9 files changed, 216 insertions, 282 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index eb41f43e2772..7f9b5fac8779 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -88,17 +88,16 @@ struct avc_entry {
         u32                     tsid;
         u16                     tclass;
         struct av_decision      avd;
-        atomic_t                used;   /* used recently */
 };
 
 struct avc_node {
         struct avc_entry        ae;
-        struct list_head        list;
+        struct hlist_node       list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
         struct rcu_head         rhead;
 };
 
 struct avc_cache {
-        struct list_head        slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS];
+        struct hlist_head       slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
         spinlock_t              slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
         atomic_t                lru_hint;       /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
         atomic_t                active_nodes;
@@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
         int i;
 
         for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-                INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
+                INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
                 spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
         }
         atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
@@ -250,16 +249,20 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 {
         int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
         struct avc_node *node;
+        struct hlist_head *head;
 
         rcu_read_lock();
 
         slots_used = 0;
         max_chain_len = 0;
         for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-                if (!list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i])) {
+                head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+                if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+                        struct hlist_node *next;
+
                         slots_used++;
                         chain_len = 0;
-                        list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+                        hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
                                 chain_len++;
                         if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
                                 max_chain_len = chain_len;
@@ -283,7 +286,7 @@ static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 
 static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
 {
-        list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+        hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
         call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
         atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
@@ -297,7 +300,7 @@ static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
 
 static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
 {
-        list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+        hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
         call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
         atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
@@ -307,29 +310,31 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
         struct avc_node *node;
         int hvalue, try, ecx;
         unsigned long flags;
+        struct hlist_head *head;
+        struct hlist_node *next;
+        spinlock_t *lock;
 
         for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
                 hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+                head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+                lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
-                if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags))
+                if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
                         continue;
 
                 rcu_read_lock();
-                list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
-                        if (atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used)) {
-                                /* Recently Unused */
-                                avc_node_delete(node);
-                                avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
-                                ecx++;
-                                if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
-                                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                                        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
+                hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
+                        avc_node_delete(node);
+                        avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+                        ecx++;
+                        if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+                                rcu_read_unlock();
+                                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+                                goto out;
                         }
                 }
                 rcu_read_unlock();
-                spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
         }
 out:
         return ecx;
@@ -344,8 +349,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
                 goto out;
 
         INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
-        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list);
-        atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1);
+        INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
         avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
 
         if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
@@ -355,21 +359,24 @@ out:
         return node;
 }
 
-static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
         node->ae.ssid = ssid;
         node->ae.tsid = tsid;
         node->ae.tclass = tclass;
-        memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+        memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
 }
 
 static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
         struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
         int hvalue;
+        struct hlist_head *head;
+        struct hlist_node *next;
 
         hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-        list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+        head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+        hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
                 if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
                     tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
                     tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
@@ -378,15 +385,6 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
                 }
         }
 
-        if (ret == NULL) {
-                /* cache miss */
-                goto out;
-        }
-
-        /* cache hit */
-        if (atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1)
-                atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1);
-out:
         return ret;
 }
 
@@ -395,30 +393,25 @@ out:
  * @ssid: source security identifier
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
  *
  * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
- * @requested permissions between the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
  * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
  * then this function return the avc_node.
  * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
         struct avc_node *node;
 
         avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
         node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
-        if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) {
+        if (node)
                 avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
-                goto out;
-        }
+        else
+                avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
 
-        node = NULL;
-        avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
-out:
         return node;
 }
 
@@ -449,34 +442,41 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * @ssid: source security identifier
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
- * @ae: AVC entry
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
  *
  * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
  * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
  * The access vectors and the sequence number are
  * normally provided by the security server in
  * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
- * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
  * revocation notification, then the function copies
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
         struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
         int hvalue;
         unsigned long flag;
 
