4 files changed, 11 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index d5666d3cc21b..f73e2c204218 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -607,8 +607,8 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
         return error;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
-                                   struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+                unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
         struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
         int error = 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 96bab9469d48..19358dc14605 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -62,19 +62,14 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
         int deleted, connected;
         int error = 0;
 
-        /* Get the root we want to resolve too */
+        /* Get the root we want to resolve too, released below */
         if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
                 /* resolve paths relative to chroot */
-                read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
-                root = current->fs->root;
-                /* released below */
-                path_get(&root);
-                read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+                get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
         } else {
                 /* resolve paths relative to namespace */
                 root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root;
                 root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root;
-                /* released below */
                 path_get(&root);
         }
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 4e015996dd4d..9d172e6e330c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  *
  * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
  */
-static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 {
         static int warned;
         if (!warned) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 42043f96e54f..4796ddd4e721 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
         tty = get_current_tty();
         if (tty) {
-                file_list_lock();
+                spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+                        struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
                         struct inode *inode;
 
                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
@@ -2179,14 +2180,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
                            file may belong to another process and we are only
                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
-                        file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
+                        file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+                                                struct tty_file_private, list);
+                        file = file_priv->file;
                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
                         if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
                                 drop_tty = 1;
                         }
                 }
-                file_list_unlock();
+                spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
                 tty_kref_put(tty);
         }
         /* Reset controlling tty. */