35664fe6daa1..b9c1219924f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
           measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
 
 config IMA_AUDIT
-        bool
+        bool "Enables auditing support"
         depends on IMA
+        depends on AUDIT
         default y
         help
           This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5690c021de8f..5f740f6971e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-         ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
+         ima_policy.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3ccf7acac6df..e7c99fd0d223 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -61,10 +61,19 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
 };
 extern struct list_head ima_measurements;       /* list of all measurements */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
 /* declarations */
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
                          const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
                          const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+                                       const unsigned char *fname,
+                                       const char *op, const char *cause,
+                                       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 88a2788b981d..032ff03ad907 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
         }
         memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
         memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-        strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+        strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
+               (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
+               file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
         result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
         if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 21e96bf188df..7a57f6769e9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
 
 static int ima_audit;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-
 /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
 static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
         return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
-#endif
 
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
                          const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e1aa2b482dd2..38477c9c3415 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -367,20 +367,11 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 
         return 0;
 out:
-        securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
-        securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
-        securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
-        securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
-        securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
-        return -1;
-}
-
-void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void)
-{
         securityfs_remove(violations);
         securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
         securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
         securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
         securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
         securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+        return -1;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 17f1f060306f..b5dfd534f13d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -90,8 +90,3 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
         return ima_fs_init();
 }
-
-void __exit ima_cleanup(void)
-{
-        ima_fs_cleanup();
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b17be79b9cf2..be8294915cf7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
         fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
         int rc;
         bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+        unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
 
         if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
                 return;
@@ -75,12 +76,27 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 out:
         mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
+        if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+                return;
+
+        /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+        pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (pathbuf) {
+                pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+                if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+                        pathname = NULL;
+                else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+                        pathname = NULL;
+        }
         if (send_tomtou)
-                ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
-                                  "ToMToU");
+                ima_add_violation(inode,
+                                  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+                                  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
         if (send_writers)
-                ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
-                                  "open_writers");
+                ima_add_violation(inode,
+                                  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+                                  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+        kfree(pathbuf);
 }
 
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -123,6 +139,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 {
         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
         struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+        unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
         int rc = 0;
 
         if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -147,8 +164,21 @@ retry:
                 goto out;
 
         rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
-        if (!rc)
-                ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+        if (rc != 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (function != BPRM_CHECK) {
+                /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+                pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+                if (pathbuf) {
+                        pathname =
+                            d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+                        if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+                                pathname = NULL;
+                }
+        }
+        ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+        kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
         mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
         return rc;
@@ -228,15 +258,11 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
         int error;
 
         error = ima_init();
-        ima_initialized = 1;
+        if (!error)
+                ima_initialized = 1;
         return error;
 }
 
-static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
-{
-        ima_cleanup();
-}
-
 late_initcall(init_ima);        /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
 
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d8edff209bf3..1a9583008aae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+        {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+        {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c92d42b021aa..1c261763f479 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
-long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
         key_serial_t id,
         const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
         unsigned ioc,
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
         struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
         long ret;
 
-        if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+        if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
                 goto no_payload;
 
         ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 3dcbf86b0d31..22ff05269e3d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK   0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
-extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
 
 extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
 extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
 extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
 
 extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
-                                          const struct iovec __user *,
+                                          const struct iovec *,
                                           unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0f5b3f027299..3364fbf46807 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
         struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
         long ret;
 
-        if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+        if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
                 goto no_payload;
 
         ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 {
         struct task_struct *me, *parent;
         const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
-        struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
+        struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
         key_ref_t keyring_r;
         struct cred *cred;
         int ret;
@@ -1466,19 +1466,17 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
                 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
         ret = -ENOMEM;
-        newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!newwork)
-                goto error_keyring;
 
         /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
          * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
          * our parent */
         cred = cred_alloc_blank();
         if (!cred)
-                goto error_newwork;
+                goto error_keyring;
+        newwork = &cred->rcu;
 
         cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
-        init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
+        init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
 
         me = current;
         rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1488,6 +1486,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
         oldwork = NULL;
         parent = me->real_parent;
 
+        task_lock(parent);
         /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
         if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
                 goto unlock;
@@ -1531,20 +1530,15 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
         if (!ret)
                 newwork = NULL;
 unlock:
+        task_unlock(parent);
         write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
         rcu_read_unlock();
-        if (oldwork) {
-                put_cred(oldwork->data);
-                kfree(oldwork);
-        }
-        if (newwork) {
-                put_cred(newwork->data);
-                kfree(newwork);
-        }
+        if (oldwork)
+                put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
+        if (newwork)
+                put_cred(cred);
         return ret;
 
