1 files changed, 49 insertions, 52 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8fef74271f22..9b777140068f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -115,71 +115,40 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
                         struct flowi *fl)
 {
         u32 state_sid;
-        u32 pol_sid;
-        int err;
+        int rc;
 
-        if (xp->security) {
-                if (!x->security)
-                        /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
-                        return 0;
-                else
-                        state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
-                pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
-        } else
+        if (!xp->security)
                 if (x->security)
                         /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
                         return 0;
                 else
                         /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
                         return 1;
-
-        err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-                          NULL);
-
-        if (err)
-                return 0;
-
-        err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-                          NULL)? 0:1;
-
-        return err;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-                                  struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-        int rc = 0;
-        u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
-
-        if (!xp->security)
-                if (!xfrm->security)
-                        return 1;
-                else
-                        return 0;
         else
-                if (!xfrm->security)
+                if (!x->security)
+                        /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
                         return 0;
+                else
+                        if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+                                /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+                                return 0;
 
-        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-        if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
-                if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-                        return 0;
+        state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-                sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-        }
+        if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+                return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
                           NULL)? 0:1;
 
+        /*
+         * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
+         * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
+         * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
+         * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
+         */
+
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -481,6 +450,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                 }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * This check even when there's no association involved is
+         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+         * explicitly allowed by policy.
+         */
+
         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 
@@ -492,10 +468,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
  * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         struct dst_entry *dst;
         int rc = 0;
@@ -514,6 +490,27 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                 }
         }
 
+        switch (proto) {
+        case IPPROTO_AH:
+        case IPPROTO_ESP:
+        case IPPROTO_COMP:
+                /*
+                 * We should have already seen this packet once before
+                 * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
+                 * unlabeled check.
+                 */
+                goto out;
+        default:
+                break;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * This check even when there's no association involved is
+         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+         * explicitly allowed by policy.
+         */
+
         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 out: