13 files changed, 280 insertions, 258 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fb4e240720d8..fa61679f8c73 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-        NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
+        NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
 int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
 {
         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
-        if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
+        if (cap_raised(tsk->cred->cap_effective, cap))
                 return 0;
         return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
-        if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
+        if (cap_issubset(child->cred->cap_permitted,
+                         current->cred->cap_permitted))
                 return 0;
         if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 return 0;
@@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 
 int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-        /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
-        if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
+        if (cap_issubset(current->cred->cap_permitted,
+                         parent->cred->cap_permitted))
                 return 0;
         if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 return 0;
@@ -87,10 +88,12 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = target->cred;
+
         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
-        *effective = target->cap_effective;
-        *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
-        *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
+        *effective   = cred->cap_effective;
+        *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+        *permitted   = cred->cap_permitted;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -122,24 +125,26 @@ int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
                      const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                      const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
+        const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
-                             cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable,
-                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
+                             cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
+                                         cred->cap_permitted))) {
                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
                 return -EPERM;
         }
         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
-                           cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable,
-                                       current->cap_bset))) {
+                           cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
+                                       cred->cap_bset))) {
                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
                 return -EPERM;
         }
 
         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
-                           cap_combine (current->cap_permitted,
-                                        current->cap_permitted))) {
+                           cap_combine (cred->cap_permitted,
+                                        cred->cap_permitted))) {
                 return -EPERM;
         }
 
@@ -155,9 +160,11 @@ void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
                     const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
                     const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-        current->cap_effective = *effective;
-        current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
-        current->cap_permitted = *permitted;
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
+        cred->cap_effective   = *effective;
+        cred->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+        cred->cap_permitted   = *permitted;
 }
 
 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -211,8 +218,8 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                  * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
                  */
                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
-                        (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
-                        (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
+                        (current->cred->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
+                        (current->cred->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
 
                 if (permitted & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
                         /*
@@ -354,8 +361,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current_uid() == 0) {
                         /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
-                                current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
-                                );
+                                current->cred->cap_bset,
+                                current->cred->cap_inheritable);
                         bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
                         ret = 0;
                 }
@@ -366,44 +373,39 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 {
-        kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted;
-        kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective;
-        uid_t uid;
-        gid_t gid;
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
 
-        current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
-
-        if (bprm->e_uid != uid || bprm->e_gid != gid ||
+        if (bprm->e_uid != cred->uid || bprm->e_gid != cred->gid ||
             !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
-                          current->cap_permitted)) {
+                          cred->cap_permitted)) {
                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 
                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
-                                bprm->e_uid = uid;
-                                bprm->e_gid = gid;
+                                bprm->e_uid = cred->uid;
+                                bprm->e_gid = cred->gid;
                         }
                         if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
                                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
                                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
-                                        current->cap_permitted);
+                                        cred->cap_permitted);
                         }
                 }
         }
 
-        current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
-        current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+        cred->suid = cred->euid = cred->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+        cred->sgid = cred->egid = cred->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 
         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
          * capability rules */
         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
-                current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+                cred->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
-                        current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+                        cred->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
                 else
-                        cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
+                        cap_clear(cred->cap_effective);
         }
 
         /*
@@ -418,27 +420,30 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
          * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
          * that is interesting information to audit.
          */
-        if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) {
-                if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, current->cap_effective) ||
-                    (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (current->uid != 0) ||
+        if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_effective)) {
+                if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_effective) ||
+                    (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (cred->uid != 0) ||
                     issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
-                        audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &pP, &pE);
+                        audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &cred->cap_permitted,
+                                             &cred->cap_effective);
         }
 
-        current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+        cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 }
 
 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-        if (current_uid() != 0) {
+        const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
+        if (cred->uid != 0) {
                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
                         return 1;
                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
                         return 1;
         }
 
-        return (current_euid() != current_uid() ||
-                current_egid() != current_gid());
+        return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
+                cred->egid != cred->gid);
 }
 
 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -501,25 +506,27 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
                                         int old_suid)
 {
-        uid_t euid = current_euid();
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
 
         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
-            (current_uid()  != 0 && euid != 0 && current_suid() != 0) &&
+            (cred->uid != 0 && cred->euid != 0 && cred->suid != 0) &&
             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
-                cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
-                cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+                cap_clear (cred->cap_permitted);
+                cap_clear (cred->cap_effective);
         }
-        if (old_euid == 0 && euid != 0) {
-                cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+        if (old_euid == 0 && cred->euid != 0) {
+                cap_clear (cred->cap_effective);
         }
-        if (old_euid != 0 && euid == 0) {
-                current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
+        if (old_euid != 0 && cred->euid == 0) {
+                cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_permitted;
         }
 }
 
