9 files changed, 317 insertions, 181 deletions

diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index f1a5bd98bf10..a678f094b72d 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -763,8 +763,14 @@ static int dummy_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-                                   int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+                                          int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+        return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+                                         u32 *seclen)
 {
         return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
@@ -1002,7 +1008,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
-        set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec);
+        set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
+        set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 74cb79eb917e..f6940618e345 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -16,11 +16,12 @@
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /* session keyring create vs join semaphore */
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(key_session_sem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
 
 /* the root user's tracking struct */
 struct key_user root_key_user = {
@@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
         }
 
         /* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
-        down(&key_session_sem);
+        mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
 
         /* look for an existing keyring of this name */
         keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, 0);
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
         key_put(keyring);
 
 error2:
-        up(&key_session_sem);
+        mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
 error:
         return ret;
 
diff --git a/security/seclvl.c b/security/seclvl.c
index 8529ea6f7aa8..441beaf1bbc1 100644
--- a/security/seclvl.c
+++ b/security/seclvl.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
  * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@austin.ibm.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Davi E. M. Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
  *
  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/sysfs.h>
 
@@ -194,35 +196,27 @@ static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
  * people...
  */
 static int
-plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len)
+plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, unsigned int len)
 {
-        char *pgVirtAddr;
         struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
-        struct scatterlist sg[1];
+        struct scatterlist sg;
         if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Plaintext password too large (%d "
                               "characters).  Largest possible is %lu "
                               "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
-                return -ENOMEM;
+                return -EINVAL;
         }
         tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
         if (tfm == NULL) {
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
                               "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
-                return -ENOSYS;
+                return -EINVAL;
         }
-        // Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
-        // and scatterlists.
-        pgVirtAddr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-        sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pgVirtAddr);
-        sg[0].offset = 0;
-        sg[0].length = len;
-        strncpy(pgVirtAddr, plaintext, len);
+        sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)plaintext, len);
         crypto_digest_init(tfm);
-        crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
+        crypto_digest_update(tfm, &sg, 1);
         crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash);
         crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
-        free_page((unsigned long)pgVirtAddr);
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -234,11 +228,9 @@ static ssize_t
 passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
                                 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-        int i;
-        unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-        char *page;
-        int rc;
+        char *p;
         int len;
+        unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
         if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
@@ -251,38 +243,39 @@ passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
                 return -EINVAL;
         }
 
-        if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+        if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (*ppos != 0)
                 return -EINVAL;
-        page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!page)
+        p = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!p)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         len = -EFAULT;
-        if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+        if (copy_from_user(p, buf, count))
                 goto out;
         
-        len = strlen(page);
+        len = count;
         /* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-        if (page[len - 1] == '\n')
+        if (p[len - 1] == '\n')
                 len--;
         /* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-        if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
+        if ((len = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, p, len))) {
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
-                              "[%d]\n", rc);
-                return rc;
-        }
-        for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) {
-                if (hashedPassword[i] != tmp[i])
-                        return -EPERM;
+                              "[%d]\n", len);
+                goto out;
         }
+
+        len = -EPERM;
+        if (memcmp(hashedPassword, tmp, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+                goto out;
+
         seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
                       "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
         seclvl = 0;
         len = count;
 
 out:
-        free_page((unsigned long)page);
+        kfree (p);
         return len;
 }
 
@@ -295,13 +288,11 @@ static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
  */
 static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 {
-        if (seclvl >= 0) {
-                if (child->pid == 1) {
-                        seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
-                                      "the init process dissallowed in "
-                                      "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                }
+        if (seclvl >= 0 && child->pid == 1) {
+                seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
+                              "the init process dissallowed in "
+                              "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
+                return -EPERM;
         }
         return 0;
 }
@@ -312,55 +303,54 @@ static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
  */
 static int seclvl_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
+        int rc = 0;
+
         /* init can do anything it wants */
         if (tsk->pid == 1)
                 return 0;
 
