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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c12
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/file.h4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c24
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c6
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c421
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c64
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig16
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h39
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c86
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c263
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c93
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c209
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h22
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c139
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c70
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c10
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c44
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c70
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c14
-rw-r--r--security/security.c33
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c75
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlink.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c55
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c75
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/audit.c23
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h6
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/condition.c20
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/mount.c5
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c16
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/util.c9
-rw-r--r--security/yama/Kconfig8
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c16
51 files changed, 1396 insertions, 676 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 806bd19af7f2..5706b74c857f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
57 57
58$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h 58$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
59$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h 59$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
60$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \ 60$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
61 $(src)/Makefile 61 $(src)/Makefile
62 $(call cmd,make-caps) 62 $(call cmd,make-caps)
63$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \ 63$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
64 $(src)/Makefile 64 $(src)/Makefile
65 $(call cmd,make-rlim) 65 $(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index b81ea10a17a3..60f0c76a27d3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ audit:
721 if (!permtest) 721 if (!permtest)
722 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, 722 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
723 OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, 723 OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
724 target, 0, info, error); 724 target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
725 725
726out: 726out:
727 aa_put_profile(hat); 727 aa_put_profile(hat);
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
848audit: 848audit:
849 if (!permtest) 849 if (!permtest)
850 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, 850 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
851 name, hname, 0, info, error); 851 name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
852 852
853 aa_put_namespace(ns); 853 aa_put_namespace(ns);
854 aa_put_profile(target); 854 aa_put_profile(target);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index cf19d4093ca4..cd21ec5b90af 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
65static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) 65static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
66{ 66{
67 struct common_audit_data *sa = va; 67 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
68 uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); 68 kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
69 69
70 if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { 70 if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
71 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); 71 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
@@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
76 audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied); 76 audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
77 } 77 }
78 if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { 78 if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
79 audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); 79 audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
80 audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid); 80 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
81 audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
82 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid));
81 } 83 }
82 84
83 if (sa->aad->fs.target) { 85 if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
103 */ 105 */
104int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, 106int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
105 gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, 107 gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
106 const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) 108 const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
107{ 109{
108 int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; 110 int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
109 struct common_audit_data sa; 111 struct common_audit_data sa;
@@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
201 */ 203 */
202 perms.kill = 0; 204 perms.kill = 0;
203 205
204 if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) { 206 if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) {
205 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); 207 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
206 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state)); 208 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
207 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state)); 209 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 4b7e18951aea..69d8cae634e7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
125 const char *target; 125 const char *target;
126 u32 request; 126 u32 request;
127 u32 denied; 127 u32 denied;
128 uid_t ouid; 128 kuid_t ouid;
129 } fs; 129 } fs;
130 }; 130 };
131}; 131};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index f98fd4701d80..967b2deda376 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct path;
71 71
72/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ 72/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
73struct path_cond { 73struct path_cond {
74 uid_t uid; 74 kuid_t uid;
75 umode_t mode; 75 umode_t mode;
76}; 76};
77 77
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
146 146
147int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, 147int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
148 gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, 148 gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
149 const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); 149 const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
150 150
151/** 151/**
152 * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions 152 * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8ea39aabe948..8c2a7f6b35e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
352 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); 352 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
353} 353}
354 354
355static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) 355static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
356{ 356{
357 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, 357 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
358 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode 358 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index cf5fd220309b..813200384d97 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
724 */ 724 */
725static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) 725static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
726{ 726{
727 struct aa_profile *p;
728
727 AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); 729 AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
728 730
729 if (!profile) 731 if (!profile)
@@ -751,7 +753,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
751 aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); 753 aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
752 aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); 754 aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
753 755
754 aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby); 756 /* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
757 * put_profile(kref_put).
758 * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
759 * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
760 * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
761 * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
762 */
763 for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
764 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
765 /* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
766 struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
767 /* break the chain */
768 p->replacedby = NULL;
769 /* now free p, chain is broken */
770 free_profile(p);
771
772 /* follow up with next profile in the chain */
773 p = next;
774 } else
775 break;
776 }
755 777
756 kzfree(profile); 778 kzfree(profile);
757} 779}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 61095df8b89a..b14a30c234b8 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
74 return 0; 74 return 0;
75} 75}
76 76
77static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, 77static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
78 unsigned long flags, void *data) 78 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
79{ 79{
80 return 0; 80 return 0;
81} 81}
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
284 return 0; 284 return 0;
285} 285}
286 286
287static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) 287static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
288{ 288{
289 return 0; 289 return 0;
290} 290}
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 442204cc22d9..842c254396db 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@
26static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); 26static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
27 27
28/* 28/*
29 * whitelist locking rules: 29 * exception list locking rules:
30 * hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read. 30 * hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read.
31 * hold rcu_read_lock() for read. 31 * hold rcu_read_lock() for read.
32 */ 32 */
33 33
34struct dev_whitelist_item { 34struct dev_exception_item {
35 u32 major, minor; 35 u32 major, minor;
36 short type; 36 short type;
37 short access; 37 short access;
@@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ struct dev_whitelist_item {
41 41
42struct dev_cgroup { 42struct dev_cgroup {
43 struct cgroup_subsys_state css; 43 struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
44 struct list_head whitelist; 44 struct list_head exceptions;
45 enum {
46 DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW,
47 DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY,
48 } behavior;
45}; 49};
46 50
47static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s) 51static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s)
@@ -74,12 +78,12 @@ static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup *new_cgrp,
74/* 78/*
75 * called under devcgroup_mutex 79 * called under devcgroup_mutex
76 */ 80 */
77static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) 81static int dev_exceptions_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
78{ 82{
79 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new; 83 struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp, *new;
80 84
81 list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) { 85 list_for_each_entry(ex, orig, list) {
82 new = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); 86 new = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
83 if (!new) 87 if (!new)
84 goto free_and_exit; 88 goto free_and_exit;
85 list_add_tail(&new->list, dest); 89 list_add_tail(&new->list, dest);
@@ -88,64 +92,60 @@ static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
88 return 0; 92 return 0;
89 93
90free_and_exit: 94free_and_exit:
91 list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) { 95 list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, dest, list) {
92 list_del(&wh->list); 96 list_del(&ex->list);
93 kfree(wh); 97 kfree(ex);
94 } 98 }
95 return -ENOMEM; 99 return -ENOMEM;
96} 100}
97 101
98/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */
99/* 102/*
100 * called under devcgroup_mutex 103 * called under devcgroup_mutex
101 */ 104 */
102static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, 105static int dev_exception_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
103 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) 106 struct dev_exception_item *ex)
104{ 107{
105 struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy, *walk; 108 struct dev_exception_item *excopy, *walk;
106 109
107 whcopy = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); 110 excopy = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL);
108 if (!whcopy) 111 if (!excopy)
109 return -ENOMEM; 112 return -ENOMEM;
110 113
111 list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { 114 list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
112 if (walk->type != wh->type) 115 if (walk->type != ex->type)
113 continue; 116 continue;
114 if (walk->major != wh->major) 117 if (walk->major != ex->major)
115 continue; 118 continue;
116 if (walk->minor != wh->minor) 119 if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
117 continue; 120 continue;
118 121
119 walk->access |= wh->access; 122 walk->access |= ex->access;
120 kfree(whcopy); 123 kfree(excopy);
121 whcopy = NULL; 124 excopy = NULL;
122 } 125 }
123 126
124 if (whcopy != NULL) 127 if (excopy != NULL)
125 list_add_tail_rcu(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); 128 list_add_tail_rcu(&excopy->list, &dev_cgroup->exceptions);
126 return 0; 129 return 0;
127} 130}
128 131
129/* 132/*
130 * called under devcgroup_mutex 133 * called under devcgroup_mutex
131 */ 134 */
132static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, 135static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
133 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) 136 struct dev_exception_item *ex)
134{ 137{
135 struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp; 138 struct dev_exception_item *walk, *tmp;
136 139
137 list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { 140 list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
138 if (walk->type == DEV_ALL) 141 if (walk->type != ex->type)
139 goto remove;
140 if (walk->type != wh->type)
141 continue; 142 continue;
142 if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major) 143 if (walk->major != ex->major)
143 continue; 144 continue;
144 if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor) 145 if (walk->minor != ex->minor)
145 continue; 146 continue;
146 147
147remove: 148 walk->access &= ~ex->access;
148 walk->access &= ~wh->access;
149 if (!walk->access) { 149 if (!walk->access) {
150 list_del_rcu(&walk->list); 150 list_del_rcu(&walk->list);
151 kfree_rcu(walk, rcu); 151 kfree_rcu(walk, rcu);
@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ remove:
153 } 153 }
154} 154}
155 155
156/**
157 * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list
158 * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned
159 *
160 * called under devcgroup_mutex
161 */
162static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup)
163{
164 struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
165
166 list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
167 list_del(&ex->list);
168 kfree(ex);
169 }
170}
171
156/* 172/*
157 * called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held. 173 * called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held.
158 */ 174 */
@@ -165,25 +181,17 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup)
165 dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL); 181 dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL);
166 if (!dev_cgroup) 182 if (!dev_cgroup)
167 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 183 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
168 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist); 184 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->exceptions);
169 parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent; 185 parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent;
170 186
171 if (parent_cgroup == NULL) { 187 if (parent_cgroup == NULL)
172 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; 188 dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
173 wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); 189 else {
174 if (!wh) {
175 kfree(dev_cgroup);
176 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
177 }
178 wh->minor = wh->major = ~0;
179 wh->type = DEV_ALL;
180 wh->access = ACC_MASK;
181 list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist);
182 } else {
183 parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup); 190 parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup);
184 mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex); 191 mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
185 ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist, 192 ret = dev_exceptions_copy(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
186 &parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist); 193 &parent_dev_cgroup->exceptions);
194 dev_cgroup->behavior = parent_dev_cgroup->behavior;
187 mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex); 195 mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
188 if (ret) { 196 if (ret) {
189 kfree(dev_cgroup); 197 kfree(dev_cgroup);
@@ -197,13 +205,9 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup)
197static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cgroup) 205static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cgroup)
198{ 206{
199 struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; 207 struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
200 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp;
201 208
202 dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); 209 dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
203 list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { 210 dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup);
204 list_del(&wh->list);
205 kfree(wh);
206 }
207 kfree(dev_cgroup); 211 kfree(dev_cgroup);
208} 212}
209 213
@@ -249,59 +253,87 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft,
249 struct seq_file *m) 253 struct seq_file *m)
250{ 254{
251 struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); 255 struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
252 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; 256 struct dev_exception_item *ex;
253 char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; 257 char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN];
254 258
255 rcu_read_lock(); 259 rcu_read_lock();
256 list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) { 260 /*
257 set_access(acc, wh->access); 261 * To preserve the compatibility:
258 set_majmin(maj, wh->major); 262 * - Only show the "all devices" when the default policy is to allow
259 set_majmin(min, wh->minor); 263 * - List the exceptions in case the default policy is to deny
260 seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(wh->type), 264 * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices"
265 */
266 if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
267 set_access(acc, ACC_MASK);
268 set_majmin(maj, ~0);
269 set_majmin(min, ~0);
270 seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL),
261 maj, min, acc); 271 maj, min, acc);
272 } else {
273 list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) {
274 set_access(acc, ex->access);
275 set_majmin(maj, ex->major);
276 set_majmin(min, ex->minor);
277 seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(ex->type),
278 maj, min, acc);
279 }
262 } 280 }
263 rcu_read_unlock(); 281 rcu_read_unlock();
264 282
265 return 0; 283 return 0;
266} 284}
267 285
268/* 286/**
269 * may_access_whitelist: 287 * may_access - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed
270 * does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access 288 * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy +
271 * requested in whitelist item refwh. 289 * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup
272 * return 1 if yes, 0 if no. 290 * won't have more privileges than its parent or to
273 * call with devcgroup_mutex held 291 * verify if a certain access is allowed.
292 * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against
293 * @refex: new exception
274 */ 294 */
275static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c, 295static int may_access(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
276 struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh) 296 struct dev_exception_item *refex)
277{ 297{
278 struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem; 298 struct dev_exception_item *ex;
299 bool match = false;
279 300
280 list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) { 301 list_for_each_entry(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
281 if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL) 302 if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
282 return 1;
283 if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK))
284 continue; 303 continue;
285 if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR)) 304 if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
286 continue; 305 continue;
287 if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major) 306 if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major)
288 continue; 307 continue;
289 if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor) 308 if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor)
290 continue; 309 continue;
291 if (refwh->access & (~whitem->access)) 310 if (refex->access & (~ex->access))
292 continue; 311 continue;
293 return 1; 312 match = true;
313 break;
294 } 314 }
315
316 /*
317 * In two cases we'll consider this new exception valid:
318 * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to allow + exception list:
319 * the new exception should *not* match any of the exceptions
320 * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, !match)
321 * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to deny + exception list:
322 * the new exception *should* match the exceptions
323 * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, match)
324 */
325 if ((dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) == match)
326 return 1;
295 return 0; 327 return 0;
296} 328}
297 329
298/* 330/*
299 * parent_has_perm: 331 * parent_has_perm:
300 * when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule 332 * when adding a new allow rule to a device exception list, the rule
301 * must be allowed in the parent device 333 * must be allowed in the parent device
302 */ 334 */
303static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg, 335static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
304 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) 336 struct dev_exception_item *ex)
305{ 337{
306 struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent; 338 struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent;
307 struct dev_cgroup *parent; 339 struct dev_cgroup *parent;
@@ -309,17 +341,28 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
309 if (!pcg) 341 if (!pcg)
310 return 1; 342 return 1;
311 parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg); 343 parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg);
312 return may_access_whitelist(parent, wh); 344 return may_access(parent, ex);
345}
346
347/**
348 * may_allow_all - checks if it's possible to change the behavior to
349 * allow based on parent's rules.