 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
                           int flags)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
         switch (flags) {
         case LSM_SETID_RE:
         case LSM_SETID_ID:
@@ -541,16 +548,16 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
                          */
 
                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
-                                if (old_fsuid == 0 && current_fsuid() != 0) {
-                                        current->cap_effective =
+                                if (old_fsuid == 0 && cred->fsuid != 0) {
+                                        cred->cap_effective =
                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
-                                                    current->cap_effective);
+                                                        cred->cap_effective);
                                 }
-                                if (old_fsuid != 0 && current_fsuid() == 0) {
-                                        current->cap_effective =
+                                if (old_fsuid != 0 && cred->fsuid == 0) {
+                                        cred->cap_effective =
                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
-                                                    current->cap_effective,
-                                                    current->cap_permitted);
+                                                    cred->cap_effective,
+                                                    cred->cap_permitted);
                                 }
                         }
                         break;
@@ -575,7 +582,8 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
  */
 static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+        if (!cap_issubset(p->cred->cap_permitted,
+                          current->cred->cap_permitted) &&
             !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
                 return -EPERM;
         return 0;
@@ -610,7 +618,7 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
                 return -EPERM;
         if (!cap_valid(cap))
                 return -EINVAL;
-        cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
+        cap_lower(current->cred->cap_bset, cap);
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -633,6 +641,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
         long error = 0;
 
         switch (option) {
@@ -640,7 +649,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
                         error = -EINVAL;
                 else
-                        error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
+                        error = !!cap_raised(cred->cap_bset, arg2);
                 break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
@@ -667,9 +676,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
          * capability-based-privilege environment.
          */
         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
-                if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
-                     & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
-                    || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
+                if ((((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+                     & (cred->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
+                    || ((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
@@ -682,11 +691,11 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                          */
                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
                 } else {
-                        current->securebits = arg2;
+                        cred->securebits = arg2;
                 }
                 break;
         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
-                error = current->securebits;
+                error = cred->securebits;
                 break;
 
 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
@@ -701,10 +710,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
                         error = -EPERM;
                 else if (arg2)
-                        current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+                        cred->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
                 else
-                        current->securebits &=
-                                ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+                        cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
                 break;
 
         default:
@@ -719,11 +727,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
-        cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
-        cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
-        p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
-        return;
+        struct cred *cred = p->cred;
+
+        cap_set_init_eff(cred->cap_effective);
+        cap_clear(cred->cap_inheritable);
+        cap_set_full(cred->cap_permitted);
+        p->cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 }
 
 int cap_syslog (int type)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index fcce331eca72..8833b447adef 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
         /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
          * assumed before calling this */
         ret = -EPERM;
-        instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+        instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
         if (!instkey)
                 goto error;
 
@@ -932,8 +932,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
         /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
          * instantiation of the key */
         if (ret == 0) {
-                key_put(current->request_key_auth);
-                current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+                key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+                current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
         }
 
 error2:
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
         /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
          * assumed before calling this */
         ret = -EPERM;
-        instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+        instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
         if (!instkey)
                 goto error;
 
@@ -983,8 +983,8 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
         /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
          * instantiation of the key */
         if (ret == 0) {
-                key_put(current->request_key_auth);
-                current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+                key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+                current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
         }
 
 error:
@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ error:
  */
 long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = current->cred;
         int ret;
 
         switch (reqkey_defl) {
@@ -1018,10 +1019,10 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
         case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
         case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
         set:
-                current->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+                cred->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
 
         case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
-                return current->jit_keyring;
+                return cred->jit_keyring;
 
         case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
         default:
@@ -1086,8 +1087,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
 
         /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
         if (id == 0) {
-                key_put(current->request_key_auth);
-                current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+                key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+                current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
                 ret = 0;
                 goto error;
         }
@@ -1103,8 +1104,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_put(current->request_key_auth);
-        current->request_key_auth = authkey;
+        key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+        current->cred->request_key_auth = authkey;
         ret = authkey->serial;
 
 error:
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 3b41f9b52537..baf3d5f31e71 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
                         struct task_struct *context,
                         key_perm_t perm)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = context->cred;
         struct key *key;
         key_perm_t kperm;
         int ret;
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
         /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
-        if (key->uid == context->fsuid) {
+        if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
                 kperm = key->perm >> 16;
                 goto use_these_perms;
         }
@@ -37,14 +38,14 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
         /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
          * membership in common with */
         if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
-                if (key->gid == context->fsgid) {
+                if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) {
                         kperm = key->perm >> 8;
                         goto use_these_perms;
                 }
 
