diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/Kconfig | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/Makefile | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 216 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 384 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 108 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/iint.c | 172 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 169 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 50 |
18 files changed, 1056 insertions, 201 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4bf00acf7937 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ | |||
1 | # | ||
2 | config INTEGRITY | ||
3 | def_bool y | ||
4 | depends on IMA || EVM | ||
5 | |||
6 | source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | ||
7 | source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0ae44aea6516 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ | |||
1 | # | ||
2 | # Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) | ||
3 | # | ||
4 | |||
5 | obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o | ||
6 | |||
7 | integrity-y := iint.o | ||
8 | |||
9 | subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima | ||
10 | obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o | ||
11 | subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm | ||
12 | obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..afbb59dd262d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ | |||
1 | config EVM | ||
2 | boolean "EVM support" | ||
3 | depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n) | ||
4 | select CRYPTO_HMAC | ||
5 | select CRYPTO_MD5 | ||
6 | select CRYPTO_SHA1 | ||
7 | select ENCRYPTED_KEYS | ||
8 | default n | ||
9 | help | ||
10 | EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against | ||
11 | integrity attacks. | ||
12 | |||
13 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7393c415a066 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ | |||
1 | # | ||
2 | # Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM) | ||
3 | # | ||
4 | obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o | ||
5 | |||
6 | evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o | ||
7 | evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d320f5197437 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
9 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
10 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: evm.h | ||
13 | * | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | ||
16 | #include <linux/security.h> | ||
17 | #include "../integrity.h" | ||
18 | |||
19 | extern int evm_initialized; | ||
20 | extern char *evm_hmac; | ||
21 | |||
22 | extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; | ||
23 | |||
24 | /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ | ||
25 | extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; | ||
26 | |||
27 | extern int evm_init_key(void); | ||
28 | extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
29 | const char *req_xattr_name, | ||
30 | const char *req_xattr_value, | ||
31 | size_t req_xattr_value_len); | ||
32 | extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, | ||
33 | const char *req_xattr_value, | ||
34 | size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); | ||
35 | extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, | ||
36 | char *hmac_val); | ||
37 | extern int evm_init_secfs(void); | ||
38 | extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void); | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5dd5b140242c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
9 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
10 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: evm_crypto.c | ||
13 | * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | |||
16 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
17 | #include <linux/crypto.h> | ||
18 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | ||
19 | #include <keys/encrypted-type.h> | ||
20 | #include <crypto/hash.h> | ||
21 | #include "evm.h" | ||
22 | |||
23 | #define EVMKEY "evm-key" | ||
24 | #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 | ||
25 | static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; | ||
26 | static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE; | ||
27 | |||
28 | struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; | ||
29 | |||
30 | static struct shash_desc *init_desc(void) | ||
31 | { | ||
32 | int rc; | ||
33 | struct shash_desc *desc; | ||
34 | |||
35 | if (hmac_tfm == NULL) { | ||
36 | hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); | ||
37 | if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) { | ||
38 | pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", | ||
39 | evm_hmac, PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm)); | ||
40 | rc = PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm); | ||
41 | hmac_tfm = NULL; | ||
42 | return ERR_PTR(rc); | ||
43 | } | ||
44 | } | ||
45 | |||
46 | desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac_tfm), | ||
47 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
48 | if (!desc) | ||
49 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | ||
50 | |||
51 | desc->tfm = hmac_tfm; | ||
52 | desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; | ||
53 | |||
54 | rc = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); | ||
55 | if (rc) | ||
56 | goto out; | ||
57 | rc = crypto_shash_init(desc); | ||
58 | out: | ||
59 | if (rc) { | ||
60 | kfree(desc); | ||
61 | return ERR_PTR(rc); | ||
62 | } | ||
63 | return desc; | ||
64 | } | ||
65 | |||
66 | /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode | ||
67 | * specific info. | ||
68 | * | ||
69 | * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete | ||
70 | * protection.) | ||
71 | */ | ||
72 | static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, | ||
73 | char *digest) | ||
74 | { | ||
75 | struct h_misc { | ||
76 | unsigned long ino; | ||
77 | __u32 generation; | ||
78 | uid_t uid; | ||
79 | gid_t gid; | ||
80 | umode_t mode; | ||
81 | } hmac_misc; | ||
82 | |||
83 | memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); | ||
84 | hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; | ||
85 | hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; | ||
86 | hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid; | ||
87 | hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid; | ||
88 | hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; | ||
89 | crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); | ||
90 | crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); | ||
91 | } | ||
92 | |||
93 | /* | ||
94 | * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs. | ||