350 * @parent: device cgroup's parent
351 * returns: != 0 in case it's allowed, 0 otherwise
352 */
353static inline int may_allow_all(struct dev_cgroup *parent)
354{
355 return parent->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
313} 356}
314 357
315/* 358/*
316 * Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules. 359 * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules.
317 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD 360 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD
318 * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not 361 * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not
319 * modify the whitelist. 362 * modify the exception list.
320 * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow 363 * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow
321 * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the 364 * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the
322 * device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN 365 * device exception list controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
323 * 366 *
324 * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting 367 * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting
325 * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your 368 * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your
@@ -329,28 +372,44 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
329 int filetype, const char *buffer) 372 int filetype, const char *buffer)
330{ 373{
331 const char *b; 374 const char *b;
332 char *endp; 375 char temp[12]; /* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */
333 int count; 376 int count, rc;
334 struct dev_whitelist_item wh; 377 struct dev_exception_item ex;
378 struct cgroup *p = devcgroup->css.cgroup;
379 struct dev_cgroup *parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(p->parent);
335 380
336 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) 381 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
337 return -EPERM; 382 return -EPERM;
338 383
339 memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh)); 384 memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
340 b = buffer; 385 b = buffer;
341 386
342 switch (*b) { 387 switch (*b) {
343 case 'a': 388 case 'a':
344 wh.type = DEV_ALL; 389 switch (filetype) {
345 wh.access = ACC_MASK; 390 case DEVCG_ALLOW:
346 wh.major = ~0; 391 if (!may_allow_all(parent))
347 wh.minor = ~0; 392 return -EPERM;
348 goto handle; 393 dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
394 rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
395 &parent->exceptions);
396 if (rc)
397 return rc;
398 devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
399 break;
400 case DEVCG_DENY:
401 dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
402 devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY;
403 break;
404 default:
405 return -EINVAL;
406 }
407 return 0;
349 case 'b': 408 case 'b':
350 wh.type = DEV_BLOCK; 409 ex.type = DEV_BLOCK;
351 break; 410 break;
352 case 'c': 411 case 'c':
353 wh.type = DEV_CHAR; 412 ex.type = DEV_CHAR;
354 break; 413 break;
355 default: 414 default:
356 return -EINVAL; 415 return -EINVAL;
@@ -360,11 +419,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
360 return -EINVAL; 419 return -EINVAL;
361 b++; 420 b++;
362 if (*b == '*') { 421 if (*b == '*') {
363 wh.major = ~0; 422 ex.major = ~0;
364 b++; 423 b++;
365 } else if (isdigit(*b)) { 424 } else if (isdigit(*b)) {
366 wh.major = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); 425 memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
367 b = endp; 426 for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
427 temp[count] = *b;
428 b++;
429 if (!isdigit(*b))
430 break;
431 }
432 rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.major);
433 if (rc)
434 return -EINVAL;
368 } else { 435 } else {
369 return -EINVAL; 436 return -EINVAL;
370 } 437 }
@@ -374,11 +441,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
374 441
375 /* read minor */ 442 /* read minor */
376 if (*b == '*') { 443 if (*b == '*') {
377 wh.minor = ~0; 444 ex.minor = ~0;
378 b++; 445 b++;
379 } else if (isdigit(*b)) { 446 } else if (isdigit(*b)) {
380 wh.minor = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); 447 memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
381 b = endp; 448 for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) {
449 temp[count] = *b;
450 b++;
451 if (!isdigit(*b))
452 break;
453 }
454 rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.minor);
455 if (rc)
456 return -EINVAL;
382 } else { 457 } else {
383 return -EINVAL; 458 return -EINVAL;
384 } 459 }
@@ -387,13 +462,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
387 for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) { 462 for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) {
388 switch (*b) { 463 switch (*b) {
389 case 'r': 464 case 'r':
390 wh.access |= ACC_READ; 465 ex.access |= ACC_READ;
391 break; 466 break;
392 case 'w': 467 case 'w':
393 wh.access |= ACC_WRITE; 468 ex.access |= ACC_WRITE;
394 break; 469 break;
395 case 'm': 470 case 'm':
396 wh.access |= ACC_MKNOD; 471 ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD;
397 break; 472 break;
398 case '\n': 473 case '\n':
399 case '\0': 474 case '\0':
@@ -404,15 +479,31 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
404 } 479 }
405 } 480 }
406 481
407handle:
408 switch (filetype) { 482 switch (filetype) {
409 case DEVCG_ALLOW: 483 case DEVCG_ALLOW:
410 if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &wh)) 484 if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex))
411 return -EPERM; 485 return -EPERM;
412 return dev_whitelist_add(devcgroup, &wh); 486 /*
487 * If the default policy is to allow by default, try to remove
488 * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
489 * don't want to break compatibility
490 */
491 if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
492 dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
493 return 0;
494 }
495 return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
413 case DEVCG_DENY: 496 case DEVCG_DENY:
414 dev_whitelist_rm(devcgroup, &wh); 497 /*
415 break; 498 * If the default policy is to deny by default, try to remove
499 * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
500 * don't want to break compatibility
501 */
502 if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) {
503 dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
504 return 0;
505 }
506 return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
416 default: 507 default:
417 return -EINVAL; 508 return -EINVAL;
418 } 509 }
@@ -457,75 +548,81 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
457 .destroy = devcgroup_destroy, 548 .destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
458 .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id, 549 .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
459 .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files, 550 .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files,
551
552 /*
553 * While devices cgroup has the rudimentary hierarchy support which
554 * checks the parent's restriction, it doesn't properly propagates
555 * config changes in ancestors to their descendents. A child
556 * should only be allowed to add more restrictions to the parent's
557 * configuration. Fix it and remove the following.
558 */
559 .broken_hierarchy = true,
460}; 560};
461 561
462int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 562/**
563 * __devcgroup_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
564 * @dev_cgroup: the dev cgroup to be tested against
565 * @type: device type
566 * @major: device major number
567 * @minor: device minor number
568 * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD
569 *
570 * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
571 */
572static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
573 short access)
463{ 574{
464 struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; 575 struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
465 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; 576 struct dev_exception_item ex;
577 int rc;
466 578
467 rcu_read_lock(); 579 memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
580 ex.type = type;
581 ex.major = major;
582 ex.minor = minor;
583 ex.access = access;
468 584
585 rcu_read_lock();
469 dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current); 586 dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
587 rc = may_access(dev_cgroup, &ex);
588 rcu_read_unlock();
470 589
471 list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { 590 if (!rc)
472 if (wh->type & DEV_ALL) 591 return -EPERM;
473 goto found;
474 if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
475 continue;
476 if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
477 continue;
478 if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != imajor(inode))
479 continue;
480 if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode))
481 continue;
482
483 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE))
484 continue;
485 if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ))
486 continue;
487found:
488 rcu_read_unlock();
489 return 0;
490 }
491 592
492 rcu_read_unlock(); 593 return 0;
594}
493 595
494 return -EPERM; 596int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
597{
598 short type, access = 0;
599
600 if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
601 type = DEV_BLOCK;
602 if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
603 type = DEV_CHAR;
604 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
605 access |= ACC_WRITE;
606 if (mask & MAY_READ)
607 access |= ACC_READ;
608
609 return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode),
610 access);
495} 611}
496 612
497int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) 613int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
498{ 614{
499 struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; 615 short type;
500 struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
501 616
502 if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) 617 if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
503 return 0; 618 return 0;
504 619
505 rcu_read_lock(); 620 if (S_ISBLK(mode))
506 621 type = DEV_BLOCK;
507 dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current); 622 else
508 623 type = DEV_CHAR;
509 list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
510 if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
511 goto found;
512 if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
513 continue;
514 if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
515 continue;
516 if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != MAJOR(dev))
517 continue;
518 if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev))
519 continue;
520
521 if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD))
522 continue;
523found:
524 rcu_read_unlock();
525 return 0;
526 }
527 624
528 rcu_read_unlock(); 625 return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
626 ACC_MKNOD);
529 627
530 return -EPERM;
531} 628}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 49a464f5595b..dfb26918699c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
106 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); 106 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
107 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; 107 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
108 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; 108 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
109 hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid; 109 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
110 hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid; 110 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
111 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; 111 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
112 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); 112 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
113 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); 113 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 8901501425f4..eb5484504f50 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
34#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK 34#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
35 XATTR_NAME_SMACK, 35 XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
36#endif 36#endif
37#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
38 XATTR_NAME_IMA,
39#endif
37 XATTR_NAME_CAPS, 40 XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
38 NULL 41 NULL
39}; 42};
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 399641c3e846..d82a5a13d855 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
22#include "integrity.h" 22#include "integrity.h"
23 23
24static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; 24static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
25static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); 25static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
26static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly; 26static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
27 27
28int iint_initialized; 28int iint_initialized;
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
35 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; 35 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
36 struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; 36 struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
37 37
38 assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock);
39
40 while (n) { 38 while (n) {
41 iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); 39 iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
42 40
@@ -63,9 +61,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
63 if (!IS_IMA(inode)) 61 if (!IS_IMA(inode))
64 return NULL; 62 return NULL;
65 63
66 spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); 64 read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
67 iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); 65 iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
68 spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); 66 read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
69 67
70 return iint; 68 return iint;
71} 69}
@@ -74,59 +72,53 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
74{ 72{
75 iint->version = 0; 73 iint->version = 0;
76 iint->flags = 0UL; 74 iint->flags = 0UL;
75 iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
77 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; 76 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
78 kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); 77 kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
79} 78}
80 79
81/** 80/**
82 * integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode 81 * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
83 * @inode: pointer to the inode 82 * @inode: pointer to the inode
83 * @return: allocated iint
84 *
85 * Caller must lock i_mutex
84 */ 86 */
85int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 87struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
86{ 88{
87 struct rb_node **p; 89 struct rb_node **p;
88 struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL; 90 struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
89 struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint; 91 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
90 int rc;
91 92
92 new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); 93 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
93 if (!new_iint) 94 if (iint)
94 return -ENOMEM; 95 return iint;
95 96
96 new_iint->inode = inode; 97 iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
97 new_node = &new_iint->rb_node; 98 if (!iint)
99 return NULL;
98 100
99 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ 101 write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
100 spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
101 102
102 p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; 103 p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
103 while (*p) { 104 while (*p) {
104 parent = *p; 105 parent = *p;
105 test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache, 106 test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
106 rb_node); 107 rb_node);
107 rc = -EEXIST;
108 if (inode < test_iint->inode) 108 if (inode < test_iint->inode)
109 p = &(*p)->rb_left; 109 p = &(*p)->rb_left;
110 else if (inode > test_iint->inode)
111 p = &(*p)->rb_right;
112 else 110 else
113 goto out_err; 111 p = &(*p)->rb_right;
114 } 112 }
115 113
114 iint->inode = inode;
115 node = &iint->rb_node;
116 inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; 116 inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
117 rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p); 117 rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
118 rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree); 118 rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
119 119
120 spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); 120 write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
121 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ 121 return iint;
122
123 return 0;
124out_err:
125 spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
126 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
127 iint_free(new_iint);
128
129 return rc;
130} 122}
131 123
132/** 124/**
@@ -142,10 +134,10 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
142 if (!IS_IMA(inode)) 134 if (!IS_IMA(inode))
143 return; 135 return;
144 136
145 spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); 137 write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
146 iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); 138 iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
147 rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree); 139 rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
148 spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); 140 write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
149 141
150 iint_free(iint); 142 iint_free(iint);
151} 143}
@@ -157,7 +149,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
157 memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); 149 memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
158 iint->version = 0; 150 iint->version = 0;
159 iint->flags = 0UL; 151 iint->flags = 0UL;
160 mutex_init(&iint->mutex); 152 iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
161 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; 153 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
162} 154}
163 155
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b9c1219924f1..d232c73647ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config IMA
11 select CRYPTO_SHA1 11 select CRYPTO_SHA1
12 select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML 12 select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
13 select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 13 select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
14 select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64
14 help 15 help
15 The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity 16 The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
16 Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash 17 Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
@@ -55,3 +56,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
55 default y 56 default y
56 help 57 help
57 Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. 58 Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
59
60config IMA_APPRAISE
61 bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
62 depends on IMA
63 default n
64 help
65 This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
66 It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
67 attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
68 the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
69 and configure EVM.
