9 files changed, 40 insertions, 45 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
index 3c88be946494..02baec732bb5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit {
 };
 
 int aa_map_resource(int resource);
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-                      struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *,
+                      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
 
 void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 6e85cdb4303f..506d2baf6147 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
         *ns_name = NULL;
         if (name[0] == ':') {
                 char *split = strchr(&name[1], ':');
+                *ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
                 if (split) {
                         /* overwrite ':' with \0 */
                         *split = 0;
@@ -47,7 +48,6 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
                 } else
                         /* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
                         name = NULL;
-                *ns_name = &name[1];
         }
         if (name && *name == 0)
                 name = NULL;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f73e2c204218..cf1de4462ccd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
         int error = 0;
 
         if (!unconfined(profile))
-                error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
+                error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
 
         return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 19358dc14605..82396050f186 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
 {
         struct path root, tmp;
         char *res;
-        int deleted, connected;
-        int error = 0;
+        int connected, error = 0;
 
         /* Get the root we want to resolve too, released below */
         if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
@@ -74,19 +73,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
         }
 
         spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
-        /* There is a race window between path lookup here and the
-         * need to strip the " (deleted) string that __d_path applies
-         * Detect the race and relookup the path
-         *
-         * The stripping of (deleted) is a hack that could be removed
-         * with an updated __d_path
-         */
-        do {
-                tmp = root;
-                deleted = d_unlinked(path->dentry);
-                res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen);
-
-        } while (deleted != d_unlinked(path->dentry));
+        tmp = root;
+        res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen);
         spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
 
         *name = res;
@@ -98,21 +86,17 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
                 *name = buf;
                 goto out;
         }
-        if (deleted) {
-                /* On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
-                 * security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an
-                 * inode allocated.
-                 *
-                 * Remove the appended deleted text and return as string for
-                 * normal mediation, or auditing.  The (deleted) string is
-                 * guaranteed to be added in this case, so just strip it.
-                 */
-                buf[buflen - 11] = 0;   /* - (len(" (deleted)") +\0) */
 
-                if (path->dentry->d_inode && !(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED)) {
+        /* Handle two cases:
+         * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted
+         * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
+         *    security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an inode
+         *    allocated.
+         */
+        if (d_unlinked(path->dentry) && path->dentry->d_inode &&
+            !(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED)) {
                         error = -ENOENT;
                         goto out;
-                }
         }
 
         /* Determine if the path is connected to the expected root */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 3cdc1ad0787e..52cc865f1464 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1151,12 +1151,14 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
                 /* released below */
                 ns = aa_get_namespace(root);
 
-        write_lock(&ns->lock);
         if (!name) {
                 /* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */
+                write_lock(&ns->parent->lock);
                 __remove_namespace(ns);
+                write_unlock(&ns->parent->lock);
         } else {
                 /* remove profile */
+                write_lock(&ns->lock);
                 profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name));
                 if (!profile) {
                         error = -ENOENT;
@@ -1165,8 +1167,8 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
                 }
                 name = profile->base.hname;
                 __remove_profile(profile);
+                write_unlock(&ns->lock);
         }
-        write_unlock(&ns->lock);
 
         /* don't fail removal if audit fails */
         (void) audit_policy(OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 4a368f1fd36d..a4136c10b1c6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
 /**
  * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
  * @profile - profile confining the task  (NOT NULL)
+ * @task - task the resource is being set on
  * @resource - the resource being set
  * @new_rlim - the new resource limit  (NOT NULL)
  *
@@ -79,18 +80,21 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
  *
  * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
  */
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-                      struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
+                      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
         int error = 0;
 
-        if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
-            new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
-
-                error = audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max,
-                        -EACCES);
+        /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
+         * processes.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+         * that the task is setting the resource of the current process
+         */
+        if ((task != current->group_leader) ||
+            (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
+             new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
+                error = -EACCES;
 
-        return error;
+        return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 16d100d3fc38..3fbcd1dda0ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
 
 /* set during initialization */
+extern int iint_initialized;
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern char *ima_hash;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index 7625b85c2274..afba4aef812f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@
 
 RADIX_TREE(ima_iint_store, GFP_ATOMIC);
 DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_iint_lock);
-
 static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
 
+int iint_initialized = 0;
+
 /* ima_iint_find_get - return the iint associated with an inode
  *
  * ima_iint_find_get gets a reference to the iint. Caller must
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
         iint_cache =
             kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
                               SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+        iint_initialized = 1;
         return 0;
 }
 security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f93641382e9f..e662b89d4079 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
         int rc;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+        if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
                 return;
         iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
         if (!iint)
                 return;
         mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+        if (!ima_initialized)
+                goto out;
         rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
         if (rc < 0)
                 goto out;
@@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+        if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
                 return;
         iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
         if (!iint)
@@ -230,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 {
         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-        int rc;
+        int rc = 0;
 
         if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
                 return 0;