1 files changed, 939 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7daf0d528037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+        aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
+        cred->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+        struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+        if (!cxt)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        cred->security = cxt;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+                                 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+        struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+        if (!cxt)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
+        new->security = cxt;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
+        struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
+
+        aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+                                        unsigned int mode)
+{
+        int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+        if (error)
+                return error;
+
+        return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+        int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+        if (error)
+                return error;
+
+        return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+}
+
+/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
+static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        const struct cred *cred;
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        cred = __task_cred(target);
+        profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+        *effective = cred->cap_effective;
+        *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+        *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
+
+        if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+                *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
+                *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
+        }
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
+                            int cap, int audit)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
+        int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
+        if (!error) {
+                profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+                if (!unconfined(profile))
+                        error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+        }
+        return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
+                       struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        int error = 0;
+
+        profile = __aa_current_profile();
+        if (!unconfined(profile))
+                error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
+                                  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
+                                  struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+        struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
+
+        return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+                                  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+        struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
+        struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+                                  dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+        };
+
+        return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permission mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
+                          struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+        struct path_cond cond = { };
+
+        if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
+        cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+        return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: request permission mask
+ * @mode: created file mode
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+                              u32 mask, umode_t mode)
+{
+        struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
+
+        if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+        return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+                               int mode)
+{
+        return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+                                  S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+        return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+                               int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+        return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+                                  unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+        struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+                                  path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+        };
+
+        if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
+                           &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+                                 const char *old_name)
+{
+        return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+                                  S_IFLNK);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        int error = 0;
+
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        profile = aa_current_profile();
+        if (!unconfined(profile))
+                error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+                                struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        int error = 0;
+
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        profile = aa_current_profile();
+        if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+                struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+                struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+                struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+                                          old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+                };
+
+                error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
+                                     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
+                                     AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+                                     &cond);
+                if (!error)
+                        error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
+                                             0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
+                                             AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
+
+        }
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+                               mode_t mode)
+{
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+        struct path_cond cond =  { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+                                   path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+        };
+
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
+                                      AA_MAY_META_READ);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+        struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        int error = 0;
+
+        if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
+         * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
+         * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
+         * actually execute the image.
+         */
+        if (current->in_execve) {
+                fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+        if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+                struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+                struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
+
+                error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
+                                     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
+                /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
+                fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+        }
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+        /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
+        file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!file->f_security)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+        return 0;
+
+}
+
+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+        struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
+
+        aa_free_file_context(cxt);
+}
+
+static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+{
+        struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+        struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
+        int error = 0;
+
+        BUG_ON(!fprofile);
+
+        if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
+            !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+                return 0;
+
+        profile = __aa_current_profile();
+
+        /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
+         * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
+         * was granted.
+         *
+         * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
+         *       delegation from unconfined tasks
+         */
+        if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
+            ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
+                error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+        return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+        u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
+
+        if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
+                mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+        return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+                       unsigned long flags)
+{
+        struct dentry *dentry;
+        int mask = 0;
+
+        if (!file || !file->f_security)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (prot & PROT_READ)
+                mask |= MAY_READ;
+        /*
+         * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
+         * write back to the files
+         */
+        if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
+                mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+        if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+                mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+        dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+        return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+        int rc = 0;
+
+        /* do DAC check */
+        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+        if (rc || addr_only)
+                return rc;
+
+        return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                                  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+{
+        return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
+                           !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+                                char **value)
+{
+        int error = -ENOENT;
+        struct aa_profile *profile;
+        /* released below */
+        const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+        struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+        profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+        if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