95 | * | ||
96 | * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate | ||
97 | * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for | ||
98 | * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory. | ||
99 | */ | ||
100 | int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, | ||
101 | const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, | ||
102 | char *digest) | ||
103 | { | ||
104 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | ||
105 | struct shash_desc *desc; | ||
106 | char **xattrname; | ||
107 | size_t xattr_size = 0; | ||
108 | char *xattr_value = NULL; | ||
109 | int error; | ||
110 | int size; | ||
111 | |||
112 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | ||
113 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | ||
114 | desc = init_desc(); | ||
115 | if (IS_ERR(desc)) | ||
116 | return PTR_ERR(desc); | ||
117 | |||
118 | error = -ENODATA; | ||
119 | for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { | ||
120 | if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) | ||
121 | && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) { | ||
122 | error = 0; | ||
123 | crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, | ||
124 | req_xattr_value_len); | ||
125 | continue; | ||
126 | } | ||
127 | size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname, | ||
128 | &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS); | ||
129 | if (size == -ENOMEM) { | ||
130 | error = -ENOMEM; | ||
131 | goto out; | ||
132 | } | ||
133 | if (size < 0) | ||
134 | continue; | ||
135 | |||
136 | error = 0; | ||
137 | xattr_size = size; | ||
138 | crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); | ||
139 | } | ||
140 | hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest); | ||
141 | |||
142 | out: | ||
143 | kfree(xattr_value); | ||
144 | kfree(desc); | ||
145 | return error; | ||
146 | } | ||
147 | |||
148 | /* | ||
149 | * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr | ||
150 | * | ||
151 | * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked. | ||
152 | */ | ||
153 | int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, | ||
154 | const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) | ||
155 | { | ||
156 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | ||
157 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; | ||
158 | int rc = 0; | ||
159 | |||
160 | rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, | ||
161 | xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); | ||
162 | if (rc == 0) { | ||
163 | xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; | ||
164 | rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, | ||
165 | &xattr_data, | ||
166 | sizeof(xattr_data), 0); | ||
167 | } | ||
168 | else if (rc == -ENODATA) | ||
169 | rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); | ||
170 | return rc; | ||
171 | } | ||
172 | |||
173 | int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, | ||
174 | char *hmac_val) | ||
175 | { | ||
176 | struct shash_desc *desc; | ||
177 | |||
178 | desc = init_desc(); | ||
179 | if (IS_ERR(desc)) { | ||
180 | printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n"); | ||
181 | return PTR_ERR(desc); | ||
182 | } | ||
183 | |||
184 | crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); | ||
185 | hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val); | ||
186 | kfree(desc); | ||
187 | return 0; | ||
188 | } | ||
189 | |||
190 | /* | ||
191 | * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC | ||
192 | */ | ||
193 | int evm_init_key(void) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | struct key *evm_key; | ||
196 | struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp; | ||
197 | int rc = 0; | ||
198 | |||
199 | evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL); | ||
200 | if (IS_ERR(evm_key)) | ||
201 | return -ENOENT; | ||
202 | |||
203 | down_read(&evm_key->sem); | ||
204 | ekp = evm_key->payload.data; | ||
205 | if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { | ||
206 | rc = -EINVAL; | ||
207 | goto out; | ||
208 | } | ||
209 | memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen); | ||
210 | out: | ||
211 | /* burn the original key contents */ | ||
212 | memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen); | ||
213 | up_read(&evm_key->sem); | ||
214 | key_put(evm_key); | ||
215 | return rc; | ||
216 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92d3d99a9f7b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Author: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
9 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
10 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: evm_main.c | ||
13 | * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, | ||
14 | * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr | ||
15 | */ | ||
16 | |||
17 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
18 | #include <linux/crypto.h> | ||
19 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | ||
20 | #include <linux/integrity.h> | ||
21 | #include <linux/evm.h> | ||
22 | #include <crypto/hash.h> | ||
23 | #include "evm.h" | ||
24 | |||
25 | int evm_initialized; | ||
26 | |||
27 | char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; | ||
28 | |||
29 | char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { | ||
30 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX | ||
31 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | ||
32 | #endif | ||
33 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK | ||
34 | XATTR_NAME_SMACK, | ||
35 | #endif | ||
36 | XATTR_NAME_CAPS, | ||
37 | NULL | ||
38 | }; | ||
39 | |||
40 | static int evm_fixmode; | ||
41 | static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) | ||
42 | { | ||
43 | if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) | ||
44 | evm_fixmode = 1; | ||
45 | return 0; | ||
46 | } | ||
47 | __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); | ||
48 | |||
49 | /* | ||
50 | * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr | ||
51 | * | ||
52 | * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes | ||
53 | * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. | ||
54 | * | ||
55 | * For performance: | ||
56 | * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the | ||
57 | * HMAC.) | ||
58 | * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. | ||
59 | * | ||
60 | * Returns integrity status | ||
61 | */ | ||
62 | static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
63 | const char *xattr_name, | ||
64 | char *xattr_value, | ||
65 | size_t xattr_value_len, | ||
66 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) | ||
67 | { | ||
68 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; | ||