-        switch (seclvl) {
-        case 2:
-                /* fall through */
-        case 1:
-                if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) {
+        if (seclvl > 0) {
+                rc = -EPERM;
+
+                if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to modify "
                                       "the IMMUTABLE and/or APPEND extended "
                                       "attribute on a file with the IMMUTABLE "
                                       "and/or APPEND extended attribute set "
                                       "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) {      // Somewhat broad...
+                else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
                                       "raw I/O while in secure level [%d] "
                                       "denied\n", seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                } else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN) {
+                else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
                                       "network administrative task while "
                                       "in secure level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                } else if (cap == CAP_SETUID) {
+                else if (cap == CAP_SETUID)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setuid "
                                       "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
                                       seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                } else if (cap == CAP_SETGID) {
+                else if (cap == CAP_SETGID)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setgid "
                                       "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
                                       seclvl);
-                } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE) {
+                else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE)
                         seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
                                       "a module operation while in secure "
                                       "level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-                        return -EPERM;
-                }
-                break;
-        default:
-                break;
+                else
+                        rc = 0;
         }
-        /* from dummy.c */
-        if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0)
-                return 0;       /* capability granted */
-        seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
-        return -EPERM;          /* capability denied */
+
+        if (!rc) {
+                if (!(cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0))
+                        rc = -EPERM;
+        }
+
+        if (rc)
+                seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
+
+        return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -466,12 +456,9 @@ static int seclvl_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
 {
         struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
-        struct inode *inode = NULL;
 
-        if (dentry) {
-                inode = dentry->d_inode;
-                seclvl_bd_release(inode);
-        }
+        if (dentry)
+                seclvl_bd_release(dentry->d_inode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -479,9 +466,7 @@ static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
  */
 static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
-        if (current->pid == 1)
-                return 0;
-        if (seclvl == 2) {
+        if (current->pid != 1 && seclvl == 2) {
                 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to unmount in secure "
                               "level %d\n", seclvl);
                 return -EPERM;
@@ -505,8 +490,9 @@ static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
 static int processPassword(void)
 {
         int rc = 0;
-        hashedPassword[0] = '\0';
         if (*passwd) {
+                char *p;
+
                 if (*sha1_passwd) {
                         seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both "
                                       "passwd and sha1_passwd "
@@ -514,12 +500,16 @@ static int processPassword(void)
                                       "exclusive.\n");
                         return -EINVAL;
                 }
-                if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, passwd,
-                                            strlen(passwd)))) {
+
+                p = kstrdup(passwd, GFP_KERNEL);
+                if (p == NULL)
+                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+                if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, p, strlen(p))))
                         seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not "
                                       "in kernel\n");
-                        return rc;
-                }
+
+                kfree (p);
                 /* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the
                  * plaintext password out for us. */
         } else if (*sha1_passwd) {      // Base 16
@@ -542,7 +532,7 @@ static int processPassword(void)
                         sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp;
                 }
         }
-        return 0;
+        return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -552,28 +542,46 @@ struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
 
 static int seclvlfs_register(void)
 {
+        int rc = 0;
+
         dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
-        if (!dir_ino)
-                return -EFAULT;
+
+        if (IS_ERR(dir_ino))
+                return PTR_ERR(dir_ino);
 
         seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
                                 dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops);
-        if (!seclvl_ino)
+        if (IS_ERR(seclvl_ino)) {
+                rc = PTR_ERR(seclvl_ino);
                 goto out_deldir;
+        }
         if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
                 passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
                                 dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
-                if (!passwd_ino)
+                if (IS_ERR(passwd_ino)) {
+                        rc = PTR_ERR(passwd_ino);
                         goto out_delf;
+                }
         }
-        return 0;
+        return rc;
+
+out_delf:
+        securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 
 out_deldir:
         securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-out_delf:
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+static void seclvlfs_unregister(void)
+{
         securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 
-        return -EFAULT;
+        if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd)
+                securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
+
+        securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -582,6 +590,8 @@ out_delf:
 static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 {
         int rc = 0;
+        static char once;
+
         if (verbosity < 0 || verbosity > 1) {
                 printk(KERN_ERR "Error: bad verbosity [%d]; only 0 or 1 "
                        "are valid values\n", verbosity);
@@ -600,6 +610,11 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
                               "module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc);
                 goto exit;
         }
+
+        if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
+                seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
+                goto exit;
+        }
         /* register ourselves with the security framework */
         if (register_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
@@ -611,20 +626,24 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
                         seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "seclvl: Failure "
                                       "registering with primary security "
                                       "module.\n");
+                        seclvlfs_unregister();
                         goto exit;
                 }               /* if primary module registered */
                 secondary = 1;
         }                       /* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-        if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
-                seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
-                goto exit;
-        }
+
         seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl: Successfully initialized.\n");
+
+        if (once) {
+                once = 1;
+                seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl is going away. It has been "
+                                "buggy for ages. Also, be warned that "
+                                "Securelevels are useless.");
+        }
  exit:
-        if (rc) {
+        if (rc)
                 printk(KERN_ERR "seclvl: Error during initialization: rc = "
                        "[%d]\n", rc);
-        }
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -633,17 +652,14 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
  */
 static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
 {
-        securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
-        if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd)
-                securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
-        securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-        if (secondary == 1) {
+        seclvlfs_unregister();
+
+        if (secondary)
                 mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
-        } else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
+        else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops))
                 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
                               "seclvl: Failure unregistering with the "
                               "kernel\n");
-        }
 }
 