-                task_lock(context);
-                ret = groups_search(context->group_info, key->gid);
-                task_unlock(context);
+                spin_lock(&cred->lock);
+                ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
+                spin_unlock(&cred->lock);
 
                 if (ret) {
                         kperm = key->perm >> 8;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 1c793b7090a7..b0904cdda2e7 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
  */
 int install_user_keyrings(void)
 {
-        struct user_struct *user = current->user;
+        struct user_struct *user = current->cred->user;
         struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
         char buf[20];
         int ret;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void)
 
         sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
 
-        keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+        keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
                                 KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void)
         }
 
         task_lock(tsk);
-        old = tsk->thread_keyring;
-        tsk->thread_keyring = keyring;
+        old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
+        tsk->cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
         task_unlock(tsk);
 
         ret = 0;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int install_process_keyring(void)
         if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
                 sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
 
-                keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+                keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
                                         KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
                 if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
                 if (tsk->signal->session_keyring)
                         flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
 
-                keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+                keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
                                         flags, NULL);
                 if (IS_ERR(keyring))
                         return PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -292,14 +292,14 @@ int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
  */
 int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-        key_check(tsk->thread_keyring);
-        key_check(tsk->request_key_auth);
+        key_check(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
+        key_check(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
 
         /* no thread keyring yet */
-        tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
+        tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
 
         /* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
-        key_get(tsk->request_key_auth);
+        key_get(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
 
         return 0;
 
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg)
  */
 void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-        key_put(tsk->thread_keyring);
-        key_put(tsk->request_key_auth);
+        key_put(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
+        key_put(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
 
 } /* end exit_keys() */
 
@@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
         /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
         task_lock(tsk);
-        old = tsk->thread_keyring;
-        tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
+        old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
+        tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
         task_unlock(tsk);
 
         key_put(old);
@@ -373,10 +373,11 @@ int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
 void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
         /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
-        if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
-                down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
-                tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid;
-                up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+        BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+        if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+                down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+                tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;
+                up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
         }
 
 } /* end key_fsuid_changed() */
@@ -388,10 +389,11 @@ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
 void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
         /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
-        if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
-                down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
-                tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid;
-                up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+        BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+        if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+                down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+                tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;
+                up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
         }
 
 } /* end key_fsgid_changed() */
@@ -426,9 +428,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
         err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
 
         /* search the thread keyring first */
-        if (context->thread_keyring) {
+        if (context->cred->thread_keyring) {
                 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-                        make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1),
+                        make_key_ref(context->cred->thread_keyring, 1),
                         context, type, description, match);
                 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                         goto found;
@@ -493,9 +495,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
                 }
         }
         /* or search the user-session keyring */
-        else if (context->user->session_keyring) {
+        else if (context->cred->user->session_keyring) {
                 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-                        make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1),
+                        make_key_ref(context->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
                         context, type, description, match);
                 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                         goto found;
@@ -517,20 +519,20 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
          * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
          * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
          */
-        if (context->request_key_auth &&
+        if (context->cred->request_key_auth &&
             context == current &&
             type != &key_type_request_key_auth
             ) {
                 /* defend against the auth key being revoked */
-                down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+                down_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
-                if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) {
-                        rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+                if (key_validate(context->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
+                        rka = context->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
 
                         key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
                                                           match, rka->context);
 
-                        up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+                        up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
                         if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                                 goto found;
@@ -547,7 +549,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
                                 break;
                         }
                 } else {
-                        up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+                        up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
                 }
         }
 
@@ -580,15 +582,16 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
 {
         struct request_key_auth *rka;
         struct task_struct *t = current;
-        key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+        struct cred *cred = t->cred;
         struct key *key;
+        key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
         int ret;
 
         key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
         switch (id) {
         case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
-                if (!t->thread_keyring) {
+                if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
                         if (!create)
                                 goto error;
 
@@ -599,7 +602,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
                         }
                 }
 