69 | enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; | ||
70 | int rc; | ||
71 | |||
72 | if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) | ||
73 | return iint->evm_status; | ||
74 | |||
75 | /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ | ||
76 | |||
77 | rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, | ||
78 | xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); | ||
79 | if (rc < 0) { | ||
80 | evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) | ||
81 | ? INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; | ||
82 | goto out; | ||
83 | } | ||
84 | |||
85 | xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; | ||
86 | rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (u8 *)&xattr_data, | ||
87 | sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS); | ||
88 | if (rc < 0) | ||
89 | evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) | ||
90 | ? INTEGRITY_NOLABEL : INTEGRITY_FAIL; | ||
91 | out: | ||
92 | if (iint) | ||
93 | iint->evm_status = evm_status; | ||
94 | return evm_status; | ||
95 | } | ||
96 | |||
97 | static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) | ||
98 | { | ||
99 | char **xattrname; | ||
100 | int namelen; | ||
101 | int found = 0; | ||
102 | |||
103 | namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); | ||
104 | for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { | ||
105 | if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen) | ||
106 | && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) { | ||
107 | found = 1; | ||
108 | break; | ||
109 | } | ||
110 | if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, | ||
111 | *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, | ||
112 | strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { | ||
113 | found = 1; | ||
114 | break; | ||
115 | } | ||
116 | } | ||
117 | return found; | ||
118 | } | ||
119 | |||
120 | /** | ||
121 | * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr | ||
122 | * @dentry: object of the verify xattr | ||
123 | * @xattr_name: requested xattr | ||
124 | * @xattr_value: requested xattr value | ||
125 | * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length | ||
126 | * | ||
127 | * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored | ||
128 | * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length | ||
129 | * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. | ||
130 | * | ||
131 | * Returns the xattr integrity status. | ||
132 | * | ||
133 | * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it | ||
134 | * is executed. | ||
135 | */ | ||
136 | enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, | ||
137 | const char *xattr_name, | ||
138 | void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, | ||
139 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) | ||
140 | { | ||
141 | if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) | ||
142 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | ||
143 | |||
144 | if (!iint) { | ||
145 | iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode); | ||
146 | if (!iint) | ||
147 | return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | ||
148 | } | ||
149 | return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, | ||
150 | xattr_value_len, iint); | ||
151 | } | ||
152 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); | ||
153 | |||
154 | /* | ||
155 | * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity | ||
156 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
157 | * | ||
158 | * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are | ||
159 | * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. | ||
160 | */ | ||
161 | static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) | ||
162 | { | ||
163 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | ||
164 | |||
165 | if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) | ||
166 | return 0; | ||
167 | return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | |||
170 | /* | ||
171 | * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute | ||
172 | * | ||
173 | * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the | ||
174 | * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid. | ||
175 | * | ||
176 | * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not | ||
177 | * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr | ||
178 | * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. | ||
179 | * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently | ||
180 | * doesn't exist, to be updated. | ||
181 | */ | ||
182 | static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, | ||
183 | const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) | ||
184 | { | ||
185 | enum integrity_status evm_status; | ||
186 | |||
187 | if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { | ||
188 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | ||
189 | return -EPERM; | ||
190 | } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { | ||
191 | if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) | ||
192 | return 0; | ||
193 | evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); | ||
194 | if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || | ||
195 | (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) | ||
196 | return 0; | ||
197 | return -EPERM; | ||
198 | } | ||
199 | evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); | ||
200 | return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; | ||
201 | } | ||
202 | |||
203 | /** | ||
204 | * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute | ||
205 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
206 | * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name | ||
207 | * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value | ||
208 | * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length | ||
209 | * | ||
210 | * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that | ||
211 | * the current value is valid. | ||
212 | */ | ||
213 | int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, | ||
214 | const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) | ||
215 | { | ||
216 | return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, | ||
217 | xattr_value_len); | ||
218 | } | ||
219 | |||
220 | /** | ||
221 | * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute | ||
222 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
223 | * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name | ||
224 | * | ||
225 | * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that | ||
226 | * the current value is valid. | ||
227 | */ | ||
228 | int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) | ||
229 | { | ||
