10 files changed, 173 insertions, 89 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index 4f6d6f9d1274..39579c3e0d14 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1395,35 +1395,44 @@ static inline bool sctp_peer_needs_update(struct sctp_association *asoc)
         return false;
 }
 
-/* Update asoc's rwnd for the approximated state in the buffer,
- * and check whether SACK needs to be sent.
- */
-void sctp_assoc_rwnd_update(struct sctp_association *asoc, bool update_peer)
+/* Increase asoc's rwnd by len and send any window update SACK if needed. */
+void sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase(struct sctp_association *asoc, unsigned int len)
 {
-        int rx_count;
         struct sctp_chunk *sack;
         struct timer_list *timer;
 
-        if (asoc->ep->rcvbuf_policy)
-                rx_count = atomic_read(&asoc->rmem_alloc);
-        else
-                rx_count = atomic_read(&asoc->base.sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
+        if (asoc->rwnd_over) {
+                if (asoc->rwnd_over >= len) {
+                        asoc->rwnd_over -= len;
+                } else {
+                        asoc->rwnd += (len - asoc->rwnd_over);
+                        asoc->rwnd_over = 0;
+                }
+        } else {
+                asoc->rwnd += len;
+        }
 
-        if ((asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) > 0)
-                asoc->rwnd = (asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) >> 1;
-        else
-                asoc->rwnd = 0;
+        /* If we had window pressure, start recovering it
+         * once our rwnd had reached the accumulated pressure
+         * threshold.  The idea is to recover slowly, but up
+         * to the initial advertised window.
+         */
+        if (asoc->rwnd_press && asoc->rwnd >= asoc->rwnd_press) {
+                int change = min(asoc->pathmtu, asoc->rwnd_press);
+                asoc->rwnd += change;
+                asoc->rwnd_press -= change;
+        }
 
-        pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p rwnd=%u, rx_count=%d, sk_rcvbuf=%d\n",
-                 __func__, asoc, asoc->rwnd, rx_count,
-                 asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf);
+        pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p rwnd increased by %d to (%u, %u) - %u\n",
+                 __func__, asoc, len, asoc->rwnd, asoc->rwnd_over,
+                 asoc->a_rwnd);
 
         /* Send a window update SACK if the rwnd has increased by at least the
          * minimum of the association's PMTU and half of the receive buffer.
          * The algorithm used is similar to the one described in
          * Section 4.2.3.3 of RFC 1122.
          */
-        if (update_peer && sctp_peer_needs_update(asoc)) {
+        if (sctp_peer_needs_update(asoc)) {
                 asoc->a_rwnd = asoc->rwnd;
 
                 pr_debug("%s: sending window update SACK- asoc:%p rwnd:%u "
@@ -1445,6 +1454,45 @@ void sctp_assoc_rwnd_update(struct sctp_association *asoc, bool update_peer)
         }
 }
 
+/* Decrease asoc's rwnd by len. */
+void sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease(struct sctp_association *asoc, unsigned int len)
+{
+        int rx_count;
+        int over = 0;
+
+        if (unlikely(!asoc->rwnd || asoc->rwnd_over))
+                pr_debug("%s: association:%p has asoc->rwnd:%u, "
+                         "asoc->rwnd_over:%u!\n", __func__, asoc,
+                         asoc->rwnd, asoc->rwnd_over);
+
+        if (asoc->ep->rcvbuf_policy)
+                rx_count = atomic_read(&asoc->rmem_alloc);
+        else
+                rx_count = atomic_read(&asoc->base.sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
+
+        /* If we've reached or overflowed our receive buffer, announce
+         * a 0 rwnd if rwnd would still be positive.  Store the
+         * the potential pressure overflow so that the window can be restored
+         * back to original value.
+         */
+        if (rx_count >= asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf)
+                over = 1;
+
+        if (asoc->rwnd >= len) {
+                asoc->rwnd -= len;
+                if (over) {
+                        asoc->rwnd_press += asoc->rwnd;
+                        asoc->rwnd = 0;
+                }
+        } else {
+                asoc->rwnd_over = len - asoc->rwnd;
+                asoc->rwnd = 0;
+        }
+
+        pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p rwnd decreased by %d to (%u, %u, %u)\n",
+                 __func__, asoc, len, asoc->rwnd, asoc->rwnd_over,
+                 asoc->rwnd_press);
+}
 
 /* Build the bind address list for the association based on info from the
  * local endpoint and the remote peer.
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 683c7d1b1306..0e8529113dc5 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -386,14 +386,13 @@ nomem:
  */
 int sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
         struct sctp_auth_bytes  *secret;
         struct sctp_shared_key *ep_key;
 
