9 files changed, 109 insertions, 177 deletions

diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index f7496c6a022b..c3a793881d04 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -156,15 +156,8 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode,
          * block. A pointer to that is in the struct vfsmount that we
          * have around.
          */
-        if (!parent ) {
-                if (mount && mount->mnt_sb) {
-                        parent = mount->mnt_sb->s_root;
-                }
-        }
-        if (!parent) {
-                pr_debug("securityfs: Ah! can not find a parent!\n");
-                return -EFAULT;
-        }
+        if (!parent)
+                parent = mount->mnt_sb->s_root;
 
         mutex_lock(&parent->d_inode->i_mutex);
         *dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c41afe6639a0..47fb65d1fcbd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
                          const char *cause, int result, int info);
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
-void ima_iintcache_init(void);
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 3cd58b60afd2..2a5e0bcf3887 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out:
  * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *              subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *      subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- *      func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ *      func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
  *      mask: contains the permission mask
  *      fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index fa592ff1ac1c..0d83edcfc402 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
         int rc = 0;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized)
-                return 0;
-
         iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
         if (!iint)
                 return -ENOMEM;
@@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized)
-                return;
         spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
         iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
         spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
@@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
         kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
 }
 
-void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
 {
         iint_cache =
             kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
                               SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+        return 0;
 }
+security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a89f44d5e030..294b005d6520 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * File: ima_main.c
  *      implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- *      and ima_path_check.
+ *      and ima_file_check.
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out:
         return found;
 }
 
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+                                 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+                                 struct inode *inode,
+                                 const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+        switch (error) {
+        case TOMTOU:
+                if (iint->readcount > 0)
+                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+                                          "ToMToU");
+                break;
+        case OPEN_WRITERS:
+                if (iint->writecount > 0)
+                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+                                          "open_writers");
+                break;
+        }
+}
+
 /*
  * Update the counts given an fmode_t
  */
@@ -99,6 +129,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
 }
 
 /*
+ * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ *      - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *        results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *      - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ *        could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+{
+        struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+        fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+        int rc;
+
+        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+                return;
+        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+        if (!iint)
+                return;
+        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+        rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+        if (rc < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+                ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+                goto out;
+        }
+        ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+out:
+        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
+        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/*
  * Decrement ima counts
  */
 static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
@@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
         kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
 }
 
-/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
- *
- * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
- * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
- * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *
- * In either case invalidate the PCR.
- */
-enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
-static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
-                                 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
-                                 struct inode *inode,
-                                 const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-        switch (error) {
-        case TOMTOU:
-                if (iint->readcount > 0)
-                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-                                          "ToMToU");
-                break;
-        case OPEN_WRITERS:
-                if (iint->writecount > 0)
-                        ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-                                          "open_writers");
-                break;
-        }
-}
-
-static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-                                const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-        int rc = 0;
-
-        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-
-        rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
-        if (!rc)
-                ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
-        return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
- * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- *      - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- *        results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *      - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- *        could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
-{
-        struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
-        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-        struct file *file = NULL;
-        int rc;
-
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-                return 0;
-        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-        if (!iint)
-                return 0;
-
-        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
-        rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
-        if (rc < 0)
-                goto out;
-
-        if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
-                ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
-                                     path->dentry->d_name.name);
-
-        if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
-                goto out;
-
-        ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
-                             path->dentry->d_name.name);
-        if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
-                struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
-                struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
-
-                file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
-                                   current_cred());
-                if (IS_ERR(file)) {
-                        int audit_info = 0;
-
-                        integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-                                            dentry->d_name.name,
-                                            "add_measurement",
-                                            "dentry_open failed",
-                                            1, audit_info);
-                        file = NULL;
-                        goto out;
-                }
-                rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
-        }
-out:
-        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-        if (file)
-                fput(file);
-        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-        return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
-
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
                                int mask, int function)
 {
@@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out:
         return rc;
 }
 
-/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
- *
- * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
- * - for nfsd exported files.
- *
- * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
-        struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-        struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-                return;
-        iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-        if (!iint)
-                return;
-        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-        ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-        mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-
-        kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
-
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
@@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+        int rc;
+
+        rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+                                 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+                                 FILE_CHECK);
+        return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
         int error;
 
-        ima_iintcache_init();
         error = ima_init();
         ima_initialized = 1;
         return error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e1278399b345..4759d0f99335 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
         {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-        {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+        {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
                         break;
                 case Opt_func:
                         audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
-                        if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
-                                entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+                        if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+                                entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+                        /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+                        else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+                                entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
                                 entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 24e060be9fa5..122b748d0f4c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
         security_ops->file_free_security(file);
-        if (file->f_dentry)
-                ima_file_free(file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7a374c2eb043..9a2ee845e9d4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
                 }
-                update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
+                update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
         }
 }
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 8a00ade85166..2aceebf5f354 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -80,9 +80,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
         /*
          * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
-         * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
          */
-        return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+        return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
@@ -184,10 +183,6 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 {
         int flags = f->f_flags;
-
-        if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
-                flags++;
-        flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
         /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
         if (current->in_execve)
                 return 0;