1 files changed, 154 insertions, 406 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 00815973d412..8d8b69c5664e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,11 +89,10 @@
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
-extern int selinux_compat_net;
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 
-        selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
+        selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -353,6 +352,7 @@ enum {
         Opt_fscontext = 2,
         Opt_defcontext = 3,
         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+        Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 };
 
 static const match_table_t tokens = {
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+        {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
         {Opt_error, NULL},
 };
 
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                 }
         }
 
-        sbsec->initialized = 1;
+        sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 
         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
@@ -441,6 +442,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
+        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
+            sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+                sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
         /* Initialize the root inode. */
         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -487,23 +494,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 
         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 
-        if (!sbsec->initialized)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         if (!ss_initialized)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        /*
-         * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
-         * settings this is going to need a mask
-         */
-        tmp = sbsec->flags;
+        tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
                 if (tmp & 0x01)
                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
                 tmp >>= 1;
         }
+        /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
@@ -549,6 +555,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
         }
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+                opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+                opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+        }
 
         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 
@@ -562,8 +572,10 @@ out_free:
 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+        char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
-        if (sbsec->initialized)
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
                     (old_sid != new_sid))
                         return 1;
@@ -571,8 +583,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
          */
-        if (!sbsec->initialized)
-                if (sbsec->flags & flag)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+                if (mnt_flags & flag)
                         return 1;
         return 0;
 }
@@ -626,7 +638,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
          * will be used for both mounts)
          */
-        if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+        if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
             && (num_opts == 0))
                 goto out;
 
@@ -637,6 +649,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
          */
         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
                 u32 sid;
+
+                if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                        continue;
                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
                 if (rc) {
@@ -690,19 +705,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                 }
         }
 
-        if (sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
-                if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
+                if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
                         goto out_double_mount;
                 rc = 0;
                 goto out;
         }
 
         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
-                sbsec->proc = 1;
+                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 
         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-        rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+        rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
         if (rc) {
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
@@ -806,10 +821,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
         }
 
         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
-        BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
+        BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 
         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
-        if (newsbsec->initialized)
+        if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
                 return;
 
         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
@@ -917,7 +932,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
                                 goto out_err;
                         }
                         break;
-
+                case Opt_labelsupport:
+                        break;
                 default:
                         rc = -EINVAL;
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
@@ -999,7 +1015,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
         char *prefix;
 
         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
-                char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+                char *has_comma;
+
+                if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+                        has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+                else
+                        has_comma = NULL;
 
                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
@@ -1014,6 +1035,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
                         break;
+                case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+                        seq_putc(m, ',');
+                        seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+                        continue;
                 default:
                         BUG();
                 };
@@ -1209,7 +1234,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                 goto out_unlock;
 
         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-        if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
                    server is ready to handle calls. */
@@ -1237,22 +1262,31 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
                 }
                 if (!dentry) {
-                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
-                               "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
-                               inode->i_ino);
+                        /*
+                         * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+                         * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+                         * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+                         * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
+                         * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+                         * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+                         * be used again by userspace.
+                         */
                         goto out_unlock;
                 }
 
                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
-                context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+                context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
                 if (!context) {
                         rc = -ENOMEM;
                         dput(dentry);
                         goto out_unlock;
                 }
+                context[len] = '\0';
                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
                                            context, len);
                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+                        kfree(context);
+
                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
                                                    NULL, 0);
@@ -1260,14 +1294,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                                 dput(dentry);
                                 goto out_unlock;
                         }
-                        kfree(context);
                         len = rc;
-                        context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+                        context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
                         if (!context) {
                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
                                 dput(dentry);
                                 goto out_unlock;
                         }
+                        context[len] = '\0';
                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
                                                    context, len);
@@ -1289,10 +1323,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
                                                              GFP_NOFS);
                         if (rc) {
-                                printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-                                       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-                                       __func__, context, -rc,
-                                       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+                                char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+                                unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+                                if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+                                        if (printk_ratelimit())
+                                                printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+                                                        "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+                                                        "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+                                } else {
+                                        printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+                                               "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+                                               __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+                                }
                                 kfree(context);
                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
                                 rc = 0;
@@ -1326,7 +1369,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
-                if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+                if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
                         if (proci->pde) {
                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
@@ -1587,7 +1630,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
                 if (rc)
                         return rc;
@@ -1801,6 +1844,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
+                else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+                        av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
                 else
                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
@@ -1815,7 +1860,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1832,7 +1877,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1848,7 +1893,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         if (error)
                 return error;
 