         /* If we don't support AUTH, or peer is not capable
          * we don't need to do anything.
          */
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+        if (!asoc->ep->auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
                 return 0;
 
         /* If the key_id is non-zero and we couldn't find an
@@ -440,16 +439,16 @@ struct sctp_shared_key *sctp_auth_get_shkey(
  */
 int sctp_auth_init_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(ep->base.sk);
         struct crypto_hash *tfm = NULL;
         __u16   id;
 
-        /* if the transforms are already allocted, we are done */
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) {
+        /* If AUTH extension is disabled, we are done */
+        if (!ep->auth_enable) {
                 ep->auth_hmacs = NULL;
                 return 0;
         }
 
+        /* If the transforms are already allocated, we are done */
         if (ep->auth_hmacs)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -665,12 +664,10 @@ static int __sctp_auth_cid(sctp_cid_t chunk, struct sctp_chunks_param *param)
 /* Check if peer requested that this chunk is authenticated */
 int sctp_auth_send_cid(sctp_cid_t chunk, const struct sctp_association *asoc)
 {
-        struct net  *net;
         if (!asoc)
                 return 0;
 
-        net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+        if (!asoc->ep->auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
                 return 0;
 
         return __sctp_auth_cid(chunk, asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
@@ -679,12 +676,10 @@ int sctp_auth_send_cid(sctp_cid_t chunk, const struct sctp_association *asoc)
 /* Check if we requested that peer authenticate this chunk. */
 int sctp_auth_recv_cid(sctp_cid_t chunk, const struct sctp_association *asoc)
 {
-        struct net *net;
         if (!asoc)
                 return 0;
 
-        net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!asoc->ep->auth_enable)
                 return 0;
 
         return __sctp_auth_cid(chunk,
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 8e5fdea05216..3d9f429858dc 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
         if (!ep->digest)
                 return NULL;
 
-        if (net->sctp.auth_enable) {
+        ep->auth_enable = net->sctp.auth_enable;
+        if (ep->auth_enable) {
                 /* Allocate space for HMACS and CHUNKS authentication
                  * variables.  There are arrays that we encode directly
                  * into parameters to make the rest of the operations easier.
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index 4e1d0fcb028e..44cbb54c8574 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -491,8 +491,13 @@ static void sctp_v4_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
                         continue;
                 if ((laddr->state == SCTP_ADDR_SRC) &&
                     (AF_INET == laddr->a.sa.sa_family)) {
-                        fl4->saddr = laddr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
                         fl4->fl4_sport = laddr->a.v4.sin_port;
+                        flowi4_update_output(fl4,
+                                             asoc->base.sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
+                                             RT_CONN_FLAGS(asoc->base.sk),
+                                             daddr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
+                                             laddr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
+
                         rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), fl4);
                         if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
                                 dst = &rt->dst;
@@ -957,7 +962,7 @@ static inline int sctp_v4_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
         SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(&inet->sk), SCTP_MIB_OUTSCTPPACKS);
 
-        return ip_queue_xmit(skb, &transport->fl);
+        return ip_queue_xmit(&inet->sk, skb, &transport->fl);
 }
 
 static struct sctp_af sctp_af_inet;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 3a1767ef3201..fee5552ddf92 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                              gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len)
 {
         struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
         sctp_inithdr_t init;
         union sctp_params addrs;
         size_t chunksize;
@@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
         chunksize += vparam_len;
 
         /* Account for AUTH related parameters */
-        if (net->sctp.auth_enable) {
+        if (ep->auth_enable) {
                 /* Add random parameter length*/
                 chunksize += sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random);
 
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
         }
 
         /* Add SCTP-AUTH chunks to the parameter list */
-        if (net->sctp.auth_enable) {
+        if (ep->auth_enable) {
                 sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random),
                                  asoc->c.auth_random);
                 if (auth_hmacs)
@@ -2010,7 +2011,7 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                         /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he
                          * supports AUTH.
                          */
-                        if (net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                        if (asoc->ep->auth_enable)
                                 asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
                         break;
                 case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
@@ -2102,6 +2103,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
  *      SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
  */
 static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
+                                        const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
                                         const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                         union sctp_params param,
                                         sctp_cid_t cid,
@@ -2152,7 +2154,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
                 goto fallthrough;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fallthrough;
 
                 /* SCTP-AUTH: Secion 6.1
@@ -2169,7 +2171,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
                 break;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fallthrough;
 
                 /* SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.2
@@ -2185,7 +2187,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
                 break;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fallthrough;
 
                 hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
@@ -2220,10 +2222,9 @@ fallthrough:
 }
 