-error_newwork:
-        kfree(newwork);
 error_keyring:
         key_ref_put(keyring_r);
         return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7445875f6818..81e7852d281d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
                      const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc)
         __acquires(&keyring->sem)
+        __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
         struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
         unsigned long prealloc;
@@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
                     unsigned long prealloc)
         __releases(&keyring->sem)
+        __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
         BUG_ON(type == NULL);
         BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 4ad54eea1ea4..54339cfd6734 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,12 +834,11 @@ error:
  * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
  * the target  process is about to resume userspace execution.
  */
-void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
 {
         const struct cred *old = current_cred();
-        struct cred *new = twork->data;
+        struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
 
-        kfree(twork);
         if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
                 put_cred(new);
                 return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3efc9b12aef4..860aeb349cb3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR       2
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 68d82daed257..4d3fab47e643 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 {
         struct avc_node *node;
 
-        node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+        node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
         if (!node)
                 goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 372ec6502aa8..6c77f63c7591 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2129,7 +2129,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                 int fd;
 
                 j++;
-                i = j * __NFDBITS;
+                i = j * BITS_PER_LONG;
                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
                         break;
@@ -2157,8 +2157,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                                                 get_file(devnull);
                                         } else {
                                                 devnull = dentry_open(
-                                                        dget(selinux_null),
-                                                        mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
+                                                        &selinux_null,
                                                         O_RDWR, cred);
                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
                                                         devnull = NULL;
@@ -2717,7 +2716,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
                         ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-        if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
+        if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
 
         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
@@ -2792,11 +2791,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
                         /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
                          * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
-                        str = value;
-                        if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
-                                audit_size = size - 1;
-                        else
-                                audit_size = size;
+                        if (value) {
+                                str = value;
+                                if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+                                        audit_size = size - 1;
+                                else
+                                        audit_size = size;
+                        } else {
+                                str = "";
+                                audit_size = 0;
+                        }
                         ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
                         audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
                         audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
@@ -3181,6 +3185,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
         case F_GETFL:
         case F_GETOWN:
         case F_GETSIG:
+        case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
                 break;
@@ -5763,21 +5768,21 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
         {
                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
-                .pf =           PF_INET,
+                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
         },
         {
                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
-                .pf =           PF_INET,
+                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
         },
         {
                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
-                .pf =           PF_INET,
+                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
         }
@@ -5789,14 +5794,14 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
         {
                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
-                .pf =           PF_INET6,
+                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
         },
         {
                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
-                .pf =           PF_INET6,
+                .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
         }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index b8c53723e09b..df2de54a958d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -145,7 +145,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
             "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
         { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
         { "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
-        { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
+        { "capability2",
+          { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
+            NULL } },
         { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
         { "tun_socket",
           { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index dde2005407aa..6d3885165d14 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
 extern int selinux_disable(void);
 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
-extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
+extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 161e01a6c7ef..8a77725423e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
 
 #include "security.h"
 
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *
 {
         switch (msgtype) {
         case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
-                struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
+                struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
 
                 memset(msg, 0, len);
                 msg->val = *((int *)data);
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *
         }
 
         case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
-                struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
+                struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
 
                 memset(msg, 0, len);
                 msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
                 goto oom;
 
         tmp = skb->tail;
-        nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len);
+        nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len, 0);
+        if (!nlh)
+                goto out_kfree_skb;
         selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data);
         nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp;
         NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = SELNLGRP_AVC;
@@ -89,7 +92,7 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
 out:
         return;
 
-nlmsg_failure:
+out_kfree_skb:
         kfree_skb(skb);
 oom:
         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __func__);
@@ -108,8 +111,12 @@ void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
 
 static int __init selnl_init(void)
 {
+        struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
+                .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX,
+        };
+
         selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX,
-                                      SELNLGRP_MAX, NULL, NULL, THIS_MODULE);
+                                      THIS_MODULE, &cfg);
         if (selnl == NULL)
                 panic("SELinux:  Cannot create netlink socket.");
         netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 3ad290251288..298e695d6822 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ out:
 
 #define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
 
-struct dentry *selinux_null;
+struct path selinux_null;
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
                                             size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
         init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
         d_add(dentry, inode);
-        selinux_null = dentry;
+        selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
 
         dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
         if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
                 return err;
         }
 
-        selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+        selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
         if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
                 printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs:  could not mount!\n");
                 err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cc361b8f3d13..99b36124f712 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack {
         char            *smk_hat;
         char            *smk_default;
         int             smk_initialized;
-        spinlock_t      smk_sblock;     /* for initialization */
 };
 
 struct socket_smack {
@@ -284,6 +283,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ */
+static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+        if (!capable(cap))
+                return 0;
+        if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+                return 1;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * logging functions
  */
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9f3705e92712..db14689a21e0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
         }
 
