3 files changed, 23 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d45393380997..dc06c0086b55 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  * returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
 {
         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
          */
-        return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
+        return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0);
 }
 
 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
-                    || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
+                    || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
                         /*
                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
+        if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c0acfa7177e5..346f21e0ec2c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -163,7 +163,12 @@ void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
 
 int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
-        return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+        return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+}
+
+int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+        return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7fd4de46b2a9..88a3ee33068a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1365,12 +1365,14 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                               int cap)
+                               int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct av_decision avd;
         u16 sclass;
         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+        int rc;
 
         tsec = tsk->security;
 
@@ -1390,7 +1392,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
                 BUG();
         }
-        return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
+
+        rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+        if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
+                avc_audit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+        return rc;
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
@@ -1802,15 +1808,15 @@ static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effecti
         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
+        return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -1975,7 +1981,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+        rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (rc == 0)
                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
                                           SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
@@ -2829,7 +2835,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
          * in-core context value, not a denial.
          */
-        error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
+        error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (!error)
                 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
                                              SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,