 /* Verify the INIT packet before we process it.  */
-int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-                     sctp_cid_t cid,
-                     sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init,
-                     struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+                     const struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid,
+                     sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
                      struct sctp_chunk **errp)
 {
         union sctp_params param;
@@ -2264,8 +2265,8 @@ int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 
         /* Verify all the variable length parameters */
         sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
-
-                result = sctp_verify_param(net, asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp);
+                result = sctp_verify_param(net, ep, asoc, param, cid,
+                                           chunk, errp);
                 switch (result) {
                 case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT:
                 case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
@@ -2497,6 +2498,7 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
         struct sctp_af *af;
         union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
         struct sctp_transport *t;
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
 
         /* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
          * time.  This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
@@ -2636,7 +2638,7 @@ do_addr_param:
                 goto fall_through;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fall_through;
 
                 /* Save peer's random parameter */
@@ -2649,7 +2651,7 @@ do_addr_param:
                 break;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fall_through;
 
                 /* Save peer's HMAC list */
@@ -2665,7 +2667,7 @@ do_addr_param:
                 break;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
-                if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+                if (!ep->auth_enable)
                         goto fall_through;
 
                 asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
index 5d6883ff00c3..fef2acdf4a2e 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
@@ -496,11 +496,10 @@ static void sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike(sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands,
 
         /* If the transport error count is greater than the pf_retrans
          * threshold, and less than pathmaxrtx, and if the current state
-         * is not SCTP_UNCONFIRMED, then mark this transport as Partially
-         * Failed, see SCTP Quick Failover Draft, section 5.1
+         * is SCTP_ACTIVE, then mark this transport as Partially Failed,
+         * see SCTP Quick Failover Draft, section 5.1
          */
-        if ((transport->state != SCTP_PF) &&
-           (transport->state != SCTP_UNCONFIRMED) &&
+        if ((transport->state == SCTP_ACTIVE) &&
            (asoc->pf_retrans < transport->pathmaxrxt) &&
            (transport->error_count > asoc->pf_retrans)) {
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 01e002430c85..5170a1ff95a1 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
 
         /* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
         err_chunk = NULL;
-        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
+        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
                               (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
                               &err_chunk)) {
                 /* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
 
         /* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
         err_chunk = NULL;
-        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
+        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
                               (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
                               &err_chunk)) {
 
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
 
         /* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
         err_chunk = NULL;
-        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
+        if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
                               (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
                               &err_chunk)) {
                 /* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
@@ -6178,7 +6178,7 @@ static int sctp_eat_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
          * PMTU.  In cases, such as loopback, this might be a rather
          * large spill over.
          */
-        if ((!chunk->data_accepted) && (!asoc->rwnd ||
+        if ((!chunk->data_accepted) && (!asoc->rwnd || asoc->rwnd_over ||
             (datalen > asoc->rwnd + asoc->frag_point))) {
 
                 /* If this is the next TSN, consider reneging to make
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index e13519e9df80..fee06b99a4da 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -2115,6 +2115,12 @@ static int sctp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
                 sctp_skb_pull(skb, copied);
                 skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
 
+                /* When only partial message is copied to the user, increase
+                 * rwnd by that amount. If all the data in the skb is read,
+                 * rwnd is updated when the event is freed.
+                 */
+                if (!sctp_ulpevent_is_notification(event))
+                        sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase(event->asoc, copied);
                 goto out;
         } else if ((event->msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) ||
                    (event->msg_flags & MSG_EOR))
@@ -3315,10 +3321,10 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(struct sock *sk,
                                       char __user *optval,
                                       unsigned int optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authchunk val;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk))
@@ -3335,7 +3341,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(struct sock *sk,
         }
 
         /* add this chunk id to the endpoint */
-        return sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, val.sauth_chunk);
+        return sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid(ep, val.sauth_chunk);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3348,12 +3354,12 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk,
                                       char __user *optval,
                                       unsigned int optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_hmacalgo *hmacs;
         u32 idents;
         int err;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (optlen < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo))
@@ -3370,7 +3376,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk,
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        err = sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, hmacs);
+        err = sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(ep, hmacs);
 out:
         kfree(hmacs);
         return err;
@@ -3386,12 +3392,12 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
                                     char __user *optval,
                                     unsigned int optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
         int ret;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (optlen <= sizeof(struct sctp_authkey))
@@ -3412,7 +3418,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        ret = sctp_auth_set_key(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc, authkey);
+        ret = sctp_auth_set_key(ep, asoc, authkey);
 out:
         kzfree(authkey);
         return ret;
@@ -3428,11 +3434,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk,
                                       char __user *optval,
                                       unsigned int optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
@@ -3444,8 +3450,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk,
         if (!asoc && val.scact_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        return sctp_auth_set_active_key(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc,
-                                        val.scact_keynumber);
+        return sctp_auth_set_active_key(ep, asoc, val.scact_keynumber);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3457,11 +3462,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_del_key(struct sock *sk,
                                    char __user *optval,
                                    unsigned int optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
@@ -3473,8 +3478,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_del_key(struct sock *sk,
         if (!asoc && val.scact_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        return sctp_auth_del_key_id(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc,
-                                    val.scact_keynumber);
+        return sctp_auth_del_key_id(ep, asoc, val.scact_keynumber);
 