70
71 For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
72 <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
73 If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5f740f6971e1..3f2ca6bdc384 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
8ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ 8ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
9 ima_policy.o 9 ima_policy.o
10ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o 10ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
11ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e7c99fd0d223..6ee8826662cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
40extern int ima_initialized; 40extern int ima_initialized;
41extern int ima_used_chip; 41extern int ima_used_chip;
42extern char *ima_hash; 42extern char *ima_hash;
43extern int ima_appraise;
43 44
44/* IMA inode template definition */ 45/* IMA inode template definition */
45struct ima_template_data { 46struct ima_template_data {
@@ -107,11 +108,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
107} 108}
108 109
109/* LIM API function definitions */ 110/* LIM API function definitions */
111int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
110int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); 112int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
111int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, 113int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
112 struct file *file); 114 struct file *file);
113void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, 115void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
114 const unsigned char *filename); 116 const unsigned char *filename);
117void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
118 const unsigned char *filename);
115int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, 119int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
116 struct inode *inode); 120 struct inode *inode);
117void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show); 121void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
@@ -123,14 +127,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
123struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); 127struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
124 128
125/* IMA policy related functions */ 129/* IMA policy related functions */
126enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; 130enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
127 131
128int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); 132int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
133 int flags);
129void ima_init_policy(void); 134void ima_init_policy(void);
130void ima_update_policy(void); 135void ima_update_policy(void);
131ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); 136ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
132void ima_delete_rules(void); 137void ima_delete_rules(void);
133 138
139/* Appraise integrity measurements */
140#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
141#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
142
143#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
144int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
145 struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
146int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
147void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
148
149#else
150static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
151 struct file *file,
152 const unsigned char *filename)
153{
154 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
155}
156
157static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask,
158 enum ima_hooks func)
159{
160 return 0;
161}
162
163static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
164 struct file *file)
165{
166}
167#endif
168
134/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ 169/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
135#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES 170#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
136 171
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 032ff03ad907..b356884fb3ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -9,13 +9,17 @@
9 * License. 9 * License.
10 * 10 *
11 * File: ima_api.c 11 * File: ima_api.c
12 * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement, 12 * Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
13 * and store_template. 13 * appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
14 */ 14 */
15#include <linux/module.h> 15#include <linux/module.h>
16#include <linux/slab.h> 16#include <linux/slab.h>
17 17#include <linux/file.h>
18#include <linux/fs.h>
19#include <linux/xattr.h>
20#include <linux/evm.h>
18#include "ima.h" 21#include "ima.h"
22
19static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima"; 23static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
20 24
21/* 25/*
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ err_out:
93} 97}
94 98
95/** 99/**
96 * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. 100 * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
97 * @inode: pointer to inode to measure 101 * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
98 * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) 102 * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
99 * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) 103 * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
@@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ err_out:
105 * mask: contains the permission mask 109 * mask: contains the permission mask
106 * fsmagic: hex value 110 * fsmagic: hex value
107 * 111 *
108 * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, 112 * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
109 * or other error, return an error code. 113 *
110*/ 114 */
111int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) 115int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
112{ 116{
113 int must_measure; 117 int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
118
119 if (!ima_appraise)
120 flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
114 121
115 must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask); 122 return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
116 return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES; 123}
124
125int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
126{
127 return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
117} 128}
118 129
119/* 130/*
@@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
129int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, 140int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
130 struct file *file) 141 struct file *file)
131{ 142{
132 int result = -EEXIST; 143 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
144 const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
145 int result = 0;
133 146
134 if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { 147 if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
135 u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version; 148 u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
136 149
137 memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); 150 iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
138 result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest); 151 result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
139 if (!result) 152 if (!result) {
140 iint->version = i_version; 153 iint->version = i_version;
154 iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
155 }
141 } 156 }
157 if (result)
158 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
159 filename, "collect_data", "failed",
160 result, 0);
142 return result; 161 return result;
143} 162}
144 163
@@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
167 struct ima_template_entry *entry; 186 struct ima_template_entry *entry;
168 int violation = 0; 187 int violation = 0;
169 188
189 if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
190 return;
191
170 entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); 192 entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
171 if (!entry) { 193 if (!entry) {
172 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, 194 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
@@ -174,7 +196,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
174 return; 196 return;
175 } 197 }
176 memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); 198 memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
177 memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); 199 memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
178 strcpy(entry->template.file_name, 200 strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
179 (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ? 201 (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
180 file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename); 202 file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -185,3 +207,33 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
185 if (result < 0) 207 if (result < 0)
186 kfree(entry); 208 kfree(entry);
187} 209}
210
211void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
212 const unsigned char *filename)
213{
214 struct audit_buffer *ab;
215 char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1];
216 int i;
217
218 if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
219 return;
220
221 for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
222 hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]);
223 hash[i * 2] = '\0';
224
225 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
226 AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
227 if (!ab)
228 return;
229
230 audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
231 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
232 audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
233 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash);
234
235 audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
236 audit_log_end(ab);
237
238 iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
239}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bdc8ba1d1d27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
1/*
2 * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
3 *
4 * Author:
5 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 */
11#include <linux/module.h>
12#include <linux/file.h>
13#include <linux/fs.h>
14#include <linux/xattr.h>
15#include <linux/magic.h>
16#include <linux/ima.h>
17#include <linux/evm.h>
18
19#include "ima.h"
20
21static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
22{
23 if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
24 ima_appraise = 0;
25 else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
26 ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
27 return 1;
28}
29
30__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
31
32/*
33 * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
34 *
35 * Return 1 to appraise
36 */
37int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
38{
39 if (!ima_appraise)
40 return 0;
41
42 return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
43}
44
45static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
46 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
47{
48 iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
49 __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
50 sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0);
51}
52
53/*
54 * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
55 *
56 * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
57 * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
58 *
59 * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
60 */
61int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
62 struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
63{
64 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
65 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
66 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
67 enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
68 const char *op = "appraise_data";
69 char *cause = "unknown";
70 int rc;
71
72 if (!ima_appraise)
73 return 0;
74 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
75 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
76
77 if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
78 return iint->ima_status;
79
80 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
81 0, GFP_NOFS);
82 if (rc <= 0) {
83 if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
84 goto out;
85
86 cause = "missing-hash";
87 status =
88 (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
89 goto out;
90 }
91
92 status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
93 if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
94 if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
95 || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
96 cause = "missing-HMAC";
97 else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
98 cause = "invalid-HMAC";
99 goto out;
100 }
101
102 switch (xattr_value->type) {
103 case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
104 rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
105 IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
106 if (rc) {
107 cause = "invalid-hash";
108 status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
109 print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
110 xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value));
111 print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
112 (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
113 sizeof iint->ima_xattr);
114 break;
115 }
116 status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
117 break;
118 case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
119 iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
120 rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
121 xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
122 iint->ima_xattr.digest,
123 IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
124 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
125 status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
126 } else if (rc) {
127 cause = "invalid-signature";
128 status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
129 } else {
130 status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
131 }
132 break;
133 default:
134 status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
135 cause = "unknown-ima-data";
136 break;
137 }
138
139out:
140 if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
141 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
142 (!xattr_value ||
143 xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
144 ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
145 status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
146 }
147 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
148 op, cause, rc, 0);
149 } else {
150 iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
151 }
152 iint->ima_status = status;
153 kfree(xattr_value);
154 return status;
155}
156
157/*
158 * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
159 */
160void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
161{
162 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
163 int rc = 0;
164
165 /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
166 if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
167 return;
168
169 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
170 if (rc < 0)
171 return;
172
173 ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
174}
175
176/**
177 * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
178 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
179 *
180 * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
181 *
182 * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
183 * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
184 */
185void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
186{
187 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
188 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
189 int must_appraise, rc;
190
191 if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
192 || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
193 return;
194
195 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
196 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
197 if (iint) {
198 if (must_appraise)
199 iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
200 else
201 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
202 }
203 if (!must_appraise)
204 rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
205 return;
206}
207
208/*
209 * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
210 *
211 * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
212 */
213static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
214 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
215{
216 if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
217 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
218 return -EPERM;
219 return 1;
220 }
221 return 0;
222}
223
224static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
225{
226 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
227
228 if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
229 return;
230
231 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
232 if (!iint)
233 return;
234
235 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
236 return;
237}
238
239int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
240 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
241{
242 int result;
243
244 result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
245 xattr_value_len);
246 if (result == 1) {
247 ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
248 result = 0;
249 }
250 return result;
251}
252
253int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
254{
255 int result;
256
257 result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
258 if (result == 1) {
259 ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
260 result = 0;
261 }
262 return result;
263}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 7a57f6769e9c..c586faae8fd6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
39 39
40 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); 40 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
41 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", 41 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
42 current->pid, current_cred()->uid, 42 current->pid,
43 audit_get_loginuid(current), 43 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid),
44 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
44 audit_get_sessionid(current)); 45 audit_get_sessionid(current));
45 audit_log_task_context(ab); 46 audit_log_task_context(ab);
46 audit_log_format(ab, " op="); 47 audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9b3ade7468b2..b21ee5b5495a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
48 struct scatterlist sg[1]; 48 struct scatterlist sg[1];
49 loff_t i_size, offset = 0; 49 loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
50 char *rbuf; 50 char *rbuf;
51 int rc; 51 int rc, read = 0;
52 52
53 rc = init_desc(&desc); 53 rc = init_desc(&desc);
54 if (rc != 0) 54 if (rc != 0)
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
59 rc = -ENOMEM; 59 rc = -ENOMEM;
60 goto out; 60 goto out;
61 } 61 }
62 if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
63 file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
64 read = 1;
65 }
62 i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode); 66 i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
63 while (offset < i_size) { 67 while (offset < i_size) {
64 int rbuf_len; 68 int rbuf_len;
@@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
80 kfree(rbuf); 84 kfree(rbuf);
81 if (!rc) 85 if (!rc)
82 rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); 86 rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
87 if (read)
88 file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
83out: 89out:
84 crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); 90 crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
85 return rc; 91 return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index be8294915cf7..73c9a268253e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -22,12 +22,19 @@
22#include <linux/mount.h> 22#include <linux/mount.h>
23#include <linux/mman.h> 23#include <linux/mman.h>
24#include <linux/slab.h> 24#include <linux/slab.h>
25#include <linux/xattr.h>
25#include <linux/ima.h> 26#include <linux/ima.h>
26 27
27#include "ima.h" 28#include "ima.h"
28 29
29int ima_initialized; 30int ima_initialized;
30 31
32#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
33int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
34#else
35int ima_appraise;
36#endif
37
31char *ima_hash = "sha1"; 38char *ima_hash = "sha1";
32static int __init hash_setup(char *str) 39static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
33{ 40{
@@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
52 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; 59 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
53 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 60 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
54 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; 61 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
55 int rc; 62 int must_measure;
56 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; 63 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
57 unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; 64 unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
58 65
@@ -67,8 +74,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
67 goto out; 74 goto out;
68 } 75 }
69 76
70 rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); 77 must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
71 if (rc < 0) 78 if (!must_measure)
72 goto out; 79 goto out;
73 80
74 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) 81 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
@@ -100,17 +107,21 @@ out:
100} 107}
101 108
102static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, 109static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
103 struct inode *inode, 110 struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
104 struct file *file)
105{ 111{
106 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; 112 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
107 113
108 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 114 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
109 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE && 115 return;
110 atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 && 116
111 iint->version != inode->i_version) 117 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
112 iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED; 118 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
113 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 119 iint->version != inode->i_version) {
120 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
121 if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
122 ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
123 }
124 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
114} 125}
115 126
116/** 127/**
@@ -140,28 +151,37 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
140 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; 151 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
141 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; 152 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
142 unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; 153 unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
143 int rc = 0; 154 int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
144 155
145 if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) 156 if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
146 return 0; 157 return 0;
147 158
148 rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function); 159 /* Determine if in appraise/audit/measurement policy,
149 if (rc != 0) 160 * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT bitmask. */
150 return rc; 161 action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
151retry: 162 if (!action)
152 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); 163 return 0;
153 if (!iint) {
154 rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
155 if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
156 goto retry;
157 return rc;
158 }
159 164
160 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 165 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
161 166
162 rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0; 167 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
163 if (rc != 0) 168
169 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
170 if (!iint)
171 goto out;
172
173 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
174 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED,
175 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */
176 iint->flags |= action;
177 action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
178
179 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
180 if (!action) {
181 if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
182 rc = iint->ima_status;
164 goto out; 183 goto out;
184 }
165 185
166 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); 186 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
167 if (rc != 0) 187 if (rc != 0)
@@ -177,11 +197,18 @@ retry:
177 pathname = NULL; 197 pathname = NULL;
178 } 198 }
179 } 199 }
180 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname); 200 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
201 ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
202 !pathname ? filename : pathname);
203 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
204 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
205 !pathname ? filename : pathname);
206 if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
207 ima_audit_measurement(iint, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
181 kfree(pathbuf); 208 kfree(pathbuf);
182out: 209out:
183 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 210 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
184 return rc; 211 return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
185} 212}
186 213
187/** 214/**
@@ -197,14 +224,14 @@ out:
197 */ 224 */
198int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 225int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
199{ 226{
200 int rc; 227 int rc = 0;
201 228
202 if (!file) 229 if (!file)
203 return 0; 230 return 0;
204 if (prot & PROT_EXEC) 231 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
205 rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, 232 rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
206 MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP); 233 MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
207 return 0; 234 return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
208} 235}
209 236
210/** 237/**
@@ -228,7 +255,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
228 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ? 255 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
229 bprm->filename : bprm->interp, 256 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
230 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); 257 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
231 return 0; 258 return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
232} 259}
233 260
234/** 261/**
@@ -249,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
249 rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, 276 rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
250 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), 277 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
251 FILE_CHECK); 278 FILE_CHECK);
252 return 0; 279 return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
253} 280}
254EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); 281EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
255 282
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1a9583008aae..c7dacd2eab7a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -24,22 +24,29 @@
24#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 24#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
25#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 25#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
26#define IMA_UID 0x0008 26#define IMA_UID 0x0008
27#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
27 28
28enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; 29#define UNKNOWN 0
30#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
31#define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
32#define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
33#define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
34#define AUDIT 0x0040
29 35
30#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 36#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
31enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, 37enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
32 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE 38 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
33}; 39};
34 40
35struct ima_measure_rule_entry { 41struct ima_rule_entry {
36 struct list_head list; 42 struct list_head list;
37 enum ima_action action; 43 int action;
38 unsigned int flags; 44 unsigned int flags;
39 enum ima_hooks func; 45 enum ima_hooks func;
40 int mask; 46 int mask;
41 unsigned long fsmagic; 47 unsigned long fsmagic;
42 uid_t uid; 48 kuid_t uid;
49 kuid_t fowner;
43 struct { 50 struct {
44 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ 51 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
45 int type; /* audit type */ 52 int type; /* audit type */
@@ -48,7 +55,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
48 55
49/* 56/*
50 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be 57 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
51 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid 58 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
52 */ 59 */
53 60
54/* 61/*
@@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
57 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building 64 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
58 * and running executables. 65 * and running executables.