-        return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+        return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1858,7 +1903,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
         int error;
 
-        error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+        error = cap_capset(new, old,
                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
         if (error)
                 return error;
@@ -1866,12 +1911,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
                            int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+        rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1926,10 +1981,6 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
         u32 tsid, sid;
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         sid = current_sid();
 
         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
@@ -1997,7 +2048,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+        rc = cap_syslog(type);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2028,10 +2079,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2058,7 +2105,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+        rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2156,11 +2203,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-}
-
 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2180,7 +2222,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
         }
 
-        return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+        return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -2290,8 +2332,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
         int rc, i;
 
-        secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
                 return;
@@ -2332,12 +2372,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
         struct itimerval itimer;
-        struct sighand_struct *psig;
         u32 osid, sid;
         int rc, i;
-        unsigned long flags;
-
-        secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
 
         osid = tsec->osid;
         sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2357,22 +2393,20 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
-                flush_signals(current);
                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-                flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
-                sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
-                recalc_sigpending();
+                if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+                        __flush_signals(current);
+                        flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+                        sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+                }
                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
         }
 
         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
-        read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-        psig = current->parent->sighand;
-        spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
-        wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
-        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
-        read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+        wake_up_interruptible(&current->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 }
 
 /* superblock security operations */
@@ -2400,7 +2434,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
-                match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
+                match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+                match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
 }
 
 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -2513,11 +2548,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
                          void *data)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
@@ -2530,11 +2560,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2570,7 +2595,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         sid = tsec->sid;
         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-        if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
                                              &newsid);
@@ -2585,14 +2610,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         }
 
         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
-        if (sbsec->initialized) {
+        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
                 isec->sid = newsid;
                 isec->initialized = 1;
         }
 
-        if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+        if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (name) {
@@ -2622,21 +2647,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma
 
 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
 }
 
@@ -2657,12 +2672,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 
 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
 }
 
@@ -2682,22 +2691,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (!mask) {
                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
@@ -2711,11 +2711,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
                 return 0;
@@ -2769,7 +2764,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
@@ -2931,16 +2926,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
         return len;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
-static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -2952,7 +2937,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
         if (!mask) {
@@ -2964,29 +2948,15 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
 
-        rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
-                           file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
-        return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+        return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+                             file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-        struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-        struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-        struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
-        u32 sid = current_sid();
-
-        if (!mask) {
+        if (!mask)
                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
                 return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
-            && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
-                return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
 
         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
@@ -3060,9 +3030,21 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         int rc = 0;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
-        if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+        /*
+         * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
+         * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
+         * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
+         * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
+         */
+        if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+                if (rc)
+                        return rc;
+        }
+
+        /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
         if (rc || addr_only)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3078,18 +3060,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                                  unsigned long prot)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
                 prot = reqprot;
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
-                rc = 0;
+                int rc = 0;
                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
@@ -3181,7 +3158,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
 {
         struct file *file;
-        u32 sid = current_sid();
+        u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
         u32 perm;
         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 
@@ -3239,12 +3216,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 
 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
@@ -3278,14 +3249,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
- * commit new credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-        secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
-/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3329,29 +3292,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-        /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
-           since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
-           identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
-           this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
-           of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
-           capable hook. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-                                   int flags)
-{
-        return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-        /* See the comment for setuid above. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3372,17 +3312,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
         *secid = task_sid(p);
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-        /* See the comment for setuid above. */
-        return 0;
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+        rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3393,7 +3327,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+        rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3408,11 +3342,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -3428,7 +3357,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+        rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3451,10 +3380,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
         u32 perm;
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
         if (!sig)
                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
         else
@@ -3467,18 +3392,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
         return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
-                              unsigned long arg2,
-                              unsigned long arg3,
-                              unsigned long arg4,
-                              unsigned long arg5)
-{
-        /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
-           any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
-           the state of the current process. */
-        return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-}
-
 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
@@ -3799,7 +3712,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-                err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
+                err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
         }
 