-        if (avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1))
+        if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
                 goto out;
 
         node = avc_alloc_node();
         if (node) {
+                struct hlist_head *head;
+                struct hlist_node *next;
+                spinlock_t *lock;
+
                 hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-                avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae);
+                avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+
+                head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+                lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
-                spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
-                list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+                spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+                hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
                         if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
                             pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
                             pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
@@ -484,9 +484,9 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_en
                                 goto found;
                         }
                 }
-                list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]);
+                hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
 found:
-                spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
         }
 out:
         return node;
@@ -742,17 +742,22 @@ static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
  * @event : Updating event
  * @perms : Permission mask bits
  * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
  *
  * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
  * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
  * otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+                           u32 seqno)
 {
         int hvalue, rc = 0;
         unsigned long flag;
         struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+        struct hlist_head *head;
+        struct hlist_node *next;
+        spinlock_t *lock;
 
         node = avc_alloc_node();
         if (!node) {
@@ -762,12 +767,17 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 
         /* Lock the target slot */
         hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-        spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
 
-        list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+        head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+        lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+        spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+        hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
                 if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
                     tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
-                    tclass == pos->ae.tclass){
+                    tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+                    seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
                         orig = pos;
                         break;
                 }
@@ -783,7 +793,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
          * Copy and replace original node.
          */
 
-        avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae);
+        avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
 
         switch (event) {
         case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
@@ -808,7 +818,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
         }
         avc_node_replace(node, orig);
 out_unlock:
-        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+        spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 out:
         return rc;
 }
@@ -823,18 +833,24 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
         int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
         unsigned long flag;
         struct avc_node *node;
+        struct hlist_head *head;
+        struct hlist_node *next;
+        spinlock_t *lock;
 
         for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-                spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+                head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+                lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+                spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
                 /*
                  * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
                  * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
                  */
                 rcu_read_lock();
-                list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+                hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
                         avc_node_delete(node);
                 rcu_read_unlock();
-                spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
         }
 
         for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
@@ -875,10 +891,10 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                          u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                          unsigned flags,
-                         struct av_decision *avd)
+                         struct av_decision *in_avd)
 {
         struct avc_node *node;
-        struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
+        struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
         int rc = 0;
         u32 denied;
 
@@ -886,29 +902,34 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
         rcu_read_lock();
 
-        node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
+        node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
         if (!node) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
-                rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &entry.avd);
+
+                if (in_avd)
+                        avd = in_avd;
+                else
+                        avd = &avd_entry;
+
+                rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
                 if (rc)
                         goto out;
                 rcu_read_lock();
-                node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry);
+                node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+        } else {
+                if (in_avd)
+                        memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
+                avd = &node->ae.avd;
         }
 
-        p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
-
-        if (avd)
-                memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd));
-
-        denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
+        denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 
         if (denied) {
                 if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
                         rc = -EACCES;
                 else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
                         avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
-                                        tsid, tclass);
+                                        tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
                 else
                         rc = -EACCES;
         }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 00815973d412..7c52ba243c64 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ enum {
         Opt_fscontext = 2,
         Opt_defcontext = 3,
         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+        Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 };
 
 static const match_table_t tokens = {
@@ -360,6 +361,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+        {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
         {Opt_error, NULL},
 };
 
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                 }
         }
 
-        sbsec->initialized = 1;
+        sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 
         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
@@ -441,6 +443,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
+        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
+            sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+                sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
         /* Initialize the root inode. */
         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -487,23 +495,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 
         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 
-        if (!sbsec->initialized)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         if (!ss_initialized)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        /*
-         * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
-         * settings this is going to need a mask
-         */
-        tmp = sbsec->flags;
+        tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
                 if (tmp & 0x01)
                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
                 tmp >>= 1;
         }
+        /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
@@ -549,6 +556,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
         }
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+                opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+                opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+        }
 
         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 
@@ -562,8 +573,10 @@ out_free:
 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+        char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
-        if (sbsec->initialized)
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
                     (old_sid != new_sid))
                         return 1;
@@ -571,8 +584,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
          */
-        if (!sbsec->initialized)
-                if (sbsec->flags & flag)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+                if (mnt_flags & flag)
                         return 1;
         return 0;
 }
@@ -626,7 +639,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
          * will be used for both mounts)
          */
-        if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+        if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
             && (num_opts == 0))
                 goto out;
 