59 */ 66 */
60static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { 67static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
61 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 68 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
62 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 69 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
63 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 70 {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -71,23 +78,45 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
71 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 78 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
72 {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, 79 {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
73 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 80 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
74 {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, 81 {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
75 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, 82 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
76}; 83};
77 84
78static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); 85static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
79static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); 86 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
80static struct list_head *ima_measure; 87 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
88 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
89 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
90 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
93 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96 {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
97};
98
99static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
100static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
101static struct list_head *ima_rules;
81 102
82static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); 103static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
83 104
84static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata; 105static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
85static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str) 106static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
86{ 107{
87 ima_use_tcb = 1; 108 ima_use_tcb = 1;
88 return 1; 109 return 1;
89} 110}
90__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup); 111__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
112
113static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
114static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
115{
116 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
117 return 1;
118}
119__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
91 120
92/** 121/**
93 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. 122 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
@@ -98,7 +127,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
98 * 127 *
99 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. 128 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
100 */ 129 */
101static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, 130static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
102 struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) 131 struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
103{ 132{
104 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 133 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -112,7 +141,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
112 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) 141 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
113 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) 142 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
114 return false; 143 return false;
115 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid) 144 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
145 return false;
146 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
116 return false; 147 return false;
117 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { 148 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
118 int rc = 0; 149 int rc = 0;
@@ -163,39 +194,61 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
163 * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list 194 * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
164 * change.) 195 * change.)
165 */ 196 */
166int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) 197int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
198 int flags)
167{ 199{
168 struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; 200 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
201 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
202
203 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
204
205 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
206 continue;
207
208 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
209 continue;
169 210
170 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) { 211 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
171 bool rc; 212 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
213 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
214 else
215 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
172 216
173 rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask); 217 if (!actmask)
174 if (rc) 218 break;
175 return entry->action;
176 } 219 }
177 return 0; 220
221 return action;
178} 222}
179 223
180/** 224/**
181 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. 225 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
182 * 226 *
183 * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the 227 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
184 * the new measure_policy_rules. 228 * the new ima_policy_rules.
185 */ 229 */
186void __init ima_init_policy(void) 230void __init ima_init_policy(void)
187{ 231{
188 int i, entries; 232 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
189 233
190 /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ 234 /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
191 if (ima_use_tcb) 235 measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
192 entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); 236 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
193 else 237 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
194 entries = 0; 238
195 239 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
196 for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) 240 if (i < measure_entries)
197 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); 241 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
198 ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; 242 &ima_default_rules);
243 else {
244 int j = i - measure_entries;
245
246 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
247 &ima_default_rules);
248 }
249 }
250
251 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
199} 252}
200 253
201/** 254/**
@@ -212,8 +265,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
212 int result = 1; 265 int result = 1;
213 int audit_info = 0; 266 int audit_info = 0;
214 267
215 if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { 268 if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
216 ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; 269 ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
217 cause = "complete"; 270 cause = "complete";
218 result = 0; 271 result = 0;
219 } 272 }
@@ -224,14 +277,19 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
224enum { 277enum {
225 Opt_err = -1, 278 Opt_err = -1,
226 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, 279 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
280 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
281 Opt_audit,
227 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, 282 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
228 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, 283 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
229 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid 284 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
230}; 285};
231 286
232static match_table_t policy_tokens = { 287static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
233 {Opt_measure, "measure"}, 288 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
234 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, 289 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
290 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
291 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
292 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
235 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, 293 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
236 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, 294 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
237 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, 295 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@@ -242,10 +300,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
242 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, 300 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
243 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, 301 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
244 {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, 302 {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
303 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
245 {Opt_err, NULL} 304 {Opt_err, NULL}
246}; 305};
247 306
248static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, 307static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
249 char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) 308 char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
250{ 309{
251 int result; 310 int result;
@@ -269,7 +328,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
269 audit_log_format(ab, " "); 328 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
270} 329}
271 330
272static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) 331static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
273{ 332{
274 struct audit_buffer *ab; 333 struct audit_buffer *ab;
275 char *p; 334 char *p;
@@ -277,7 +336,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
277 336
278 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); 337 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
279 338
280 entry->uid = -1; 339 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
340 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
281 entry->action = UNKNOWN; 341 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
282 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) { 342 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
283 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; 343 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -306,11 +366,35 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
306 366
307 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; 367 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
308 break; 368 break;
369 case Opt_appraise:
370 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
371
372 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
373 result = -EINVAL;
374
375 entry->action = APPRAISE;
376 break;
377 case Opt_dont_appraise:
378 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
379
380 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
381 result = -EINVAL;
382
383 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
384 break;
385 case Opt_audit:
386 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
387
388 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
389 result = -EINVAL;
390
391 entry->action = AUDIT;
392 break;
309 case Opt_func: 393 case Opt_func:
310 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); 394 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
311 395
312 if (entry->func) 396 if (entry->func)
313 result = -EINVAL; 397 result = -EINVAL;
314 398
315 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) 399 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
316 entry->func = FILE_CHECK; 400 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
@@ -361,20 +445,37 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
361 case Opt_uid: 445 case Opt_uid:
362 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); 446 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
363 447
364 if (entry->uid != -1) { 448 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
365 result = -EINVAL; 449 result = -EINVAL;
366 break; 450 break;
367 } 451 }
368 452
369 result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); 453 result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
370 if (!result) { 454 if (!result) {
371 entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; 455 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
372 if (entry->uid != lnum) 456 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
373 result = -EINVAL; 457 result = -EINVAL;
374 else 458 else
375 entry->flags |= IMA_UID; 459 entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
376 } 460 }
377 break; 461 break;
462 case Opt_fowner:
463 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
464
465 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
466 result = -EINVAL;
467 break;
468 }
469
470 result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
471 if (!result) {
472 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
473 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
474 result = -EINVAL;
475 else
476 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
477 }
478 break;
378 case Opt_obj_user: 479 case Opt_obj_user:
379 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); 480 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
380 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, 481 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
@@ -426,7 +527,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
426} 527}
427 528
428/** 529/**
429 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules 530 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
430 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule 531 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
431 * 532 *
432 * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. 533 * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
@@ -436,12 +537,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
436{ 537{
437 const char *op = "update_policy"; 538 const char *op = "update_policy";
438 char *p; 539 char *p;
439 struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; 540 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
440 ssize_t result, len; 541 ssize_t result, len;
441 int audit_info = 0; 542 int audit_info = 0;
442 543
443 /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ 544 /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
444 if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { 545 if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
445 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, 546 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
446 NULL, op, "already exists", 547 NULL, op, "already exists",
447 -EACCES, audit_info); 548 -EACCES, audit_info);
@@ -474,9 +575,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
474 return result; 575 return result;
475 } 576 }
476 577
477 mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); 578 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
478 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); 579 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
479 mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); 580 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
480 581
481 return len; 582 return len;
482} 583}
@@ -484,12 +585,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
484/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ 585/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
485void ima_delete_rules(void) 586void ima_delete_rules(void)
486{ 587{
487 struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; 588 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
488 589
489 mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); 590 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
490 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { 591 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
491 list_del(&entry->list); 592 list_del(&entry->list);
492 kfree(entry); 593 kfree(entry);
493 } 594 }
494 mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); 595 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
495} 596}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7a25ecec5aaa..e9db763a875e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -15,8 +15,22 @@
15#include <linux/integrity.h> 15#include <linux/integrity.h>
16#include <crypto/sha.h> 16#include <crypto/sha.h>
17 17
18/* iint action cache flags */
19#define IMA_MEASURE 0x0001
20#define IMA_MEASURED 0x0002
21#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x0004
22#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x0008
23/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x0010 do not use this flag */
24#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x0020
25#define IMA_AUDIT 0x0040
26#define IMA_AUDITED 0x0080
27
18/* iint cache flags */ 28/* iint cache flags */
19#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 29#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x0100
30
31#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT)
32#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \
33 | IMA_COLLECTED)
20 34
21enum evm_ima_xattr_type { 35enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
22 IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, 36 IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -34,9 +48,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
34 struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ 48 struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
35 struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ 49 struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
36 u64 version; /* track inode changes */ 50 u64 version; /* track inode changes */
37 unsigned char flags; 51 unsigned short flags;
38 u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; 52 struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
39 struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ 53 enum integrity_status ima_status;
40 enum integrity_status evm_status; 54 enum integrity_status evm_status;
41}; 55};
42 56
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 2d1bb8af7696..9e1e005c7596 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
773 * 773 *
774 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. 774 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
775 */ 775 */
776static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, 776static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
777 size_t datalen) 777 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
778{ 778{
779 struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; 779 struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
780 char *datablob = NULL; 780 char *datablob = NULL;
@@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
782 char *master_desc = NULL; 782 char *master_desc = NULL;
783 char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; 783 char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
784 char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; 784 char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
785 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
785 int ret; 786 int ret;
786 787
787 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 788 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
788 return -EINVAL; 789 return -EINVAL;
789 790
790 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 791 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
791 if (!datablob) 792 if (!datablob)
792 return -ENOMEM; 793 return -ENOMEM;
793 datablob[datalen] = 0; 794 datablob[datalen] = 0;
794 memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); 795 memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
795 ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc, 796 ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
796 &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv); 797 &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
797 if (ret < 0) 798 if (ret < 0)
@@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
834 * 835 *
835 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. 836 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
836 */ 837 */
837static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) 838static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
838{ 839{
839 struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; 840 struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
840 struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; 841 struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
841 char *buf; 842 char *buf;
842 char *new_master_desc = NULL; 843 char *new_master_desc = NULL;
843 const char *format = NULL; 844 const char *format = NULL;
845 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
844 int ret = 0; 846 int ret = 0;
845 847
846 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 848 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
847 return -EINVAL; 849 return -EINVAL;
848 850
849 buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 851 buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
851 return -ENOMEM; 853 return -ENOMEM;
852 854
853 buf[datalen] = 0; 855 buf[datalen] = 0;
854 memcpy(buf, data, datalen); 856 memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
855 ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); 857 ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
856 if (ret < 0) 858 if (ret < 0)
857 goto out; 859 goto out;
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 61ab7c82ebb1..d67c97bb1025 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
62 62
63 if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) { 63 if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) {
64 kdebug("IMMEDIATE"); 64 kdebug("IMMEDIATE");
65 queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); 65 schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
66 } else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) { 66 } else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
67 kdebug("DEFERRED"); 67 kdebug("DEFERRED");
68 key_gc_next_run = gc_at; 68 key_gc_next_run = gc_at;
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
77void key_schedule_gc_links(void) 77void key_schedule_gc_links(void)
78{ 78{
79 set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags); 79 set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
80 queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); 80 schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
81} 81}
82 82
83/* 83/*
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
120 set_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags); 120 set_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags);
121 121
122 kdebug("schedule"); 122 kdebug("schedule");
123 queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); 123 schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
124 124
125 kdebug("sleep"); 125 kdebug("sleep");
126 wait_on_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, key_gc_wait_bit, 126 wait_on_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, key_gc_wait_bit,
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ maybe_resched:
369 } 369 }
370 370
371 if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN) 371 if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN)
372 queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); 372 schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
373 kleave(" [end %x]", gc_state); 373 kleave(" [end %x]", gc_state);
374 return; 374 return;
375 375
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 22ff05269e3d..8bbefc3b55d4 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ struct key_user {
52 atomic_t usage; /* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */ 52 atomic_t usage; /* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */
53 atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */ 53 atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */
54 atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */ 54 atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */
55 uid_t uid; 55 kuid_t uid;
56 struct user_namespace *user_ns;
57 int qnkeys; /* number of keys allocated to this user */ 56 int qnkeys; /* number of keys allocated to this user */
58 int qnbytes; /* number of bytes allocated to this user */ 57 int qnbytes; /* number of bytes allocated to this user */
59}; 58};
@@ -62,8 +61,7 @@ extern struct rb_root key_user_tree;
62extern spinlock_t key_user_lock; 61extern spinlock_t key_user_lock;
63extern struct key_user root_key_user; 62extern struct key_user root_key_user;
64 63
65extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, 64extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid);
66 struct user_namespace *user_ns);
67extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user); 65extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user);
68 66
69/* 67/*
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 50d96d4e06f2..a15c9da8f971 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
18#include <linux/workqueue.h> 18#include <linux/workqueue.h>
19#include <linux/random.h> 19#include <linux/random.h>
20#include <linux/err.h> 20#include <linux/err.h>
21#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
22#include "internal.h" 21#include "internal.h"
23 22
24struct kmem_cache *key_jar; 23struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key)
52 * Get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't 51 * Get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
53 * already exist. 52 * already exist.