         return err;
@@ -3990,13 +3903,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
                                   int size)
 {
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-
-        return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
+        return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
@@ -4047,10 +3954,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
@@ -4120,72 +4023,6 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
-                                                struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                                struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-                                                u16 family,
-                                                char *addrp)
-{
-        int err;
-        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-        u16 sk_class;
-        u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
-        u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
-        sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
-        switch (sk_class) {
-        case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
-                node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
-                recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-                break;
-        case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
-                node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
-                recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-                break;
-        case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
-                node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
-                recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
-                break;
-        default:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
-                node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
-                recv_perm = 0;
-                break;
-        }
-
-        err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-        err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-        err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        if (!recv_perm)
-                return 0;
-        err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
-                              ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
-        if (unlikely(err)) {
-                printk(KERN_WARNING
-                       "SELinux: failure in"
-                       " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
-                       " network port label not found\n");
-                return err;
-        }
-        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
-}
-
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                        u16 family)
 {
@@ -4203,14 +4040,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
-        if (selinux_compat_net)
-                err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
-                                                           family, addrp);
-        else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+        if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
+                if (err)
+                        return err;
+        }
 
         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
@@ -4252,7 +4087,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-        if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+        if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4384,7 +4219,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 
-        selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
+        selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -4428,16 +4263,15 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
-                return 0;
+        } else {
+                err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
+                if (err)
+                        return err;
+                req->secid = newsid;
+                req->peer_secid = peersid;
         }
 
-        err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        req->secid = newsid;
-        req->peer_secid = peersid;
-        return 0;
+        return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
@@ -4454,7 +4288,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 
         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
          * thread with access to newsksec */
-        selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
+        selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -4467,8 +4301,6 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
                 family = PF_INET;
 
         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
-
-        selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4620,71 +4452,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
 }
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
-                                                int ifindex,
-                                                struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-                                                u16 family, char *addrp)
-{
-        int err;
-        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-        u16 sk_class;
-        u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
-        u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
-        sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
-        switch (sk_class) {
-        case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
-                node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
-                send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-                break;
-        case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
-                node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
-                send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-                break;
-        case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
-                node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
-                send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
-                break;
-        default:
-                netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
-                node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
-                send_perm = 0;
-                break;
-        }
-
-        err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-        err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
-                return err;
-
-        err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-        err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        if (send_perm != 0)
-                return 0;
-
-        err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
-                              ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
-        if (unlikely(err)) {
-                printk(KERN_WARNING
-                       "SELinux: failure in"
-                       " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
-                       " network port label not found\n");
-                return err;
-        }
-        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
-}
-
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
                                                 int ifindex,
                                                 u16 family)
@@ -4705,15 +4472,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
                 return NF_DROP;
 
-        if (selinux_compat_net) {
-                if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
-                                                         &ad, family, addrp))
-                        return NF_DROP;
-        } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+        if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
                         return NF_DROP;
-        }
 
         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
@@ -4737,7 +4499,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-        if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+        if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
@@ -4746,7 +4508,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
-        if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
+        if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
                 return NF_ACCEPT;
 #endif
         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4844,7 +4606,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         int err;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+        err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
@@ -4859,7 +4621,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
         int err;
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-        err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+        err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
@@ -5167,11 +4929,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
         u32 perms;
-        int rc;
-
-        rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
 
         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
                 perms = SHM__READ;
@@ -5581,7 +5338,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
 
         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
-        .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
@@ -5623,8 +5379,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
-        .inode_need_killpriv =          selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
-        .inode_killpriv =               selinux_inode_killpriv,
         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
@@ -5644,17 +5398,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
-        .cred_commit =                  selinux_cred_commit,
         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
-        .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
-        .task_fix_setuid =              selinux_task_fix_setuid,
-        .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
-        .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
@@ -5664,7 +5413,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
-        .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,