230 | return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); | ||
231 | } | ||
232 | |||
233 | /** | ||
234 | * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes | ||
235 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
236 | * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name | ||
237 | * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value | ||
238 | * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length | ||
239 | * | ||
240 | * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. | ||
241 | * | ||
242 | * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from | ||
243 | * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's | ||
244 | * i_mutex lock. | ||
245 | */ | ||
246 | void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, | ||
247 | const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) | ||
248 | { | ||
249 | if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) | ||
250 | && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) | ||
251 | return; | ||
252 | |||
253 | evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); | ||
254 | return; | ||
255 | } | ||
256 | |||
257 | /** | ||
258 | * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr | ||
259 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
260 | * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name | ||
261 | * | ||
262 | * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. | ||
263 | */ | ||
264 | void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) | ||
265 | { | ||
266 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | ||
267 | |||
268 | if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) | ||
269 | return; | ||
270 | |||
271 | mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); | ||
272 | evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); | ||
273 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); | ||
274 | return; | ||
275 | } | ||
276 | |||
277 | /** | ||
278 | * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute | ||
279 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
280 | */ | ||
281 | int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) | ||
282 | { | ||
283 | unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; | ||
284 | enum integrity_status evm_status; | ||
285 | |||
286 | if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) | ||
287 | return 0; | ||
288 | evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); | ||
289 | if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || | ||
290 | (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) | ||
291 | return 0; | ||
292 | return -EPERM; | ||
293 | } | ||
294 | |||
295 | /** | ||
296 | * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata | ||
297 | * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry | ||
298 | * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status | ||
299 | * | ||
300 | * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID | ||
301 | * changes. | ||
302 | * | ||
303 | * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller | ||
304 | * to lock the inode's i_mutex. | ||
305 | */ | ||
306 | void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) | ||
307 | { | ||
308 | if (!evm_initialized) | ||
309 | return; | ||
310 | |||
311 | if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) | ||
312 | evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); | ||
313 | return; | ||
314 | } | ||
315 | |||
316 | /* | ||
317 | * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm | ||
318 | */ | ||
319 | int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, | ||
320 | const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, | ||
321 | struct xattr *evm_xattr) | ||
322 | { | ||
323 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; | ||
324 | int rc; | ||
325 | |||
326 | if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) | ||
327 | return 0; | ||
328 | |||
329 | xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); | ||
330 | if (!xattr_data) | ||
331 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
332 | |||
333 | xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; | ||
334 | rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); | ||
335 | if (rc < 0) | ||
336 | goto out; | ||
337 | |||
338 | evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; | ||
339 | evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); | ||
340 | evm_xattr->name = kstrdup(XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); | ||
341 | return 0; | ||
342 | out: | ||
343 | kfree(xattr_data); | ||
344 | return rc; | ||
345 | } | ||
346 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); | ||
347 | |||
348 | static int __init init_evm(void) | ||
349 | { | ||
350 | int error; | ||
351 | |||
352 | error = evm_init_secfs(); | ||
353 | if (error < 0) { | ||
354 | printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n"); | ||
355 | goto err; | ||
356 | } | ||
357 | err: | ||
358 | return error; | ||
359 | } | ||
360 | |||
361 | static void __exit cleanup_evm(void) | ||
362 | { | ||
363 | evm_cleanup_secfs(); | ||
364 | if (hmac_tfm) | ||
365 | crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm); | ||
366 | } | ||
367 | |||
368 | /* | ||
369 | * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes | ||
370 | */ | ||
371 | static int __init evm_display_config(void) | ||
372 | { | ||
373 | char **xattrname; | ||
374 | |||
375 | for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) | ||
376 | printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname); | ||
377 | return 0; | ||
378 | } | ||
379 | |||
380 | pure_initcall(evm_display_config); | ||
381 | late_initcall(init_evm); | ||
382 | |||
383 | MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module"); | ||
384 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1753e98bf9a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Author: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
9 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
10 | */ | ||
11 | |||
12 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
13 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | ||
14 | |||
15 | int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr) | ||
16 | { | ||
17 | int xattr_len = strlen(xattr); | ||
18 | |||
19 | if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len) | ||
20 | && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0)) | ||
21 | return 1; | ||
22 | if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len) | ||
23 | && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0)) | ||
24 | return 1; | ||
25 | return 0; | ||
26 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ac7629950578 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
9 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