54 */ 53 */
55struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns) 54struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid)
56{ 55{
57 struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; 56 struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
58 struct rb_node *parent = NULL; 57 struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
@@ -67,13 +66,9 @@ try_again:
67 parent = *p; 66 parent = *p;
68 user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node); 67 user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
69 68
70 if (uid < user->uid) 69 if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid))
71 p = &(*p)->rb_left; 70 p = &(*p)->rb_left;
72 else if (uid > user->uid) 71 else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid))
73 p = &(*p)->rb_right;
74 else if (user_ns < user->user_ns)
75 p = &(*p)->rb_left;
76 else if (user_ns > user->user_ns)
77 p = &(*p)->rb_right; 72 p = &(*p)->rb_right;
78 else 73 else
79 goto found; 74 goto found;
@@ -102,7 +97,6 @@ try_again:
102 atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0); 97 atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
103 atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0); 98 atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
104 candidate->uid = uid; 99 candidate->uid = uid;
105 candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
106 candidate->qnkeys = 0; 100 candidate->qnkeys = 0;
107 candidate->qnbytes = 0; 101 candidate->qnbytes = 0;
108 spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock); 102 spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
@@ -131,7 +125,6 @@ void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
131 if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) { 125 if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
132 rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree); 126 rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
133 spin_unlock(&key_user_lock); 127 spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
134 put_user_ns(user->user_ns);
135 128
136 kfree(user); 129 kfree(user);
137 } 130 }
@@ -229,7 +222,7 @@ serial_exists:
229 * key_alloc() calls don't race with module unloading. 222 * key_alloc() calls don't race with module unloading.
230 */ 223 */
231struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, 224struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
232 uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, 225 kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
233 key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags) 226 key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
234{ 227{
235 struct key_user *user = NULL; 228 struct key_user *user = NULL;
@@ -253,16 +246,16 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
253 quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; 246 quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
254 247
255 /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ 248 /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
256 user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user_ns); 249 user = key_user_lookup(uid);
257 if (!user) 250 if (!user)
258 goto no_memory_1; 251 goto no_memory_1;
259 252
260 /* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and 253 /* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
261 * its description */ 254 * its description */
262 if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) { 255 if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
263 unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ? 256 unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
264 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; 257 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
265 unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ? 258 unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
266 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; 259 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
267 260
268 spin_lock(&user->lock); 261 spin_lock(&user->lock);
@@ -380,7 +373,7 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
380 373
381 /* contemplate the quota adjustment */ 374 /* contemplate the quota adjustment */
382 if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { 375 if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
383 unsigned maxbytes = (key->user->uid == 0) ? 376 unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
384 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; 377 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
385 378
386 spin_lock(&key->user->lock); 379 spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
@@ -412,8 +405,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
412 * key_construction_mutex. 405 * key_construction_mutex.
413 */ 406 */
414static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, 407static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
415 const void *data, 408 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
416 size_t datalen,
417 struct key *keyring, 409 struct key *keyring,
418 struct key *authkey, 410 struct key *authkey,
419 unsigned long *_prealloc) 411 unsigned long *_prealloc)
@@ -431,7 +423,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
431 /* can't instantiate twice */ 423 /* can't instantiate twice */
432 if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { 424 if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
433 /* instantiate the key */ 425 /* instantiate the key */
434 ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen); 426 ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
435 427
436 if (ret == 0) { 428 if (ret == 0) {
437 /* mark the key as being instantiated */ 429 /* mark the key as being instantiated */
@@ -482,22 +474,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
482 struct key *keyring, 474 struct key *keyring,
483 struct key *authkey) 475 struct key *authkey)
484{ 476{
477 struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
485 unsigned long prealloc; 478 unsigned long prealloc;
486 int ret; 479 int ret;
487 480
481 memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
482 prep.data = data;
483 prep.datalen = datalen;
484 prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
485 if (key->type->preparse) {
486 ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
487 if (ret < 0)
488 goto error;
489 }
490
488 if (keyring) { 491 if (keyring) {
489 ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, 492 ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
490 &prealloc); 493 &prealloc);
491 if (ret < 0) 494 if (ret < 0)
492 return ret; 495 goto error_free_preparse;
493 } 496 }
494 497
495 ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey, 498 ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey,
496 &prealloc); 499 &prealloc);
497 500
498 if (keyring) 501 if (keyring)
499 __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); 502 __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
500 503
504error_free_preparse:
505 if (key->type->preparse)
506 key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
507error:
501 return ret; 508 return ret;
502} 509}
503 510
@@ -598,7 +605,7 @@ void key_put(struct key *key)
598 key_check(key); 605 key_check(key);
599 606
600 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage)) 607 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage))
601 queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); 608 schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
602 } 609 }
603} 610}
604EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put); 611EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put);
@@ -706,7 +713,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
706 * if we get an error. 713 * if we get an error.
707 */ 714 */
708static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, 715static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
709 const void *payload, size_t plen) 716 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
710{ 717{
711 struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); 718 struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
712 int ret; 719 int ret;
@@ -722,7 +729,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
722 729
723 down_write(&key->sem); 730 down_write(&key->sem);
724 731
725 ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); 732 ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
726 if (ret == 0) 733 if (ret == 0)
727 /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ 734 /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
728 clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); 735 clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
@@ -774,6 +781,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
774 unsigned long flags) 781 unsigned long flags)
775{ 782{
776 unsigned long prealloc; 783 unsigned long prealloc;
784 struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
777 const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); 785 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
778 struct key_type *ktype; 786 struct key_type *ktype;
779 struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; 787 struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
@@ -789,8 +797,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
789 } 797 }
790 798
791 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 799 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
792 if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate) 800 if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate ||
793 goto error_2; 801 (!description && !ktype->preparse))
802 goto error_put_type;
794 803
795 keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); 804 keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
796 805
@@ -798,18 +807,37 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
798 807
799 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); 808 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
800 if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) 809 if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
801 goto error_2; 810 goto error_put_type;
811
812 memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
813 prep.data = payload;
814 prep.datalen = plen;
815 prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
816 if (ktype->preparse) {
817 ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
818 if (ret < 0) {
819 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
820 goto error_put_type;
821 }
822 if (!description)
823 description = prep.description;
824 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
825 if (!description)
826 goto error_free_prep;
827 }
802 828
803 ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); 829 ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
804 if (ret < 0) 830 if (ret < 0) {
805 goto error_2; 831 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
832 goto error_free_prep;
833 }
806 834
807 /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have 835 /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
808 * to modify the keyring */ 836 * to modify the keyring */
809 ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE); 837 ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
810 if (ret < 0) { 838 if (ret < 0) {
811 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); 839 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
812 goto error_3; 840 goto error_link_end;
813 } 841 }
814 842
815 /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing 843 /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
@@ -840,25 +868,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
840 perm, flags); 868 perm, flags);
841 if (IS_ERR(key)) { 869 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
842 key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); 870 key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
843 goto error_3; 871 goto error_link_end;
844 } 872 }
845 873
846 /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ 874 /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
847 ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL, 875 ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc);
848 &prealloc);
849 if (ret < 0) { 876 if (ret < 0) {
850 key_put(key); 877 key_put(key);
851 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); 878 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
852 goto error_3; 879 goto error_link_end;
853 } 880 }
854 881
855 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); 882 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
856 883
857 error_3: 884error_link_end:
858 __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); 885 __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
859 error_2: 886error_free_prep:
887 if (ktype->preparse)
888 ktype->free_preparse(&prep);
889error_put_type:
860 key_type_put(ktype); 890 key_type_put(ktype);
861 error: 891error:
862 return key_ref; 892 return key_ref;
863 893
864 found_matching_key: 894 found_matching_key:
@@ -866,10 +896,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
866 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned 896 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
867 */ 897 */
868 __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); 898 __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
869 key_type_put(ktype);
870 899
871 key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); 900 key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
872 goto error; 901 goto error_free_prep;
873} 902}
874EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); 903EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
875 904
@@ -888,6 +917,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
888 */ 917 */
889int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) 918int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
890{ 919{
920 struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
891 struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); 921 struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
892 int ret; 922 int ret;
893 923
@@ -900,18 +930,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
900 930
901 /* attempt to update it if supported */ 931 /* attempt to update it if supported */
902 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; 932 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
903 if (key->type->update) { 933 if (!key->type->update)
904 down_write(&key->sem); 934 goto error;
905
906 ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
907 if (ret == 0)
908 /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
909 clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
910 935
911 up_write(&key->sem); 936 memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
937 prep.data = payload;
938 prep.datalen = plen;
939 prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
940 if (key->type->preparse) {
941 ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
942 if (ret < 0)
943 goto error;
912 } 944 }
913 945
914 error: 946 down_write(&key->sem);
947
948 ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
949 if (ret == 0)
950 /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
951 clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
952
953 up_write(&key->sem);
954
955 if (key->type->preparse)
956 key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
957error:
915 return ret; 958 return ret;
916} 959}
917EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); 960EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 3364fbf46807..5d34b4e827d6 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
46 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a 46 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
47 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. 47 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
48 * 48 *
49 * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
50 * generate one from the payload.
