diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 414 |
1 files changed, 414 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b5291ad5ef56 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* | ||
| 2 | * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation | ||
| 3 | * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
| 6 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
| 7 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * ima_policy.c | ||
| 10 | * - initialize default measure policy rules | ||
| 11 | * | ||
| 12 | */ | ||
| 13 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
| 14 | #include <linux/list.h> | ||
| 15 | #include <linux/security.h> | ||
| 16 | #include <linux/magic.h> | ||
| 17 | #include <linux/parser.h> | ||
| 18 | |||
| 19 | #include "ima.h" | ||
| 20 | |||
| 21 | /* flags definitions */ | ||
| 22 | #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 | ||
| 23 | #define IMA_MASK 0x0002 | ||
| 24 | #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 | ||
| 25 | #define IMA_UID 0x0008 | ||
| 26 | |||
| 27 | enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; | ||
| 28 | |||
| 29 | #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 | ||
| 30 | enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, | ||
| 31 | LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE | ||
| 32 | }; | ||
| 33 | |||
| 34 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry { | ||
| 35 | struct list_head list; | ||
| 36 | enum ima_action action; | ||
| 37 | unsigned int flags; | ||
| 38 | enum ima_hooks func; | ||
| 39 | int mask; | ||
| 40 | unsigned long fsmagic; | ||
| 41 | uid_t uid; | ||
| 42 | struct { | ||
| 43 | void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ | ||
| 44 | int type; /* audit type */ | ||
| 45 | } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; | ||
| 46 | }; | ||
| 47 | |||
| 48 | /* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be | ||
| 49 | * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid | ||
| 50 | */ | ||
| 51 | static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { | ||
| 52 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, | ||
| 53 | .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 54 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 55 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 56 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 57 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, | ||
| 58 | .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 59 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
| 60 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, | ||
| 61 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, | ||
| 62 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, | ||
| 63 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, | ||
| 64 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, | ||
| 65 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID} | ||
| 66 | }; | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); | ||
| 69 | static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); | ||
| 70 | static struct list_head *ima_measure; | ||
| 71 | |||
| 72 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); | ||
| 73 | |||
| 74 | /** | ||
| 75 | * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. | ||
| 76 | * @rule: a pointer to a rule | ||
| 77 | * @inode: a pointer to an inode | ||
| 78 | * @func: LIM hook identifier | ||
| 79 | * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) | ||
| 80 | * | ||
| 81 | * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. | ||
| 82 | */ | ||
| 83 | static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, | ||
| 84 | struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) | ||
| 85 | { | ||
| 86 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | ||
| 87 | int i; | ||
| 88 | |||
| 89 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) | ||
| 90 | return false; | ||
| 91 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask) | ||
| 92 | return false; | ||
| 93 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) | ||
| 94 | && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) | ||
| 95 | return false; | ||
| 96 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid) | ||
| 97 | return false; | ||
| 98 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { | ||
| 99 | int rc; | ||
| 100 | u32 osid, sid; | ||
| 101 | |||
| 102 | if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) | ||
| 103 | continue; | ||
| 104 | |||
| 105 | switch (i) { | ||
| 106 | case LSM_OBJ_USER: | ||
| 107 | case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: | ||
| 108 | case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: | ||
| 109 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); | ||
| 110 | rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, | ||
| 111 | rule->lsm[i].type, | ||
| 112 | AUDIT_EQUAL, | ||
| 113 | rule->lsm[i].rule, | ||
| 114 | NULL); | ||
| 115 | break; | ||
| 116 | case LSM_SUBJ_USER: | ||
| 117 | case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: | ||
| 118 | case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: | ||
| 119 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); | ||
| 120 | rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, | ||
| 121 | rule->lsm[i].type, | ||
| 122 | AUDIT_EQUAL, | ||
| 123 | rule->lsm[i].rule, | ||
| 124 | NULL); | ||
| 125 | default: | ||
| 126 | break; | ||
| 127 | } | ||
| 128 | if (!rc) | ||
| 129 | return false; | ||
| 130 | } | ||
| 131 | return true; | ||
| 132 | } | ||
| 133 | |||
| 134 | /** | ||
| 135 | * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions | ||
| 136 | * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made | ||
| 137 | * @func: IMA hook identifier | ||
| 138 | * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) | ||
| 139 | * | ||
| 140 | * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) | ||
| 141 | * conditions. | ||
| 142 | * | ||
| 143 | * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list, | ||
| 144 | * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list | ||
| 145 | * change.) | ||
| 146 | */ | ||
| 147 | int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) | ||
| 148 | { | ||
| 149 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; | ||
| 150 | |||
| 151 | list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) { | ||
| 152 | bool rc; | ||
| 153 | |||
| 154 | rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask); | ||
| 155 | if (rc) | ||
| 156 | return entry->action; | ||
| 157 | } | ||
| 158 | return 0; | ||
| 159 | } | ||
| 160 | |||
| 161 | /** | ||
| 162 | * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. | ||
| 163 | * | ||
| 164 | * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the | ||
| 165 | * the new measure_policy_rules. | ||
| 166 | */ | ||
| 167 | void ima_init_policy(void) | ||
| 168 | { | ||
| 169 | int i; | ||
| 170 | |||
| 171 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++) | ||
| 172 | list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); | ||
| 173 | ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; | ||
| 174 | } | ||
| 175 | |||
| 176 | /** | ||
| 177 | * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules | ||
| 178 | * | ||
| 179 | * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new | ||
| 180 | * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be | ||
| 181 | * added to the policy. | ||
| 182 | */ | ||
| 183 | void ima_update_policy(void) | ||
| 184 | { | ||
| 185 | const char *op = "policy_update"; | ||
| 186 | const char *cause = "already exists"; | ||
| 187 | int result = 1; | ||
| 188 | int audit_info = 0; | ||
| 189 | |||
| 190 | if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { | ||
| 191 | ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; | ||
| 192 | cause = "complete"; | ||
| 193 | result = 0; | ||
| 194 | } | ||
| 195 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
| 196 | NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info); | ||
| 197 | } | ||
| 198 | |||
| 199 | enum { | ||
| 200 | Opt_err = -1, | ||
| 201 | Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, | ||
| 202 | Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, | ||
| 203 | Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, | ||
| 204 | Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid | ||
| 205 | }; | ||
| 206 | |||
| 207 | static match_table_t policy_tokens = { | ||
| 208 | {Opt_measure, "measure"}, | ||
| 209 | {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, | ||
| 210 | {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, | ||
| 211 | {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, | ||
| 212 | {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, | ||
| 213 | {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"}, | ||
| 214 | {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"}, | ||
| 215 | {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"}, | ||
| 216 | {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, | ||
| 217 | {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, | ||
| 218 | {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, | ||
| 219 | {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, | ||
| 220 | {Opt_err, NULL} | ||
| 221 | }; | ||
| 222 | |||
| 223 | static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, | ||
| 224 | char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) | ||
| 225 | { | ||
| 226 | int result; | ||
| 227 | |||
| 228 | entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; | ||
| 229 | result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, | ||
| 230 | AUDIT_EQUAL, args, | ||
| 231 | &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); | ||
| 232 | return result; | ||
| 233 | } | ||
| 234 | |||
| 235 | static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) | ||
| 236 | { | ||
| 237 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | ||
| 238 | char *p; | ||
| 239 | int result = 0; | ||
| 240 | |||
| 241 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); | ||
| 242 | |||
| 243 | entry->action = -1; | ||
| 244 | while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) { | ||
| 245 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | ||
| 246 | int token; | ||
| 247 | unsigned long lnum; | ||
| 248 | |||
| 249 | if (result < 0) | ||
| 250 | break; | ||
| 251 | if (!*p) | ||
| 252 | continue; | ||
| 253 | token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); | ||
| 254 | switch (token) { | ||
| 255 | case Opt_measure: | ||
| 256 | audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure"); | ||
| 257 | entry->action = MEASURE; | ||
| 258 | break; | ||
| 259 | case Opt_dont_measure: | ||
| 260 | audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure"); | ||
| 261 | entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; | ||
| 262 | break; | ||
| 263 | case Opt_func: | ||
| 264 | audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 265 | if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) | ||
| 266 | entry->func = PATH_CHECK; | ||
| 267 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) | ||
| 268 | entry->func = FILE_MMAP; | ||
| 269 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) | ||
| 270 | entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; | ||
| 271 | else | ||
| 272 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
| 273 | if (!result) | ||
| 274 | entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; | ||
| 275 | break; | ||
| 276 | case Opt_mask: | ||
| 277 | audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 278 | if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) | ||