10 | * | ||
11 | * File: evm_secfs.c | ||
12 | * - Used to signal when key is on keyring | ||
13 | * - Get the key and enable EVM | ||
14 | */ | ||
15 | |||
16 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> | ||
17 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
18 | #include "evm.h" | ||
19 | |||
20 | static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm; | ||
21 | |||
22 | /** | ||
23 | * evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm | ||
24 | * | ||
25 | * @filp: file pointer, not actually used | ||
26 | * @buf: where to put the result | ||
27 | * @count: maximum to send along | ||
28 | * @ppos: where to start | ||
29 | * | ||
30 | * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate | ||
31 | */ | ||
32 | static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, | ||
33 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | ||
34 | { | ||
35 | char temp[80]; | ||
36 | ssize_t rc; | ||
37 | |||
38 | if (*ppos != 0) | ||
39 | return 0; | ||
40 | |||
41 | sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized); | ||
42 | rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); | ||
43 | |||
44 | return rc; | ||
45 | } | ||
46 | |||
47 | /** | ||
48 | * evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm | ||
49 | * @file: file pointer, not actually used | ||
50 | * @buf: where to get the data from | ||
51 | * @count: bytes sent | ||
52 | * @ppos: where to start | ||
53 | * | ||
54 | * Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring. | ||
55 | * - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring | ||
56 | * - create list of hmac protected extended attributes | ||
57 | * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate | ||
58 | */ | ||
59 | static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, | ||
60 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | ||
61 | { | ||
62 | char temp[80]; | ||
63 | int i, error; | ||
64 | |||
65 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized) | ||
66 | return -EPERM; | ||
67 | |||
68 | if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) | ||
69 | return -EINVAL; | ||
70 | |||
71 | if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) | ||
72 | return -EFAULT; | ||
73 | |||
74 | temp[count] = '\0'; | ||
75 | |||
76 | if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) | ||
77 | return -EINVAL; | ||
78 | |||
79 | error = evm_init_key(); | ||
80 | if (!error) { | ||
81 | evm_initialized = 1; | ||
82 | pr_info("EVM: initialized\n"); | ||
83 | } else | ||
84 | pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n"); | ||
85 | return count; | ||
86 | } | ||
87 | |||
88 | static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = { | ||
89 | .read = evm_read_key, | ||
90 | .write = evm_write_key, | ||
91 | }; | ||
92 | |||
93 | int __init evm_init_secfs(void) | ||
94 | { | ||
95 | int error = 0; | ||
96 | |||
97 | evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, | ||
98 | NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops); | ||
99 | if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm)) | ||
100 | error = -EFAULT; | ||
101 | return error; | ||
102 | } | ||
103 | |||
104 | void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void) | ||
105 | { | ||
106 | if (evm_init_tpm) | ||
107 | securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm); | ||
108 | } | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..399641c3e846 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: integrity_iint.c | ||
13 | * - implements the integrity hooks: integrity_inode_alloc, | ||
14 | * integrity_inode_free | ||
15 | * - cache integrity information associated with an inode | ||
16 | * using a rbtree tree. | ||
17 | */ | ||
18 | #include <linux/slab.h> | ||
19 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
20 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | ||
21 | #include <linux/rbtree.h> | ||
22 | #include "integrity.h" | ||
23 | |||
24 | static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; | ||
25 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); | ||
26 | static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly; | ||
27 | |||
28 | int iint_initialized; | ||
29 | |||
30 | /* | ||
31 | * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode | ||
32 | */ | ||
33 | static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) | ||
34 | { | ||
35 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; | ||
36 | struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; | ||
37 | |||
38 | assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
39 | |||
40 | while (n) { | ||
41 | iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); | ||
42 | |||
43 | if (inode < iint->inode) | ||
44 | n = n->rb_left; | ||
45 | else if (inode > iint->inode) | ||
46 | n = n->rb_right; | ||
47 | else | ||
48 | break; | ||
49 | } | ||
50 | if (!n) | ||
51 | return NULL; | ||
52 | |||
53 | return iint; | ||
54 | } | ||
55 | |||
56 | /* | ||
57 | * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode | ||
58 | */ | ||
59 | struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) | ||
60 | { | ||
61 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; | ||
62 | |||
63 | if (!IS_IMA(inode)) | ||
64 | return NULL; | ||
65 | |||
66 | spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
67 | iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); | ||
68 | spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
69 | |||
70 | return iint; | ||
71 | } | ||
72 | |||
73 | static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) | ||
74 | { | ||
75 | iint->version = 0; | ||
76 | iint->flags = 0UL; | ||
77 | iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | ||
78 | kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); | ||
79 | } | ||
80 | |||
81 | /** | ||
82 | * integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode | ||
83 | * @inode: pointer to the inode | ||
84 | */ | ||
85 | int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) | ||
86 | { | ||
87 | struct rb_node **p; | ||
88 | struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL; | ||
89 | struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint; | ||
90 | int rc; | ||
91 | |||
92 | new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); | ||
93 | if (!new_iint) | ||
94 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
95 | |||
96 | new_iint->inode = inode; | ||
97 | new_node = &new_iint->rb_node; | ||
98 | |||
99 | mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
100 | spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
101 | |||
102 | p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; | ||
103 | while (*p) { | ||
104 | parent = *p; | ||
105 | test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache, | ||