51 *
49 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. 52 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
50 * 53 *
51 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error 54 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
@@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
72 if (ret < 0) 75 if (ret < 0)
73 goto error; 76 goto error;
74 77
75 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); 78 description = NULL;
76 if (IS_ERR(description)) { 79 if (_description) {
77 ret = PTR_ERR(description); 80 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
78 goto error; 81 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
82 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
83 goto error;
84 }
85 if (!*description) {
86 kfree(description);
87 description = NULL;
88 }
79 } 89 }
80 90
81 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ 91 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
@@ -569,8 +579,8 @@ okay:
569 ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, 579 ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
570 "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s", 580 "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s",
571 key->type->name, 581 key->type->name,
572 key->uid, 582 from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
573 key->gid, 583 from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
574 key->perm, 584 key->perm,
575 key->description ?: ""); 585 key->description ?: "");
576 586
@@ -766,15 +776,25 @@ error:
766 * 776 *
767 * If successful, 0 will be returned. 777 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
768 */ 778 */
769long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) 779long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
770{ 780{
771 struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL; 781 struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
772 struct key *key; 782 struct key *key;
773 key_ref_t key_ref; 783 key_ref_t key_ref;
774 long ret; 784 long ret;
785 kuid_t uid;
786 kgid_t gid;
787
788 uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
789 gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
790 ret = -EINVAL;
791 if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
792 goto error;
793 if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
794 goto error;
775 795
776 ret = 0; 796 ret = 0;
777 if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1) 797 if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
778 goto error; 798 goto error;
779 799
780 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 800 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
@@ -792,27 +812,27 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
792 812
793 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { 813 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
794 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */ 814 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
795 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid) 815 if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
796 goto error_put; 816 goto error_put;
797 817
798 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other 818 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
799 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */ 819 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
800 if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid)) 820 if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
801 goto error_put; 821 goto error_put;
802 } 822 }
803 823
804 /* change the UID */ 824 /* change the UID */
805 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) { 825 if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
806 ret = -ENOMEM; 826 ret = -ENOMEM;
807 newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns()); 827 newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
808 if (!newowner) 828 if (!newowner)
809 goto error_put; 829 goto error_put;
810 830
811 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */ 831 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
812 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { 832 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
813 unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ? 833 unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
814 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; 834 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
815 unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ? 835 unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
816 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; 836 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
817 837
818 spin_lock(&newowner->lock); 838 spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
@@ -846,7 +866,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
846 } 866 }
847 867
848 /* change the GID */ 868 /* change the GID */
849 if (gid != (gid_t) -1) 869 if (group != (gid_t) -1)
850 key->gid = gid; 870 key->gid = gid;
851 871
852 ret = 0; 872 ret = 0;
@@ -897,7 +917,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
897 down_write(&key->sem); 917 down_write(&key->sem);
898 918
899 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ 919 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
900 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) { 920 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
901 key->perm = perm; 921 key->perm = perm;
902 ret = 0; 922 ret = 0;
903 } 923 }
@@ -1486,7 +1506,6 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1486 oldwork = NULL; 1506 oldwork = NULL;
1487 parent = me->real_parent; 1507 parent = me->real_parent;
1488 1508
1489 task_lock(parent);
1490 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ 1509 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1491 if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) 1510 if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
1492 goto unlock; 1511 goto unlock;
@@ -1507,18 +1526,18 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1507 1526
1508 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be 1527 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1509 * SUID/SGID */ 1528 * SUID/SGID */
1510 if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid || 1529 if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) ||
1511 pcred->euid != mycred->euid || 1530 !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) ||
1512 pcred->suid != mycred->euid || 1531 !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) ||
1513 pcred->gid != mycred->egid || 1532 !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) ||
1514 pcred->egid != mycred->egid || 1533 !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) ||
1515 pcred->sgid != mycred->egid) 1534 !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid))
1516 goto unlock; 1535 goto unlock;
1517 1536
1518 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ 1537 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1519 if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring && 1538 if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
1520 pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) || 1539 !uid_eq(pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
1521 mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) 1540 !uid_eq(mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
1522 goto unlock; 1541 goto unlock;
1523 1542
1524 /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ 1543 /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
@@ -1530,7 +1549,6 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1530 if (!ret) 1549 if (!ret)
1531 newwork = NULL; 1550 newwork = NULL;
1532unlock: 1551unlock:
1533 task_unlock(parent);
1534 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); 1552 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1535 rcu_read_unlock(); 1553 rcu_read_unlock();
1536 if (oldwork) 1554 if (oldwork)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 81e7852d281d..6e42df15a24c 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
66 * operations. 66 * operations.
67 */ 67 */
68static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, 68static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
69 const void *data, size_t datalen); 69 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
70static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); 70static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion);
71static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); 71static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
72static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); 72static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
121 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. 121 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data.
122 */ 122 */
123static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, 123static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
124 const void *data, size_t datalen) 124 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
125{ 125{
126 int ret; 126 int ret;
127 127
128 ret = -EINVAL; 128 ret = -EINVAL;
129 if (datalen == 0) { 129 if (prep->datalen == 0) {
130 /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ 130 /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
131 keyring_publish_name(keyring); 131 keyring_publish_name(keyring);
132 ret = 0; 132 ret = 0;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ error:
256/* 256/*
257 * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring. 257 * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring.
258 */ 258 */
259struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, 259struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
260 const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags, 260 const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags,
261 struct key *dest) 261 struct key *dest)
262{ 262{
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
612 &keyring_name_hash[bucket], 612 &keyring_name_hash[bucket],
613 type_data.link 613 type_data.link
614 ) { 614 ) {
615 if (keyring->user->user_ns != current_user_ns()) 615 if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid))
616 continue; 616 continue;
617 617
618 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags)) 618 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 0b4d019e027d..efcc0c855a0d 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -36,33 +36,27 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
36 36
37 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); 37 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
38 38
39 if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user_ns)
40 goto use_other_perms;
41
42 /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */ 39 /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
43 if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) { 40 if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid)) {
44 kperm = key->perm >> 16; 41 kperm = key->perm >> 16;
45 goto use_these_perms; 42 goto use_these_perms;
46 } 43 }
47 44
48 /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group 45 /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
49 * membership in common with */ 46 * membership in common with */
50 if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) { 47 if (gid_valid(key->gid) && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
51 if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) { 48 if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid)) {
52 kperm = key->perm >> 8; 49 kperm = key->perm >> 8;
53 goto use_these_perms; 50 goto use_these_perms;
54 } 51 }
55 52
56 ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, 53 ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
57 make_kgid(current_user_ns(), key->gid));
58 if (ret) { 54 if (ret) {
59 kperm = key->perm >> 8; 55 kperm = key->perm >> 8;
60 goto use_these_perms; 56 goto use_these_perms;
61 } 57 }
62 } 58 }
63 59
64use_other_perms:
65
66 /* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */ 60 /* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */
67 kperm = key->perm; 61 kperm = key->perm;
68 62
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 30d1ddfd9cef..217b6855e815 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
88 */ 88 */
89#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS 89#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
90 90
91static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n) 91static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
92{ 92{
93 struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); 93 struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
94 94
95 n = rb_next(n); 95 n = rb_next(n);
96 while (n) { 96 while (n) {
97 struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node); 97 struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
98 if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns) 98 if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))
99 break; 99 break;
100 n = rb_next(n); 100 n = rb_next(n);
101 } 101 }
@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
107 return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops); 107 return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
108} 108}
109 109
110static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id) 110static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)
111{ 111{
112 struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); 112 struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
113 struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node; 113 struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
114 struct key *minkey = NULL; 114 struct key *minkey = NULL;
115 115
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id)
132 return NULL; 132 return NULL;
133 133
134 for (;;) { 134 for (;;) {
135 if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns) 135 if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))
136 return minkey; 136 return minkey;
137 n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node); 137 n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
138 if (!n) 138 if (!n)
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
151 151
152 if (*_pos > INT_MAX) 152 if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
153 return NULL; 153 return NULL;
154 key = find_ge_key(pos); 154 key = find_ge_key(p, pos);
155 if (!key) 155 if (!key)
156 return NULL; 156 return NULL;
157 *_pos = key->serial; 157 *_pos = key->serial;
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
168{ 168{
169 struct rb_node *n; 169 struct rb_node *n;
170 170
171 n = key_serial_next(v); 171 n = key_serial_next(p, v);
172 if (n) 172 if (n)
173 *_pos = key_node_serial(n); 173 *_pos = key_node_serial(n);
174 return n; 174 return n;
@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
254 atomic_read(&key->usage), 254 atomic_read(&key->usage),
255 xbuf, 255 xbuf,
256 key->perm, 256 key->perm,
257 key->uid, 257 from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
258 key->gid, 258 from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
259 key->type->name); 259 key->type->name);
260 260
261#undef showflag 261#undef showflag
@@ -270,26 +270,26 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
270 270
271#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */ 271#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
272 272
273static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) 273static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
274{ 274{
275 while (n) { 275 while (n) {
276 struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node); 276 struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);
277 if (user->user_ns == current_user_ns()) 277 if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid))
278 break; 278 break;
279 n = rb_next(n); 279 n = rb_next(n);
280 } 280 }
281 return n; 281 return n;
282} 282}
283 283
284static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) 284static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
285{ 285{
286 return __key_user_next(rb_next(n)); 286 return __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n));
287} 287}
288 288
289static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r) 289static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r)
290{ 290{
291 struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r); 291 struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
292 return __key_user_next(n); 292 return __key_user_next(user_ns, n);
293} 293}
294 294
295/* 295/*
@@ -309,10 +309,10 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
309 309
310 spin_lock(&key_user_lock); 310 spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
311 311
312 _p = key_user_first(&key_user_tree); 312 _p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree);
313 while (pos > 0 && _p) { 313 while (pos > 0 && _p) {
314 pos--; 314 pos--;
315 _p = key_user_next(_p); 315 _p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p);
316 } 316 }
317 317
318 return _p; 318 return _p;
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
321static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) 321static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
322{ 322{
323 (*_pos)++; 323 (*_pos)++;
324 return key_user_next((struct rb_node *)v); 324 return key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v);
325} 325}
326 326
327static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) 327static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
@@ -334,13 +334,13 @@ static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
334{ 334{
335 struct rb_node *_p = v; 335 struct rb_node *_p = v;
336 struct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node); 336 struct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node);
337 unsigned maxkeys = (user->uid == 0) ? 337 unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
338 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; 338 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
339 unsigned maxbytes = (user->uid == 0) ? 339 unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
340 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; 340 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
341 341
342 seq_printf(m, "%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\n", 342 seq_printf(m, "%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\n",
343 user->uid, 343 from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid),
344 atomic_read(&user->usage), 344 atomic_read(&user->usage),
345 atomic_read(&user->nkeys), 345 atomic_read(&user->nkeys),
346 atomic_read(&user->nikeys), 346 atomic_read(&user->nikeys),
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 178b8c3b130a..86468f385fc8 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
34 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock), 34 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
35 .nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), 35 .nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
36 .nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), 36 .nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
37 .uid = 0, 37 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
38 .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
39}; 38};
40 39
41/* 40/*
@@ -48,11 +47,13 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
48 struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; 47 struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
49 char buf[20]; 48 char buf[20];
50 int ret; 49 int ret;
50 uid_t uid;
51 51
52 cred = current_cred(); 52 cred = current_cred();
53 user = cred->user; 53 user = cred->user;
54 uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
54 55
55 kenter("%p{%u}", user, user->uid); 56 kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
56 57
57 if (user->uid_keyring) { 58 if (user->uid_keyring) {
58 kleave(" = 0 [exist]"); 59 kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
@@ -67,11 +68,11 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
67 * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been 68 * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
68 * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it 69 * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
69 * may have been destroyed by setuid */ 70 * may have been destroyed by setuid */
70 sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid); 71 sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
71 72
72 uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true); 73 uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
73 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { 74 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
74 uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, 75 uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
75 cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, 76 cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
76 NULL); 77 NULL);
77 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { 78 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
@@ -82,12 +83,12 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
82 83
83 /* get a default session keyring (which might also exist 84 /* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
84 * already) */ 85 * already) */
85 sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid); 86 sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
86 87
87 session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true); 88 session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
88 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { 89 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
89 session_keyring = 90 session_keyring =
90 keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, 91 keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
91 cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); 92 cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
92 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { 93 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
93 ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); 94 ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 000e75017520..66e21184b559 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
139 goto error_link; 139 goto error_link;
140 140
141 /* record the UID and GID */ 141 /* record the UID and GID */
142 sprintf(uid_str, "%d", cred->fsuid); 142 sprintf(uid_str, "%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
143 sprintf(gid_str, "%d", cred->fsgid); 143 sprintf(gid_str, "%d", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
144 144
145 /* we say which key is under construction */ 145 /* we say which key is under construction */
146 sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial); 146 sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
442 442
443 kenter(""); 443 kenter("");
444 444
445 user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid(), current_user_ns()); 445 user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
446 if (!user) 446 if (!user)
447 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 447 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
448 448
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 60d4e3f5e4bb..85730d5a5a59 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
19#include <asm/uaccess.h> 19#include <asm/uaccess.h>
20#include "internal.h" 20#include "internal.h"
21 21
22static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); 22static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
23 struct key_preparsed_payload *);
23static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); 24static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
24static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); 25static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
25static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); 26static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
@@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
42 * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. 43 * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