| 279 | entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; | ||
| 280 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) | ||
| 281 | entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; | ||
| 282 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) | ||
| 283 | entry->mask = MAY_READ; | ||
| 284 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) | ||
| 285 | entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; | ||
| 286 | else | ||
| 287 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
| 288 | if (!result) | ||
| 289 | entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; | ||
| 290 | break; | ||
| 291 | case Opt_fsmagic: | ||
| 292 | audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 293 | result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, | ||
| 294 | &entry->fsmagic); | ||
| 295 | if (!result) | ||
| 296 | entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; | ||
| 297 | break; | ||
| 298 | case Opt_uid: | ||
| 299 | audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 300 | result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); | ||
| 301 | if (!result) { | ||
| 302 | entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; | ||
| 303 | if (entry->uid != lnum) | ||
| 304 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
| 305 | else | ||
| 306 | entry->flags |= IMA_UID; | ||
| 307 | } | ||
| 308 | break; | ||
| 309 | case Opt_obj_user: | ||
| 310 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 311 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 312 | LSM_OBJ_USER, | ||
| 313 | AUDIT_OBJ_USER); | ||
| 314 | break; | ||
| 315 | case Opt_obj_role: | ||
| 316 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 317 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 318 | LSM_OBJ_ROLE, | ||
| 319 | AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); | ||
| 320 | break; | ||
| 321 | case Opt_obj_type: | ||
| 322 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 323 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 324 | LSM_OBJ_TYPE, | ||
| 325 | AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); | ||
| 326 | break; | ||
| 327 | case Opt_subj_user: | ||
| 328 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 329 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 330 | LSM_SUBJ_USER, | ||
| 331 | AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); | ||
| 332 | break; | ||
| 333 | case Opt_subj_role: | ||
| 334 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 335 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 336 | LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, | ||
| 337 | AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); | ||
| 338 | break; | ||
| 339 | case Opt_subj_type: | ||
| 340 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
| 341 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
| 342 | LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, | ||
| 343 | AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); | ||
| 344 | break; | ||
| 345 | case Opt_err: | ||
| 346 | audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p); | ||
| 347 | break; | ||
| 348 | } | ||
| 349 | } | ||
| 350 | if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) | ||
| 351 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
| 352 | |||
| 353 | audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1); | ||
| 354 | audit_log_end(ab); | ||
| 355 | return result; | ||
| 356 | } | ||
| 357 | |||
| 358 | /** | ||
| 359 | * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules | ||
| 360 | * @rule - ima measurement policy rule | ||
| 361 | * | ||
| 362 | * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. | ||
| 363 | * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure. | ||
| 364 | */ | ||
| 365 | int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) | ||
| 366 | { | ||
| 367 | const char *op = "update_policy"; | ||
| 368 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; | ||
| 369 | int result = 0; | ||
| 370 | int audit_info = 0; | ||
| 371 | |||
| 372 | /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ | ||
| 373 | if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { | ||
| 374 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
| 375 | NULL, op, "already exists", | ||
| 376 | -EACCES, audit_info); | ||
| 377 | return -EACCES; | ||
| 378 | } | ||
| 379 | |||
| 380 | entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
| 381 | if (!entry) { | ||
| 382 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
| 383 | NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); | ||
| 384 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
| 385 | } | ||
| 386 | |||
| 387 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); | ||
| 388 | |||
| 389 | result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry); | ||
| 390 | if (!result) { | ||
| 391 | mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
| 392 | list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); | ||
| 393 | mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
| 394 | } else { | ||
| 395 | kfree(entry); | ||
| 396 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
| 397 | NULL, op, "invalid policy", result, | ||
| 398 | audit_info); | ||
| 399 | } | ||
| 400 | return result; | ||
| 401 | } | ||
| 402 | |||
| 403 | /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ | ||
| 404 | void ima_delete_rules(void) | ||
| 405 | { | ||
| 406 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; | ||
| 407 | |||
| 408 | mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
| 409 | list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { | ||
| 410 | list_del(&entry->list); | ||
| 411 | kfree(entry); | ||
| 412 | } | ||
| 413 | mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
| 414 | } | ||