 }
 
@@ -5381,16 +5385,16 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_maxburst(struct sock *sk, int len,
 static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
                                     char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_hmacalgo  __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
         struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
         __u16 data_len = 0;
         u32 num_idents;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
-        hmacs = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_hmacs_list;
+        hmacs = ep->auth_hmacs_list;
         data_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
 
         if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len)
@@ -5411,11 +5415,11 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
 static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
                                     char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
@@ -5430,7 +5434,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
         if (asoc)
                 val.scact_keynumber = asoc->active_key_id;
         else
-                val.scact_keynumber = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->active_key_id;
+                val.scact_keynumber = ep->active_key_id;
 
         len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
         if (put_user(len, optlen))
@@ -5444,7 +5448,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
 static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
                                     char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authchunks __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
         struct sctp_authchunks val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
@@ -5452,7 +5456,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         u32    num_chunks = 0;
         char __user *to;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
@@ -5489,7 +5493,7 @@ num:
 static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
                                     char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
-        struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+        struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
         struct sctp_authchunks __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
         struct sctp_authchunks val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
@@ -5497,7 +5501,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         u32    num_chunks = 0;
         char __user *to;
 
-        if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
+        if (!ep->auth_enable)
                 return -EACCES;
 
         if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
@@ -5514,7 +5518,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         if (asoc)
                 ch = (struct sctp_chunks_param *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
         else
-                ch = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_chunk_list;
+                ch = ep->auth_chunk_list;
 
         if (!ch)
                 goto num;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
index 35c8923b5554..c82fdc1eab7c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_rto_min(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
 static int proc_sctp_do_rto_max(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
                                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
                                 loff_t *ppos);
+static int proc_sctp_do_auth(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
+                             void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
+                             loff_t *ppos);
 
 static struct ctl_table sctp_table[] = {
         {
@@ -266,7 +269,7 @@ static struct ctl_table sctp_net_table[] = {
                 .data           = &init_net.sctp.auth_enable,
                 .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                 .mode           = 0644,
-                .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler   = proc_sctp_do_auth,
         },
         {
                 .procname       = "addr_scope_policy",
@@ -400,6 +403,37 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_rto_max(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
         return ret;
 }
 
+static int proc_sctp_do_auth(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
+                             void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
+                             loff_t *ppos)
+{
+        struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
+        struct ctl_table tbl;
+        int new_value, ret;
+
+        memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
+        tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
+
+        if (write)
+                tbl.data = &new_value;
+        else
+                tbl.data = &net->sctp.auth_enable;
+
+        ret = proc_dointvec(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+        if (write) {
+                struct sock *sk = net->sctp.ctl_sock;
+
+                net->sctp.auth_enable = new_value;
+                /* Update the value in the control socket */
+                lock_sock(sk);
+                sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_enable = new_value;
+                release_sock(sk);
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
 int sctp_sysctl_net_register(struct net *net)
 {
         struct ctl_table *table = sctp_net_table;
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index 8d198ae03606..85c64658bd0b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ static void sctp_ulpevent_receive_data(struct sctp_ulpevent *event,
         skb = sctp_event2skb(event);
         /* Set the owner and charge rwnd for bytes received.  */
         sctp_ulpevent_set_owner(event, asoc);
-        sctp_assoc_rwnd_update(asoc, false);
+        sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease(asoc, skb_headlen(skb));
 
         if (!skb->data_len)
                 return;
@@ -1011,7 +1011,6 @@ static void sctp_ulpevent_release_data(struct sctp_ulpevent *event)
 {
         struct sk_buff *skb, *frag;
         unsigned int    len;
-        struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
         /* Current stack structures assume that the rcv buffer is
          * per socket.   For UDP style sockets this is not true as
@@ -1036,11 +1035,8 @@ static void sctp_ulpevent_release_data(struct sctp_ulpevent *event)
         }
 
 done:
-        asoc = event->asoc;
-        sctp_association_hold(asoc);
+        sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase(event->asoc, len);
         sctp_ulpevent_release_owner(event);
-        sctp_assoc_rwnd_update(asoc, true);
-        sctp_association_put(asoc);
 }
 
 static void sctp_ulpevent_release_frag_data(struct sctp_ulpevent *event)