43 */ 44 */
44static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, 45static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
45 const void *data, 46 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
46 size_t datalen)
47{ 47{
48 key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data; 48 key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;
49 return 0; 49 return 0;
50} 50}
51 51
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2d5d041f2049..e13fcf7636f7 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -369,38 +369,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
369} 369}
370 370
371/* 371/*
372 * get a random value from TPM
373 */
374static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
375{
376 int ret;
377
378 INIT_BUF(tb);
379 store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
380 store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
381 store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
382 store32(tb, len);
383 ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
384 if (!ret)
385 memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
386 return ret;
387}
388
389static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
390{
391 struct tpm_buf *tb;
392 int ret;
393
394 tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
395 if (!tb)
396 return -ENOMEM;
397 ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
398
399 kfree(tb);
400 return ret;
401}
402
403/*
404 * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. 372 * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
405 * 373 *
406 * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. 374 * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
@@ -413,8 +381,8 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
413 381
414 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) 382 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
415 return -EPERM; 383 return -EPERM;
416 ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); 384 ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
417 if (ret < 0) 385 if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
418 return ret; 386 return ret;
419 return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; 387 return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
420} 388}
@@ -429,8 +397,8 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
429 unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; 397 unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
430 int ret; 398 int ret;
431 399
432 ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); 400 ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
433 if (ret < 0) 401 if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
434 return ret; 402 return ret;
435 403
436 INIT_BUF(tb); 404 INIT_BUF(tb);
@@ -524,8 +492,8 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
524 if (ret < 0) 492 if (ret < 0)
525 goto out; 493 goto out;
526 494
527 ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); 495 ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
528 if (ret < 0) 496 if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
529 goto out; 497 goto out;
530 ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); 498 ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
531 datsize = htonl(datalen); 499 datsize = htonl(datalen);
@@ -634,8 +602,8 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
634 602
635 ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); 603 ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
636 keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); 604 keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
637 ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); 605 ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
638 if (ret < 0) { 606 if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
639 pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); 607 pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
640 return ret; 608 return ret;
641 } 609 }
@@ -927,22 +895,24 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
927 * 895 *
928 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. 896 * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
929 */ 897 */
930static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, 898static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
931 size_t datalen) 899 struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
932{ 900{
933 struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; 901 struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
934 struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; 902 struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
903 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
935 char *datablob; 904 char *datablob;
936 int ret = 0; 905 int ret = 0;
937 int key_cmd; 906 int key_cmd;
907 size_t key_len;
938 908
939 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 909 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
940 return -EINVAL; 910 return -EINVAL;
941 911
942 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 912 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
943 if (!datablob) 913 if (!datablob)
944 return -ENOMEM; 914 return -ENOMEM;
945 memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); 915 memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
946 datablob[datalen] = '\0'; 916 datablob[datalen] = '\0';
947 917
948 options = trusted_options_alloc(); 918 options = trusted_options_alloc();
@@ -974,8 +944,9 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
974 pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); 944 pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
975 break; 945 break;
976 case Opt_new: 946 case Opt_new:
977 ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); 947 key_len = payload->key_len;
978 if (ret < 0) { 948 ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
949 if (ret != key_len) {
979 pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); 950 pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
980 goto out; 951 goto out;
981 } 952 }
@@ -1011,17 +982,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
1011/* 982/*
1012 * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values 983 * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
1013 */ 984 */
1014static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) 985static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
1015{ 986{
1016 struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; 987 struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
1017 struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; 988 struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
1018 struct trusted_key_options *new_o; 989 struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
990 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
1019 char *datablob; 991 char *datablob;
1020 int ret = 0; 992 int ret = 0;
1021 993
1022 if (!p->migratable) 994 if (!p->migratable)
1023 return -EPERM; 995 return -EPERM;
1024 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 996 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
1025 return -EINVAL; 997 return -EINVAL;
1026 998
1027 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 999 datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1038,7 +1010,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
1038 goto out; 1010 goto out;
1039 } 1011 }
1040 1012
1041 memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); 1013 memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
1042 datablob[datalen] = '\0'; 1014 datablob[datalen] = '\0';
1043 ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); 1015 ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
1044 if (ret != Opt_update) { 1016 if (ret != Opt_update) {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index c7660a25a3e4..55dc88939185 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
58/* 58/*
59 * instantiate a user defined key 59 * instantiate a user defined key
60 */ 60 */
61int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) 61int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
62{ 62{
63 struct user_key_payload *upayload; 63 struct user_key_payload *upayload;
64 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
64 int ret; 65 int ret;
65 66
66 ret = -EINVAL; 67 ret = -EINVAL;
67 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 68 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
68 goto error; 69 goto error;
69 70
70 ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); 71 ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
78 79
79 /* attach the data */ 80 /* attach the data */
80 upayload->datalen = datalen; 81 upayload->datalen = datalen;
81 memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); 82 memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
82 rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); 83 rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
83 ret = 0; 84 ret = 0;
84 85
@@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
92 * update a user defined key 93 * update a user defined key
93 * - the key's semaphore is write-locked 94 * - the key's semaphore is write-locked
94 */ 95 */
95int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) 96int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
96{ 97{
97 struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap; 98 struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap;
99 size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
98 int ret; 100 int ret;
99 101
100 ret = -EINVAL; 102 ret = -EINVAL;
101 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) 103 if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
102 goto error; 104 goto error;
103 105
104 /* construct a replacement payload */ 106 /* construct a replacement payload */
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
108 goto error; 110 goto error;
109 111
110 upayload->datalen = datalen; 112 upayload->datalen = datalen;
111 memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); 113 memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
112 114
113 /* check the quota and attach the new data */ 115 /* check the quota and attach the new data */
114 zap = upayload; 116 zap = upayload;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 860aeb349cb3..8dcd4ae10a5f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -136,11 +136,23 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
136 136
137int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 137int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
138{ 138{
139#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
140 int rc;
141 rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
142 if (rc)
143 return rc;
144#endif
139 return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode); 145 return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
140} 146}
141 147
142int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 148int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
143{ 149{
150#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
151 int rc;
152 rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
153 if (rc)
154 return rc;
155#endif
144 return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent); 156 return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
145} 157}
146 158
@@ -264,8 +276,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
264 return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry); 276 return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
265} 277}
266 278
267int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, 279int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
268 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 280 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
269{ 281{
270 return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 282 return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
271} 283}
@@ -434,7 +446,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
434 return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode); 446 return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode);
435} 447}
436 448
437int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) 449int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
438{ 450{
439 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) 451 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
440 return 0; 452 return 0;
@@ -561,6 +573,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
561 ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 573 ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
562 if (ret) 574 if (ret)
563 return ret; 575 return ret;
576 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
577 if (ret)
578 return ret;
564 return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 579 return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
565} 580}
566 581
@@ -596,6 +611,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
596 ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 611 ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
597 if (ret) 612 if (ret)
598 return ret; 613 return ret;
614 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
615 if (ret)
616 return ret;
599 return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 617 return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
600} 618}
601 619
@@ -761,6 +779,9 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
761 779
762void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 780void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
763{ 781{
782#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
783 yama_task_free(task);
784#endif
764 security_ops->task_free(task); 785 security_ops->task_free(task);
765} 786}
766 787
@@ -876,6 +897,12 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
876int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 897int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
877 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 898 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
878{ 899{
900#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
901 int rc;
902 rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
903 if (rc != -ENOSYS)
904 return rc;
905#endif
879 return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 906 return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
880} 907}
881 908
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6c77f63c7591..61a53367d029 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2088,15 +2088,19 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); 2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2089} 2089}
2090 2090
2091static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2092{
2093 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2094}
2095
2091/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ 2096/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2092static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, 2097static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2093 struct files_struct *files) 2098 struct files_struct *files)
2094{ 2099{
2095 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; 2100 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2096 struct tty_struct *tty; 2101 struct tty_struct *tty;
2097 struct fdtable *fdt;
2098 long j = -1;
2099 int drop_tty = 0; 2102 int drop_tty = 0;
2103 unsigned n;
2100 2104
2101 tty = get_current_tty(); 2105 tty = get_current_tty();
2102 if (tty) { 2106 if (tty) {
@@ -2123,58 +2127,19 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2123 no_tty(); 2127 no_tty();
2124 2128
2125 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ 2129 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2126 spin_lock(&files->file_lock); 2130 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2127 for (;;) { 2131 if (!n) /* none found? */
2128 unsigned long set, i; 2132 return;
2129 int fd;
2130
2131 j++;
2132 i = j * BITS_PER_LONG;
2133 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2134 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2135 break;
2136 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2137 if (!set)
2138 continue;
2139 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2140 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2141 if (set & 1) {
2142 file = fget(i);
2143 if (!file)
2144 continue;
2145 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2146 file,
2147 file_to_av(file))) {
2148 sys_close(i);
2149 fd = get_unused_fd();
2150 if (fd != i) {
2151 if (fd >= 0)
2152 put_unused_fd(fd);
2153 fput(file);
2154 continue;
2155 }
2156 if (devnull) {
2157 get_file(devnull);
2158 } else {
2159 devnull = dentry_open(
2160 &selinux_null,
2161 O_RDWR, cred);
2162 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2163 devnull = NULL;
2164 put_unused_fd(fd);
2165 fput(file);
2166 continue;
2167 }
2168 }
2169 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2170 }
2171 fput(file);
2172 }
2173 }
2174 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2175 2133
2176 } 2134 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2177 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); 2135 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2136 devnull = NULL;
2137 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2138 do {
2139 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2140 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2141 if (devnull)
2142 fput(devnull);
2178} 2143}
2179 2144
2180/* 2145/*
@@ -2483,9 +2448,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2483 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); 2448 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2484} 2449}
2485 2450
2486static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, 2451static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2487 struct path *path, 2452 struct path *path,
2488 char *type, 2453 const char *type,
2489 unsigned long flags, 2454 unsigned long flags,
2490 void *data) 2455 void *data)
2491{ 2456{
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 8a77725423e0..14d810ead420 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -113,13 +113,12 @@ static int __init selnl_init(void)
113{ 113{
114 struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { 114 struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
115 .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX, 115 .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX,
116 .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
116 }; 117 };
117 118
118 selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, 119 selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
119 THIS_MODULE, &cfg);
120 if (selnl == NULL) 120 if (selnl == NULL)
121 panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket."); 121 panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket.");
122 netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV);
123 return 0; 122 return 0;
124} 123}
125 124
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 298e695d6822..3a6e8731646c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
174 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, 174 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
175 "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u", 175 "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
176 new_value, selinux_enforcing, 176 new_value, selinux_enforcing,
177 audit_get_loginuid(current), 177 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
178 audit_get_sessionid(current)); 178 audit_get_sessionid(current));
179 selinux_enforcing = new_value; 179 selinux_enforcing = new_value;
180 if (selinux_enforcing) 180 if (selinux_enforcing)
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
305 goto out; 305 goto out;
306 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, 306 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
307 "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u", 307 "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
308 audit_get_loginuid(current), 308 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
309 audit_get_sessionid(current)); 309 audit_get_sessionid(current));
310 } 310 }
311 311
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
485 return -EACCES; 485 return -EACCES;
486 } 486 }
487 487
488 vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED; 488 vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
489 vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops; 489 vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
490 490
491 return 0; 491 return 0;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
551out1: 551out1:
552 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, 552 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
553 "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", 553 "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
554 audit_get_loginuid(current), 554 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
555 audit_get_sessionid(current)); 555 audit_get_sessionid(current));
556out: 556out:
557 mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); 557 mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4321b8fc8863..b4feecc3fe01 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2440 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), 2440 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2441 !!values[i], 2441 !!values[i],
2442 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, 2442 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2443 audit_get_loginuid(current), 2443 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2444 audit_get_sessionid(current)); 2444 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2445 } 2445 }
2446 if (values[i]) 2446 if (values[i])
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8221514cc997..38be92ce901e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
408 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem 408 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
409 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise. 409 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
410 */ 410 */
411static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, 411static int smack_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
412 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 412 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
413{ 413{
414 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security; 414 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security;
415 struct smk_audit_info ad; 415 struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1691,40 +1691,19 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1691 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting 1691 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
1692 * @p: task to wait for 1692 * @p: task to wait for
1693 * 1693 *
1694 * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise 1694 * Returns 0
1695 */ 1695 */
1696static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) 1696static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
1697{ 1697{
1698 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1699 char *sp = smk_of_current();
1700 char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
1701 int rc;
1702
1703 /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
1704 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1705 if (rc == 0)
1706 goto out_log;
1707
1708 /* 1698 /*
1709 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task 1699 * Allow the operation to succeed.
1710 * has privilege to perform operations that might 1700 * Zombies are bad.
1711 * account for the smack labels having gotten to 1701 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
1712 * be different in the first place. 1702 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
1713 * 1703 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
1714 * This breaks the strict subject/object access 1704 * may expect to know when the child exits.
1715 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
1716 * state into account in the decision as well as
1717 * the smack value.