         /*
-         * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
-         * only one that gets privilege and current does not
-         * have that label.
+         * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
          */
-        if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
-                goto out_audit;
-
-        if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+        if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 rc = 0;
 
 out_audit:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ee0bb5735f35..8221514cc997 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
         int rc = 0;
         char *sp = smk_of_current();
 
-        if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 return 0;
 
          if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
         sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
         sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
         sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
-        spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
 
         sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
@@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
         char *commap;
         char *nsp;
 
-        spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
-        if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
-                spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+        if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
                 return 0;
-        }
+
         sp->smk_initialized = 1;
-        spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
 
         for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
                 commap = strchr(op, ',');
@@ -825,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
-                if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                         rc = -EPERM;
                 /*
                  * check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@ -835,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                     smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
                         rc = -EINVAL;
         } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
-                if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                         rc = -EPERM;
                 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
                     strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -931,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
-                if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                         rc = -EPERM;
         } else
                 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1720,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
          * state into account in the decision as well as
          * the smack value.
          */
-        if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
+            has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 rc = 0;
         /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
  out_log:
@@ -2721,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
         if (p != current)
                 return -EPERM;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@@ -2784,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
         smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
         /*
@@ -2820,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
         smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
 #endif
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
         return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 1810c9a4ed48..b1b768e4049a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -215,28 +215,27 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
  * @access: access string
  * @rule: Smack rule
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
  */
 static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
                                 const char *access, struct smack_rule *rule,
-                                int import)
+                                int import, int len)
 {
-        int rc = -1;
-        int done;
         const char *cp;
         struct smack_known *skp;
 
         if (import) {
-                rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, 0);
+                rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
                 if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
                         return -1;
 
-                rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, 0);
+                rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
                 if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
                         return -1;
         } else {
-                cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, 0);
+                cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
                 if (cp == NULL)
                         return -1;
                 skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
                         return -1;
                 rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
 
-                cp = smk_parse_smack(object, 0);
+                cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
                 if (cp == NULL)
                         return -1;
                 skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 
         rule->smk_access = 0;
 
-        for (cp = access, done = 0; *cp && !done; cp++) {
+        for (cp = access; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
                 switch (*cp) {
                 case '-':
                         break;
@@ -282,13 +281,11 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
                         rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
                         break;
                 default:
-                        done = 1;
-                        break;
+                        return 0;
                 }
         }
-        rc = 0;
 
-        return rc;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import)
         int rc;
 
         rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
-                           data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import);
+                           data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import,
+                           SMK_LABELLEN);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -325,11 +323,11 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule,
         int datalen;
         int rc = -1;
 
-        /*
-         * This is probably inefficient, but safe.
-         */
+        /* This is inefficient */
         datalen = strlen(data);
-        subject = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+        /* Our first element can be 64 + \0 with no spaces */
+        subject = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (subject == NULL)
                 return -1;
         object = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule,
                 goto free_out_o;
 
         if (sscanf(data, "%s %s %s", subject, object, access) == 3)
-                rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import);
+                rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import, 0);
 
         kfree(access);
 free_out_o:
@@ -520,6 +518,9 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
         if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
                 return;
 
+        if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+                return;
+
         seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
 
         seq_putc(s, ' ');
@@ -534,8 +535,6 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
                 seq_putc(s, 'a');
         if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
                 seq_putc(s, 't');
-        if (srp->smk_access == 0)
-                seq_putc(s, '-');
 
         seq_putc(s, '\n');
 }
@@ -595,13 +594,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
                               size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-
         /*
          * Must have privilege.
          * No partial writes.
          * Enough data must be present.
          */
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
          * No partial writes.
          * Enough data must be present.
          */
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
         if (*ppos != 0)
                 return -EINVAL;
@@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
          * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
          * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
          */
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
         if (*ppos != 0)
                 return -EINVAL;
@@ -1267,7 +1265,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char temp[80];
         int i;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1334,7 +1332,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char temp[80];
         int i;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1412,7 +1410,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char temp[80];
         int i;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1503,7 +1501,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char *data;
         int rc = count;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1586,7 +1584,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
         int rc = count;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         /*
@@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         char temp[32];
         int i;
 
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1885,7 +1883,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         /*
          * Must have privilege.
          */
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;
 
         return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -2051,7 +2049,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
         }
 
         root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
-        root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known);
 
         return 0;
 }