-                key = t->thread_keyring;
+                key = cred->thread_keyring;
                 atomic_inc(&key->usage);
                 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
                 break;
@@ -628,7 +631,8 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
                         ret = install_user_keyrings();
                         if (ret < 0)
                                 goto error;
-                        ret = install_session_keyring(t->user->session_keyring);
+                        ret = install_session_keyring(
+                                cred->user->session_keyring);
                         if (ret < 0)
                                 goto error;
                 }
@@ -641,25 +645,25 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
                 break;
 
         case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
-                if (!t->user->uid_keyring) {
+                if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
                         ret = install_user_keyrings();
                         if (ret < 0)
                                 goto error;
                 }
 
-                key = t->user->uid_keyring;
+                key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
                 atomic_inc(&key->usage);
                 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
                 break;
 
         case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
-                if (!t->user->session_keyring) {
+                if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
                         ret = install_user_keyrings();
                         if (ret < 0)
                                 goto error;
                 }
 
-                key = t->user->session_keyring;
+                key = cred->user->session_keyring;
                 atomic_inc(&key->usage);
                 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
                 break;
@@ -670,7 +674,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
                 goto error;
 
         case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
-                key = t->request_key_auth;
+                key = cred->request_key_auth;
                 if (!key)
                         goto error;
 
@@ -679,19 +683,19 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
                 break;
 
         case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
-                if (!t->request_key_auth)
+                if (!cred->request_key_auth)
                         goto error;
 
-                down_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
-                if (t->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
+                down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+                if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
                         key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
                         key = NULL;
                 } else {
-                        rka = t->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+                        rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
                         key = rka->dest_keyring;
                         atomic_inc(&key->usage);
                 }
-                up_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
+                up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
                 if (!key)
                         goto error;
                 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -791,7 +795,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
         keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
         if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
                 /* not found - try and create a new one */
-                keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+                keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
                                         KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
                 if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 8e9d93b4a402..3e9b9eb1dd28 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
 
         /* we specify the process's default keyrings */
         sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
-                tsk->thread_keyring ? tsk->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
+                tsk->cred->thread_keyring ?
+                tsk->cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
 
         prkey = 0;
         if (tsk->signal->process_keyring)
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
                 sskey = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
                 rcu_read_unlock();
         } else {
-                sskey = tsk->user->session_keyring->serial;
+                sskey = tsk->cred->user->session_keyring->serial;
         }
 
         sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
@@ -232,11 +233,11 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
         } else {
                 /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
                  * find one that we actually have */
-                switch (tsk->jit_keyring) {
+                switch (tsk->cred->jit_keyring) {
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
-                        if (tsk->request_key_auth) {
-                                authkey = tsk->request_key_auth;
+                        if (tsk->cred->request_key_auth) {
+                                authkey = tsk->cred->request_key_auth;
                                 down_read(&authkey->sem);
                                 rka = authkey->payload.data;
                                 if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
                         }
 
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
-                        dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->thread_keyring);
+                        dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
                         if (dest_keyring)
                                 break;
 
@@ -268,11 +269,12 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
                                 break;
 
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
-                        dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->session_keyring);
+                        dest_keyring =
+                                key_get(tsk->cred->user->session_keyring);
                         break;
 
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
-                        dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->uid_keyring);
+                        dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->user->uid_keyring);
                         break;
 
                 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 1762d44711d5..2125579d5d73 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -164,22 +164,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 
         /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
          * another process */
-        if (current->request_key_auth) {
+        if (current->cred->request_key_auth) {
                 /* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
-                down_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+                down_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
                 /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
                  * servicing is already instantiated */
                 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
-                             &current->request_key_auth->flags))
+                             &current->cred->request_key_auth->flags))
                         goto auth_key_revoked;
 
-                irka = current->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+                irka = current->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
                 rka->context = irka->context;
                 rka->pid = irka->pid;
                 get_task_struct(rka->context);
 
-                up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+                up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
         }
         else {
                 /* it isn't - use this process as the context */
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
         return authkey;
 
 auth_key_revoked:
-        up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+        up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
         kfree(rka->callout_info);
         kfree(rka);
         kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 64af2d3409ef..cf02490cd1eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
 int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
 {
         if (selinux_enabled) {
-                struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+                struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
 
                 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
                                     PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9f6da154cc82..328308f2882a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -167,21 +167,21 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-        task->security = tsec;
+        task->cred->security = tsec;
 
         return 0;
 }
 
 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
-        task->security = NULL;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
+        task->cred->security = NULL;
         kfree(tsec);
 }
 
 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 
 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 
         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
         int rc = 0, i;
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
@@ -1353,8 +1353,8 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
 
-        tsec1 = tsk1->security;
-        tsec2 = tsk2->security;
+        tsec1 = tsk1->cred->security;
+        tsec2 = tsk2->cred->security;
         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
 }
@@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.tsk = tsk;
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
 