1718 */ 1705 */
1719 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || 1706 return 0;
1720 has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1721 rc = 0;
1722 /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
1723 out_log:
1724 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1725 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1726 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1727 return rc;
1728} 1707}
1729 1708
1730/** 1709/**
@@ -2705,9 +2684,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
2705static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, 2684static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2706 void *value, size_t size) 2685 void *value, size_t size)
2707{ 2686{
2708 int rc;
2709 struct task_smack *tsp; 2687 struct task_smack *tsp;
2710 struct task_smack *oldtsp;
2711 struct cred *new; 2688 struct cred *new;
2712 char *newsmack; 2689 char *newsmack;
2713 2690
@@ -2737,21 +2714,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2737 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known) 2714 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
2738 return -EPERM; 2715 return -EPERM;
2739 2716
2740 oldtsp = p->cred->security;
2741 new = prepare_creds(); 2717 new = prepare_creds();
2742 if (new == NULL) 2718 if (new == NULL)
2743 return -ENOMEM; 2719 return -ENOMEM;
2744 2720
2745 tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL); 2721 tsp = new->security;
2746 if (tsp == NULL) { 2722 tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
2747 kfree(new);
2748 return -ENOMEM;
2749 }
2750 rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
2751 if (rc != 0)
2752 return rc;
2753 2723
2754 new->security = tsp;
2755 commit_creds(new); 2724 commit_creds(new);
2756 return size; 2725 return size;
2757} 2726}
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index b1b768e4049a..99929a50093a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
49 SMK_LOAD_SELF2 = 15, /* load task specific rules with long labels */ 49 SMK_LOAD_SELF2 = 15, /* load task specific rules with long labels */
50 SMK_ACCESS2 = 16, /* make an access check with long labels */ 50 SMK_ACCESS2 = 16, /* make an access check with long labels */
51 SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */ 51 SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */
52 SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */
52}; 53};
53 54
54/* 55/*
@@ -1992,6 +1993,77 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
1992}; 1993};
1993 1994
1994/** 1995/**
1996 * smk_write_revoke_subj - write() for /smack/revoke-subject
1997 * @file: file pointer
1998 * @buf: data from user space
1999 * @count: bytes sent
2000 * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
2001 */
2002static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
2003 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
2004{
2005 char *data = NULL;
2006 const char *cp = NULL;
2007 struct smack_known *skp;
2008 struct smack_rule *sp;
2009 struct list_head *rule_list;
2010 struct mutex *rule_lock;
2011 int rc = count;
2012
2013 if (*ppos != 0)
2014 return -EINVAL;
2015
2016 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2017 return -EPERM;
2018
2019 if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
2020 return -EINVAL;
2021
2022 data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
2023 if (data == NULL)
2024 return -ENOMEM;
2025
2026 if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
2027 rc = -EFAULT;
2028 goto free_out;
2029 }
2030
2031 cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
2032 if (cp == NULL) {
2033 rc = -EINVAL;
2034 goto free_out;
2035 }
2036
2037 skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
2038 if (skp == NULL) {
2039 rc = -EINVAL;
2040 goto free_out;
2041 }
2042
2043 rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
2044 rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
2045
2046 mutex_lock(rule_lock);
2047
2048 list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list)
2049 sp->smk_access = 0;
2050
2051 mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
2052
2053free_out:
2054 kfree(data);
2055 kfree(cp);
2056 return rc;
2057}
2058
2059static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
2060 .write = smk_write_revoke_subj,
2061 .read = simple_transaction_read,
2062 .release = simple_transaction_release,
2063 .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
2064};
2065
2066/**
1995 * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock 2067 * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
1996 * @sb: the empty superblock 2068 * @sb: the empty superblock
1997 * @data: unused 2069 * @data: unused
@@ -2037,6 +2109,9 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
2037 "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, 2109 "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
2038 [SMK_CIPSO2] = { 2110 [SMK_CIPSO2] = {
2039 "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, 2111 "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
2112 [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
2113 "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
2114 S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
2040 /* last one */ 2115 /* last one */
2041 {""} 2116 {""}
2042 }; 2117 };
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index 7ef9fa3e37e0..c1b00375c9ad 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -168,9 +168,14 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
168 stamp.day, stamp.hour, stamp.min, stamp.sec, r->profile, 168 stamp.day, stamp.hour, stamp.min, stamp.sec, r->profile,
169 tomoyo_mode[r->mode], tomoyo_yesno(r->granted), gpid, 169 tomoyo_mode[r->mode], tomoyo_yesno(r->granted), gpid,
170 tomoyo_sys_getpid(), tomoyo_sys_getppid(), 170 tomoyo_sys_getpid(), tomoyo_sys_getppid(),
171 current_uid(), current_gid(), current_euid(), 171 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
172 current_egid(), current_suid(), current_sgid(), 172 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid()),
173 current_fsuid(), current_fsgid()); 173 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()),
174 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid()),
175 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid()),
176 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid()),
177 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid()),
178 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid()));
174 if (!obj) 179 if (!obj)
175 goto no_obj_info; 180 goto no_obj_info;
176 if (!obj->validate_done) { 181 if (!obj->validate_done) {
@@ -191,15 +196,19 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
191 tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos, 196 tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
192 " path%u.parent={ uid=%u gid=%u " 197 " path%u.parent={ uid=%u gid=%u "
193 "ino=%lu perm=0%o }", (i >> 1) + 1, 198 "ino=%lu perm=0%o }", (i >> 1) + 1,
194 stat->uid, stat->gid, (unsigned long) 199 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid),
195 stat->ino, stat->mode & S_IALLUGO); 200 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid),
201 (unsigned long)stat->ino,
202 stat->mode & S_IALLUGO);
196 continue; 203 continue;
197 } 204 }
198 pos += snprintf(buffer + pos, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos, 205 pos += snprintf(buffer + pos, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos,
199 " path%u={ uid=%u gid=%u ino=%lu major=%u" 206 " path%u={ uid=%u gid=%u ino=%lu major=%u"
200 " minor=%u perm=0%o type=%s", (i >> 1) + 1, 207 " minor=%u perm=0%o type=%s", (i >> 1) + 1,
201 stat->uid, stat->gid, (unsigned long) 208 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid),
202 stat->ino, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), 209 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid),
210 (unsigned long)stat->ino,
211 MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
203 mode & S_IALLUGO, tomoyo_filetype(mode)); 212 mode & S_IALLUGO, tomoyo_filetype(mode));
204 if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) { 213 if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) {
205 dev = stat->rdev; 214 dev = stat->rdev;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 2e0f12c62938..f89a0333b813 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -925,7 +925,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_manager(void)
925 925
926 if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) 926 if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
927 return true; 927 return true;
928 if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid)) 928 if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root &&
929 (!uid_eq(task->cred->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ||
930 !uid_eq(task->cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)))
929 return false; 931 return false;
930 exe = tomoyo_get_exe(); 932 exe = tomoyo_get_exe();
931 if (!exe) 933 if (!exe)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 75e4dc1c02a0..d4f166bc3508 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ struct tomoyo_address_group {
561 561
562/* Subset of "struct stat". Used by conditional ACL and audit logs. */ 562/* Subset of "struct stat". Used by conditional ACL and audit logs. */
563struct tomoyo_mini_stat { 563struct tomoyo_mini_stat {
564 uid_t uid; 564 kuid_t uid;
565 gid_t gid; 565 kgid_t gid;
566 ino_t ino; 566 ino_t ino;
567 umode_t mode; 567 umode_t mode;
568 dev_t dev; 568 dev_t dev;
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
970 const u8 index); 970 const u8 index);
971int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, 971int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
972 const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev); 972 const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
973int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, 973int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
974 const char *type, unsigned long flags, 974 const char *type, unsigned long flags,
975 void *data_page); 975 void *data_page);
976int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file); 976int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
index 986330b8c73e..63681e8be628 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
@@ -813,28 +813,28 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
813 unsigned long value = 0; 813 unsigned long value = 0;
814 switch (index) { 814 switch (index) {
815 case TOMOYO_TASK_UID: 815 case TOMOYO_TASK_UID:
816 value = current_uid(); 816 value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
817 break; 817 break;
818 case TOMOYO_TASK_EUID: 818 case TOMOYO_TASK_EUID:
819 value = current_euid(); 819 value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid());
820 break; 820 break;
821 case TOMOYO_TASK_SUID: 821 case TOMOYO_TASK_SUID:
822 value = current_suid(); 822 value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid());
823 break; 823 break;
824 case TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID: 824 case TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID:
825 value = current_fsuid(); 825 value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid());
826 break; 826 break;
827 case TOMOYO_TASK_GID: 827 case TOMOYO_TASK_GID:
828 value = current_gid(); 828 value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid());
829 break; 829 break;
830 case TOMOYO_TASK_EGID: 830 case TOMOYO_TASK_EGID:
831 value = current_egid(); 831 value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid());
832 break; 832 break;
833 case TOMOYO_TASK_SGID: 833 case TOMOYO_TASK_SGID:
834 value = current_sgid(); 834 value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid());
835 break; 835 break;
836 case TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID: 836 case TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID:
837 value = current_fsgid(); 837 value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid());
838 break; 838 break;
839 case TOMOYO_TASK_PID: 839 case TOMOYO_TASK_PID:
840 value = tomoyo_sys_getpid(); 840 value = tomoyo_sys_getpid();
@@ -970,13 +970,13 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
970 case TOMOYO_PATH2_UID: 970 case TOMOYO_PATH2_UID:
971 case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID: 971 case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID:
972 case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID: 972 case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID:
973 value = stat->uid; 973 value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid);
974 break; 974 break;
975 case TOMOYO_PATH1_GID: 975 case TOMOYO_PATH1_GID:
976 case TOMOYO_PATH2_GID: 976 case TOMOYO_PATH2_GID:
977 case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID: 977 case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID:
978 case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID: 978 case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID:
979 value = stat->gid; 979 value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid);
980 break; 980 break;
981 case TOMOYO_PATH1_INO: 981 case TOMOYO_PATH1_INO:
982 case TOMOYO_PATH2_INO: 982 case TOMOYO_PATH2_INO:
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index fe00cdfd0267..390c646013cb 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
71 * 71 *
72 * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). 72 * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
73 */ 73 */
74static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name, 74static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
75 const char *dev_name,
75 struct path *dir, const char *type, 76 struct path *dir, const char *type,
76 unsigned long flags) 77 unsigned long flags)
77{ 78{
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
183 * 184 *
184 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. 185 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
185 */ 186 */
186int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, 187int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
187 const char *type, unsigned long flags, 188 const char *type, unsigned long flags,
188 void *data_page) 189 void *data_page)
189{ 190{
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index c2d04a50f76a..a2ee362546ab 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -373,13 +373,15 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
373 * 373 *
374 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. 374 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
375 */ 375 */
376static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) 376static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
377{ 377{
378 int error = 0; 378 int error = 0;
379 if (uid != (uid_t) -1) 379 if (uid_valid(uid))
380 error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, uid); 380 error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path,
381 if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1) 381 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid));
382 error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, gid); 382 if (!error && gid_valid(gid))
383 error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path,
384 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid));
383 return error; 385 return error;
384} 386}
385 387
@@ -406,8 +408,8 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path)
406 * 408 *
407 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. 409 * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
408 */ 410 */
409static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, 411static int tomoyo_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
410 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 412 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
411{ 413{
412 return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 414 return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
413} 415}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 867558c98334..2952ba576fb9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -949,18 +949,13 @@ bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
949const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void) 949const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
950{ 950{
951 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; 951 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
952 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
953 const char *cp = NULL; 952 const char *cp = NULL;
954 953
955 if (!mm) 954 if (!mm)
956 return NULL; 955 return NULL;
957 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); 956 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
958 for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { 957 if (mm->exe_file)
959 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { 958 cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&mm->exe_file->f_path);
960 cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
961 break;
962 }
963 }
964 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); 959 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
965 return cp; 960 return cp;
966} 961}
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 51d6709d8bbd..20ef5143c0c0 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -11,3 +11,11 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA
11 Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt. 11 Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
12 12
13 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. 13 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
14
15config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
16 bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
17 depends on SECURITY_YAMA
18 default n
19 help
20 When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
21 selected primary LSM.
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 0cc99a3ea42d..b4c29848b49d 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
100 * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list 100 * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
101 * @task: task being removed 101 * @task: task being removed
102 */ 102 */
103static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 103void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
104{ 104{
105 yama_ptracer_del(task, task); 105 yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
106} 106}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
116 * Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama 116 * Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
117 * does not handle the given option. 117 * does not handle the given option.
118 */ 118 */
119static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 119int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
120 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 120 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
121{ 121{
122 int rc; 122 int rc;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
143 if (arg2 == 0) { 143 if (arg2 == 0) {
144 yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself); 144 yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
145 rc = 0; 145 rc = 0;
146 } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) { 146 } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY || (int)arg2 == -1) {
147 rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself); 147 rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
148 } else { 148 } else {
149 struct task_struct *tracer; 149 struct task_struct *tracer;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
243 * 243 *
244 * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. 244 * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
245 */ 245 */
246static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, 246int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
247 unsigned int mode) 247 unsigned int mode)
248{ 248{
249 int rc; 249 int rc;
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
293 * 293 *
294 * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. 294 * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
295 */ 295 */
296static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 296int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
297{ 297{
298 int rc; 298 int rc;
299 299
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
324 return rc; 324 return rc;
325} 325}
326 326
327#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
327static struct security_operations yama_ops = { 328static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
328 .name = "yama", 329 .name = "yama",
329 330
@@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
332 .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, 333 .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
333 .task_free = yama_task_free, 334 .task_free = yama_task_free,
334}; 335};
336#endif
335 337
336#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL 338#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
337static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, 339static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
@@ -378,13 +380,17 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
378 380
379static __init int yama_init(void) 381static __init int yama_init(void)
380{ 382{
383#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
381 if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops)) 384 if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
382 return 0; 385 return 0;
386#endif
383 387
384 printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); 388 printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
385 389
390#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
386 if (register_security(&yama_ops)) 391 if (register_security(&yama_ops))
387 panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n"); 392 panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
393#endif
388 394
389#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL 395#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
390 if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table)) 396 if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2024-11-10 10:55:48 -0500