 module_init(seclvl_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b65c201e9ff5..ccaf988f3729 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 
+static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+
 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 
 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -146,10 +148,11 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-        isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+        isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
         if (!isec)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
+        memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
         init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
         isec->inode = inode;
@@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 
         inode->i_security = NULL;
-        kfree(isec);
+        kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 }
 
 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -1929,7 +1932,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-        struct inode_security_struct *isec;
         u32 newsid, clen;
         int rc;
         char *namep = NULL, *context;
@@ -1937,7 +1939,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         tsec = current->security;
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-        isec = inode->i_security;
 
         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -1957,7 +1958,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 
         inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
 
-        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+        if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (name) {
@@ -3318,24 +3319,38 @@ out:
         return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-                                     int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+                                            int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
         int err = 0;
         char *scontext;
         u32 scontext_len;
         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+        u32 peer_sid = 0;
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-        if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+
+        /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
+        if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+                ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+                peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+        }
+        else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+                peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+
+                if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+                        err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+        }
+        else {
                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-        
-        err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+        err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+
         if (err)
                 goto out;
 
@@ -3356,6 +3371,23 @@ out:
         return err;
 }
 
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+        int err = 0;
+        u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+
+        if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
@@ -4344,7 +4376,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-        .socket_getpeersec =            selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+        .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+        .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
         .sk_getsid =                    selinux_sk_getsid_security,
@@ -4376,6 +4409,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
         tsec = current->security;
         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 
+        sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+                                            sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+                                            0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
         avc_init();
 
         original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 8e87996c6dd5..c10f1fc41502 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -49,6 +51,16 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         return NF_ACCEPT;
 }
+
+static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+        return SECSID_NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 69b9329b2054..85e399259832 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -88,8 +88,15 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
         { XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY,   NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
         { XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY,   NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
         { XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI,    NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE,     NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE,      NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
         { XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY,   NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
         { XFRM_MSG_UPDSA,       NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE,   NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA,     NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_NEWAE,       NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+        { XFRM_MSG_GETAE,       NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
 };
 
 static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b5fa02d17b1e..f5d78365488f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 
 
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(sel_sem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
 /* global data for booleans */
 static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
         ssize_t length;
         void *data = NULL;
 
-        down(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
         length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
         if (length)
@@ -262,7 +263,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
         else
                 length = count;
 out:
-        up(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
         vfree(data);
         return length;
 }
@@ -709,12 +710,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 {
         char *page = NULL;
         ssize_t length;
-        ssize_t end;
         ssize_t ret;
         int cur_enforcing;
         struct inode *inode;
 
-        down(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
         ret = -EFAULT;
 
@@ -740,26 +740,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 
         length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
                           bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET]);
-        if (length < 0) {
-                ret = length;
-                goto out;
-        }
-
-        if (*ppos >= length) {
-                ret = 0;
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if (count + *ppos > length)
-                count = length - *ppos;
-        end = count + *ppos;
-        if (copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count)) {
-                ret = -EFAULT;
-                goto out;
-        }
-        *ppos = end;
-        ret = count;
+        ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 out:
-        up(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
         if (page)
                 free_page((unsigned long)page);
         return ret;
@@ -773,7 +756,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
         int new_value;
         struct inode *inode;
 