         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         isec = inode->i_security;
 
         if (!adp) {
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                 struct file *file,
                                 u32 av)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
 
@@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-        tsec = ctx->security;
+        tsec = ctx->cred->security;
 
         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
 }
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
         u32 av;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
@@ -1606,7 +1606,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         sbsec = sb->s_security;
         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
                             perms, ad);
@@ -1758,8 +1758,8 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
                 return rc;
 
         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
-                struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-                struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
+                struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
+                struct task_security_struct *csec = child->cred->security;
                 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
                                     SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
         }
@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
 
         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
@@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         if (bsec->set)
                 return 0;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = inode->i_security;
 
         /* Default to the current task SID. */
@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         int atsecure = 0;
 
         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 
         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
 
         bsec = bprm->security;
         sid = bsec->sid;
@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
                         rcu_read_lock();
                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
-                                sec = tracer->security;
+                                sec = tracer->cred->security;
                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
                         }
                         rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -2274,7 +2274,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         int rc, i;
         unsigned long flags;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         bsec = bprm->security;
 
         if (bsec->unsafe) {
@@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         int rc;
         char *namep = NULL, *context;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
 
@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 
@@ -2995,7 +2995,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
         int rc = 0;
-        u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
+        u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)
+                   (current->cred->security))->sid;
 
         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
@@ -3107,7 +3108,7 @@ static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         fsec = file->f_security;
         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 
@@ -3125,7 +3126,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         fsec = file->f_security;
 
         if (!signum)
@@ -3188,12 +3189,12 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec1 = current->security;
+        tsec1 = current->cred->security;
 
         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
-        tsec2 = tsk->security;
+        tsec2 = tsk->cred->security;
 
         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
@@ -3251,7 +3252,7 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 
 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
         *secid = tsec->sid;
 }
 
@@ -3343,7 +3344,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
         else
                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
-        tsec = p->security;
+        tsec = p->cred->security;
         if (secid)
                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
         else
@@ -3375,7 +3376,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
 
         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
 
-        tsec = p->security;
+        tsec = p->cred->security;
         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
         return;
@@ -3384,7 +3385,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
                                   struct inode *inode)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 
         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -3632,7 +3633,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int err = 0;
 
-        tsec = task->security;
+        tsec = task->cred->security;
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
@@ -3656,7 +3657,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
         if (kern)
                 goto out;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
@@ -3677,7 +3678,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
@@ -3723,7 +3724,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
                 u32 sid, node_perm;
 
-                tsec = current->security;
+                tsec = current->cred->security;
                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
                 if (family == PF_INET) {
@@ -4764,7 +4765,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
                               u16 sclass)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 
         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -4814,7 +4815,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4845,7 +4846,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4871,7 +4872,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4917,7 +4918,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
         msec = msg->security;
 
@@ -4965,7 +4966,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
-        tsec = target->security;
+        tsec = target->cred->security;
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
         msec = msg->security;
 
@@ -4992,7 +4993,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5018,7 +5019,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5091,7 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5117,7 +5118,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5224,7 +5225,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
                         return error;
         }
 
-        tsec = p->security;
+        tsec = p->cred->security;
 
         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
                 sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -5308,7 +5309,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
-        tsec = p->security;
+        tsec = p->cred->security;
         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
@@ -5361,7 +5362,8 @@ boundary_ok:
                 rcu_read_lock();
                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
                 if (tracer != NULL) {
-                        struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
+                        struct task_security_struct *ptsec =
+                                tracer->cred->security;
                         u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
                         rcu_read_unlock();
                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
@@ -5405,7 +5407,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
                              unsigned long flags)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
 
         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -5439,7 +5441,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 
         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
-        tsec = ctx->security;
+        tsec = ctx->cred->security;
         ksec = key->security;
 
         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
@@ -5683,7 +5685,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
         if (task_alloc_security(current))
                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
-        tsec = current->security;
+        tsec = current->cred->security;
         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 
         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 69c9dccc8cf0..10715d1330b9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-        tsec = tsk->security;
+        tsec = tsk->cred->security;
         if (!tsec)
                 return -EACCES;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8f17f542a116..d7db76617b0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
         struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
 {
         int rc = 0;
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
         char *ctx_str = NULL;
         u32 str_len;
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         int rc = 0;
 
         if (ctx) {
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
   */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
         int rc = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 79ff21ed4c3b..b6dd4fc0fb0b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
+        rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, obj_label, mode);
         if (rc == 0)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
          * only one that gets privilege and current does not
          * have that label.
          */
-        if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->security)
+        if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
                 return rc;
 