@@ -637,6 +650,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
          */
         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
                 u32 sid;
+
+                if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                        continue;
                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
                 if (rc) {
@@ -690,19 +706,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                 }
         }
 
-        if (sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
-                if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
+                if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
                         goto out_double_mount;
                 rc = 0;
                 goto out;
         }
 
         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
-                sbsec->proc = 1;
+                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 
         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-        rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+        rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
         if (rc) {
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
@@ -806,10 +822,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
         }
 
         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
-        BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
+        BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 
         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
-        if (newsbsec->initialized)
+        if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
                 return;
 
         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
@@ -917,7 +933,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
                                 goto out_err;
                         }
                         break;
-
+                case Opt_labelsupport:
+                        break;
                 default:
                         rc = -EINVAL;
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
@@ -999,7 +1016,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
         char *prefix;
 
         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
-                char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+                char *has_comma;
+
+                if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+                        has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+                else
+                        has_comma = NULL;
 
                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
@@ -1014,6 +1036,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
                         break;
+                case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+                        seq_putc(m, ',');
+                        seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+                        continue;
                 default:
                         BUG();
                 };
@@ -1209,7 +1235,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                 goto out_unlock;
 
         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-        if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
                    server is ready to handle calls. */
@@ -1237,19 +1263,26 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
                 }
                 if (!dentry) {
-                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
-                               "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
-                               inode->i_ino);
+                        /*
+                         * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+                         * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+                         * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+                         * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+                         * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+                         * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+                         * be used again by userspace.
+                         */
                         goto out_unlock;
                 }
 
                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
-                context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+                context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
                 if (!context) {
                         rc = -ENOMEM;
                         dput(dentry);
                         goto out_unlock;
                 }
+                context[len] = '\0';
                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
                                            context, len);
                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
@@ -1262,12 +1295,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                         }
                         kfree(context);
                         len = rc;
-                        context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+                        context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
                         if (!context) {
                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
                                 dput(dentry);
                                 goto out_unlock;
                         }
+                        context[len] = '\0';
                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
                                                    context, len);
@@ -1289,10 +1323,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
                                                              GFP_NOFS);
                         if (rc) {
-                                printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-                                       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-                                       __func__, context, -rc,
-                                       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+                                char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+                                unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+                                if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+                                        if (printk_ratelimit())
+                                                printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+                                                        "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+                                                        "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+                                } else {
+                                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+                                               "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+                                               __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+                                }
                                 kfree(context);
                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
                                 rc = 0;
@@ -1326,7 +1369,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
-                if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+                if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
                         if (proci->pde) {
                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
@@ -1587,7 +1630,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
                 if (rc)
                         return rc;
@@ -1801,6 +1844,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
+                else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+                        av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
                 else
                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
@@ -1815,7 +1860,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1832,7 +1877,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1848,7 +1893,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         if (error)
                 return error;
 
-        return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+        return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1858,7 +1903,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
         int error;
 
-        error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+        error = cap_capset(new, old,
                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
         if (error)
                 return error;
@@ -1866,12 +1911,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
                            int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+        rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1997,7 +2052,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+        rc = cap_syslog(type);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2028,10 +2083,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2058,7 +2109,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+        rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2156,11 +2207,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-}
-
 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2180,7 +2226,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
         }
 
-        return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+        return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -2290,8 +2336,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
         int rc, i;
 
-        secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
                 return;
@@ -2337,8 +2381,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         int rc, i;
         unsigned long flags;
 
-        secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
-
         osid = tsec->osid;
         sid = tsec->sid;
 
@@ -2400,7 +2442,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
-                match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
+                match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+                match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
 }
 
 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -2513,11 +2556,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
                          void *data)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
@@ -2530,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2570,7 +2603,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         sid = tsec->sid;
         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-        if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
                                              &newsid);
@@ -2585,14 +2618,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         }
 
         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
-        if (sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
                 isec->sid = newsid;
                 isec->initialized = 1;
         }
 
-        if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+        if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (name) {
@@ -2622,21 +2655,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma
 
 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
 }
 
@@ -2657,12 +2680,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 
 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
 }
 