106 | rb_node); | ||
107 | rc = -EEXIST; | ||
108 | if (inode < test_iint->inode) | ||
109 | p = &(*p)->rb_left; | ||
110 | else if (inode > test_iint->inode) | ||
111 | p = &(*p)->rb_right; | ||
112 | else | ||
113 | goto out_err; | ||
114 | } | ||
115 | |||
116 | inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; | ||
117 | rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p); | ||
118 | rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree); | ||
119 | |||
120 | spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
121 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
122 | |||
123 | return 0; | ||
124 | out_err: | ||
125 | spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
126 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
127 | iint_free(new_iint); | ||
128 | |||
129 | return rc; | ||
130 | } | ||
131 | |||
132 | /** | ||
133 | * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free | ||
134 | * @inode: pointer to the inode | ||
135 | * | ||
136 | * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. | ||
137 | */ | ||
138 | void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) | ||
139 | { | ||
140 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; | ||
141 | |||
142 | if (!IS_IMA(inode)) | ||
143 | return; | ||
144 | |||
145 | spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
146 | iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); | ||
147 | rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree); | ||
148 | spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); | ||
149 | |||
150 | iint_free(iint); | ||
151 | } | ||
152 | |||
153 | static void init_once(void *foo) | ||
154 | { | ||
155 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; | ||
156 | |||
157 | memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); | ||
158 | iint->version = 0; | ||
159 | iint->flags = 0UL; | ||
160 | mutex_init(&iint->mutex); | ||
161 | iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; | ||
162 | } | ||
163 | |||
164 | static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) | ||
165 | { | ||
166 | iint_cache = | ||
167 | kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache), | ||
168 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); | ||
169 | iint_initialized = 1; | ||
170 | return 0; | ||
171 | } | ||
172 | security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init); | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index b6ecfd4d8d78..19c053b82303 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | |||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ | |||
3 | config IMA | 3 | config IMA |
4 | bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" | 4 | bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" |
5 | depends on SECURITY | 5 | depends on SECURITY |
6 | select INTEGRITY | ||
6 | select SECURITYFS | 7 | select SECURITYFS |
7 | select CRYPTO | 8 | select CRYPTO |
8 | select CRYPTO_HMAC | 9 | select CRYPTO_HMAC |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 787c4cb916cd..5690c021de8f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile | |||
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ | |||
6 | obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o | 6 | obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o |
7 | 7 | ||
8 | ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ | 8 | ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ |
9 | ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o | 9 | ima_policy.o ima_audit.o |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 08408bd71462..3ccf7acac6df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h | |||
@@ -24,18 +24,19 @@ | |||
24 | #include <linux/tpm.h> | 24 | #include <linux/tpm.h> |
25 | #include <linux/audit.h> | 25 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
26 | 26 | ||
27 | #include "../integrity.h" | ||
28 | |||
27 | enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; | 29 | enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; |
28 | enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; | 30 | enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; |
29 | 31 | ||
30 | /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ | 32 | /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ |
31 | #define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE 20 | 33 | #define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE |
32 | #define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 | 34 | #define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 |
33 | 35 | ||
34 | #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9 | 36 | #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9 |
35 | #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) | 37 | #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) |
36 | 38 | ||
37 | /* set during initialization */ | 39 | /* set during initialization */ |
38 | extern int iint_initialized; | ||
39 | extern int ima_initialized; | 40 | extern int ima_initialized; |
40 | extern int ima_used_chip; | 41 | extern int ima_used_chip; |
41 | extern char *ima_hash; | 42 | extern char *ima_hash; |
@@ -96,34 +97,21 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) | |||
96 | return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS); | 97 | return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS); |
97 | } | 98 | } |
98 | 99 | ||
99 | /* iint cache flags */ | ||
100 | #define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 | ||
101 | |||
102 | /* integrity data associated with an inode */ | ||
103 | struct ima_iint_cache { | ||
104 | struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in ima_iint_tree */ | ||
105 | struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ | ||
106 | u64 version; /* track inode changes */ | ||
107 | unsigned char flags; | ||
108 | u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
109 | struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ | ||
110 | }; | ||
111 | |||
112 | /* LIM API function definitions */ | 100 | /* LIM API function definitions */ |
113 | int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); | 101 | int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); |
114 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); | 102 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
115 | void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | 103 | struct file *file); |
104 | void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | ||
116 | const unsigned char *filename); | 105 | const unsigned char *filename); |
117 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, | 106 | int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, |
118 | struct inode *inode); | 107 | struct inode *inode); |