         if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6e2dc0bab70d..791da238d049 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
-        rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+        rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, ctp->cred->security,
+                        MAY_READWRITE);
         if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 return 0;
         return rc;
@@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
-        rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+        rc = smk_access(ptp->cred->security, current->cred->security,
+                        MAY_READWRITE);
         if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 return 0;
         return rc;
@@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 static int smack_syslog(int type)
 {
         int rc;
-        char *sp = current->security;
+        char *sp = current->cred->security;
 
         rc = cap_syslog(type);
         if (rc != 0)
@@ -373,7 +375,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
  */
 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
-        inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+        inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->cred->security);
         if (inode->i_security == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         return 0;
@@ -818,7 +820,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
  */
 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
-        file->f_security = current->security;
+        file->f_security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -916,7 +918,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  */
 static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 {
-        file->f_security = current->security;
+        file->f_security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -941,7 +943,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
          * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
          */
         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
-        rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
+        rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                 return 0;
         return rc;
@@ -984,7 +986,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-        tsk->security = current->security;
+        tsk->cred->security = current->cred->security;
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -999,7 +1001,7 @@ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
  */
 static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-        task->security = NULL;
+        task->cred->security = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1011,7 +1013,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1022,7 +1024,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
  */
 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1033,7 +1035,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1045,7 +1047,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-        *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
+        *secid = smack_to_secid(p->cred->security);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1061,7 +1063,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 
         rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
         if (rc == 0)
-                rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+                rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1078,7 +1080,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 
         rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
         if (rc == 0)
-                rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+                rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1090,7 +1092,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
  */
 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1108,7 +1110,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 
         rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
         if (rc == 0)
-                rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+                rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1120,7 +1122,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
  */
 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1131,7 +1133,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-        return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+        return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1154,13 +1156,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
          * can write the receiver.
          */
         if (secid == 0)
-                return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+                return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         /*
          * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
          * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
          * we can't take privilege into account.
          */
-        return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+        return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1173,7 +1175,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+        rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
         if (rc == 0)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -1204,7 +1206,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
-        isp->smk_inode = p->security;
+        isp->smk_inode = p->cred->security;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1223,7 +1225,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
  */
 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
-        char *csp = current->security;
+        char *csp = current->cred->security;
         struct socket_smack *ssp;
 
         ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
@@ -1448,7 +1450,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
  */
 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
-        msg->security = current->security;
+        msg->security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1484,7 +1486,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
         struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
 
-        isp->security = current->security;
+        isp->security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1593,7 +1595,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
         struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
 
-        isp->security = current->security;
+        isp->security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1697,7 +1699,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
         struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
 
-        kisp->security = current->security;
+        kisp->security = current->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1852,7 +1854,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
         struct super_block *sbp;
         struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
         struct inode_smack *isp;
-        char *csp = current->security;
+        char *csp = current->cred->security;
         char *fetched;
         char *final;
         struct dentry *dp;
@@ -2009,7 +2011,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
         if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL);
+        cp = kstrdup(p->cred->security, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (cp == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2055,7 +2057,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
         if (newsmack == NULL)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        p->security = newsmack;
+        p->cred->security = newsmack;
         return size;
 }
 
@@ -2288,8 +2290,8 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
                 return;
 
         ssp = sk->sk_security;
-        ssp->smk_in = current->security;
-        ssp->smk_out = current->security;
+        ssp->smk_in = current->cred->security;
+        ssp->smk_out = current->cred->security;
         ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
         rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
@@ -2362,7 +2364,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
                            unsigned long flags)
 {
-        key->security = tsk->security;
+        key->security = tsk->cred->security;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2403,10 +2405,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
         /*
          * This should not occur
          */
-        if (context->security == NULL)
+        if (context->cred->security == NULL)
                 return -EACCES;
 
-        return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+        return smk_access(context->cred->security, keyp->security,
+                          MAY_READWRITE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -2726,7 +2729,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
         /*
          * Set the security state for the initial task.
          */
-        current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+        current->cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 
         /*
          * Initialize locks
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index c21d8c8bf0c7..c5ca279e0506 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
 
         audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
         audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security);
 
         rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
         if (rc != 0)
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 
         audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
         audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security);
 
         if (oldambient != NULL) {
                 rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
                                  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
         char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
-        char *sp = current->security;
+        char *sp = current->cred->security;
 
         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                 return -EPERM;