+                error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
+                                       value);
+        else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && cxt->previous)
+                error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous),
+                                       value);
+        else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
+                error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec),
+                                       value);
+        else
+                error = -EINVAL;
+
+        put_cred(cred);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+                                void *value, size_t size)
+{
+        char *command, *args = value;
+        size_t arg_size;
+        int error;
+
+        if (size == 0)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
+         * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
+         * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
+         */
+        if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
+                if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
+                        return -EINVAL;
+                args[size] = '\0';
+        }
+
+        /* task can only write its own attributes */
+        if (current != task)
+                return -EACCES;
+
+        args = value;
+        args = strim(args);
+        command = strsep(&args, " ");
+        if (!args)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        args = skip_spaces(args);
+        if (!*args)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
+        if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+                if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
+                        error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+                                                         !AA_DO_TEST);
+                } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
+                        error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+                                                         AA_DO_TEST);
+                } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
+                        error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+                                                             !AA_DO_TEST);
+                } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
+                        error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+                                                             AA_DO_TEST);
+                } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
+                        error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
+                } else {
+                        struct common_audit_data sa;
+                        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+                        sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+                        sa.aad.info = name;
+                        sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
+                        return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+                                        &sa, NULL);
+                }
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
+                error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+                                                     !AA_DO_TEST);
+        } else {
+                /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
+                return -EINVAL;
+        }
+        if (!error)
+                error = size;
+        return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
+                                   struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+        struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
+        int error = 0;
+
+        if (!unconfined(profile))
+                error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
+
+        return error;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+        .name =                         "apparmor",
+
+        .ptrace_access_check =          apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
+        .ptrace_traceme =               apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
+        .capget =                       apparmor_capget,
+        .capable =                      apparmor_capable,
+
+        .path_link =                    apparmor_path_link,
+        .path_unlink =                  apparmor_path_unlink,
+        .path_symlink =                 apparmor_path_symlink,
+        .path_mkdir =                   apparmor_path_mkdir,
+        .path_rmdir =                   apparmor_path_rmdir,
+        .path_mknod =                   apparmor_path_mknod,
+        .path_rename =                  apparmor_path_rename,
+        .path_chmod =                   apparmor_path_chmod,
+        .path_chown =                   apparmor_path_chown,
+        .path_truncate =                apparmor_path_truncate,
+        .dentry_open =                  apparmor_dentry_open,
+        .inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
+
+        .file_permission =              apparmor_file_permission,
+        .file_alloc_security =          apparmor_file_alloc_security,
+        .file_free_security =           apparmor_file_free_security,
+        .file_mmap =                    apparmor_file_mmap,
+        .file_mprotect =                apparmor_file_mprotect,
+        .file_lock =                    apparmor_file_lock,
+
+        .getprocattr =                  apparmor_getprocattr,
+        .setprocattr =                  apparmor_setprocattr,
+
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+        .cred_free =                    apparmor_cred_free,
+        .cred_prepare =                 apparmor_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer =                apparmor_cred_transfer,
+
+        .bprm_set_creds =               apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
+        .bprm_committing_creds =        apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
+        .bprm_committed_creds =         apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
+        .bprm_secureexec =              apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
+
+        .task_setrlimit =               apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+};
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
+ */
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
+ */
+
+/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
+enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
+module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
+                  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Debug mode */
+int aa_g_debug;
+module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Audit mode */
+enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
+                  &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
+ * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
+ */
+int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
+                   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* lock out loading/removal of policy
+ * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
+ *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
+ */
+int aa_g_lock_policy;
+module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
+                   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Syscall logging mode */
+int aa_g_logsyscall;
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
+unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
+ * on the loaded policy is done.
+ */
+int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
+                   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Boot time disable flag */
+static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
+
+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+        unsigned long enabled;
+        int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+        if (!error)
+                apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+        return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
+
+/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        if (aa_g_lock_policy)
+                return -EACCES;
+        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        return param_set_uint(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        if (!apparmor_enabled)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        int i;
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        if (!apparmor_enabled)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        if (!val)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+                if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+                        aa_g_audit = i;
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+        return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        if (!apparmor_enabled)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+        int i;
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        if (!apparmor_enabled)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        if (!val)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+                if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+                        aa_g_profile_mode = i;
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+        return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor init functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
+ *
+ * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
+ */
+static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
+{
+        struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+        struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+
+        cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!cxt)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
+        cred->security = cxt;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
+{
+        int error;
+
+        if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+                aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
+                apparmor_enabled = 0;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
+        if (error) {
+                AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
+                goto alloc_out;
+        }
+
+        error = set_init_cxt();
+        if (error) {
+                AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
+                goto register_security_out;
+        }
+
+        error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
+        if (error) {
+                AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
+                goto register_security_out;
+        }
+
+        /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
+        apparmor_initialized = 1;
+        if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
+        else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
+                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
+        else
+                aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
+
+        return error;
+
+register_security_out:
+        aa_free_root_ns();
+
+alloc_out:
+        aa_destroy_aafs();
+
+        apparmor_enabled = 0;
+        return error;
+
+}
+
+security_initcall(apparmor_init);