119 | void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, | 108 | void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show); |
120 | enum ima_show_type show); | ||
121 | 109 | ||
122 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete | 110 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete |
123 | * integrity data associated with an inode. | 111 | * integrity data associated with an inode. |
124 | */ | 112 | */ |
125 | struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); | 113 | struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); |
126 | struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode); | 114 | struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); |
127 | 115 | ||
128 | /* IMA policy related functions */ | 116 | /* IMA policy related functions */ |
129 | enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; | 117 | enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index da36d2c085a4..0d50df04ccc4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | |||
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) | |||
126 | * | 126 | * |
127 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise | 127 | * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise |
128 | */ | 128 | */ |
129 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) | 129 | int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
130 | struct file *file) | ||
130 | { | 131 | { |
131 | int result = -EEXIST; | 132 | int result = -EEXIST; |
132 | 133 | ||
@@ -156,8 +157,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) | |||
156 | * | 157 | * |
157 | * Must be called with iint->mutex held. | 158 | * Must be called with iint->mutex held. |
158 | */ | 159 | */ |
159 | void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, | 160 | void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
160 | const unsigned char *filename) | 161 | struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename) |
161 | { | 162 | { |
162 | const char *op = "add_template_measure"; | 163 | const char *op = "add_template_measure"; |
163 | const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; | 164 | const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ef21b96a0b42..e1aa2b482dd2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | |||
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1); | |||
287 | /* | 287 | /* |
288 | * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file | 288 | * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file |
289 | */ | 289 | */ |
290 | int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) | 290 | static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) |
291 | { | 291 | { |
292 | /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ | 292 | /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ |
293 | if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) | 293 | if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) |
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4ae73040ab7b..000000000000 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * File: ima_iint.c | ||
13 | * - implements the IMA hooks: ima_inode_alloc, ima_inode_free | ||
14 | * - cache integrity information associated with an inode | ||
15 | * using a rbtree tree. | ||
16 | */ | ||
17 | #include <linux/slab.h> | ||
18 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
19 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | ||
20 | #include <linux/rbtree.h> | ||
21 | #include "ima.h" | ||
22 | |||
23 | static struct rb_root ima_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; | ||
24 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_iint_lock); | ||
25 | static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly; | ||
26 | |||
27 | int iint_initialized = 0; | ||
28 | |||
29 | /* | ||
30 | * __ima_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode | ||
31 | */ | ||
32 | static struct ima_iint_cache *__ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode) | ||
33 | { | ||
34 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint; | ||
35 | struct rb_node *n = ima_iint_tree.rb_node; | ||
36 | |||
37 | assert_spin_locked(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
38 | |||
39 | while (n) { | ||
40 | iint = rb_entry(n, struct ima_iint_cache, rb_node); | ||
41 | |||
42 | if (inode < iint->inode) | ||
43 | n = n->rb_left; | ||
44 | else if (inode > iint->inode) | ||
45 | n = n->rb_right; | ||
46 | else | ||
47 | break; | ||
48 | } | ||
49 | if (!n) | ||
50 | return NULL; | ||
51 | |||
52 | return iint; | ||
53 | } | ||
54 | |||
55 | /* | ||
56 | * ima_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode) | ||
59 | { | ||
60 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint; | ||
61 | |||
62 | if (!IS_IMA(inode)) | ||
63 | return NULL; | ||
64 | |||
65 | spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
66 | iint = __ima_iint_find(inode); | ||
67 | spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
68 | |||
69 | return iint; | ||
70 | } | ||
71 | |||
72 | static void iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint) | ||
73 | { | ||
74 | iint->version = 0; | ||
75 | iint->flags = 0UL; | ||
76 | kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); | ||
77 | } | ||
78 | |||
79 | /** | ||
80 | * ima_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode | ||
81 | * @inode: pointer to the inode | ||
82 | */ | ||
83 | int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) | ||
84 | { | ||
85 | struct rb_node **p; | ||
86 | struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL; | ||
87 | struct ima_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint; | ||
88 | int rc; | ||
89 | |||
90 | new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); | ||
91 | if (!new_iint) | ||
92 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
93 | |||
94 | new_iint->inode = inode; | ||
95 | new_node = &new_iint->rb_node; | ||
96 | |||
97 | mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
98 | spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
99 | |||
100 | p = &ima_iint_tree.rb_node; | ||
101 | while (*p) { | ||
102 | parent = *p; | ||
103 | test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct ima_iint_cache, rb_node); | ||
104 | |||
105 | rc = -EEXIST; | ||
106 | if (inode < test_iint->inode) | ||
107 | p = &(*p)->rb_left; | ||
108 | else if (inode > test_iint->inode) | ||
109 | p = &(*p)->rb_right; | ||
110 | else | ||
111 | goto out_err; | ||
112 | } | ||
113 | |||
114 | inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; | ||
115 | rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p); | ||
116 | rb_insert_color(new_node, &ima_iint_tree); | ||
117 | |||
118 | spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