@@ -2682,22 +2699,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (!mask) {
                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
@@ -2711,11 +2719,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
                 return 0;
@@ -2769,7 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
@@ -2931,16 +2934,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
         return len;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
-static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -3078,18 +3071,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                                  unsigned long prot)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
                 prot = reqprot;
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
-                rc = 0;
+                int rc = 0;
                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
@@ -3239,12 +3227,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 
 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
@@ -3278,14 +3260,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
- * commit new credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-        secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
-/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3329,29 +3303,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-        /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
-           since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
-           identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
-           this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
-           of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
-           capable hook. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-                                   int flags)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-        /* See the comment for setuid above. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3372,17 +3323,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
         *secid = task_sid(p);
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-        /* See the comment for setuid above. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+        rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3393,7 +3338,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+        rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3408,11 +3353,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -3428,7 +3368,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+        rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3451,10 +3391,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
         u32 perm;
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         if (!sig)
                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
         else
@@ -3467,18 +3403,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
         return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
-                              unsigned long arg2,
-                              unsigned long arg3,
-                              unsigned long arg4,
-                              unsigned long arg5)
-{
-        /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
-           any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
-           the state of the current process. */
-        return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
@@ -4047,10 +3971,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
@@ -4844,7 +4764,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         int err;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+        err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
@@ -4859,7 +4779,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
         int err;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+        err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
@@ -5167,11 +5087,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
         u32 perms;
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
                 perms = SHM__READ;
@@ -5581,7 +5496,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
 
         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
-        .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
@@ -5623,8 +5537,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
-        .inode_need_killpriv =          selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
-        .inode_killpriv =               selinux_inode_killpriv,
         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
@@ -5644,17 +5556,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
-        .cred_commit =                  selinux_cred_commit,
         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
-        .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
-        .task_fix_setuid =              selinux_task_fix_setuid,
-        .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
-        .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
@@ -5664,7 +5571,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
-        .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index c0c885427b91..31df1d7c1aee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
    S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
    S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
    S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 0ba79fe00e11..d645192ee950 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
 #define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
 #define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__OPEN                           0x00020000UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
 #define FIFO_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
@@ -707,6 +708,7 @@
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY         0x01000000UL
 #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV      0x02000000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT     0x04000000UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
 #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3cc45168f674..c4e062336ef3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
         u32 def_sid;                    /* default SID for labeling */
         u32 mntpoint_sid;               /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
         unsigned int behavior;          /* labeling behavior */
-        unsigned char initialized;      /* initialization flag */
         unsigned char flags;            /* which mount options were specified */
-        unsigned char proc;             /* proc fs */
         struct mutex lock;
         struct list_head isec_head;
         spinlock_t isec_lock;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 72447370bc95..5c3434f7626f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -37,15 +37,23 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX    POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
 #endif
 
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK      0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT     0x01
 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT   0x02
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT  0x08
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED        0x10
+#define SE_SBPROC               0x20
+#define SE_SBLABELSUPP  0x40
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR     "context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR   "fscontext="
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext="
 #define DEFCONTEXT_STR  "defcontext="
+#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
 
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 
@@ -80,7 +88,6 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
         u32 allowed;
-        u32 decided;
         u32 auditallow;
         u32 auditdeny;
         u32 seqno;
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 4ed7bab89c59..c6875fd3b9d6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
         { AUDIT_USER,           NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
         { AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,    NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
         { AUDIT_TTY_GET,        NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
-        { AUDIT_TTY_SET,        NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+        { AUDIT_TTY_SET,        NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT   },
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 01ec6d2c6b97..d3c8b982cfb0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 
         length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
                           "%x %x %x %x %u",
-                          avd.allowed, avd.decided,
+                          avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
                           avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
                           avd.seqno);
 out2:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index c65e4fe4a0f1..deeec6c013ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
          * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
          */
         avd->allowed = 0;
-        avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
         avd->auditallow = 0;
         avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
         avd->seqno = latest_granting;
@@ -743,7 +742,6 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 
         if (!ss_initialized) {
                 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
-                avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
                 avd->auditallow = 0;
                 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
                 avd->seqno = latest_granting;