2 files changed, 61 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 778cb0cfc5d8..48ca5b092768 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -24,6 +24,25 @@
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/*
+ * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
+ * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to
+ * be available in the default configuration.
+ */
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_FULL_SET
+#else /* ie. ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
+#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+
+kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET;    /* systemwide capability bound */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
+
+/* Global security state */
+
+unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
+
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
@@ -73,14 +92,44 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+
+static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
+{
+        /*
+         * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
+         * filesystem capability support.
+         */
+        return (target != current);
+}
+
+static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
+{
+        /*
+         * return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
+         * to the old permitted set.
+         */
+        return !cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP);
+}
+
+#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+
+static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
+static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
+
+#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+
 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-        /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capset. */
-        /* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */
-        if (!cap_issubset (*inheritable,
-                           cap_combine (target->cap_inheritable,
-                                        current->cap_permitted))) {
+        if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
+                return -EPERM;
+        }
+        if (cap_inh_is_capped()
+            && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+                             cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
+                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
+                /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
                 return -EPERM;
         }
 
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index bc43d4c7383e..6d895ade73de 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -37,15 +37,13 @@ static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
                          kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
 {
         *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
-        if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-                if (target->euid == 0) {
-                        *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
-                        *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
-                }
-                if (target->fsuid == 0) {
-                        *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
-                        *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
-                }
+        if (target->euid == 0) {
+                *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+                *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+        }
+        if (target->fsuid == 0) {
+                *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+                *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
         }
         return 0;
 }