119 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
120 | |||
121 | return 0; | ||
122 | out_err: | ||
123 | spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
124 | mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ | ||
125 | iint_free(new_iint); | ||
126 | |||
127 | return rc; | ||
128 | } | ||
129 | |||
130 | /** | ||
131 | * ima_inode_free - called on security_inode_free | ||
132 | * @inode: pointer to the inode | ||
133 | * | ||
134 | * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. | ||
135 | */ | ||
136 | void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) | ||
137 | { | ||
138 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint; | ||
139 | |||
140 | if (!IS_IMA(inode)) | ||
141 | return; | ||
142 | |||
143 | spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
144 | iint = __ima_iint_find(inode); | ||
145 | rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &ima_iint_tree); | ||
146 | spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); | ||
147 | |||
148 | iint_free(iint); | ||
149 | } | ||
150 | |||
151 | static void init_once(void *foo) | ||
152 | { | ||
153 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint = foo; | ||
154 | |||
155 | memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); | ||
156 | iint->version = 0; | ||
157 | iint->flags = 0UL; | ||
158 | mutex_init(&iint->mutex); | ||
159 | } | ||
160 | |||
161 | static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void) | ||
162 | { | ||
163 | iint_cache = | ||
164 | kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0, | ||
165 | SLAB_PANIC, init_once); | ||
166 | iint_initialized = 1; | ||
167 | return 0; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init); | ||
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 26b46ff74663..1eff5cb001e5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | |||
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ | |||
22 | #include <linux/mount.h> | 22 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
23 | #include <linux/mman.h> | 23 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
24 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 24 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
25 | #include <linux/ima.h> | ||
25 | 26 | ||
26 | #include "ima.h" | 27 | #include "ima.h" |
27 | 28 | ||
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ out: | |||
82 | "open_writers"); | 83 | "open_writers"); |
83 | } | 84 | } |
84 | 85 | ||
85 | static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, | 86 | static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |
86 | struct inode *inode, | 87 | struct inode *inode, |
87 | struct file *file) | 88 | struct file *file) |
88 | { | 89 | { |
@@ -105,12 +106,12 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, | |||
105 | void ima_file_free(struct file *file) | 106 | void ima_file_free(struct file *file) |
106 | { | 107 | { |
107 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | 108 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; |
108 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint; | 109 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; |
109 | 110 | ||
110 | if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) | 111 | if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) |
111 | return; | 112 | return; |
112 | 113 | ||
113 | iint = ima_iint_find(inode); | 114 | iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); |
114 | if (!iint) | 115 | if (!iint) |
115 | return; | 116 | return; |
116 | 117 | ||
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | |||
121 | int mask, int function) | 122 | int mask, int function) |
122 | { | 123 | { |
123 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | 124 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; |
124 | struct ima_iint_cache *iint; | 125 | struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; |
125 | int rc = 0; | 126 | int rc = 0; |
126 | 127 | ||
127 | if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) | 128 | if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) |
@@ -131,9 +132,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, | |||
131 | if (rc != 0) | 132 | if (rc != 0) |
132 | return rc; | 133 | return rc; |
133 | retry: | 134 | retry: |
134 | iint = ima_iint_find(inode); | 135 | iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); |
135 | if (!iint) { | 136 | if (!iint) { |
136 | rc = ima_inode_alloc(inode); | 137 | rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode); |
137 | if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST) | 138 | if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST) |
138 | goto retry; | 139 | goto retry; |
139 | return rc; | 140 | return rc; |
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3143a3c39868 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2009-2010 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * | ||
4 | * Authors: | ||
5 | * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
6 | * | ||
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | ||
8 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | ||
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | ||
10 | * License. | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | */ | ||
13 | |||
14 | #include <linux/types.h> | ||
15 | #include <linux/integrity.h> | ||
16 | #include <crypto/sha.h> | ||
17 | |||
18 | /* iint cache flags */ | ||
19 | #define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 | ||
20 | |||
21 | enum evm_ima_xattr_type { | ||
22 | IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, | ||
23 | EVM_XATTR_HMAC, | ||
24 | EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, | ||
25 | }; | ||
26 | |||
27 | struct evm_ima_xattr_data { | ||
28 | u8 type; | ||
29 | u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
30 | } __attribute__((packed)); | ||
31 | |||
32 | /* integrity data associated with an inode */ | ||
33 | struct integrity_iint_cache { | ||
34 | struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ | ||
35 | struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ | ||
36 | u64 version; /* track inode changes */ | ||
37 | unsigned char flags; | ||
38 | u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | ||
39 | struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ | ||
40 | enum integrity_status evm_status; | ||
41 | }; | ||
42 | |||
43 | /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete | ||
44 | * integrity data associated with an inode. | ||
45 | */ | ||
46 | struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); | ||
47 | struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); | ||
48 | |||
49 | /* set during initialization */ | ||
50 | extern int iint_initialized; | ||