1 files changed, 1 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 8ee42b2a5f19..1a04247e3a17 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                 u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
                 struct common_audit_data *a,
                 unsigned flags)
@@ -497,67 +497,6 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 }
 
 /**
- * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
- * @a:  auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
- * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
- * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
- * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
- * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
- * before calling the auditing code.
- */
-inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-               u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
-               unsigned flags)
-{
-        u32 denied, audited;
-        denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
-        if (unlikely(denied)) {
-                audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
-                /*
-                 * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
-                 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
-                 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
-                 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
-                 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
-                 * assume:
-                 *
-                 * denied == READ
-                 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
-                 * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
-                 *
-                 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
-                 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
-                 * ACCESS
-                 */
-                if (a &&
-                    a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
-                    !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
-                        audited = 0;
-        } else if (result)
-                audited = denied = requested;
-        else
-                audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
-        if (likely(!audited))
-                return 0;
-
-        return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-                requested, audited, denied,
-                a, flags);
-}
-
-/**
  * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
  * @callback: callback function
  * @events: security events