-        down(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
         length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
         if (length)
@@ -812,7 +795,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
         length = count;
 
 out:
-        up(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
         if (page)
                 free_page((unsigned long) page);
         return length;
@@ -831,7 +814,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
         ssize_t length = -EFAULT;
         int new_value;
 
-        down(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
         length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
         if (length)
@@ -869,7 +852,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
         length = count;
 
 out:
-        up(&sel_sem);
+        mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
         if (page)
                 free_page((unsigned long) page);
         return length;
@@ -987,7 +970,7 @@ out:
         return ret;
 err:
         kfree(values);
-        d_genocide(dir);
+        sel_remove_bools(dir);
         ret = -ENOMEM;
         goto out;
 }
@@ -1168,37 +1151,38 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
                 dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
                 if (!dentry) {
                         ret = -ENOMEM;
-                        goto err;
+                        goto out;
                 }
 
                 inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
                 if (!inode) {
                         ret = -ENOMEM;
-                        goto err;
+                        goto out;
                 }
                 inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
                 d_add(dentry, inode);
         }
 out:
         return ret;
-err:
-        d_genocide(dir);
-        goto out;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_dir(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry)
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         int ret = 0;
         struct inode *inode;
 
-        inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+        inode = sel_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
         if (!inode) {
                 ret = -ENOMEM;
                 goto out;
         }
         inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
         inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+        /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+        inode->i_nlink++;
         d_add(dentry, inode);
+        /* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+        dir->i_nlink++;
 out:
         return ret;
 }
@@ -1207,7 +1191,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 {
         int ret;
         struct dentry *dentry;
-        struct inode *inode;
+        struct inode *inode, *root_inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
         static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
@@ -1228,30 +1212,33 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
         };
         ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
         if (ret)
-                return ret;
+                goto err;
+
+        root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
 
         dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME);
-        if (!dentry)
-                return -ENOMEM;
+        if (!dentry) {
+                ret = -ENOMEM;
+                goto err;
+        }
 
-        inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
-        if (!inode)
-                goto out;
-        inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
-        inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
-        d_add(dentry, inode);
-        bool_dir = dentry;
-        ret = sel_make_bools();
+        ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
         if (ret)
-                goto out;
+                goto err;
+
+        bool_dir = dentry;
 
         dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
-        if (!dentry)
-                return -ENOMEM;
+        if (!dentry) {
+                ret = -ENOMEM;
+                goto err;
+        }
 
         inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
-        if (!inode)
-                goto out;
+        if (!inode) {
+                ret = -ENOMEM;
+                goto err;
+        }
         isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
         isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
@@ -1262,22 +1249,23 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
         selinux_null = dentry;
 
         dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc");
-        if (!dentry)
-                return -ENOMEM;
+        if (!dentry) {
+                ret = -ENOMEM;
+                goto err;
+        }
 
-        ret = sel_make_dir(sb, dentry);
+        ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
         if (ret)
-                goto out;
+                goto err;
 
         ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
         if (ret)
-                goto out;
-
-        return 0;
+                goto err;
 out:
-        dput(dentry);
+        return ret;
+err:
         printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  failed while creating inodes\n", __FUNCTION__);
-        return -ENOMEM;
+        goto out;
 }
 
 static struct super_block *sel_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8a764928ff4b..63e0b7f29cb5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
@@ -48,9 +49,9 @@ static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 #define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
 #define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
 
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
-#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
-#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
+#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
 
 static struct sidtab sidtab;
 struct policydb policydb;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index b2af7ca496c1..dfab6c886698 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -225,6 +225,74 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 }
 
 /*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
+ * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
+ * association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
+        u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+        if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+                goto out;
+
+        dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
+        if (!dst)
+                goto out;
+
+        for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+             dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+                struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+                if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+                        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+                        peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+                        break;
+                }
+        }
+        dst_release(dst);
+
+out:
+        return peer_sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
+ * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
+ * type SCM_SECURITY.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+        struct sec_path *sp;
+
+        if (skb == NULL)
+                return SECSID_NULL;
+
+        if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
+                return SECSID_NULL;
+
+        sp = skb->sp;
+        if (sp) {
+                int i;
+
+                for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                        struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+                        if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+                                struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+                                return ctx->ctx_sid;
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+        return SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
  * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
  * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then